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PL 6 · cols. 347–446

L. Caecilius Firmianus Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum liber tertius, De falsa sapientia philosophorum

Editors' preface

PL 6:347
LIBER TERTIUS.
BOOK III.
DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPHORUM.
ON THE FALSE WISDOM OF THE PHILOSOPHERS.
CAPUT PRIMUM.
CHAPTER I.
Veritatis collatio cum eloquentia; cur eam non sunt assecuti philosophi: de stylo simplici Scripturarum.
A comparison of truth with eloquence; why the philosophers did not attain it: on the simple style of the Scriptures.
Vellem mihi, quando veritas in obscuro latere adhuc existimatur, vel errore atque imperitia vulgi, variis et ineptis superstitionibus servientis, vel philosophis pravitate ingeniorum turbantibus eam potius quam illustrantibus, etsi non qualis in Marco Tullio fuit, quia praecipua et admirabilis fuit, aliquam tamen proximam eloquentiae contingere facultatem; ut
I could wish for myself, since truth is still thought to lie hidden in obscurity, whether through the error and ignorance of the common people, enslaved to various and foolish superstitions, or through the philosophers, who by the perversity of their minds confuse it rather than illuminate it, to attain, if not such a faculty of eloquence as was in Marcus Tullius, since it was pre-eminent and admirable, yet at least one close to it; so that
Editors' notes and page, col. 347

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; each note is keyed by its lemma. --> [1] ‹lemma: Philosophorum (book title)› · col 347 Philosophorum. Hanc vocem addidi ex mss. 1 Regio, Rostochiensi et Marm. necnon ex ipsomet Lactantio, lib. III, cap. 1 et 30.

Of the philosophers. I have added this word from the manuscripts — 1 Regius, the Rostock and Marm. — and also from Lactantius himself, book III, chapters 1 and 30.

[2] ‹lemma: Vellem mihi› · col 347 Vellem mihi. Ms. Reg. vetust. n. 3736 [numeral unclear in scan], addit, Constantine Imperator. Plures mss. habent quoniam, pro quando. Vellem mihi, etc. id est, Nisi veritas per se ipsa valeret, vellem eloquentiam, si non eamdem, ac Marcus Tullius, saltem proximam habere, ut vires veritatis exererem.

I could wish for myself. The old Regius manuscript no. 3736 adds O Emperor Constantine. Several manuscripts have quoniam (since) for quando (when). I could wish for myself, etc.: that is, If truth did not prevail by itself, I could wish to have an eloquence, if not the same as Marcus Tullius had, at least close to it, so as to put forth the strength of the truth.

[3] ‹lemma: Philosophis (chapter title)› · col 348 Philosophis. De his hocce libro tertio agitur.

Philosophers. It is of these that this third book treats.

[4] ‹lemma: Quia praecipua› · col 348 Quia praecipua. Ita editi, cum omnibus mss. praeter 1 Clarom., in quo est quae; et sic legere amabat Francius.

Because pre-eminent. So the editions, with all the manuscripts except 1 Claromontanus, in which is quae (which); and so Francius liked to read.

[5] ‹lemma: Veritas vi sua propria valet› · col 348 Veritas vi sua propria valet. Ne credas Lactantii institutum esse, ut eloquentiam, quam unam Cicero de summis virtutibus esse dicit, damnare velit, quam agnoscit donum esse Dei: sed discernit inter veram eloquentiam (quae fucos et lenocinia nescit), ac inter (continues)

Truth prevails by its own strength. Do not think it Lactantius's purpose to condemn eloquence — which Cicero calls one of the highest virtues, and which he acknowledges to be a gift of God: rather he distinguishes between true eloquence (which knows nothing of paint and allurements) and (continues)

(printed under page 177)

Page

  • running head: 347 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A interna et propria scientia; B regnum, virtus, sed immortalitas; C ograe, de migratione animarum; D fuit, quia praecipua
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: editors' matter: the argument of Book III continued from the previous column (first words "interna et propria scientia") and its second paragraph "Parte secunda" stand above the band; they belong to the previous unit and were cut on receipt (not set here). "Pytha-/ograe" is printed across a line break (Pythaograe). The italic chapter summary "Veritatis collatio cum eloquentia" is set as printed. Full-width lines not set: "LIBER TERTIUS" and "DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PH[ILOSOPHORUM]" with its ornament, printed across both columns between the argument and CAPUT PRIMUM. The VARIORUM NOTAE at the page foot (Philosophorum; Vellem mihi) are left for the later pass.
  • other: a full-width band stands across cols 347/348 in mid-page: the 3 paragraph(s) above it in col 348 are set here, after the 2 above it in col 347 (reading order, moved on receipt); the band itself (its title lines) is not set by the volunteer page: set it here, at the move, with full_width
  • other: the column opens with the end of the previous work (another unit); not set here: the unit begins at CAPUT PRIMUM.
  • running head: 347 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 348
  • marginal letters: A ‹interna et propria scientia› (editors' argument); B ‹regnum, virtus, sed immortalitas› (editors' argument); C ‹ogræ, de migratione animarum› (editors' argument); D ‹fuit, quia præcipua et admirabilis›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the upper part of the page (cols 347-348, above the rule) is editors' prose: the end of the argument (synopsis) of Book III, "interna et propria scientia ... ut Deum cognoscat et colat." Not set. The Variorum notae at the page foot are not set.
PL 6:348
quantum veritas vi sua propria valet, tantum ingenii quoque viribus nixa, exereret se aliquando, et discussis convictisque tam publicis, quam eorum, qui sapientes putantur erroribus, humano generi clarissimum lumen inferret. Quod quidem duabus ex causis fieri vellem: vel quod magis possent credere homines ornatae veritati, qui etiam mendacio credunt, capti orationis ornatu, lenocinioque verborum; vel certe, ut ipsi philosophi suis armis potissimum, quibus placere sibi et confidere solent, opprimerentur a nobis.
as much as truth avails by its own proper force, so much, relying also on the strength of talent, it might at length put itself forth, and, the errors both of the public and of those who are thought wise having been dispelled and refuted, bring to the human race a most brilliant light. This indeed I should wish to happen for two reasons: either because men, who believe even a lie when captivated by the adornment of speech and the allurement of words, might more readily believe truth adorned; or certainly, that the philosophers themselves might be overwhelmed by us chiefly with their own weapons, in which they are accustomed to take pleasure and to trust.
Editors' notes and page, col. 348

Page

  • running head: CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. (cut at left edge; presumably LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT.)
  • marginal letters: A corpora, de mortis bono; B luerunt (Cap. 24); C est, ut Deum cognoscat; D bus placere sibi et confidere
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: editors' matter set: continuation of the Argumentum of Book III (corpora, de mortis bono...), through Sequitur conclusio libri; full-width lines not set, standing between the Argumentum and the text, cut at the left edge: book title (...R TERTIUS., i.e. LIBER TERTIUS.) and subtitle (...ENTIA PHILOSOPHORUM., i.e. DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPHORUM.) with an ornament; text begins mid-sentence (quantum veritas), continuing Chapter I from column 347; VARIORUM NOTAE at page foot left for later pass; "essequam" printed without space, set as esse quam; "lis" read as iis; "inoplnatus" read as inopinatus (damaged i)
  • other: the 3 paragraph(s) of this column above the full-width band are set under col 347 (reading order, moved on receipt)
  • running head: 347 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 348
  • marginal letters: A ‹corpora, de mortis bono› (editors' argument); B ‹luerunt (Cap. 24)› (editors' argument); C ‹est, ut Deum cognoscat› (editors' argument); D ‹bus placere sibi et confidere›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the upper part of the page above the rule is editors' prose (argument of Book III), not set; the Variorum notae at the foot are not set.
PL 6:349
Sed quoniam Deus hanc voluit rei esse naturam, ut simplex et nuda veritas esset luculentior, quia satis ornata per se est, ideoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur, mendacium vero specie placeret aliena, quia per se corruptum vanescit ac diffluit, nisi ornatu aliunde quaesito circumlitum fuerit ac politum: aequo animo fero, ingenium mihi mediocre fuisse concessum. Verum ego non eloquentiae, sed veritatis fiducia suscepi hoc opus, fortasse majus quam ut possit meis viribus sustineri: quod tamen, etiamsi ego defecerim, Deo (cujus est hoc munus) adjuvante, veritas ipsa complebit. Etenim cum sciam maximos quoque oratores a causidicis mediocribus saepe victos, quod tanta est potentia veritatis, ut seipsam, quamvis in rebus exiguis, sua claritate defendat: cur hanc ego in maxima causa, ab ingeniosis quidem illis ac disertis viris, sed tamen falsa dicentibus, oppressum iri putem? ac non illa, si minus oratione nostra, quae de tenui fonte admodum exilis emanat, lumine tamen suo clara et illustris appareat? Nec si philosophi doctrina litterarum mirabiles extiterunt, ego etiam illis scientiam veri cognitionemque concesserim, quam nemo cogitando, aut disputando assequi potest. Neque ego nunc reprehendo
But since God willed the nature of the matter to be such that simple and bare truth should be the more luminous, because it is adorned enough by itself, and is therefore corrupted when painted over with ornaments added from outside, while falsehood should please by a borrowed beauty, because, being corrupt in itself, it vanishes and melts away unless it has been smeared over and polished with ornament sought from elsewhere: I bear with equanimity that only a mediocre talent has been granted to me. But I have undertaken this work in reliance not on eloquence but on truth, a work perhaps greater than can be sustained by my strength; yet even if I should fail, truth itself, with God helping (Whose gift this is), will complete it. For since I know that even the greatest orators have often been defeated by mediocre pleaders, because so great is the power of truth that it defends itself by its own clearness, even in trifling matters: why should I think that truth, in the greatest of causes, will be overwhelmed by men who are indeed talented and eloquent, but who nevertheless speak falsehoods? And why should it not, even if less so through our speech, which flows very thinly from a slender spring, yet appear clear and illustrious by its own light? Nor, if the philosophers stood out as admirable for their learning in letters, would I therefore grant them also the knowledge and understanding of the true, which no one can attain by thinking or by disputing. Nor do I now blame
Editors' notes and page, col. 349

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 349 eam quae est justitiae adulatrix; ut in Gorgia Plato, et Quintilianus lib. II, cap. 16, ut prudenter, ita vere docuerunt. BETULEIUS.

(continued) that which is the flatterer of justice; as Plato in the Gorgias, and Quintilian book II, chapter 16, have taught as truly as wisely. BETULEIUS.

[2] ‹lemma: Ut simplex, etc.› · col 349 Ut simplex, etc. Hinc gentiles occasionem ridendi S. Scripturam sumpsere, et non solum S. Scripturam, verum et christianorum scripta, tanquam minus ornata et simplicia spernebant. Arnob. lib. I: Barbarismis et soloecismis obsitae, inquit, sunt res vestrae. Item Isidorus Pelusiota, lib. IV, epist. 27. HERALD. — De ratione simplici veritatis enucleandae, vide Platonem in Cratylo. — Simplex et nuda veritas, etc. Minuc. Fel., cap. 16: Quo imperitior sermo, hoc illustrior ratio est: quoniam non fucatur pompa facundiae et gratiae, sed ut est, recti regula sustinetur. Cyprian, l. II, ep. 2, ad Donatum: Cum de Domino et de Deo vox est, vocis pura sinceritas non eloquentiae viribus nititur ad fidei argumenta, sed rebus. Denique accipe non diserta, sed fortia, nec..... culto sermone fucata, sed... rudi veritate simplicia. Adde aurea verba Origenis contra Celsum l. III, ed. Cantab., pag. 135. Egregie Euripides in Phoeniss., vers 472, seqq. BONEMAN.

That simple, etc. From this the Gentiles took occasion to mock Holy Scripture, and they despised not only Holy Scripture but also the writings of Christians as less ornate and plain. Arnobius book I: Your affairs, he says, are overgrown with barbarisms and solecisms. So too Isidore of Pelusium, book IV, letter 27. HERALD. — On the plain manner of setting out the truth, see Plato in the Cratylus. — Simple and naked truth, etc. Minucius Felix, chapter 16: The less skilled the speech, the clearer the reasoning: for it is not painted with the pomp of eloquence and charm, but is upheld, just as it is, by the rule of right. Cyprian, book II, letter 2, to Donatus: When the voice speaks of the Lord and of God, the pure sincerity of the voice relies, for the proofs of faith, not on the strength of eloquence but on facts. In short, receive things not eloquent but strong, not..... painted with polished speech, but... plain with unpolished truth. Add the golden words of Origen against Celsus, book III, Cambridge edition, page 135. Excellently Euripides in the Phoenissae, verse 472 and following. BONEMAN.

[3] ‹lemma: Placeret› · col 349 Placeret. Restitui ex mss. 1 Bonon. antiq., 2 Reg. Lips., Pal., 1 Colb. et 1 Brun., quod praecedentia exigunt, ut simplex et nuda veritas esset luculentior... mendacium vero specie placeret aliena. Alter Brun. habet placere, mendose; mss. 14 cum ed., placet.

Should please. I have restored this from the manuscripts — 1 old Bononiensis, 2 Regii, Lipsiensis, Palatinus, 1 Colbertinus and 1 Brunsvicensis — because what precedes requires it: that simple and naked truth should be the more brilliant... but falsehood should please by a borrowed appearance. The other Brunsvicensis has placere, wrongly; 14 manuscripts with the editions, placet (pleases).

[4] ‹lemma: Vanescit› · col 349 Vanescit. Mss 5 rec. inanescit.

Vanishes. Five recent manuscripts: inanescit (becomes empty).

[5] ‹lemma: Diffluit› · col 349 Diffluit. Sic reposui ex 24 mss. ac vulgatis Is. et Cellar. Defluit est in 8 rec. scriptis, et in omnibus fere impressis.

Flows away. So I have restored from 24 manuscripts and the editions of Isaeus and Cellarius. Defluit is in 8 recent manuscripts and in almost all printed editions.

[6] ‹lemma: Nisi ornatu aliunde quaesito circumlitum fuerit ac politum› · col 349 Nisi ornatu aliunde quaesito circumlitum fuerit ac politum. Haec a nonnullis novis editoribus neglecta restitui Lactantio ex omnibus prope vulgatis, et 48 mss. nisi quod, pro circumlitum, 1 Reg. habet circumventum; Christ, excultum.

Unless it has been smeared over and polished with ornament sought from elsewhere. These words, neglected by some recent editors, I have restored to Lactantius from almost all editions and 48 manuscripts, except that for circumlitum (smeared over) 1 Regius has circumventum (surrounded); Christ, excultum (refined).

[7] ‹lemma: Etiamsi ego defecerim› · col 349 Etiamsi ego defecerim. De Opif., cap. 20: Ego vero libentius sub hoc onere defecerim. Imitatur Quintilianum l. XII, prooem.: Licet major moles premat, tamen... constitutum est, vel deficere potius, quam desperare. BUN.

Even if I should fail. De opificio, chapter 20: But I would more gladly fail under this burden. He imitates Quintilian, book XII, preface: Although a greater weight presses, yet... it is resolved rather even to fail than to despair. BUN.

[8] ‹lemma: Maximos quoque› · col 349 Maximos quoque. Ita ferunt cuncti ferme editi, et antiquiores ac potiores mss. Vulgati tres et 18 rec. mss., maximos quosque.

The greatest also. So read nearly all the editions, and the older and better manuscripts. Three editions and 18 recent manuscripts: maximos quosque (all the greatest).

[9] ‹lemma: Potentia veritatis, ut seipsam... defendat› · col 350 Potentia veritatis, ut seipsam... defendat. Apparet Cicero, Orat. pro Coelio, cap. 26: O magna vis veritatis, quae contra hominum ingenia, calliditatem, solertiam; contraque fictas omnium insidias facile se per seipsam defendat. BUN.

The power of truth, so that it defends itself... Cicero shows through, speech for Caelius, chapter 26: O great force of truth, which against the talents, cunning and shrewdness of men, and against the contrived plots of all, easily defends itself by itself. BUN.

[10] ‹lemma: Cur hanc ego› · col 350 Cur hanc ego. Sic emendavi ex optimis et antiquissimis mss. ac omnibus pene editis. Scripti sex et 3 rec. impressi ferunt, cur hanc ergo.

Why I this. So I have corrected from the best and oldest manuscripts and almost all editions. Six manuscripts and 3 recent printed editions read cur hanc ergo (why then this).

[11] ‹lemma: Neque ego› · col 350 Neque ego. Mss. 15 rec. et plerique vulgati, neque enim.

Nor I. Fifteen recent manuscripts and most editions: neque enim (for neither).

[12] ‹lemma: Naturam hominis Deus veri adipiscendi cupientissimam fecit› · col 350 Naturam hominis Deus veri adipiscendi cupientissimam fecit. Rectius Deo tribuit, quam Cicero natura, l. II Fin. 14: Natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi. BUN.

God made man's nature most desirous of attaining the truth. He ascribes this more rightly to God than Cicero does to nature, De finibus book II, 14: Nature has implanted in man the desire of finding the truth. BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Induxerunt› · col 350 Induxerunt. Legitur Induerunt apud Buneman., qui in hunc locum exhibet notam sequentem. — Induerunt. Ausus sum contra omnes, quos vidi, libros, qui induxerunt habent, hic recipere induerunt; praecessit enim. ipsi se. Inducere alii alios possunt, induimus nos ipsi. Pari modo hic legendum censuit Davisius. ad Cic. II Divinat. cap. 17: Cur vos induitis in eas captiones? Idem censet Heumannus. Iterum Lact. l. VI, cap. 12: Prudens ac sciens in hos se laqueos induit.

