expectandum. Quoque saepius prophetiis ejus eventus respondissent, eo certius constabat non casui haec, sed vero certis causis esse tribuenda. Cum vero duorum essent generum prophetiae, aliae clarae facilesque intellectu, in quibus nulla esse posset de vero prophetae sensu dubitatio; aliae rursus pro usitato prophetiarum idiomate, symbolis aenigmatibusque involutae, ut aegre intelligi posset quaenam prophetae esset aut numinis sententia: ex priorum veritate de posterioribus erat solidissime judicandum. Si omnes obscurae essent, ut in oraculis Apollinis Loxiae, nostrorumque hodiernorum enthusiastarum deliriis; nulla jam erant intrinseca credibilitatis argumenta, ut nisi forte eum locum extrinseca supplessent, quantumvis verae essent: at nullum certe habebant veritatis, quo a falsis internoscerentur, characterem, nec alios proinde, ut vera crederentur, obligabant. Sin aliquae perspicuae; jam facile judicium erat, de reliquis quid esset statuendum. Si eventus vel unius perspicuae prophetiae non respondisset; plane sequebatur nec reliquis esse fidendum, quin potius illas vel naturali enthusiasmo, vel alteri, potius diabolico spiritui quam divino esse tribuendas. Ita Maximillae prophetias re⟨f⟩ellit Asterius Urbanus (Ap. Euseb., Hist. eccl., V, 16). Praedixerat illa imminere πολέμους et ἀκαταστασίας, cum tamen post annum tertium decimum jam elapsum, nec particulare bellum aut universale in terris fuisset, christianis etiam pax firma stabilisque permansisset. Inde concludit fidem ei omnem esse derogandam. Quod si evenissent quae praedicta sunt, pro talium eventuum frequentia prophetae fides magis erat minusve stabilita. Omnino solidissima erat hujusmodi argumentatio, nec video quid in ea reprehendere possint, nedum ridere, scurrae athei; nec quid simile obtendere possint pro suis, quas hodie venditant prophetiis, heri nudiustertiusque nati fanatici, sive eorum qui communi protestantium vocabulo censentur, sive etiam eorum quos mysticos appellant theologos pontificii. Neutri argumentis extrinsecis utuntur, sive miraculis, coram et in propatulo, inque infidelium facie editis, sive aliorum, a nobis etiam agnitorum prophetarum testimoniis. Neutri testimoniis intrinsecis, sive cordium infidelium patefactis occultis, sive futurorum contingentium praedictione, jam diu ante eventum manifesta, publicamque in lucem edita.
to be expected. And the more often the outcomes had answered to his prophecies, the more certainly it was established that these things were to be attributed not to chance but in fact to definite causes. But since prophecies were of two kinds, some clear and easy to understand, in which there could be no doubt about the true sense of the prophet, others again, according to the customary idiom of prophecies, wrapped in symbols and riddles, so that it could hardly be understood what the meaning of the prophet or of the deity was: from the truth of the former, judgement was to be made most soundly about the latter. If all had been obscure, as in the oracles of Apollo Loxias and in the ravings of our present-day enthusiasts, there were then no intrinsic arguments for credibility, so that, unless perhaps extrinsic ones had filled that place, however true they might be, they certainly had no mark of truth by which they might be distinguished from false ones, and so they did not oblige others to believe them true. But if some were clear, then it was an easy judgement what was to be decided about the rest. If the outcome of even one clear prophecy had not answered to it, it plainly followed that the rest were not to be trusted either, but rather that they were to be attributed either to natural enthusiasm or to another spirit, a diabolical rather than a divine one. Thus Asterius Urbanus refutes the prophecies of Maximilla (in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.16). She had foretold that wars and disturbances were imminent, whereas, when the thirteenth year had already passed, there had been neither a particular nor a universal war on earth, and for the Christians too peace had remained firm and stable. From this he concludes that all credit is to be withdrawn from her. But if the things foretold had come to pass, the prophet's credit was more or less established according to the frequency of such outcomes. This kind of argument was altogether most sound, and I do not see what atheist scoffers could find fault with in it, still less laugh at; nor what similar thing the fanatics born yesterday and the day before could put forward on behalf of their own prophecies, which they peddle today, whether of those who are counted under the common name of Protestants, or also of those whom the papists call mystical theologians. Neither party uses extrinsic arguments, whether miracles performed openly and in public and before the face of unbelievers, or the testimonies of other prophets also acknowledged by us. Neither uses intrinsic testimonies, whether the secrets of the hearts of unbelievers laid bare, or the prediction of future contingents, made manifest long before the event and published in the open light.
§ 34. — Monendi sunt interim lectores non esse tamen quod prophetarum omnia prophetico sint spiritui tribuenda. Ne hoc quidem Judaei de suis, nec de Pythiis Graeci, nec de prophetis suis gentiles alii, Phoenices atque Aegyptii, nec qui prophetas agnoverunt, ullos docuisse arbitror. Elisaeum latuit Sunamitidis infortunium. Humano etiam spiritu edidit nonnulla sanctissimus Apostolus. Non est igitur prophetae fides in dubium vocanda, si qua illi humanitus dicta exciderint, hoc est, in iis quae nec ipse Spiritui Dei, sed suo potius, tribuit. Ut si Apostolus in iis quae se, non Dominum
§ 34. — Readers are meanwhile to be reminded, however, that it is not the case that all things of the prophets are to be attributed to the prophetic spirit. Not even the Jews about their own, nor the Greeks about the Pythias, nor other gentiles, Phoenicians and Egyptians, about their prophets, nor any who acknowledged prophets, taught this, I think. The misfortune of the Shunammite woman was hidden from Elisha. The most holy Apostle too uttered some things by a human spirit. The credit of a prophet, therefore, is not to be called into doubt if some things spoken in a human way have escaped him, that is, in those things which he himself attributed not to the Spirit of God but rather to his own. As if the Apostle, in those things in which he, not the Lord,