Have led in. Induerunt (have entangled) is read in Bunemann, who gives on this place the following note. — Induerunt. Against all the books I have seen, which have induxerunt, I have dared to adopt induerunt here; for ipsi se (themselves) went before. Others can lead others in (inducere); we entangle ourselves (induimus nos ipsi). In the same way Davisius judged it should be read here, on Cicero, De divinatione II, chapter 17: Why do you entangle yourselves in these quibbles? Heumann judges the same. Again Lactantius, book VI, chapter 12: Knowingly and wittingly he entangles himself in these snares.

[14] ‹lemma: Ex sapientia› · col 350 Ex sapientia. Repete, falsa.

From wisdom. Supply again falsa (false).

[15] ‹lemma: Cogitationes philosophorum› · col 350 Cogitationes philosophorum. Ms. 1 Reg. cum edit. Rom. 1470, addit hominum; 1 alter Reg. cum 8 editis, omnium: quae vox saltem est subaudienda, ut conjicitur ex Lactantii loco infra posito, cap. 16: Abjicienda est omnis philosophia, Gentilium scilicet; Scriptura enim damnat non omnem, sed tantum vanam philosophiam, ut constat ex cap. II, vers. 8, ad Colossenses.

The thoughts of the philosophers. Manuscript 1 Regius, with the Rome edition of 1470, adds hominum (of men); another Regius with 8 editions, omnium (of all): a word which must at least be understood, as is inferred from the passage of Lactantius set below, chapter 16: All philosophy is to be cast away — that of the Gentiles, namely; for Scripture condemns not all philosophy but only vain philosophy, as is clear from Colossians chapter 2, verse 8.

[16] ‹lemma: Nec enim decebat aliter, ut› · col 350 Nec enim decebat aliter, ut. Vult omitti aliter Bunem. « Proscripsi, inquit, vocem hic ineptam aliter: ubi reliqui omnes, nec enim decebat aliter, ut. Delet quoque Heumannus: nam hic sensum turbat plane. Rescripsi ex omnibus Tornesianis ab an. 1548–1613: Nec enim decebat, ut, cum. Illud aliter priori loco motum postea commodius eaedem reddunt cum Betul. legendo, tanquam aliter fides ei non haberetur, quas sum secutus. »

For it was not fitting otherwise, that. Bunemann wants aliter (otherwise) omitted. « I have struck out, he says, the word aliter, unfitting here, where all the rest have nec enim decebat aliter, ut. Heumann also deletes it, for here it plainly disturbs the sense. I have written instead, from all the Tornaesius editions of 1548–1613: Nec enim decebat, ut, cum (for it was not fitting that, when). The same editions, which I have followed, afterwards more fittingly restore that aliter, moved from its earlier place, reading with Betuleius tanquam aliter fides ei non haberetur (as though otherwise it would not be believed). »

[17] ‹lemma: Pronuntiare. Verum ipse, ut Deus› · col 350 Pronuntiare. Verum ipse, ut Deus. Haec interpunctio est mss. 6 Reg., quorum duo antiquissimi sunt, 4 (continues)

To pronounce. But he himself, as God. This punctuation is that of 6 Regii manuscripts, of which two are very old, 4 (continues)

(printed under page 178)

Page

  • running head: 349 LIBER III: DE FALSA SAPIENTI (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A Sed quoniam Deus hanc voluit; B fendat : cur hanc ego in maxima causa; C ram, verum et christianorum scripta (in the notes); D mendacium vero specie placeret aliena. Alter Brun. (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: last word "re-" is split at the column break and is set as printed; a stray mark before "claritate" (printed "sua ,claritate") is ignored; the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE and the editors' notes below it (eam quae est justitiae adulatrix ... maximos quosque) are page-foot commentary and are left for the later pass
PL 6:350
eorum studium; qui veritatem scire voluerunt, quia naturam hominis Deus veri adipiscendi cupientissimam fecit: sed id arguo, id revinco, quod honestam illorum et optimam voluntatem non sit secutus effectus; quia neque quid esset verum ipsum sciebant, neque quomodo, aut ubi, aut qua mente quaerendum. Ita dum succurrere humanis erroribus cupiunt, ipsi se in plagas; et errores maximos induxerunt: Ad hoc igitur me opus coarguendi philosophiam, susceptae materiae ordo ipse deduxit.
the zeal of those who wished to know the truth, because God made the nature of man most desirous of attaining the truth; but this I charge, this I refute, that the result did not follow their honourable and excellent will; because they knew neither what the truth itself was, nor how, or where, or with what mind it was to be sought. Thus, while they desire to come to the aid of human errors, they themselves have led themselves into snares and into the greatest errors. To this task, then, of refuting philosophy, the very order of the subject undertaken has led me.
Nam cum error omnis, aut ex religione falsa oriatur, aut ex sapientia, in eo convincendo necesse est utrumque subvertere. Cum enim sit nobis divinis litteris traditum, cogitationes philosophorum stultas esse, id ipsum re et argumentis docendum est: ne quis honesto sapientiae nomine inductus, aut inanis eloquentiae splendore deceptus, humanis malit quam divinis credere; quae quidem tradita sunt breviter ac nude. Nec enim decebat aliter; ut cum Deus ad hominem loqueretur, argumentis assereret suas voces, tanquam fides ei non haberetur: sed; ut oportuit, est locutus, quasi rerum omnium maximus judex, cujus est non argumentari; sed pronuntiare. Verum ipse, ut Deus. Nos autem; cum ad res singulas
For since every error arises either from false religion or from wisdom, in refuting it one must overthrow both. For since it has been handed down to us in the divine writings that the thoughts of the philosophers are foolish, this very thing must be shown by fact and by arguments, lest anyone, led on by the honourable name of wisdom or deceived by the splendour of empty eloquence, should prefer to believe human things rather than divine; which indeed have been handed down briefly and plainly. Nor was it fitting otherwise, that when God was speaking to man He should support His words with arguments, as though credence were not given Him; but, as was proper, He spoke as the supreme judge of all things, whose part it is not to argue but to pronounce. But He [did so] as God. We, however, when for the individual matters
Editors' notes and page, col. 350

Page

  • running head: [cut off at left edge] ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 350
  • marginal letters: A ‹prehendo eorum studium›; B ‹quis honesto sapientiae›; C ‹Cur hanc ego (in the notes)›; D ‹Ex sapientia. Repete (in the notes)›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-word with the fragment "prehendo" (re-prehendo broken from column 349) and ends with "singu-" broken across the column break; the scan is speckled, so several marks read as semicolons (studium; plagas; sed; argumentari; autem;) and the colon before "Ad hoc" may be commas or a full stop and are UNSURE; the running head is cut off at the left edge; the heading VARIORUM NOTAE and the notes below it are the editors' commentary at the page foot, left for the later pass; margin D stands level with "Ex sapientia. Repete, falsa.", just above "Cogitationes philosophorum", UNSURE
PL 6:351
testimonia divinae vocis habeamus, profecto monstrabimus, quanto certioribus argumentis possint vera defendi, cum etiam falso sic defendantur, ut vera soleant videri. Quare non est, quod philosophis tantum honoris habeamus, aut eorum eloquentiam pertimescamus. Loqui enim bene potuerunt, ut homines eruditi, vere autem loqui, nullo modo, quia veritatem non didicerant ab eo, qui ejus potens esset. Nec sane magnum aliquid efficiemus, quod illos ignorantiae red⟨a⟩rguemus, quam ipsi saepissime confitentur in eo solo, quoniam his non creditur, in quo solo credi debuit; conabor ostendere, nunquam illos tam veridicos fuisse, quam cum sententiam de sua ignoratione dixerunt.
we have testimonies of the divine voice, we shall assuredly show by how much surer arguments true things can be defended, since things are defended even falsely in such a way that they commonly seem true. Therefore there is no reason why we should pay so much honour to the philosophers, or dread their eloquence. For they were able to speak well, as learned men, but to speak truly, in no way, because they had not learned the truth from Him who had power over it. Nor indeed shall we accomplish anything great in convicting them of ignorance, which they themselves very often confess in that one matter alone, since they are not believed in that alone in which they ought to have been believed; I shall try to show that they were never so truthful as when they pronounced their opinion about their own ignorance.
CAPUT II.
Chapter II.
De philosophia, et quam inanis fuerit ejus in exponenda veritate occupatio.
Of philosophy, and how empty its occupation has been in setting forth the truth.
Nunc quoniam duobus prioribus libris religionum falsitas demonstrata est, nec non origo ipsa totius erroris exposita: hujus libri munus est philosophiam quoque ostendere, quam inanis et falsa sit; ut, omni errore sublato, veritas patefacta clarescat. Ordiamur itaque a communi philosophiae nomine, ut ipso capite
Now since in the two former books the falsity of the religions has been demonstrated, and also the very origin of the whole error has been set forth, the task of this book is to show philosophy too, how empty and false it is; so that, all error having been removed, the truth, laid open, may shine forth. Let us begin, then, from the common name of philosophy, so that with the very head
Editors' notes and page, col. 351

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 351 Colb., Lips., Tornes., Betul., Em., Brun. ac vet. ed. 2, Rom. et Venet. 1490. In pluribus mss. nulla est ad haec verba interpunctio: quatuor ultima a ms. Mertoniensi absunt: unde ea esse glossema fere suspicor cum Walchio et Heumanno.

(continued) Colbertinus, Lipsiensis, Tornaesius, Betuleius, Em., Brunsvicensis and 2 old editions, Rome and Venice 1490. In most manuscripts there is no punctuation at these words; the last four are missing from the Merton manuscript, so that I rather suspect, with Walch and Heumann, that they are a gloss.

[2] ‹lemma: Monstrabimus› · col 351 Monstrabimus. Sic emendavi ex cunctis mss. codicibus, et editis Rom. 1470, Betul., et versione Gallica, an 1563.

We shall show. So I have corrected from all the manuscripts, and the editions of Rome 1470 and Betuleius, and the French translation of 1563.

[3] ‹lemma: Tantum honoris habeamus, aut› · col 351 Tantum honoris habeamus, aut. Bunem., ut. « Sic edo, inquit, ex Sublac., Rost., Ven., 1471, 72, utraque 78, 93, 97, Paris., Parrh., Junt., Ald., Crat., Gymn., et Heumannus sic legendum credit. Recte. Sic lego l. VII, c. 5: Si tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipsius causa mundum fabricaret. Ib., c. 4: Tantum illi honoris habuit, ut eum praeficeret universis. Recentiores sine ulla mss. mentione, nisi quod Cauci, aut... etiam eorum hic variant. Gryph., 1541, et hunc secuti Thomas. Isaeus, Gall., Cant., Spark., Cell., tantum honoris habeamus, aut eorum; Tornaes., 1548 et Betul. tantum honoris debeamus, aut; Tornes., 1587–1613, et Walch., tantum honorem habeamus, aut. Si ut pro aut legas, postrema lectio bona. Sic Cyprian., epist. ad Magnum, ed. Pamel., ep. 76. Nisi si justum... ut... tantus honor habeatur haereticis, ut non interrogentur, etc. »

Let us pay so much honour, or. Bunemann reads ut (that). « So I publish, he says, from the Subiaco, Rostock, Venice 1471, 72, both of 78, 93, 97, Paris, Parrhasius, Giunta, Aldine, Cratander and Gymnicus editions, and Heumann believes it should be read so. Rightly. So I read in book VII, chapter 5: If he paid man so much honour as to build the world for his sake. Ibid., chapter 4: He paid him so much honour as to set him over all things. The more recent editions, without any mention of manuscripts — except that Cauci's has aut... etiam eorum — vary here. Gryphius 1541, and following him Thomas, Isaeus, the French, Cambridge, Sparke and Cellarius editions: tantum honoris habeamus, aut eorum; Tornaesius 1548 and Betuleius: tantum honoris debeamus, aut; Tornaesius 1587–1613 and Walch: tantum honorem habeamus, aut. If you read ut for aut, the last reading is good. So Cyprian, letter to Magnus, Pamelius's edition, letter 76: Unless it be just... that... such honour be paid to heretics that they are not questioned, etc. »

[4] ‹lemma: Redarguemus› · col 351 Redarguemus. Ita omnes ferme mss. et multi impressi, 2 Reg., arguemus; 2 al. Reg., redarguimus; 5 edd., redarguamus. — Illos ignorantiae redarguemus. Idem quoque iterum dixit in Epit., cap. 29, eosque stultitiae redarguit. Ejus generis sunt l. III, c. 4, aliquem stultitiae convincere; ibidem sup. stultitiae accusare; Epit., c. 32, stultitiae condemnare. BUN.

We shall convict. So nearly all manuscripts and many printed editions; 2 Regii, arguemus (we shall accuse); 2 other Regii, redarguimus (we convict); 5 editions, redarguamus (let us convict). — We shall convict them of ignorance. He said the same again in the Epitome, chapter 29: and convicts them of folly. Of the same kind are book III, chapter 4, to convict someone of folly; ibidem above, to accuse of folly; Epitome, chapter 32, to condemn of folly. BUN.

[5] ‹lemma: Quoniam his non creditur› · col 351 Quoniam his non creditur. Haec verba absunt a mss. Oxoniensibus, Bold. et Cott. sed reperiuntur in aliis codicibus ac impressis, ac optimum sensum efficiunt. Haec porro lectio nostra multo distinctior editione Romana, quae sic habet: Nec sane magnum aliquid efficiemus, quod illos ignorantiae arguemus, quam saepissime confitentur. In eo solo, quoniam eis non creditur, in quo solo credi debuit; conabor ostendere, etc.

Since these are not believed. These words are missing from the Oxford manuscripts, Bodleian and Cottonian, but are found in other manuscripts and printed editions, and make excellent sense. This reading of ours is, moreover, much clearer than the Roman edition, which has: Nor shall we achieve anything great by accusing them of ignorance, which they very often confess. In that alone, since they are not believed, in which alone they ought to have been believed; I shall try to show, etc.

[6] ‹lemma: Sententiam› · col 351 Sententiam. Post hanc dictionem, ms. 1 Bon. antiq. et rec. edit. Thom., Thys., Gall. inserunt, in se.

Opinion. After this word manuscript 1 old Bononiensis and the recent editions of Thomas, Thysius and the French insert in se (in itself).

[7] ‹lemma: Prioribus› · col 352 Prioribus. Ita reposui ex manuscriptis, praeter 2 Reg. et editos, in quibus est superioribus, quae vox deest in uno Colbertino.

Earlier. So I have restored from the manuscripts, except 2 Regii and the editions, in which is superioribus (preceding); the word is missing in one Colbertinus.

[8] ‹lemma: Ad excidendum› · col 352 Ad excidendum. Sic restitui ex quamplurimis mss. editisque, Rom. 1470, Gymnic., Crat., Betul. Et sic legendum esse censebat doct. Francius. In 12, vulgatis et recentissimis 2 scriptis est ad excindendum; in septem ad incidendum.

For cutting out. So I have restored from very many manuscripts and editions — Rome 1470, Gymnicus, Cratander, Betuleius. And so the learned Francius judged it should be read. In 12 editions and the 2 most recent manuscripts is ad excindendum (for destroying); in seven, ad incidendum (for cutting into).

[9] ‹lemma: Disjecta et dissipata› · col 352 Disjecta et dissipata. Ex omnibus ferme mss. et excusis ita reposui. Tres impressi ferunt dissecta, nec male; tres scripti cum edit. Tornes. et Soubron. disjuncta.

Scattered and dispersed. So I have restored from nearly all manuscripts and printed editions. Three printed editions read dissecta (cut apart), not badly; three manuscripts with the Tornaesius and Soubron editions, disjuncta (disjoined).

[10] ‹lemma: Ipsique definiunt› · col 352 Ipsique definiunt. Vide Cic. II Officior. in principio.

And they themselves define. See Cicero, De officiis II, at the beginning.

[11] ‹lemma: Studiosos sapientiae› · col 352 Studiosos sapientiae, φιλοσόφους.

Lovers of wisdom: philosophers (philosophous).

[12] ‹lemma: Sapientes› · col 352 Sapientes, σοφούς.

Wise men: sophous.

[13] ‹lemma: Immo vero Pythagoras› · col 352 Immo vero Pythagoras. Videndi Augustinus lib. XIV de Trinitate, cap. 1, et lib. VIII, cap. 2, de Civitate Dei; et Cicero lib. V Tusculan. quaest. Deus ergo ipse summa sapientia: cultus autem Dei est sapientia hominis, de qua nunc loquimur. Nam sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Secundum hanc itaque sapientiam, quae Dei cultus est, ait sancta Scriptura (Sapient. VI, 26): Multitudo sapientium sanitas est orbis terrarum. Sed si de sapientia sapientium disputare est, imitandum est exemplum Pythagorae, qui cum ausus non fuisset se sapientem profiteri, philosophum potius, id est amatorem sapientiae, se esse respondit? A quo id nomen exortum, ita deinceps posteris placuit, ut quantalibet de rebus ad sapientiam pertinentibus doctrina quisque, vel sibi vel aliis videretur excellere, nonnisi philosophus vocaretur. Vide praeter S. Augustin. ubi supra; Ciceron., praefat. l. I Tuscul., et Laert. initio.

Nay rather Pythagoras. See Augustine, De Trinitate book XIV, chapter 1, and City of God book VIII, chapter 2; and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations book V. God himself, then, is the highest wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom of man, of which we now speak. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. According to this wisdom, then, which is the worship of God, Holy Scripture says (Wis. 6:26): The multitude of the wise is the health of the world. But if one is to dispute about the wisdom of the wise, must we not follow the example of Pythagoras, who, since he had not dared to profess himself wise, answered that he was rather a philosopher, that is, a lover of wisdom? The name having arisen from him, it so pleased posterity thereafter that anyone, however much he seemed to himself or to others to excel in learning about matters belonging to wisdom, was called nothing but a philosopher. See, besides St Augustine as above, Cicero, preface to Tusculans book I, and Laertius at the beginning.

[14] ‹lemma: Imperfectae rei perfectum› · col 352 Imperfectae rei perfectum. Laertius c. I. ex Heraclide Pontico refert Pythagorae verba: μηδένα εἶναι σοφὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἢ Θεόν. Seneca, ep. 89: Dicam inter sapientiam et philosophiam quid intersit: sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae; philosophia sapientiae amor est et affectatio. BUN.

The perfect of an imperfect thing. Laertius, chapter I, reports from Heraclides Ponticus the words of Pythagoras: no man is wise, but only God. Seneca, letter 89: I will say what difference there is between wisdom and philosophy: wisdom is the perfect good of the human mind; philosophy is the love of wisdom and the striving after it. BUN.

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destructo, facilior nobis aditus pateat ad excidendum omne corpus: si tamen potest corpus vocari, cujus partes ac membra discordent, nec ulla compage inter se cohaereant, sed quasi disjecta et dissipata, palpitare potius, quam vivere videantur. Philosophia est (ut nomen indicat, ipsique definiunt) studium sapientiae. Unde igitur probem magis philosophiam non esse sapientiam, quam ex ipsius nominis significatione? Qui enim sapientiae studet, utique nondum sapit, sed ut sapere possit studet. In caeteris artibus, studium quid efficiat, et quo tendat, apparet. Quas cum discendo aliquis assecutus est, jam non studiosus artificii, sed artifex nominatur. At enim verecundiae causa studiosos se sapientiae, non sapientes vocaverunt. Immo vero Pythagoras, qui hoc primos nomen invenit, cum paulo plus saperet, quam illi priores, qui se sapientes putaverunt, intellexit nullo humano studio posse ad sapientiam perveniri, et ideo non oportere, incomprehensae atque imperfectae rei perfectum nomen imponi. Itaque cum ab eo quaereretur, quemnam se profiteretur, respondit: philosophum, id est, quaesitorem sapientiae. Si ergo philosophia sapientiam quaerit, nec ipsa sapientia est; quia necesse est aliud esse, quod quaerit; aliud,
destroyed, an easier approach may lie open to us for cutting down the whole body: if indeed that can be called a body whose parts and members are at variance and hold together by no joining among themselves, but, as though scattered and dispersed, seem to quiver rather than to live. Philosophy is (as its name indicates, and as they themselves define it) the pursuit of wisdom. From what, then, could I better prove that philosophy is not wisdom than from the meaning of its very name? For he who pursues wisdom is certainly not yet wise, but pursues it so that he may be able to be wise. In the other arts it is evident what the pursuit accomplishes and to what it tends. When someone has attained these by learning, he is no longer called a student of the craft, but a craftsman. But, it is said, out of modesty they called themselves students of wisdom, not wise men. On the contrary, Pythagoras, who first devised this name, since he was a little wiser than those earlier men who thought themselves wise, understood that wisdom could be reached by no human pursuit, and that therefore a perfect name ought not to be imposed on a thing not grasped and imperfect. And so, when he was asked what he professed himself to be, he answered: a philosopher, that is, a seeker of wisdom. If, therefore, philosophy seeks wisdom, neither is it itself wisdom; because that which seeks must necessarily be one thing, and another,
Editors' notes and page, col. 352

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quod quaeritur: nec quaesitio ipsa recta est, quia nihil potest invenire.
that which is sought: nor is the seeking itself right, since it can find nothing.
Ego vero ne studiosos quidem sapientiae philosophos esse concesserim, quia illo studio ad sapientiam non pervenitur. Nam si facultas inveniendae veritatis huic studio subjaceret, et si esset id studium tamquam iter ad sapientiam, aliquando esset inventa. Cum vero tot temporibus, tot ingeniis in ejus inquisitione contritis non sit comprehensa, apparet nullam esse ibi sapientiam. Non ergo sapientiae student, qui philosophantur: sed ipsi studere se putant; quia illud quod quaerunt, ubi, aut quale sit nesciunt. Sive ergo sapientiae student, sive non student, sapientes non sunt; quia nunquam reperiri potest, quod aut non recte quaeritur, aut omnino non quaeritur. Videamus tamen id ipsum, possit ne hoc studio reperiri aliquid, an nihil.
But I would not grant that philosophers are even students of wisdom, since by that study one does not arrive at wisdom. For if the power of finding the truth lay within this study, and if that study were, as it were, a road to wisdom, it would at some time have been found. But since, after so many ages and so many minds have been worn out in the search for it, it has not been grasped, it is evident that there is no wisdom there. Therefore those who philosophize are not students of wisdom; rather, they think that they are studying it, since they do not know where that which they seek is, or what kind of thing it is. Whether, therefore, they study wisdom or do not study it, they are not wise; for that can never be found which is either not sought rightly or not sought at all. Let us nevertheless look at this very point: whether anything can be found by this study, or nothing.
Editors' notes and page, col. 353

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Opinatione› · col 353 Opinatione. Opinatio est opinio quae scientiae opponitur, et a recentioribus philosophis dicitur probabilitas. Ex Walchio.

By supposing. Supposition is opinion as opposed to knowledge, and is called probability by more recent philosophers. From Walch.

[2] ‹lemma: Scientia ab ingenio› · col 353 Scientia ab ingenio. Id est, ab animo. Nam infra cap. 6, dicit scientiam ab anima esse, ignorationem a corpore. Vide cap. 1 de ira Dei. Metaphysicum illud lumen divinitus in mentibus nostris accensum, alii sapientiam, alii scientiam (huc hic noster) appellant, cum scientia proprie sit rerum in natura mutabili perpetuarum et constantium: quod lumen est ab ipsa natura mentibus mortalium inditum; quod licet corporali caligine obnubiletur, plus tamen lucis in aliis, in aliis minus est, et ob id etiam plus in aliis, in aliis minus scientiae est. Quod quidem mirum non est, cum divinae sapientiae doctor Augustinus neget, cuiquam sanctorum coelestem sapientiam totam contigisse. Cujus asseverationis ipsum Paulum auctorem habet αὐθεντικώτατον. BETULEIUS.

Knowledge from the intellect. That is, from the mind. For below, in chapter 6, he says that knowledge is from the soul, ignorance from the body. See chapter 1 of De ira Dei. That metaphysical light kindled by God in our minds some call wisdom, others knowledge (to this our author inclines here), since knowledge properly is of things perpetual and constant within mutable nature: a light put into the minds of mortals by nature itself; and though it is clouded by bodily darkness, there is yet more light in some, less in others, and for that reason more knowledge in some, less in others. Nor is this surprising, since Augustine, teacher of divine wisdom, denies that the whole of heavenly wisdom has fallen to any of the saints. For this assertion he has Paul himself as his most authoritative warrant. BETULEIUS.

[3] ‹lemma: Idcirco enim oculos et aures› · col 353 Idcirco enim oculos et aures, etc. Socrates quidem in Theaeteto, in secunda definitione, τὴν ἐπιστήμην definit αἴσθησιν. Quomodo vero inter se differant, docet Aristot. in III de Anima, cap. 8. BETULEIUS.

For this reason eyes and ears, etc. Socrates, indeed, in the Theaetetus, in the second definition, defines knowledge as perception. How they differ from one another Aristotle teaches in De anima III, chapter 8. BETULEIUS.

[4] ‹lemma: Permanaret› · col 353 Permanaret. Sic restitui ex mss. 2 Bonon., Lips., Pal., Tax., ad hoc enim conspirant antiquiores et potiores mss. Regio-Put. qui habet, permaneret; Cauc., 3 Reg., Ultr., 1 Brun. permanet pro permanaret; 1 Colb., permearet. In rec. 5 al. Reg., 5 Colb., 2 Clarom. et in excusis est perveniret; in 1 Reg. et 1 Brun., perveniat. — Permanaret. Scite, ut Cicero, permanare ad animum, ad sensus, ad aures. In omnibus edd. perveniret, quod et ipsum elegans. BUN.

Should flow through. So I have restored from manuscripts 2 Bononienses, Lipsiensis, Palatinus, Tax.; for to this the older and better manuscripts agree — the Regio-Puteanus, which has permaneret (should remain); Cauci's, 3 Regii, the Utrecht and 1 Brunsvicensis have permanet for permanaret; 1 Colbertinus, permearet (should pass through). In 5 other recent Regii, 5 Colbertini, 2 Claromontani and in the printed editions is perveniret (should reach); in 1 Regius and 1 Brunsvicensis, perveniat. — Permanaret. Aptly, as Cicero says to flow through to the mind, to the senses, to the ears. In all editions perveniret, which is itself elegant too. BUN.

[5] ‹lemma: Sol utrumne› · col 353 Sol utrumne, etc. Lucretius de sideribus in Universum lib. V: Quidquid id est, nihilo fertur majore figura, / Quam nostris oculis, quod cernimus, esse videtur. Epicuri dogma hoc est. Vide super hac re Plutarchi verba ex philosophorum Placitis lib. II, cap. 11, ubi solem septies et vicies terra majorem dixit. Consentit Galenus, περὶ φιλοσοφ. Ἱστορίας cap. 58. Sed apud Cic. in Acad quaest. amplius duodeviginti partibus mathematicis terra major creditur: id quod praecedenti capite apud Plut. eidem Anaximandro tribuitur. Sed in ejus Vita apud Laert. legitur asseruisse, τὸν ἥλιον οὐκ ἐλάττονα τῆς γῆς, καὶ καθαρότατον πῦρ. Plato in eadem fere sententia fuit in Epinomide. Macrob. in I de Som. Scip., cap. 20, Erathosteni tribuit, quod (continued in col 354) vivalium lib. ex Ptolemaeo colligit, solem quam terra majorem esse centies sexagies sexies, additis octavis tribus. Lege praeterea de solis magnitudine Cleomedem lib. II, Plin. lib. II, cap. 11. BETULEIUS. — Vide si lubet Cartesium.

Whether the sun, etc. Lucretius on the heavenly bodies generally, book V: "Whatever it is, it is carried with no greater shape / Than it seems to our eyes, as we see it, to be." This is the doctrine of Epicurus. See on this matter Plutarch's words from the Opinions of the Philosophers, book II, chapter 11, where he said the sun was twenty-seven times larger than the earth. Galen agrees, On the History of Philosophy, chapter 58. But in Cicero's Academic Questions it is believed to be more than eighteen mathematical parts larger than the earth, which in the preceding chapter of Plutarch is ascribed to the same Anaximander. But in his Life in Laertius he is read to have asserted that the sun is not smaller than the earth, and is the purest fire. Plato was of almost the same opinion in the Epinomis. Macrobius, Somnium Scipionis I, chapter 20, ascribes to Eratosthenes what (the text continues in col 354) ...vivalium [the opening of the word falls in the gutter; probably Firmicus's book] gathers from Ptolemy: that the sun is one hundred and sixty-six and three-eighths times larger than the earth. Read besides, on the size of the sun, Cleomedes book II, Pliny book II, chapter 11. BETULEIUS. — See Descartes, if you like.

[6] ‹lemma: Luna globosa› · col 354 Luna globosa. Vide Plutarchum in Placitis lib. II, cap. 27. Cleomedes priscos tres tantum in luna figuras protulisse refert: surgentem in cornua, dividuam, plenam; indeque Dianam Triviam fuisse dictam. Testatur tamen a junioribus adjectum esse, utrinque turgidam; sic enim ἀμφίκυρτον Valla reddidisse videtur, quod Budaeus utrinque convexum. Cujus quidem Plin. lib. II, cap. 9, et Theon in Arato, haec memorantes, nullam faciunt mentionem. Sed meminit Martianus l. VIII, meminit Macrob. lib. I, cap. 6, Somn., et ipsa Luna apud Lucianum in Icaromenippo. Adjiciemus his, quae refert Cicero in Academ. quaest lib. IV de Xenophane, qui lunam habitabilem dixit, eamque esse terram multarum urbium. Physici certe lunam aethercam terram dixerunt, teste Macrobio. Vide de his omnibus Philelphi Convivales sermones. Aristoteles l. II de Coelo, c. 11, sidera omnia σφαιροειδῆ facit: sicut etiam Cicero in Scipionis Somnio, ubi Macrobius stellarum corpora sphaeras appellat. Sed inventi sunt qui secus putarunt, Cleantes, Anaximenes, et alii. BETULEIUS.

The moon is a globe. See Plutarch in the Opinions, book II, chapter 27. Cleomedes reports that the ancients put forward only three shapes of the moon: rising into horns, halved, full; and that hence Diana was called Trivia. He testifies, however, that a fourth was added by later writers, swollen on both sides; for so Valla seems to have rendered amphikyrton, which Budé renders convex on both sides. Pliny book II, chapter 9, and Theon on Aratus, in recounting these, make no mention of it. But Martianus mentions it, book VIII, and Macrobius, Somnium book I, chapter 6, and the Moon herself in Lucian's Icaromenippus. We will add to these what Cicero reports in the Academic Questions book IV of Xenophanes, who said the moon was habitable and was a land of many cities. The natural philosophers certainly called the moon an ethereal earth, as Macrobius witnesses. On all of these see Filelfo's Convivia. Aristotle, De caelo book II, chapter 11, makes all the stars spherical; as also Cicero in the Dream of Scipio, where Macrobius calls the bodies of the stars spheres. But some were found who thought otherwise: Cleanthes, Anaximenes and others. BETULEIUS.

[7] ‹lemma: Et stellae utrumne coelo adhaereant› · col 354 Et stellae utrumne coelo adhaereant, etc. Ita reposui ex editis Tornes. Soubron. et omnibus manu exaratis, praeter 2 Reg. rec. et impressos, in quibus est, et stellae utrumne cohaereant coelo. Notat Xenocratis, sive, ut Galenus habet, Xenophanis dogma: de his vide Plutarchum. Hodie certe nec ille stellarum situs agnoscitur, nec dubiantur quin fixae stellae cum tota universitate circumagantur. Cur autem Lactantius dictitet per aerem ferri sidera, ratione caret, nisi aera pro aethere dixerit. Est enim omnino ἄκυρον, vel ex vulgi opinione sumptum: quae, ut in Phaedone Plato docet, ex imbecillitate et tarditate visus nostri nascitur; vel quod superioribus idem aether est, quod nobis aer, ut idem Plato ibidem refert. BETULEIUS.

And whether the stars cling to the sky, etc. So I have restored from the Tornaesius and Soubron editions and all the handwritten copies, except 2 recent Regii and the printed editions, in which is et stellae utrumne cohaereant coelo (and whether the stars hold together with the sky). He is noting the doctrine of Xenocrates or, as Galen has it, of Xenophanes: on these see Plutarch. Today certainly that position of the stars is not recognised, nor is it doubted that the fixed stars are carried round with the whole universe. Why Lactantius keeps saying the stars are borne through the air is without reason, unless he said air for ether. For it is wholly improper, or taken from the opinion of the crowd, which, as Plato teaches in the Phaedo, arises from the weakness and slowness of our sight; or else because to the beings above, ether is the same as air is to us, as the same Plato relates in the same place. BETULEIUS.

[8] ‹lemma: Utrum quietum sit et immobile› · col 354 Utrum quietum sit et immobile. Sic habent mss. Jun., Cantabrig., duo Reg. et alii cum plur. editis; 3 al. Reg., aut mobile; mss. Cauc., immortale. Emendo ex optimis et veterrimis 4 Reg., 1 Bon., antiq., Ultr., Goth., Em., 4 Colb., 2 Brun. et ed. Graph., Gymnic, Tornes., Soubron., Paris., Cellar., Valch., et immobile; nec aliter hunc locum ad verbum refert Isidorus (continues)

Whether it is at rest and immovable. So the manuscripts Junius, Cambridge, two Regii and others with most editions; 3 other Regii, aut mobile (or movable); Cauci's manuscripts, immortale (immortal). I correct from the best and oldest — 4 Regii, 1 old Bononiensis, Utrecht, Gotha, Em., 4 Colbertini, 2 Brunsvicenses — and the editions of Gryphius [printed "Graph."], Gymnicus, Tornaesius, Soubron, Paris, Cellarius, Walch [printed "Valch."]: et immobile; nor does Isidore report this passage word for word otherwise (continues)

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  • marginal letters: A quod quaeritur: nec quaesitio ipsa recta est, quia; B ipsum, possit ne hoc studio reperiri aliquid, an; C pellant, cum scientia proprie sit rerum (in the notes); D Clarom. et in excusis est perveniret (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence (quod quaeritur); the heading VARIORUM NOTAE is printed across both columns above the notes and cut off at the right edge, so it is not set; the Variorum notae at the page foot (Nec quaesitio ipsa recta est ... Opinatione ... Scientia ab ingenio ... Idcirco enim oculos et aures ... Permanaret ... Sol utrumne) are left for the later pass; the right-hand column visible at the edge belongs to col. 354 and is not set; the running head is damaged in print (LIBEII III) and read as LIBER III
PL 6:354
CAPUT III.
Chapter III.
Philosophia quibus rebus constet; et quis fuerit Academicae sectae auctor primarius.
Of what things philosophy consists; and who was the first founder of the Academic sect.
Duabus rebus videtur philosophia constare, scientia et opinatione, nec ulla alia re. Scientia ab ingenio venire non potest, ne cogitatione comprehendi; quia in seipso habere propriam scientiam, non hominis, sed Dei est. Mortalis autem natura non capit scientiam, nisi quae veniat extrinsecus. Idcirco enim oculos, et aures, et caeteros sensus patefecit in corpore divina solertia, ut per eos aditus scientia permanaret ad mentem. Nam causas naturalium rerum disquirere, aut scire velle: sol utrumne tantus, quantus videtur, an multis partibus major sit, quam omnis haec terra; item, luna globosa sit, an concava; et stellae utrumne adhaereant coelo, an per aerem libero
Philosophy seems to consist of two things, knowledge and opinion, and of no other thing. Knowledge cannot come from natural talent, nor be grasped by thought; for to have knowledge of one's own within oneself belongs not to man but to God. But mortal nature does not receive knowledge except such as comes from outside. For this reason divine skill opened in the body the eyes, the ears and the other senses, so that through those entrances knowledge might flow through to the mind. For to inquire into the causes of natural things, or to wish to know them: whether the sun is as large as it appears, or is many times larger than this whole earth; likewise, whether the moon is spherical or concave; and whether the stars are fixed to the heaven, or through the air by free
Editors' notes and page, col. 354

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  • running head: [cut off at left edge] ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 354
  • marginal letters: A ‹CAPUT III.›; B ‹haec terra; item, luna globosa›; C ‹plenam; indeque Dianam› (in the notes); D ‹ex editis Tornes. Soubron.› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "ne cogitatione" is clearly printed as "ne"; the usual reading is "nec", so this is listed as a misprint, UNSURE. "coelo" is printed with œ and "caeteros", "stellae", "adhaereant", "Academicae sectae" with æ. The full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE" stands below the text block, cut off at the left edge, and is not set. The editors' Variorum notae below it (Plut. et alii Anaximandro adscripserunt ... ; Luna globosa ... ; Et stellae utrumne coelo adhaereant ... ; Utrum quietum sit et immobile ...) are page-foot commentary for the later pass and are not set. The column ends mid-sentence at "libero".
PL 6:355
cursu ferantur; coelum ipsum qua magnitudine, qua materia constet, utrum quietum sit et immobile, an incredibili celeritate volvatur; quanta sit terrae crassitudo, aut quibus fundamentis librata et suspensa sit. Haec, inquam, disputando, et conjecturis velle comprehendere, tale est profecto, quale si disserere velimus, qualem esse arbitremur cujuspiam remotissimae gentis urbem, quam nunquam vidimus, cujusque nihil aliud quam nomen audivimus. Si nobis in ea re scientiam vindicemus, quae non potest sciri, nonne insanire videamur, qui id affirmare audeamus, in quo revinci possimus? Quanto magis, qui naturalia, quae sciri ab homine non possunt, scire se putant, furiosi dementesque sunt judicandi. Recte ergo Socrates, et eum secuti Academici scientiam sustulerunt, quae non disputantis, sed divinantis est. Superest, ut opinatio in philosophia sola sit. Nam unde abest scientia, id totum possidet opinatio. Id enim opinatur quisque, quod nescit. Illi autem, qui de rebus naturalibus disputant, opinantur ita esse, ut disputant. Nesciunt igitur veritatem; quoniam scientia, certi est, opinatio, incerti.
course are borne; the heaven itself, of what magnitude, of what material it consists, whether it is at rest and immovable, or revolves with incredible speed; how great is the thickness of the earth, or on what foundations it is balanced and suspended. To wish to grasp these things, I say, by disputing and by conjectures, is surely just as if we should wish to discuss what sort of city we judge the city of some most remote nation to be, which we have never seen, and of which we have heard nothing other than the name. If we were to claim for ourselves knowledge in a matter which cannot be known, would we not seem to be mad, who dare to affirm that in which we can be refuted? How much more are those to be judged raving and demented who think that they know natural things, which cannot be known by man. Rightly therefore did Socrates, and the Academics who followed him, do away with knowledge, which belongs not to one who disputes but to one who divines. It remains that opinion alone is in philosophy. For wherever knowledge is absent, opinion possesses the whole of it. For each man forms an opinion about what he does not know. But those who dispute about natural things are of the opinion that things are as they dispute. They therefore do not know the truth; since knowledge belongs to what is certain, opinion to what is uncertain.
Redeamus ad illud superius exemplum. Age, opinemur de statu et qualitate urbis illius, quae nobis rebus omnibus praeter nomen ignota est. Verisimile est, in plano sitam, lapideis moenibus, aedificiis sublimibus, viis pluribus, magnificis ornatisque delubris. Describamus, si placet, mores habitumque civium. Sed cum haec dixerimus, alius contraria disputabit;
Let us return to that example above. Come, let us form opinions about the state and character of that city, which is unknown to us in all things except its name. It is likely that it is situated on a plain, with walls of stone, lofty buildings, many streets, and magnificent and adorned temples. Let us describe, if you please, the manners and dress of the citizens. But when we have said these things, another [man] will argue contrary things;
Editors' notes and page, col. 355

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 355 lib. II Origin., cap. 24, et praeterea istic sequitur, an incredibili celeritate volvatur. Vide Copernicum, cardinalem de Cusa, Cartesium, aliosque auctores infra laudatos; nempe Macrobium lib. I de Somnio Scipionis, cap. 17; Plinium lib. II, cap. 3; Aristotelem, in libro de Coelo secundo, de Mundo, et alibi. Cicero de Universitate n. 17 sic: Maxima itaque una conversione atque eadem ipse circum se torquetur et vertitur. (Vide col. 355, lin. 2).

(continued) Origines book II, chapter 24, and there follows besides, or whether it revolves with incredible speed. See Copernicus, Cardinal of Cusa, Descartes and the other authors cited below: namely Macrobius, Somnium Scipionis book I, chapter 17; Pliny book II, chapter 3; Aristotle in the second book De caelo, in De mundo, and elsewhere. Cicero, De universitate no. 17, thus: And so it is twisted and turned about itself in one and the same greatest revolution. (See col. 355, line 2.)

[2] ‹lemma: Quanta sit terrae crassitudo› · col 355 Quanta sit terrae crassitudo. Macrob. lib. I de Somnio Scipionis, c. 20, colligit, ut ipse praedicat, evidentissimis et indubitabilibus dimensionibus universae terrae ambitum, quae ubicumque vel incolitur, vel inhabitabilis jacet, habere stadiorum millia ducenta quinquaginta duo, diametron vero octoginta millia stadiorum, vel non multo amplius habere. Idque ex ratione Eratosthenis, quam sequitur etiam Cleomedes libro I. Lege ad haec magnam Ptolomaei Constructionem lib. V, cap. 16, et ibidem Theonis Hypomnemata, et Martianum in sua Geometria. Caeterum de terrae magnitudine indeterminate disputat Plato in Phaedone. BET.

How great is the thickness of the earth. Macrobius, Somnium Scipionis book I, chapter 20, concludes, as he himself proclaims, by the most evident and indubitable measurements, that the circumference of the whole earth, wherever it is inhabited or lies uninhabitable, is two hundred and fifty-two thousand stadia, and its diameter eighty thousand stadia, or not much more. And this from the reckoning of Eratosthenes, which Cleomedes also follows in book I. Read on this Ptolemy's great Syntaxis, book V, chapter 16, and in the same place Theon's Commentaries, and Martianus in his Geometry. For the rest, Plato discusses the size of the earth without determining it in the Phaedo. BET.

[3] ‹lemma: Quibus fundamentis librata› · col 355 Quibus fundamentis librata, etc. Vide Simmiam apud Platonem in Phaedone ad finem; Ciceronem in Acad. Ptolemaeum lib. III, cap. 7. ALMAGESTI.

On what foundations balanced, etc. See Simmias in Plato's Phaedo, towards the end; Cicero in the Academica; Ptolemy book III, chapter 7. OF THE ALMAGEST.

[4] ‹lemma: Disputando› · col 355 Disputando. Mss. 1 Bon. antiq., disputare.

By disputing. Manuscript 1 old Bononiensis: disputare (to dispute).

[5] ‹lemma: Arbitremur› · col 355 Arbitremur. Sic restitui ex 13 optimis ac vetustissimis mss. et 4 editis Torn., Soubr., Cellar. et Walch. Scripti 7 rec. et 16 excusi ferunt, arbitramur.

Let us judge. So I have restored from 13 of the best and oldest manuscripts and 4 editions, Tornaesius, Soubron, Cellarius and Walch. Seven recent manuscripts and 16 printed editions read arbitramur (we judge).

[6] ‹lemma: Qui naturalia› · col 355 Qui naturalia. Non illam calumniatur physicen, quae medicinae fundamentum est, ut infra cap. 5 et 6 patebit; sed eam, cujus proprium, ut Laertius inquit, est, disputare de mundo, deque rebus in mundo existentibus.

Who natural things. He does not slander that natural science which is the foundation of medicine, as will appear below in chapters 5 and 6; but the one whose proper business, as Laertius says, is to dispute about the world and about the things existing in the world.

[7] ‹lemma: Recte ergo Socrates› · cols 355–356 Recte ergo Socrates, etc. Vel ex ipso Laertio patet, Academiam ex Socratis fluxisse doctrina. Plato siquidem Socratis auditor, Academiam constituit. Academici licet docendi genus optimum quibusdam secuti videntur, quia vero illorum professio in opinionibus duntaxat sita est, vera nobis Carneadis Stoici de ipsis censura videtur, qui opinaturum sapientem, erraturum dixit; qui enim opinatur, nihil scit. Scientia igitur e medio ab ipsis tollitur. Contra Academicorum heresim disserit Augustinus libris tribus, ex re ipsa inscriptis; Epiphanius lib. I. BETUL.

Rightly therefore Socrates, etc. It is clear even from Laertius himself that the Academy flowed from the teaching of Socrates. For Plato, a hearer of Socrates, founded the Academy. Although the Academics seem to some to have followed the best manner of teaching, yet because their profession rests only in opinions, the judgement passed on them by Carneades the Stoic seems true to us, who said that the wise man who opines will err; for he who opines knows nothing. Knowledge, therefore, is removed from the midst by them. Augustine argues against the heresy of the Academics in three books named from the matter itself; Epiphanius, book I. BETUL.

[8] ‹lemma: Opinatur... quod nescit› · col 356 Opinatur... quod nescit. L. III, c. 4. Exprimit hic Ciceronem l. IV Tus., c. 11: Opinatio est, judicare se scire, quod nesciat. BUN.

He opines... what he does not know. Book III, chapter 4. Here he renders Cicero, Tusculans book IV, chapter 11: Opinion is to judge that one knows what one does not know. BUN.

[9] ‹lemma: Verius› · col 356 Verius. Ita reposui ex cunctis prope mss. Duo recentissimi cum impressis ferunt certius; tres veri certius. Agitur hic de vero. Vide seqq.

More truly. So I have restored from almost all the manuscripts. The two most recent with the printed editions read certius (more certainly); three, veri certius. The subject here is the true. See what follows.

[10] ‹lemma: In rerum naturam cadunt› · col 356 In rerum naturam cadunt. Sic restitui in quarto casu ex omnibus ferme mss. et veteribus editis 2 Romanis, Tornes. ac Soubron. Vulgati quamplures cum scriptis 4, natura.

Fall within the nature of things. So I have restored it in the fourth case [accusative] from nearly all the manuscripts and the old editions, 2 Roman, Tornaesius and Soubron. Very many editions with 4 manuscripts: natura (in nature).

[11] ‹lemma: Nullus igitur› · col 356 Nullus igitur. Hanc lectionem admisi ex cunctis mss. et edit. Cellar. et Walch. In 14 excusis est, nullus enim.

No one therefore. I have admitted this reading from all the manuscripts and the editions of Cellarius and Walch. In 14 printed editions is nullus enim (for no one).

[12] ‹lemma: Descensurum› · col 356 Descensurum. Sc. de coelo. Reimm., dissensurum, non male. Pro recepta Livius lib. VI, cap. 18: Nunquam propter me de coelo descendant. Conf. Lact. l. III, c. 20. BUN.

Would come down. That is, from heaven. Reimmann: dissensurum (would disagree), not badly. For the received reading, Livy book VI, chapter 18: Never for my sake will they come down from heaven. Compare Lactantius book III, chapter 20. BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Licet connivere videatur› · col 356 Licet connivere videatur. At, teste Thomasio, in uno Vaticano codice legitur, licet conticere videatur, quod ipsi maxime probatur; aitque connivere nil significare, quod ad rem pertinet.

Although he seems to wink at it. But, on the witness of Thomasius, in one Vatican manuscript is read licet conticere videatur (although he seems to keep silent), which he strongly approves; and he says connivere signifies nothing to the purpose.

[14] ‹lemma: Summa stultitia› · col 356 Summa stultitia. De hac vide Paulum, I Cor., cap. III, 19.

The highest folly. On this see Paul, 1 Corinthians 3:19.

(printed under page 181)

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  • running head: 355 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[ARUM INSTITUTIONUM] (cut off at right edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹cursu ferantur; coelum ipsum›; B ‹sustulerunt, quae non disputantis›; C ‹vium. Sed cum haec dixerimus›; D ‹rum, vel non multo amplius habere› (in the Variorum notes at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: heavy/worn type makes several c look like e (Haee, seiri, judieandi, Reete, vindieemus, eujuspiam, eujusque) and h like b (nibil); read as damaged type, not misprints, and set as Haec, sciri, judicandi, Recte, vindicemus, cujuspiam, cujusque, nihil; UNSURE. Last word dis- split at column break (disserat or similar follows in col. 356). Full-width heading VARIORUM NOT[AE] stands below the text block, cut off at right edge, not set. The Variorum notes at the page foot (lib. II Origin., cap. 24 ... Recte ergo Socrates, etc.) are commentary, left for the later pass.
PL 6:356
et cum hic quoque peroraverit, surget et tertius, et alii deinceps, et opiniabuntur multo disparia, quam nos sumus opinati. Quid ergo erit ex omnibus verius? fortasse nihil. At omnia sunt dicta, quae in rerum naturam cadunt; ut necesse sit aliquid eorum esse verum. At nescietur, quis verum dixerit. Potest fieri, ut omnes ex parte aliqua erraverint, ex parte attigerint veritatem. Stulti ergo sumus, si hoc disputatione quaeramus; potest enim supervenire aliquis, qui opiniones nostras derideat, nosque pro insanis habeat, qui velimus id, quod nescimus, quale sit, opinari. Verum non opus est longe posita conquirere, unde nemo fortasse veniat, qui nos redarguat. Age, opinemur, quid nunc in foro geratur, quid in curia; longum est id quoque: dicamus, interposito uno pariete quid fiat; nemo potest id scire, nisi qui audiverit, aut viderit. Nullus igitur audet id dicere, quia statim non verbis, sed re ipsa praesenti refutabitur. Atqui hoc idem faciunt philosophi, qui disputant in coelo quid agatur: sed eo se id impune facere arbitrantur, quia nullus existit, qui errores eorum coarguat. Quod si existimarent descensurum esse aliquem, qui eos delirare ac mentiri doceret, nunquam quidquam de iis rebus, quas scire non possunt, disputarent. Nec tamen ideo felicior putanda est eorum impudentia et audacia, quia non redarguuntur: redarguit enim Deus, cui soli veritas nota est, licet connivere videatur, eamque hominum sapientiam pro summa stultitia computat.
and when this one too has finished speaking, a third will rise, and others after him, and they will hold opinions far different from those we have held. Which, then, of them all will be the truer? Perhaps none. But everything that falls within the nature of things has been said, so that some one of them must necessarily be true. But it will not be known who has spoken the truth. It may be that all have erred in some part and in some part have touched the truth. We are fools, then, if we seek this by disputation; for someone may come along who would laugh at our opinions and regard us as madmen, since we wish to form an opinion about a thing we do not know, as to what sort it is. But there is no need to search out things set far off, from where perhaps no one will come to refute us. Come, let us form an opinion about what is now being done in the forum, what in the senate-house; that too is a long way: let us say what is happening with a single wall in between; no one can know it except one who has heard or seen. No one, therefore, dares to say it, because he will at once be refuted, not by words but by the fact itself before him. Yet the philosophers do this very thing, who dispute about what is being done in heaven; but they think they do it with impunity for this reason, that no one exists who could convict them of their errors. But if they thought that someone would come down to show them that they were raving and lying, they would never dispute anything about those things which they cannot know. Nor yet is their impudence and audacity to be thought the more fortunate because they are not refuted: for God, to Whom alone the truth is known, does refute them, though He seems to overlook it, and He counts that wisdom of men as the height of folly.
Editors' notes and page, col. 356

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  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 356 (start of the head cut off at the left edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹putabit; et cum hic quoque›; B ‹mus, interposito uno pariete›; C ‹hominum sapientiam pro summa› (C stands just below this last text line); D ‹centissimi cum impressis ferunt› (in the notes area)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the column begins mid-sentence (putabit) and the text block ends at computat. The VARIORUM NOTAE heading (full width, cut off at left) and the notes below it (Academiam ex Socratis…; Opinatur… quod nescit; Verius; In rerum naturam cadunt; Nullus igitur; Descensurum; Licet connivere videatur; Summa stultitia) are page-foot commentary and are left for the later pass. "rebus, quas": the comma is damaged and looks like a point, so it is UNSURE. "redarguuntur" has worn u's. "Digitized by Google" and the OCR stamp at the foot are not set.
PL 6:357
CAPUT IV.
Chapter IV.
Scientiam a Socrate, opinationem a Zenone esse sublatam.
That knowledge was taken away by Socrates, opinion by Zeno.
Recte igitur Zeno ac Stoici opinationem repudiarunt. Opinari enim te scire, quod nescias, non est sapientis, sed temerarii potius, ac stulti. Ergo si neque sciri quidqnam potest, ut Socrates docuit, nec opinari oportet ut Zeno, tota philosophia sublata est. Quid, quod non tantum ab his duobus evertitur, qui philosophiae principes fuerunt, sed ab omnibus; ut jam videatur, jampridem suis armis esse confecta. In mnltas sectas philosophia divisa est; et omnes varia sentiunt. In qua ponimus veritatem? in omnibus certe non potest. Designemus quamlibet: nempe in caeteris omnibus sapientia non erit. Transeamus ad singulas: eodem modo, quidquid uni dabimus, caeteris auferemus. Unaquaeque enim secta omnes alias evertit, ut se suaque confirmet; nec ulli alteri sapere concedit, ne se desipere fateatur: sed sicut alias tollit, sic ipsa quoque ab aliis tollitur omnibus. Nihilominus enim philosophi sunt, qui eam stultitiae accusant. Quamcumque laudaveris, veramque dixeris, a philosophis vituperatur, ut falsa. Credemusne igitur uni sese suamque doctrinam laudanti, an multis unius alterius ignorantiam culpantibus? Rectius sit necesse est, quod plurimi sentiunt, quam quod unus. Nemo enim potest de se recte judicare, quod nobilis poeta testatur. Ita enim comparatam esse hominum naturam omnium, aliena ut melius videant, et dijudicent quam sua. Cum igitur omnia
Rightly, therefore, did Zeno and the Stoics reject opinion. For to suppose that you know what you do not know is not the mark of a wise man, but rather of a rash and foolish one. Therefore, if nothing can be known, as Socrates taught, and one ought not to hold opinions, as Zeno [taught], the whole of philosophy has been taken away. What of the fact that it is overturned not only by these two, who were the leaders of philosophy, but by all, so that it now seems to have long since been destroyed by its own weapons? Philosophy has been divided into many sects, and all hold different views. In which do we place the truth? Certainly it cannot be in all. Let us designate whichever one you please: then, of course, in all the others there will be no wisdom. Let us pass to them one by one: in the same way, whatever we give to one we shall take away from the rest. For each sect overturns all the others, so as to establish itself and its own; and it grants to no other that it is wise, lest it confess that it is itself foolish: but as it removes the others, so it is itself also removed by all the others. For there are none the less philosophers who accuse it of folly. Whichever you praise and declare true is censured by philosophers as false. Shall we then believe one who praises himself and his own doctrine, or the many who blame the ignorance of one other? What very many think must needs be more correct than what one thinks. For no one can judge rightly concerning himself, as a noble poet testifies. For the nature of all men is so constituted that they see and judge the things of others better than their own. Since therefore all things
Editors' notes and page, col. 357

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Opinari... te scire› · col 357 Opinari... te scire. Illud scire non debet abesse: hic necessarium, et habent omnes editiones recte. Requirit locus Ciceronis a me ad c. 3 citatus, et Epit. cap. 31: Opinari autem scire, quod ignores, temeritas ac stultitia est. BUN.

To suppose... that you know. That scire (to know) ought not to be missing: it is necessary here, and all the editions rightly have it. The passage of Cicero cited by me on chapter 3 requires it, and Epitome chapter 31: But to suppose that you know what you do not know is rashness and folly. BUN.

[2] ‹lemma: Scire› · col 357 Scire. Abest scire ab Emmanuel. et Gothano mss.

To know. Scire is missing from the Emmanuel and Gotha manuscripts.

[3] ‹lemma: Qui philosophiae principes fuerunt› · col 357 Qui philosophiae principes fuerunt. Academici et Stoici principes erant philosophorum. Academicae sectae fundamentum quasi posuit Socrates; Stoicae auctor est Zeno.

Who were the leaders of philosophy. The Academics and the Stoics were the leaders of the philosophers. Socrates as it were laid the foundation of the Academic sect; the founder of the Stoic is Zeno.

[4] ‹lemma: Comparatam› · col 357 Comparatam. De quo vide Terent. Heauton. act. III, scen. 1, vs. 97. Hinc nata est sententia, Neminem in re sua idoneum judicem esse.

Constituted. On which see Terence, Heauton timorumenos, act III, scene 1, verse 97. From this was born the maxim, No one is a fit judge in his own cause.

[5] ‹lemma: Sparti illi poetarum› · cols 357–358 Sparti illi poetarum. Sic legendum censeo cum Jo. Cauci, et Isaeo: sic impressum est in Florent., Junt., Aldina 1515 et 1535, Veneta 1509 et 1521, Parrhas., Parisiensi 1525, Antuerp., Graph. 1532, Cratandri ac Gymnici editionibus. Sparti illi poetarum sunt homines illi e dentibus serpentis a Cadmo satis orti: fabula notior est, quam ut referri debeat. Hoc saltem addam, spartos illos vocari a Graeco nomine σπείρω; hinc σπάρτοι sati, seminati. Hoc verbum Lactant. Latino more scripsit: sic etiam Vulgatus interpres Joan. V, 2, et Plinius Graecum nomen tanquam Latinum scripsere probata dicendo pro ovibus. Lib. VII, cap. 2, sic Virgil. alicubi, acta, quod est ἀκτή, littus, dixit. Etiam in hoc Isaeo assentior, mendum irrepsisse, eo quod scribae significationem hujus dictionis non percipientes, et mendum suspicati, pro sparti, spartiatae substituerunt. GALLAEUS. — Hanc vocem natam suspicor ex sparti, sati; quae ultima dictio per interpretationem in quibusdam veteribus codicibus fuerit addita, et in textum intrusa, ac demum corrupta in τὸ spartiati, vel spartiatae, quod est in 28 mss. et 9 editis. Vide et Euripid. in Poenis, et Ovid. l. III Metamorph.

Those Sown Men of the poets. So I judge it should be read, with Jo. Cauci and Isaeus: so it is printed in the Florentine, Giunta, Aldine 1515 and 1535, Venetian 1509 and 1521, Parrhasius, Paris 1525, Antwerp, Gryphius [printed "Graph."] 1532, Cratander and Gymnicus editions. Those Sown Men of the poets are the men who sprang from the serpent's teeth sown by Cadmus: the fable is too well known to need telling. This at least I will add, that they are called sparti from the Greek word speirō (I sow); hence spartoi, sown, seeded. Lactantius wrote this word in the Latin manner: so too the Vulgate translator, John 5:2, and Pliny wrote a Greek word as if Latin, saying probata for sheep. Book VII, chapter 2; so Virgil somewhere said acta, which is aktē, shore. In this too I agree with Isaeus, that an error crept in because the scribes, not grasping the meaning of this word and suspecting an error, substituted spartiatae (Spartans) for sparti. GALLAEUS. — I suspect this word arose from sparti, sati (sown); the last word was added as an explanation in some old manuscripts, intruded into the text, and finally corrupted into spartiati or spartiatae, which is in 28 manuscripts and 9 editions. See also Euripides in the Phoenissae, and Ovid, Metamorphoses book III.

[6] ‹lemma: Arcesilas› · col 358 Arcesilas. Novae seu mediae Academiae conditor. Cic., in Acad. quaest., veterem Academiam, Platonicam illam vocat: novam, quae usque ad Carneadem perducta est, qui quartus ab Arcesila fuit, in eademque Arcesilae ratione permansit. Cic. lib. III de Orat.: Arcesilas primum, qui Polemonem audierat, ex variis Platonis libris, sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi, quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit. BETULEIUS.

Arcesilas. Founder of the New or Middle Academy. Cicero, in the Academic Questions, calls the Platonic one the Old Academy; the New, that which was carried on as far as Carneades, who was fourth from Arcesilas and remained in the same system as Arcesilas. Cicero, De oratore book III: Arcesilas first, who had heard Polemon, seized above all from the various books of Plato and the Socratic dialogues this: that there is nothing certain which can be grasped either by the senses or by the mind. BETULEIUS.

[7] ‹lemma: Novam non philosophandi philosophiam› · col 358 Novam non philosophandi philosophiam. Ut Fabius Maximus novum genus pugnandi, non pugnare. Flor. II, 6. FRANCIUS.

A new philosophy of not philosophizing. As Fabius Maximus had a new kind of fighting: not fighting. Florus II, 6. FRANCIUS.

[8] ‹lemma: Detrahit› · col 358 Detrahit. Omnium manuscriptorum et vet. edit. Rom. est; distrahit editorum rec.

Takes away. This is the reading of all the manuscripts and the old Roman edition; distrahit (tears apart) that of the recent editions.

[9] ‹lemma: Quasi civile bellum› · col 358 Quasi civile bellum, etc. Cicero in eo lib. qui Lucullus inscribitur, affirmat Arcesilam, philosophiam bene constitutam eo evertisse modo, quo Gracchus Tiberius Remp. et in eorum delituisse auctoritate, qui negarent quidquam sciri aut percipi posse: quorum e numero eximit, et Socratem, et Platonem. BET.

As if a civil war, etc. Cicero, in the book entitled Lucullus, affirms that Arcesilas overthrew a well-ordered philosophy in the same way as Tiberius Gracchus overthrew the Republic, and that he sheltered under the authority of those who denied that anything could be known or grasped: from whose number he excepts both Socrates and Plato. BET.

[10] ‹lemma: Tironum caterva› · col 358 Tironum caterva. Intelligit Arcesilae sectatores, et novos Academicos.

The band of recruits. He means the followers of Arcesilas, the New Academics.

[11] ‹lemma: Veterani› · col 358 Veterani. Scilicet Platonici.

The veterans. That is, the Platonists.

[12] ‹lemma: Sine interitu suo sibi› · col 358 Sine interitu suo sibi. Addidi suo ex Bon., Tax., Pen., Cauc., Junt., Cant., Sublac., Rost. Ven., 1471, utraque 78, 93, 97, Pier., Junt., Ald., Parrh., Crat., Gymn., Gryph., Tornes. Non video, quare Thomas. ejusque asseclae illud suo ejecerint. BUN.

Without its own destruction, to itself. I have added suo (its own) from the Bononiensis, Tax., Pen., Cauci, Junius, Cambridge, and the Subiaco, Rostock, Venice 1471, both of 78, 93, 97, Pierius, Giunta, Aldine, Parrhasius, Cratander, Gymnicus, Gryphius and Tornaesius editions. I do not see why Thomasius and his followers threw out that suo. BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Vincit› · col 358 Vincit. Sic ex mss. reposui. In editis et 1 Reg. rec. est, vicit. Utrumque tamen potest dici.

Wins. So I have restored from the manuscripts. In the editions and 1 recent Regius is vicit (won). Either, however, can be said.

(printed under page 182)

Page

  • running head: 357 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[IA] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹CAPUT IV.› (gutter, beside the chapter heading line); B ‹in caeteris omnibus sapientia non erit. Transeamus›; C ‹esse hominum naturam omnium, aliena ut melius›; D beside ‹Parisiensi 1525› in the Variorum notae (not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: caption type damaged: "a" before Socrate and "sublatam" (printed like sμblatqm) read from context; the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE (cut off at the right edge) stands above the page-foot notes and is not set; the Variorum notae (Opinari... te scire; Scire; Qui philosophiae principes fuerunt; Comparatam; Sparti illi poetarum) are left for the later pass; the column ends mid-sentence at "omnia"
PL 6:358
incerta sint, aut omnibus credendum est, aut nemini: si nemini, sapientes ergo non sunt, quia singuli diversa affirmantes, sapientes esse se putant: si omnibus, aeque non sunt sapientes, quia singuli ab omnibus esse negantur sapientes. Pereunt igitur universi hoc modo, et tanquam sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet: quod eo fit, quia gladium habent, scutum non habent.
are uncertain, then either all must be believed, or none: if none, then they are not wise, because each of them, while affirming different things, thinks himself wise; if all, they are equally not wise, because each is denied by all to be wise. In this way, therefore, they all perish together, and like those Sown Men of the poets, they so slaughter one another that no one out of them all remains: and this happens because they have a sword, but do not have a shield.
Si ergo singulae sectae multarum sectarum judicio stultitiae convincuntur, omnes igitur vanae, atque inanes reperiuntur: ita seipsam philosophia consumit, et conficit. Quod cum intelligeret Arcesilas Academiae conditor, reprehensiones omnium inter se collegit, confessionemque ignorantiae clarorum philosophorum, armavitque se adversus omnes. Ita constituit novam non philosophandi philosophiam. Eo igitur auctore, duo philosophiae genera esse coeperunt: unum, illud vetus, quod scientiam sibi vendicat; alterum, novum repugnans, quod eam detrahit. In his duobus generibus video dissidium, et quasi civile bellum. Sapientiam, quae detrahi non potest, in qua parte ponemus? Si natura rerum sciri potest, haec tironum caterva interibit; si non potest, veterani conficientur: si pares fuerint, nihilominus peribit dux omnium philosophia, quia detracta est; nihil enim potest sine interitu sibi esse contrarium. Si autem, ut docui, nulla potest esse in homine interna et propria scientia, ob fragilitatem conditionis humanae, Arcesilae manus vincit. Sed ne ipsa quidem stabit, quia non potest omnino nihil sciri.
If, therefore, the individual sects are convicted of folly by the judgement of many sects, then all are found to be vain and empty: thus philosophy consumes and destroys itself. When Arcesilas, the founder of the Academy, understood this, he gathered together the criticisms of all against one another, and the confession of ignorance of the famous philosophers, and armed himself against all. Thus he established a new philosophy of not philosophizing. With him as originator, therefore, two kinds of philosophy began to exist: the one, that old one, which claims knowledge for itself; the other, the new one, opposing it, which takes it away. In these two kinds I see discord, and as it were a civil war. Wisdom, which cannot be taken away, on which side shall we place it? If the nature of things can be known, this band of recruits will perish; if it cannot, the veterans will be destroyed: if they should be equal, nonetheless philosophy, the leader of all, will perish, because it has been taken away; for nothing can be contrary to itself without destruction. But if, as I have shown, there can be in man no inner and proper knowledge, because of the frailty of the human condition, the band of Arcesilas wins. Yet not even it will stand, because it is not possible that nothing at all be known.
Editors' notes and page, col. 358

Page

  • running head: [cut off at left edge]ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 358
  • marginal letters: A ‹incerta sint, aut omnibus›; B ‹sophorum, armavitque se›; C ‹manae, Arcesilae manus vincit›; D ‹Rom. est; distrahit editorum rec.› (in the Variorum notae at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the column begins mid-sentence (incerta) and ends at a full stop (sciri.); after "conditor" a stray mark like ";" stands before the comma, read as a speck of type and set as "conditor,"; the running head's last word looks like PHILOSOPII in the scan, set as PHILOSOPH.; the full-width heading "[V]ARIORUM NOTAE." at the page foot is cut off at the left edge and is not set; the Variorum notae below it (from "spartiati" to "Utrumque tamen potest dici") are not set, left for the later pass; the column 357 text visible at the left edge is not set
PL 6:359
CAPUT V.
Chapter V.
Multarum rerum scientiam esse necessariam.
That knowledge of many things is necessary.
Sunt enim multa, quae natura ipsa nos scire, et usus frequens, et vitae necessitas cogit. Itaque pereundum est, nisi scias, quae ad vitam sunt utilia, ut appetas, quae periculosa, ut fugias et vites. Praeterea multa sunt, quae usus invenit. Nam solis ac lunae varii cursus, et meatus siderum, et ratio temporum deprehensa est, et natura corporum a medicis, herbarumque vires, et ab agricolis natura terrarum, nec non imbrium futurorum, ac tempestatum signa collecta sunt. Nulla denique ars est, quae non scientia constet. Debuit ergo Arcesilas, si quid saperet, distinguere, quae sciri possent, quaeve nesciri. Sed si id fecisset, ipse se in populum redegisset. Nam vulgus interdum plus sapit; quia tantum, ⟨qu⟩antum opus est sapit. A quo si quaeras, utrum sciat aliquid, an nihil, dicet se scire, quae sciat, fatebitur se nescire, quae nesciat. Recte ergo aliorum sustulit disciplinas, sed non recte fundavit suam. Ignoratio enim rerum omnium non potest esse sapientia, cujus est scire proprium. Ita cum philosophos expugnaverit, ac docuerit eos nihil scire, ipse quoque nomen philosophi perdidit; quia doctrina ejus est nihil scire. Nam qui alios reprehendit, quod nesciant, ipse debet sciens esse. Cum autem nihil sciat, quae perversitas, quaeve insolentia est, ob id ipsum se philosophum constituere, propter quod caeteros tollat? Possunt enim sic respondere : Si nihil nos scire convincis, et ideo non esse sapientes, quia nihil sciamus; ergone tu quidem es sapiens, quia te quoque confiteris nihil scire? Quid ergo promovit Arcesilas, nisi quod confectis omnibus philosophis, seipsum quoque eodem mucrone transfixit?
For there are many things which nature itself, and frequent use, and the necessity of life compel us to know. And so one must perish unless you know which things are useful for life, so that you may seek them, and which are dangerous, so that you may flee and avoid them. Moreover there are many things which experience has discovered. For the varied courses of the sun and moon, and the movements of the stars, and the reckoning of the seasons have been ascertained, and the nature of bodies has been gathered by physicians, and the powers of herbs, and by farmers the nature of soils, as well as the signs of coming rains and of storms. In short there is no art which does not rest on knowledge. Arcesilas therefore ought, if he had any sense, to have distinguished which things could be known and which could not be known. But if he had done this, he would have reduced himself to the level of the common people. For the common crowd is sometimes wiser, because it is wise only as far as there is need. If you ask it whether it knows anything or nothing, it will say that it knows what it knows, and will confess that it does not know what it does not know. Rightly therefore did he take away the teachings of others, but not rightly did he found his own. For ignorance of all things cannot be wisdom, whose proper property is to know. Thus, when he had overthrown the philosophers and taught them that they know nothing, he himself also lost the name of philosopher, because his teaching is to know nothing. For he who rebukes others for not knowing ought himself to be one who knows. But since he knows nothing, what perversity, or what insolence is it, to set himself up as a philosopher on the very ground on which he does away with the rest? For they can answer thus: If you prove that we know nothing, and are therefore not wise because we know nothing, are you then wise, because you too confess that you know nothing? What then did Arcesilas achieve, except that, having dispatched all the philosophers, he pierced himself too with the same blade?
Editors' notes and page, col. 359

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Herbarum vires› · col 359 Herbarum vires. Herbariae medicinae inventionem Galenus assignat Cheironi Centauro, Macer Artemisiae. BETULEIUS.

The powers of herbs. Galen assigns the invention of herbal medicine to Chiron the Centaur, Macer to Artemisia. BETULEIUS.

[2] ‹lemma: Nec non imbrium› · col 359 Nec non imbrium. Id ipse Christus concedit Matth. XVI, Lucae XI. De his Aratus potissimum, et Virgil. in Georg. BETUL.

And also of rains. Christ himself grants this, Matthew 16, Luke 11. On these see above all Aratus, and Virgil in the Georgics. BETUL.

[3] ‹lemma: Debuit ergo Arcesilas› · col 359 Debuit ergo Arcesilas. Arcesilas, teste Mela, nihil affirmantis Academiae antistes, ita omnem rerum scientiam ex hominibus sustulit, ut eam soli Deo reliquerit; ut Epiphanius de eo scribit tom. II, lib. III, de Haeresibus. BETULEIUS.

Arcesilas therefore ought. Arcesilas, on Mela's witness, the head of the Academy that affirms nothing, so took away all knowledge of things from men that he left it to God alone; as Epiphanius writes of him, volume II, book III, On Heresies. BETULEIUS.

[4] ‹lemma: Se in populum redegisset› · col 359 Se in populum redegisset. In populum redigere dixit, pro eo quod est in ordinem redigere. De quo loquendi modo vide Budaeum in L. D. Marcus. ff. de Off. praesidis. — Se in populum redegisset. Id est, se vulgo philosophorum annumerasset. Prius in ordinem redigere, auctore Prisciano et Raph. Reg. inter viles et abjectos connumerari dixit Quintil. I Instit. c. 4. BUN.

He would have reduced himself to the people. He said to reduce to the people for what is to reduce to the ranks. On this manner of speaking see Budé on the law D. Marcus, Digest, De officio praesidis. — He would have reduced himself to the people. That is, he would have counted himself among the common herd of philosophers. In ordinem redigere came first, on the authority of Priscian and Raphael Regius; Quintilian, Institutio I, chapter 4, said to be counted among the base and abject. BUN.

[5] ‹lemma: Convincis› · col 359 Convincis. Manuscriptorum ac 3 vet. edit. Rom., Tornes. et Soubron. est haec lectio; conviceris, caeterorum editorum.

You prove. This is the reading of the manuscripts and of 3 old editions, Rome, Tornaesius and Soubron; conviceris (you will have proved), that of the other editors.

[6] ‹lemma: Arcesilas› · col 359 Arcesilas. Mss. pene omnes et vet. edit. Rom. ferunt Archesilas. At 1 Reg. vetustissimus et vulgati, Arcesilas, cum Diogene Laertio de Vitis Philosophorum.

Arcesilas. Almost all manuscripts and the old Roman edition read Archesilas. But 1 very old Regius and the editions have Arcesilas, with Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers.

[7] ‹lemma: Confectis› · cols 359–360 Confectis. Artis Gladiatoriae verbum, quod de gladiatore multis vulneribus confosso dicitur. Cicero Catil. II: c. 11: Gladiatori illi confecto et saucio. CELLAR.

Finished off. A word of the gladiatorial art, said of a gladiator pierced with many wounds. Cicero, Against Catiline II, chapter 11: To that finished and wounded gladiator. CELLAR.

[8] ‹lemma: Inter ipsos› · col 360 Inter ipsos. Sic restitui ex 29 potioribus et antiquioribus mss. Pro ipsos, editi et sex rec. scripti reposuerunt philosophos ob novi capitis initium; alii 4 et edit. Is. post ipsos addiderunt philosophos, scilicet glossema ex ora libri admissum in textum.

Among themselves. So I have restored from 29 better and older manuscripts. For ipsos (themselves), the editions and six recent manuscripts have put philosophos (the philosophers), because of the beginning of a new chapter; 4 others and the edition of Isaeus have added philosophos after ipsos — a gloss, that is, let into the text from the margin of a book.

[9] ‹lemma: Ab animo est qui› · col 360 Ab animo est qui. Masculino genere omnes fere scripti et quinque excusi. In editis 14 est, ab anima quae. Supra, cap. 3, dixit scientiam ab ingenio esse.

Is from the mind, which. In the masculine gender nearly all the manuscripts and five printed editions. In 14 editions is ab anima quae (from the soul, which). Above, in chapter 3, he said that knowledge is from the intellect.

[10] ‹lemma: Sinistro versus› · col 360 Sinistro versus. Sinistrorsus Caesaris VI. Gall. in meis Lexicis desidero. BUN.

Towards the left. I miss Caesar's sinistrorsus (leftward), Gallic War VI, in my lexicons. BUN.

[11] ‹lemma: Paucarum rerum› · col 360 Paucarum rerum. Cum ms. 1 Bonon. Thysius et Gallaeus addunt et.

Of few things. With manuscript 1 Bononiensis, Thysius and Gallaeus add et (and).

[12] ‹lemma: Quia› · col 360 Quia. Hic et infra quam legendum esse censebat Francius.

Because. Here and below Francius judged that quam should be read.

[13] ‹lemma: Consertis manibus› · col 360 Consertis manibus. Proverbium, pro summa contentione: metaphora sumpta a luctantibus. Vel est allusio ad antiquum illum fori morem, quo ex jure manu consertum vocabant. De quo praeter Bud. et Erasm. vide Gell. lib. XX, cap. 9. BETUL. — Consertis manibus. Sparkius interpretatur, summo conatu: significat, pugnantes, ut l. V, c. 6: Tum inter se manus conserere coeperunt. BUN.

With hands joined in combat. A proverb, for the utmost struggle: a metaphor taken from wrestlers. Or it is an allusion to that ancient custom of the forum by which they summoned one ex jure manum consertum (to join hands at law). On which, besides Budé and Erasmus, see Gellius book XX, chapter 9. BETUL. — Consertis manibus. Sparke interprets it with the utmost effort; it means fighting, as in book V, chapter 6: Then they began to come to grips with one another. BUN.

[14] ‹lemma: In medio constitutam fore, quae› · col 360 In medio constitutam fore, quae. Sic fere omnes. Subaudio scientiam, quae. BUN.

Would be placed in the middle, which. So nearly all. I understand scientiam, quae (a knowledge, which). BUN.

(printed under page 183)

Page

  • running head: 359 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹CAPUT V.›; B ‹saperet, distinguere, quae sciri possent›; C ‹teros tollat? Possunt enim sic respondere›; D ‹scientiam ex hominibus sustulit, ut eam soli Deo re-› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "⟨qu⟩antum" at the head of a line has damaged initial letters, read as quantum; "vitam" (ad vitam) has a faint t, read with confidence. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOT[AE]" stands above the page-foot notes and is cut off at the right edge, so it is not set. The Variorum notae (Herbarum vires ... Confectis ...) are page-foot commentary left for the later pass. The right-hand column of the images belongs to col. 360 and is not set.
PL 6:360
CAPUT VI.
Chapter VI.
De sapientia, et Academicis et Physicis.
On wisdom, and on the Academics and the Physicists.
Nusquam ne igitur sapientia est? Immo vero inter ipsos fuit: sed nemo vidit. Alii putaverunt, sciri posse omnia; hi sapientes utique non fuerunt; alii nihil, ne hi quidem sapientes fuerunt; illi, quia plus homini dederunt; hi, quia minus: utrisque in utramque partem modus defuit. Ubi ergo sapientia est? Ut neque te omnia scire putes, quod Dei est, neque omnia nescire, quod pecudis. Est enim aliquod medium, quod sit hominis, id est scientia cum ignoratione conjuncta et temperata. Scientia in nobis ab animo est, qui oritur e coelo; ignoratio a corpore, quod est e terra: unde nobis et cum Deo, et cum animalibus est aliqua communitas. Ita quoniam ex his duobus constamus elementis, quorum alterum luce praeditum est, alterum tenebris; pars nobis data est scientiae, pars ignorantiae. Per hunc quasi pontem transire sine cadendi periculo licet; nam illi omnes, qui se in alteram partem inclinaverunt, aut dextro, aut sinistro versus ceciderunt. Utraque autem pars quomodo erraverit, dicam. Academici contra Physicos ex rebus obscuris argumentati sunt, nullam esse scientiam, et exemplis paucarum rerum incomprehensibilium contenti, amplexi sunt ignorantiam; tanquam scientiam totam sustulissent, quia in parte sustulerant. Physici contra ex iis, quae aperta sunt, argumentum trahebant, omnia sciri posse, contentique perspicuis, retinebant scientiam; tanquam totam defendissent, quia ex parte defenderant. Itaque neque hi clara, neque illi obscura viderunt: sed utrique, dum solam scientiam consertis manibus vel retinent, vel eripiunt, non viderunt, in medio constitutam fore, quae illos ad sapientiam transmitteret.
Is wisdom, then, nowhere? On the contrary, it was among them: but no one saw it. Some thought that all things could be known; these certainly were not wise; others that nothing [could be known], and neither were these wise; the former because they granted too much to man, the latter because too little: both lacked measure, each in its own direction. Where, then, is wisdom? In this: that you should neither think that you know all things, which belongs to God, nor be ignorant of all things, which belongs to a beast. For there is a certain middle ground which belongs to man, that is, knowledge joined with ignorance and tempered by it. Knowledge in us comes from the mind, which arises from heaven; ignorance from the body, which is from the earth: hence we have a certain fellowship both with God and with the animals. Thus, since we are composed of these two elements, of which one is endowed with light and the other with darkness, a share of knowledge has been given to us, and a share of ignorance. Over this, as if over a bridge, one may cross without danger of falling; for all those who leaned towards one side or the other fell, either to the right or to the left. But how each party erred, I shall say. The Academics argued against the Physicists from obscure matters that there is no knowledge, and, content with examples of a few incomprehensible things, they embraced ignorance; as though they had abolished knowledge entirely, because they had abolished it in part. The Physicists, on the contrary, drew from things that are evident the argument that all things can be known, and, content with what is plain, they held on to knowledge; as though they had defended it entirely, because they had defended it in part. And so neither did the latter see the clear things, nor the former the obscure: but both, while with hands locked in combat they either hold on to knowledge alone or snatch it away, did not see that there would be [knowledge] set in the middle, which would carry them across to wisdom.
Editors' notes and page, col. 360

Page

  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 360 (left edge of the head cut off in the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹CAPUT VI.›; B ‹et cum animalibus est aliqua communitas›; C ‹tanquam totam defendissent›; D ‹scripti et quinque excusi› (beside the Variorum notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: stray marks in "CAPUT |VI." and "sapientia,¯et" ignored; "Nusquam ne" set as two words, as printed; the heading "VARIORUM NOTÆ." and the notes beneath it (Catil. II..., Inter ipsos..., Ab animo est qui..., etc.) are page-foot commentary, not set here; the "VARIORUM NOTÆ" heading appears to run in from the left column, possibly a full-width line, cut off at the image edge
PL 6:361
Verum Arcesilas ignorantiae magister, cum Zenoni obtrectaret principi Stoicorum, ut totam philosophiam everteret, auctore Socrate, suscepit hanc sententiam, ut affirmaret nihil sciri posse. Itaque coarguit existimationem philosophorum, qui putassent ingeniis suis erutam esse, atque inventam veritatem: videlicet, quia mortalis fuerat illa sapientia, paucisque ante temporibus instituta, ad summum jam incrementum pervenerat, ut jam necessario consenesceret, ac periret, repente extitit Academia, tanquam senectus philosophiae, quae illam conficeret jam deflorescentem. Recteque vidit Arcesilas, arrogantes, vel potius stultos esse, qui putent, scientiam veritatis conjectura posse comprehendi. Sed tamen falsa dicentem redarguere non potest, nisi qui scierit ante, quid sit verum: quod Arcesilas veritate non cognita facere conatus, introduxit genus philosophiae ἀσύστατον quod latine instabile, sive inconstans possumus dicere. Ut enim nihil sciendum sit, aliquid sciri necesse est. Nam si omnino nihil scias, id ipsum, nihil sciri posse, tolletur. Itaque qui velut sententiae loco pronuntiat, nihil sciri, tanquam praeceptum profitetur et cognitum, ergo aliquid sciri potest.
But Arcesilas, the master of ignorance, when he was disparaging Zeno, the chief of the Stoics, took up this opinion on the authority of Socrates, so as to overturn the whole of philosophy: he affirmed that nothing can be known. So he refuted the estimation of the philosophers, who had supposed that truth had been dug out and found by their own talents. That is to say, because that wisdom had been mortal, and, established only a short time before, had reached its utmost growth, so that it must now of necessity grow old and perish, the Academy suddenly arose, like the old age of philosophy, to finish it off as it was already fading. And Arcesilas rightly saw that those are arrogant, or rather foolish, who think that knowledge of the truth can be grasped by conjecture. But no one can refute a person who says false things unless he has first known what is true. Arcesilas attempted to do this without having come to know the truth, and so introduced a kind of philosophy that is asystaton, which we can call in Latin unstable or inconsistent. For even granting that nothing is to be known, it is necessary that something be known. For if you know absolutely nothing, that very thing, that nothing can be known, will be taken away. Therefore he who pronounces, as if by way of an opinion, that nothing is known, professes it as a precept and as something known; therefore something can be known.
Huic simile est illud, quod in scholis proponi solet in asystati generis exemplum; somniasse quemdam, ne somniis crederet. Si enim crediderit, tum sequitur ut credendum non sit. Si autem non crediderit, tunc sequitur ut credendum sit. Ita si nihil sciri potest, necesse est, id ipsum sciri, quod nihil sciatur. Si autem scitur, posse nihil sciri, falsum est ergo, quod dicitur, nihil posse sciri. Sic inducitur dogma sibi ipsi repugnans, seque dissolvens. Sed homo
Similar to this is the case customarily set forth in the schools as an example of the asystatic kind: that someone dreamed that he should not believe dreams. For if he believed it, then it follows that it is not to be believed. But if he did not believe it, then it follows that it is to be believed. So if nothing can be known, it is necessary that this very thing be known, that nothing is known. But if it is known that nothing can be known, then what is said, that nothing can be known, is false. Thus a doctrine is introduced that contradicts itself and dissolves itself. But the man,
Editors' notes and page, col. 361

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. The page foot also carries the signature line "PATROL. VI." and the sheet number "12" (printer's matter, not notes). --> [1] ‹lemma: Socrate› · col 361 Socrate. De qua Socratis doctrina copiose et eleganter disserit Xenophon, de Dictis et Factis Socratis non longe ab initio.

Socrates. Of this doctrine of Socrates Xenophon discourses copiously and elegantly, in the Sayings and Deeds of Socrates, not far from the beginning.

[2] ‹lemma: Suscepit hanc sententiam› · col 361 Suscepit hanc sententiam, etc. De qua Cic. de Orat. l. III: Arcesilas primum qui Polemonem audierat, ex variis Platonis libris, sermonibusque Socraticis, hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi, quod aut sensibus, aut animo percipi possit. Arnob., lib. II: Qui nihil ab homine comprehendi, atque omnia caecis obscuritatibus involuta, non Arcesilae, Carneadae credit? Lucretius hanc sententiam refellit lib. IV: Denique nil sciri si quis putat, id quoque nescit / An sciri possit, quum se nil scire fatetur, etc. GALLAEUS.

He took up this opinion, etc. On which Cicero, De oratore book III: Arcesilas first, who had heard Polemon, seized above all from the various books of Plato and the Socratic dialogues this: that there is nothing certain which can be grasped either by the senses or by the mind. Arnobius, book II: Who does not believe Arcesilas and Carneades, that nothing is grasped by man and that all things are wrapped in blind obscurities? Lucretius refutes this opinion in book IV: "Finally, if anyone thinks that nothing is known, he does not know this either, / Whether it can be known, since he admits he knows nothing," etc. GALLAEUS.

[3] ‹lemma: Existimationem› · col 361 Existimationem. Sic restitui ex manuscriptis. Editi habent aestimationem.

Reputation. So I have restored from the manuscripts. The editions have aestimationem (valuation).

[4] ‹lemma: Mortalis› · col 361 Mortalis. Ed. Sublac. habet immortalis.

Mortal. The Subiaco edition has immortalis (immortal).

[5] ‹lemma: Repente extitit Academia› · col 361 Repente extitit Academia. Intellige, nova. De triplici Academia, vetere, media, nova, doctissime disserentem lege Georg. Horn. lib. III, cap. 20 Histor. philosoph.

Suddenly the Academy arose. Understand: the New. On the threefold Academy — Old, Middle, New — read Georg Horn, who discusses it most learnedly, History of Philosophy book III, chapter 20.

[6] ‹lemma: Ἀσύστατον› · col 361 Ἀσύστατον. Nam apud dialecticos Graeci. ἀσύστατον, Latini insolubile vocant, fallaciarum genus, ut, Nihil scio. Igitur hoc scis, quod nihil scis.

Asystaton (the self-inconsistent). For among the dialecticians the Greeks call asystaton, the Latins insolubile (the insoluble), a kind of fallacy, as: I know nothing. Therefore you know this, that you know nothing.

[7] ‹lemma: Ut enim nihil sciendum› · cols 361–362 Ut enim nihil sciendum. Ita omnes mss. praeter recentissimos 1 Reg. et 1 Clarom. qui post nihil inserunt sciri posse, ut et editi quatuor. De hoc Socratis dicto vide Laertium in Socrate et Platonem in Alcib. II. — Ut enim nihil scire posse sciendum sit. Jun., Lips. alter, Gothan., Sublac., Rost., Ven. 1471, utraque 78, 93, 97, Pier., Parr., Paris., Crat., Ald., Gymn.. Ut enim nihil sciendum sit. BUN.

For so that nothing is to be known. So all the manuscripts, except the most recent 1 Regius and 1 Claromontanus, which insert sciri posse (can be known) after nihil, as do four editions. On this saying of Socrates see Laertius on Socrates, and Plato in Alcibiades II. — Ut enim nihil scire posse sciendum sit (for so that it is to be known that nothing can be known): Junius, the second Lipsiensis, Gotha, and the Subiaco, Rostock, Venice 1471, both of 78, 93, 97, Pierius, Parrhasius, Paris, Cratander, Aldine and Gymnicus editions. Ut enim nihil sciendum sit. BUN.

[8] ‹lemma: Nihil agit› · col 362 Nihil agit. Nihil agere proverbialiter dicuntur ii, qui sumunt inanem operam; unde verbum, satius est otiari quam nihil agere. — Nihil agit. Elegans formula; id est, nihil promovet. Lact. l. V, cap. 14: Sed nihil fortasse apud ipsos agamus. De Ira cap. 22: Ne nihil apud istos agamus. Cic. pro Rosc. Amerino, cap. 45: Quae omnia si . . . in patronum voluerit conferre, nihil egerit. BUN.

He does nothing. Those who spend empty effort are proverbially said to do nothing; hence the saying, better to be idle than to do nothing. — Nihil agit. An elegant formula; that is, he achieves nothing. Lactantius book V, chapter 14: But perhaps we may achieve nothing with them. De ira chapter 22: Lest we achieve nothing with these men. Cicero, For Roscius of Ameria, chapter 45: If he should wish to lay all these things... upon his advocate, he will have achieved nothing. BUN.

[9] ‹lemma: Furem suum prodit› · col 362 Furem suum prodit. Hanc restitui lectionem, quae cunctorum ferme mss. est et vet. edit. Rom. 1470. Caeteri editi cum 1 Reg. rec. a secunda manu habent furtum. 1 Reg. veterrimus, furorem. Et illi philosophi dicuntur furiosi litigatores, infra capitis 8 initio.

Betrays its own thief. I have restored this reading, which is that of nearly all the manuscripts and of the old Roman edition of 1470. The other editions, with 1 recent Regius in a second hand, have furtum (its theft). 1 very old Regius: furorem (its madness). And those philosophers are called raving litigants below, at the beginning of chapter 8.

[10] ‹lemma: Exceptione facta› · col 362 Exceptione facta. Exceptio apud Jureconsultos est actionis exclusio.

An exception having been made. An exception, among the jurists, is the barring of an action.

[11] ‹lemma: Nec sciri posse› · col 362 Nec sciri posse. Ita lectio quae est 3 Reg. veter. et 1 Clarom. verior et melior nobis visa est, quam aliorum nesciri posse. Vide seq.

Nor can be known. This reading, which is that of 3 old Regii and 1 Claromontanus, seemed to us truer and better than the others' nesciri posse (can be unknown). See what follows.

[12] ‹lemma: Non possunt› · col 362 Non possunt, legitur non possint, apud Buneman. qui hujus vocis sic rationem reddit. — Edo in conjunctivo ex Goth. et Lips. secundo, non possint; praecessit enim quia doceat. Idem Heumann. vidit. BUN.

They cannot: non possint is read in Bunemann, who gives this reason for the word. — I publish it in the subjunctive, non possint, from the Gotha and the second Lipsiensis; for quia doceat went before. Heumann saw the same. BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Ab aliis› · col 362 Ab aliis. Sic lego cum omnibus pene mss. et ed. Tornes. ac Soubron. In 5 rec. scriptis et editis est, ab his.

From others. So I read with almost all the manuscripts and the Tornaesius and Soubron editions. In 5 recent manuscripts and the editions is ab his (from these).

[14] ‹lemma: Quam possumus› · col 362 Quam possumus. Ita omnes fere mss. et ed. Paris. 1525. Caeterae editiones cum 6 scriptis rec., possimus.

Than we can. So nearly all manuscripts and the Paris edition of 1525. The other editions with 6 recent manuscripts: possimus.

[15] ‹lemma: Aut etiam dediscitur› · col 362 Aut etiam dediscitur. Etiam in mss. est; aut omnino dediscitur in editis.

Or is even unlearned. Etiam (even) is in the manuscripts; aut omnino dediscitur (or is wholly unlearned) in the editions.

(printed under page 184)

Page

  • running head: 361 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHI[cut off at image edge]
  • marginal letters: A ‹Verum Arcesilas ignorantiae magister›; B ‹veritate non cognita facere conatus›; C ‹Si autem scitur, posse nihil sciri›; D ‹beside the notes line "Denique nil sciri si quis putat"; it stands in the Variorum Notae area›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: The first word looks like "Vernm" in the image; I take this as worn type for Verum and set Verum (UNSURE). In "asystati" there is a mark like a tilde or macron over the final i, which looks like damaged type; set as asystati (UNSURE). "solet in asystati" is printed run together as "soletinasystati"; set with word spaces. The column ends at "homo", which continues in column 362. The VARIORUM NOTAE heading is printed across both columns and its notes are not set; they are for the later pass. The signature "Patrol. VI." is omitted. No editors' matter is in the text block.
PL 6:362
versutus, caeteris philosophis voluit scientiam eripere, ut eam domi absconderet. Nam sibi illam profecto non adimit, qui aliquid affirmat, ut caeteris adimat: sed nihil agit; apparet enim, ac furem suum prodit. Quanto faceret sapientius ac verius, si exceptione facta, diceret, causas rationesque duntaxat rerum coelestium, seu naturalium, quia sunt abditae, nec sciri posse, quia nullus doceat, nec quaeri oportere, quia inveniri quaerendo non possunt. Qua exceptione interposita, et physicos admonuisset, ne quaererent ea quae modum excederent cogitationis humanae; et seipsum calumniae invidia liberasset; et nobis certe dedisset aliquid, quod sequeremur. Nunc autem cum ab illis sequendis nos retraxerit, ne velimus plus scire, quam possumus, non minus a se quoque ipso retraxit. Quis enim velit laborare, ne quidquam sciat? aut ejusmodi suscipere doctrinam, ut etiam communem scientiam perdat? Quae si doctrina est, scientia constet necesse est; si non est, quis tam stultus est, ut discendum id putet, in quo aut nihil discitur aut etiam dediscitur? Quare si neque omnia sciri possunt, quod physici putaverunt, neque nihil, quod Academici, philosophia omnis extincta est.
being cunning, wished to snatch knowledge away from the other philosophers, so as to hide it at home. For he who affirms something in order to take it away from others certainly does not take it away from himself: but he achieves nothing; for it shows through, and betrays its thief. How much more wisely and truly would he have acted, if, making an exception, he had said that only the causes and reasons of heavenly or natural things, because they are hidden, can neither be known, since no one teaches them, nor ought to be sought, since they cannot be found by seeking. By interposing this exception he would both have warned the physicists not to seek those things which exceed the measure of human thought; and he would have freed himself from the odium of false accusation; and he would certainly have given us something to follow. But now, since he has drawn us back from following them, so that we may not wish to know more than we can, he has no less drawn us back from himself too. For who would wish to labour so as to know nothing? or to take up a teaching of such a kind as to lose even common knowledge? If this is a teaching, it must necessarily consist of knowledge; if it is not, who is so foolish as to think that something must be learned in which either nothing is learned or something is even unlearned? Therefore, if neither can all things be known, as the physicists thought, nor nothing, as the Academics [thought], all philosophy is extinguished.
CAPUT VII.
Chapter VII.
De philosophia ethica et summo bono.
On ethical philosophy and the highest good.
Transeamus nunc ad alteram philosophiae partem, quam ipsi moralem vocant, in qua totius philosophiae ratio continetur; si quidem in illa physica sola oblectatio est, in hac etiam utilitas. Et quoniam in disponendo vitae statu, formandisque moribus, periculo majori peccatur, majorem diligentiam necesse est adhiberi, ut sciamus quomodo nos oporteat vivere. Illic enim potest venia concedi; quia sive aliquid
Let us pass now to the other part of philosophy, which they themselves call moral, in which the whole system of philosophy is contained; since in that physical part there is delight alone, in this one there is also usefulness. And since in arranging the state of life and in forming morals one errs at greater peril, greater diligence must be applied, so that we may know how we ought to live. For there pardon can be granted; because whether something
Editors' notes and page, col. 362

Page

  • running head: SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. (cut at left edge of image; first word(s) not visible)
  • marginal letters: A ‹versutus, caeteris philosophis›; B ‹retraxit. Quis enim velit›; C ‹majori peccatur, majorem›; D ‹cunctorum ferme mss.› (beside the page-foot notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence with "versutus" and ends mid-sentence with "aliquid"; full-width heading of the page-foot notes, cut at left edge ("...UM NOTAE."), stands between the text block and the notes and is not set; the page-foot notes (beginning "utraque 78, 93, 97") are left for the later pass; text prints "ab illis" where the notes lemma reads "Ab aliis", set as printed; no editors' matter in the text block
PL 6:363
dicunt, nihil prosunt, sive delirant, nihil nocent. Hic vero nullus dissidio, nullus errori est locus. Unum sentire omnes oportet, ipsamque philosophiam uno quasi ore praecipere; quia si quid fuerit erratum, vita omnis evertitur. In illa priori parte ut periculi minus, ita plus difficultatis est; quod obscura rerum ratio cogit diversa et varia sentire. Hic ut periculi plus, ita minus dificultatis; quod ipse usus rerum et quotidiana experimenta possunt docere, quid sit verius, et melius. Videamus ergo, utrumne consentiant, aut quid nobis afferant, quo rectius vita degatur. Non necesse est omnia circuire. unum eligamus, ac potissimum, quod est summum ac
they say, they do no good, or if they rave, they do no harm. Here, however, there is no room for disagreement, none for error. All must think one and the same thing, and teach philosophy itself as if with one mouth; for if any error has been made, the whole of life is overturned. In that former part, as there is less danger, so there is more difficulty, since the obscure nature of things compels them to think diverse and varied things. Here, as there is more danger, so there is less difficulty, since the very use of things and daily experience can teach what is truer and better. Let us see, then, whether they agree, or what they offer us by which life may be lived more rightly. It is not necessary to go round all of them: let us choose one, and that above all which is the highest and
Editors' notes and page, col. 363

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. The top line of the col 364 foot is cut off in the rendered image (marked [line cut in image]); the left image may also start below the first note line. --> [1] ‹lemma: Epicurus summum bonum in voluptate animi esse censet› · col 363 Epicurus summum bonum in voluptate animi esse censet. Est optima sententia, quam deinde ii, qui inepte illum sequebantur, sinistre sunt interpretati. Praeter Gassendum, consulatur hic Stanleius Histor. Phil., pag. 1052. WALCHIUS — Lactantius, sibi parum constans, infra cap. 17, illum voluptatis corporis assertorem, et cap. 27, voluptarium hominem nominat; ex. Cicer. secunda Tuscul., Senecam quidem maximum stoicorum, quorum dogmata vehementer a corporis voluptatibus abhorrent, Epicuri studiosissimum fuisse ex ejus epistolis constat, quas ferme omnes aliquo Epicuri praecepto conclusas voluit, ejusque de illo sententiam habes cap. 12 et 13, de Vita beata. Quodnam autem summum bonum, et quam voluptatem finem esse dicat Epicurus, suam ipsemet sententiam enuntiat in epistola ad Menaeceum apud Laertium in Epicur. claris disertisque verbis, cujus sententiae meminit quoque Cicero in primo de Finibus. Petrus Victor., Variar. Lect. lib. XXVII, c. 14, persimilem eum Socrati fuisse contendit; et Laertius testatur, plerosque asseruisse illum continentissimum, adeo ut aqua tantum et cibario pane contentus fuerit. ISAEUS. — In sequenti capite videbimus, quatenus animi voluptas Epicuro sit finis bonorum.

Epicurus holds that the highest good lies in pleasure of the mind. It is an excellent opinion, which those who afterwards followed him foolishly interpreted perversely. Besides Gassendi, consult here Stanley, History of Philosophy, page 1052. WALCH — Lactantius, little consistent with himself, below in chapter 17 calls him an advocate of bodily pleasure, and in chapter 27 a man of pleasure; following Cicero, second Tusculan. Yet it is clear from his letters that Seneca, the greatest of the Stoics, whose doctrines recoil strongly from bodily pleasures, was a most devoted admirer of Epicurus: he chose to close almost all his letters with some precept of Epicurus, and you have his opinion of him in chapters 12 and 13 of De vita beata. What highest good, moreover, and what pleasure Epicurus says is the end, he himself declares in clear and eloquent words in his letter to Menoeceus, in Laertius's Epicurus; Cicero too mentions this view in the first book De finibus. Petrus Victorius, Variae lectiones book XXVII, chapter 14, contends that he was very like Socrates; and Laertius testifies that most asserted he was most temperate, so much so that he was content with water and common bread alone. ISAEUS. — In the following chapter we shall see how far pleasure of the mind is for Epicurus the end of goods.

[2] ‹lemma: Aristippus› · col 363 Aristippus. A Lactantio infra depingitur tanquam omnium Scenarum homo, quique id unicum sibi propositum habuerit, cujusvis ingenio mentem suam ac mores accommodaret. Extat hujus Vita apud Laertium lib. II. Multa de hujus asotia lege apud Athenaeum, lib. XII δειπνοσοφιστικῶν. Ex Ecclesiasticis porro hujus dogma notat Epiphanius tom. II. lib. III, contra Haereses. Contra eos qui voluptatem bonorum finem constituunt, disputat etiam Arist. in X Moralium. BETUL.

Aristippus. He is portrayed below by Lactantius as a man for every stage, whose one aim was to fit his mind and manners to anyone's temper. His Life is extant in Laertius, book II. Read much about his profligacy in Athenaeus, Deipnosophists book XII. Among the Church writers, moreover, Epiphanius notes his doctrine, volume II, book III, Against Heresies. Aristotle too argues against those who make pleasure the end of goods, in Ethics X. BETUL.

[3] ‹lemma: Callipho› · col 363 Callipho. Cicero lib. II de Finib., cap. 6: Callipho adjunxit ad honestatem voluptatem; et lib. IV Acad., c. 45, fin. BUN.

Callipho. Cicero, De finibus book II, chapter 6: Callipho joined pleasure to virtue; and Academica book IV, chapter 45, end. BUN.

[4] ‹lemma: Callipho et Dinomachus› · cols 363–364 Callipho et Dinomachus. Multi mss. et editi addunt, sed perperam, Cyrenaici, quam vocem respuunt tres mss. Reg quorum duo sunt omnium antiquissimi. Et quidem eos a Cyrenaicis distinguunt Cicero, l. III de Officiis sub finem, et Lactantius hic et infra cap. 8, necnon lib. VII, cap. 7. Et merito; hi enim ambo philosophi, qui in summo bono statuendo honestatem cum voluptate jungebant, alieni profecto erant ab Aristippi sententia, qui summum bonum in solis [line cut in image] ...tatem. In Epit. cap. 33. Dinomachus et Callipho honestam voluptatem probaverunt. BONEMAN.

Callipho and Dinomachus. Many manuscripts and editions add, wrongly, Cyrenaici (the Cyrenaics), a word rejected by three Regii manuscripts, of which two are the oldest of all. Indeed Cicero distinguishes them from the Cyrenaics, De officiis book III near the end, and so does Lactantius here and below in chapter 8, and also book VII, chapter 7. And rightly; for these two philosophers, who in fixing the highest good joined virtue with pleasure, were certainly far from the view of Aristippus, who [placed] the highest good in [bodily pleasures] alone [line cut in image] ...[-tatem]. In the Epitome, chapter 33: Dinomachus and Callipho approved honourable pleasure. BONEMAN.

[5] ‹lemma: Diodorus cum privatione doloris. Summum bonum posuit Hieronymus in non dolendo› · col 364 Diodorus cum privatione doloris. Summum bonum posuit Hieronymus in non dolendo. Sic nonnulli mss. inter quos 2 Reg. et 1 Colb. ac 3 vet. edd. et Epitom. cap. 56, et sic omnino legendum et interpungendum esse hunc locum, ut olim Ciacconius animadvertit, et ratio ipsa, et Cicero, ex quo ferme omnia haec mutuatus est Lactantius, pervincunt. Nam si legas: Diodorus in privatione doloris summum bonum posuit: Hieronymus in non dolendo, ut vulgo legitur, quae erit differentia inter opinionem Diodori, et Hieronymi? At constat ex Cicerone, hoc interesse, quod Diodorus non simpliciter in non dolendo summum bonum ponebat, sed cum vacuitate doloris honestatem jungebat. Hieronymus vero id simpliciter, nullo adjecto, in non dolendo statuebat. Vide Ciceron. l. II de Fin., paulo post initium. ISAEUS. — Diodori multi fuere philosophiae addicti; sed is de quo hic est sermo, Socratis fuit discipulus: Hieronymus ille Rhodius fuit philosophus. Alius est profecto a S. Hieronymo.

Diodorus, with the absence of pain. Hieronymus placed the highest good in not feeling pain. So some manuscripts, among them 2 Regii and 1 Colbertinus, and 3 old editions, and the Epitome chapter 56; and that this passage must by all means be read and punctuated so, as Ciacconius once observed, both reason itself and Cicero — from whom Lactantius borrowed almost all of this — prove decisively. For if you read: Diodorus placed the highest good in the absence of pain: Hieronymus in not feeling pain, as is commonly read, what difference will there be between the opinion of Diodorus and that of Hieronymus? But it is clear from Cicero that the difference is this: Diodorus did not place the highest good simply in not feeling pain, but joined virtue to freedom from pain; whereas Hieronymus set it simply, with nothing added, in not feeling pain. See Cicero, De finibus book II, a little after the beginning. ISAEUS. — Many men named Diodorus were devoted to philosophy; but the one spoken of here was a disciple of Socrates. That Hieronymus was a philosopher of Rhodes; he is certainly someone other than St Jerome.

[6] ‹lemma: Peripatetici› · col 364 Peripatetici. Quid stoici a peripateticis differant, et quae tria sint peripateticorum genera, lege apud Cic. in IV de Finibus; apud ipsum peripateticorum principem, lib. Moralium I, cap. 8. BETULEIUS.

The Peripatetics. How the Stoics differ from the Peripatetics, and what the three kinds of goods of the Peripatetics are, read in Cicero, De finibus IV; and in the prince of the Peripatetics himself, Ethics book I, chapter 8. BETULEIUS.

[7] ‹lemma: Herilli› · col 364 Herilli. Hic fuit Chalcedonius, vel potius Carthaginensis. ὁ Καρχηδόνιος, ait Laertius. Zenonis discipulus erat; ac de eo vide Ciceronem in IV Academicar. quaestion. et lib. II de Finibus. Herillus porro ad scientiam omnia revocans, unum quoddam bonum vidit. Sed nec optimum, nec quo vita gubernari possit. Itaque hic ipse jampridem est rejectus.

Of Herillus. He was of Chalcedon, or rather of Carthage: "the Carthaginian", says Laertius. He was a disciple of Zeno; on him see Cicero, Academic Questions IV and De finibus book II. Herillus, moreover, referring everything to knowledge, saw one particular good — but neither the best, nor one by which life could be governed. And so he himself has long since been rejected.

[8] ‹lemma: Zenonis› · col 364 Zenonis Haec Cicero antiquis peripateticis tribuit. Sed ille idem Cicero refert, Zenoni summum bonum esse id quod ducitur a conciliatione naturae. Memineris interim, Zenonem προηγμένα dicere, quae alii bona vocant: quae Latinorum alii praeentia, alii producta interpretantur, de quibus forte alibi plura. BETULEIUS.

Of Zeno. Cicero attributes these things to the old Peripatetics. But the same Cicero reports that for Zeno the highest good is that which is derived from the attraction of nature. Remember meanwhile that Zeno calls proēgmena (things preferred) what others call goods: which some Latin writers render praeentia, others producta; of these, perhaps, more elsewhere. BETULEIUS.

[9] ‹lemma: Stoicorum› · col 364 Stoicorum. Extat sub S. Augustini nomine inscriptus liber de stoicis et Epicureis, in quo ait: Epicuro finis bonorum est voluptas corporis, stoico virtus animi, christiano donum Dei.

Of the Stoics. There is extant a book on the Stoics and Epicureans inscribed with the name of St Augustine, in which he says: For the Epicurean the end of goods is bodily pleasure, for the Stoic virtue of mind, for the Christian the gift of God.

[10] ‹lemma: In omnibus› · col 364 In omnibus. Heumannus delet in, juxta sex veteres editiones.

In all. Heumann deletes in, following six old editions.

(printed under page 185)

Page

  • running head: 363 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the right edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹dicunt, nihil prosunt›; B ‹Quod est summum. Quae philosophorum› (in the Variorum Notae); C ‹dem maximum stoicorum› (in the Variorum Notae); D ‹tium lib. II. Multa de hujus› (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column number in the head is blurred and could be read as 365; set as 363 per the assignment. After "circuire" the page shows a stop followed by lowercase "unum"; it is set as printed, possibly a damaged colon. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" is not set; it stands below the text block and is cut off at the right edge. The Variorum Notae at the page foot (Quod est summum ...; Cardo versatur ...; Epicurus summum bonum ...; Aristippus ...; Callipho ...; Callipho et Dinomachus ...) are not set, as they are left for the later apparatus pass. The column ends mid-sentence with "ac".
PL 6:364
principale, in quo totius sapientiae cardo versatur. Epicurus summum bonum in voluptate animi esse censet; Aristippus in voluptate corporis; Callipho et Dinomachus honestatem cum voluptate junxerunt; Diodorus cum privatione doloris. Summum bonum posuit H⟨i⟩eronymus in non dolendo; peripatetici autem in bonis animi, et corporis, et fortunae. Herilli summum bonum est scientia; Zenonis, cum natura congruenter vivere: quorumdam stoicorum, virtutem sequi; Aristoteles in honestate ac virtute summum bonum collocavit. Hae sunt fere omnium sententiae. In tanta diversitate, quem sequimur? cui credimus? Par est in omnibus auctoritas. Si eligere possumus
the chief point, on which the hinge of all wisdom turns. Epicurus holds that the highest good lies in pleasure of the mind; Aristippus, in pleasure of the body; Callipho and Dinomachus joined honour with pleasure; Diodorus, with freedom from pain. Hieronymus placed the highest good in not feeling pain; the Peripatetics, again, in the goods of the mind, and of the body, and of fortune. The highest good of Herillus is knowledge; that of Zeno, to live in agreement with nature; that of certain Stoics, to follow virtue; Aristotle set the highest good in honour and virtue. These are the opinions of nearly all. In so great a diversity, whom do we follow? whom do we believe? The authority is equal in them all. If we can choose
Editors' notes and page, col. 364

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  • running head: [LAC]TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 364 (column number blurred in the scan)
  • marginal letters: A principale, in quo totius sapientiae; B (beside the footnotes: corporeis voluptatibus statuebat); C (beside the footnotes: madvertit, et ratio ipsa); D (beside the footnotes: Herilli. Hic fuit Chalcedonius)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: H⟨i⟩eronymus: the i is lost to damaged type (H.eronymus). The column ends with the word split "pos-/sumus" (tail at the top of col 365, read there in QA Q2a): set whole here as "possumus"; the tail is not repeated at the head of col 365. Everything below VARIORUM NOTAE (Betuleius, Isaeus, Buneman notes) is editors' apparatus, not set.
PL 6:365
quod est melius, jam non est philosophia nobis necessaria, quia sapientes jam sumus, qui de sapientium sententiis judicemus. Cum vero discendae sapientiae causa veniamus, qui possumus judicare, qui nondum sapere coeperimus? maxime cum praesto adsit academicus, qui nos pallio retrahat, ac vetet cuiquam credere, nec tamen afferat ipse quod sequamur.
what is better, philosophy is no longer necessary to us, since we are already wise, we who judge the opinions of the wise. But since we come for the sake of learning wisdom, how can we judge, we who have not yet begun to be wise? especially since the Academic is at hand to pull us back by the cloak and forbid us to believe anyone, and yet does not himself offer anything for us to follow.
CAPUT VIII.
Chapter VIII.
De summo bono, et animi corporisque voluptatibus et virtute.
Of the highest good, and of the pleasures of the mind and of the body, and of virtue.
Quid ergo superest, nisi ut, omissis litigatoribus furiosis ac pertinacibus, veniamus ad judicem illum, scilicet datorem simplicis et quietae sapientiae? Quae non tantum formare nos, ac inducere in viam possit, verum etiam de controversiis istorum ferre sententiam. Haec nos docet, quid sit hominis verum ac summum bonum: de quo priusquam dicere incipio, illae omnes sententiae sunt refellendae, ut appareat neminem illorum fuisse sapientem. Cum de officio hominis agatur, oportet summum summi animalis bonum in eo constitui, quod commune cum caeteris animalibus esse non possit. Sed ut feris dentes, armentis cornua, volucribus pennae, propria sunt: sic homini aliquid suum debet adscribi, sine quo rationem suae conditionis amittat. Nam quod vivendi aut generandi causa datum est omnibus, est quidem bonum naturale; summum tamen non est, nisi quod est unicuique generi proprium. Sapiens ergo non
What then remains, except that, leaving aside these raving and obstinate litigants, we come to that judge, namely the giver of simple and tranquil wisdom? This can not only form us and lead us into the way, but also pass sentence on the controversies of these men. It teaches us what the true and highest good of man is: and before I begin to speak of it, all those opinions must be refuted, so that it may be plain that none of those men was wise. Since it is the duty of man that is in question, the highest good of the highest animal must be placed in that which cannot be common to it with the other animals. But just as teeth are proper to wild beasts, horns to cattle, wings to birds, so something of his own must be assigned to man, without which he would lose the rationale of his condition. For what has been given to all for the sake of living or of begetting is indeed a natural good; yet nothing is the highest except what is proper to each kind. Not wise, therefore,
Editors' notes and page, col. 365

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Veniamus› · col 365 Veniamus. Ex mss. et multis editis restitui; in nonnullis est venimus.

Let us come. I have restored this from the manuscripts and many editions; in some is venimus (we come).

[2] ‹lemma: Qui› · col 365 Qui. Addidi ex potioribus et vetustis mss. Reg. aliisque, et editis decem: in nonnullis omissum, in pluribus est quid.

Who. I have added it from the better and older Regii manuscripts and others, and from ten editions: in some it is omitted, in most is quid (what).

[3] ‹lemma: Nos pallio retrahat› · col 365 Nos pallio retrahat. Isidorus dictum putat Pallium a pellibus, quia prius super indumenta pellicea veteres induebantur, quasi pellea, sive a palla, per derivationem. Philosophorum propria haec vestis fuit, ut apparet ex dicto Herodis Attici apud Gellium lib. IX: Video, inquit, barbam et pallium, philosophum non video. Apud Graecos etiam in usu praecipue fuit. Hinc palliati sumuntur pro Graecis, sicut pro Romanis togati. Dictae propterea fabulae palliatae, in quibus inducebantur Graeci, sicut togatae in quibus Romani. Communem utrique sexui fuisse vestem, colligi potest ex Ulpiano, Tacito, qui promiscua appellat pallia. Martialis: Hanc velo, quae facilis, quae palliolata vagatur. Scripsit quoque Lampridius, Matronas regias contentas esse debere unico pallio, auro sparso. Etiam in lecto usos fuisse veteres, significare videtur Ovid. lib. I Amor., Eleg. 2: Nec in lecto pallia nostra sedent.

Should hold us back by the cloak. Isidore thinks pallium is said from pelles (skins), because the ancients used formerly to wear skin garments over their clothing, as if "pellea"; or from palla, by derivation. This garment was proper to philosophers, as appears from the saying of Herodes Atticus in Gellius book IX: I see, he says, a beard and a cloak; a philosopher I do not see. Among the Greeks too it was chiefly in use. Hence the palliati are taken for Greeks, as the togati for Romans. Plays were therefore called palliatae in which Greeks were brought on, as togatae in which Romans were. That the garment was common to both sexes may be gathered from Ulpian and Tacitus, who calls cloaks promiscuous. Martial: "This one I want, who is easy, who wanders about in a little cloak." Lampridius also wrote that royal matrons ought to be content with a single cloak sprinkled with gold. That the ancients used it in bed too Ovid seems to indicate, Amores book I, elegy 2: "Nor do my coverlets stay put on the bed."

[4] ‹lemma: Omissis litigatoribus furiosis› · cols 365–366 Omissis litigatoribus furiosis. Ita cum cunctis prope editis manuscripti omnes, praeter 3 scriptos et 4 excusos, in quibus est litigationibus. At litigatoribus, adjuncta furiosis ac pertinacibus flagitant. Hunc locum sic exhibet antiquissimus 1 Bonon. codex: Quid ergo superest, nisi ut obvius his litigatoribus furiosis et pertinacibus manus demus ad judicem? Non igitur legendum est litigationibus: quia, ut recte ait Thomasius, non de contentionibus et litigationibus hic agitur, sed de hominibus contentiosis et litigatoribus.

Leaving aside the raving litigants. So, with almost all the editions, all the manuscripts, except 3 manuscripts and 4 printed editions, in which is litigationibus (litigations). But the adjuncts furiosis ac pertinacibus (raving and obstinate) demand litigatoribus (litigants). The very old 1 Bononiensis codex gives this passage thus: What then remains, but that, meeting these raving and obstinate litigants, we yield ourselves to the judge? Litigationibus is therefore not to be read: for, as Thomasius rightly says, the subject here is not contentions and litigations but contentious and litigious men.

[5] ‹lemma: Sapientiae? quae› · col 366 Sapientiae? quae. Sic reposui ex mss. 6 Reg., 2 Bonon., Cauc., et 11 aliis ac vulgatis Tornes. et Walch. In 4 scriptis rec., et 10 excusis, qui.

Of wisdom? which. So I have restored from manuscripts 6 Regii, 2 Bononienses, Cauci's and 11 others, and the Tornaesius and Walch editions. In 4 recent manuscripts and 10 printed editions, qui.

[6] ‹lemma: Haec nos› · col 366 Haec nos. Idem mss. qui supra. In 1 Reg. rec. et in vulgatis, Hic nos.

This us. The same manuscripts as above. In 1 recent Regius and in the editions, Hic nos (here us).

[7] ‹lemma: Summi animalis› · col 366 Summi animalis. Id est hominis; atque in eo explicando summo bono totum hoc caput occupatur.

Of the highest animal. That is, of man; and this whole chapter is taken up with explaining his highest good.

[8] ‹lemma: Non fuit› · col 366 Non fuit. Is est Epicurus.

There was not. This is Epicurus.

[9] ‹lemma: Communis est› · col 366 Communis est. Ita ferunt omnes editi et mss. praeter 1 Bonon. antiq., 1 Reg. rec. et 1 Colb., in quibus est, commune.

Is common. So read all the editions and manuscripts except 1 old Bononiensis, 1 recent Regius and 1 Colbertinus, in which is commune (neuter).

[10] ‹lemma: Quem semper in corporis voluptates ruentem› · col 366 Quem semper in corporis voluptates ruentem. Legit Buneman.: Quem corporis semper voluptatem tuentem atque in hunc locum notam sequentem exhibet. — Ita edo (inquit); nam plures scripti e tediti in singulari, voluptatem, rectius. Est quidem et altera lectio, in corporis voluptates ruentem, elegans, quam Lips., Sublac., Ven. 1471, Rost., Gryph., Tornes., Thom. et recentiores habent, ut Lact. l. VI, cap. 23: Ut in hos affectus avidissime ruerent. BUN.

Whom, always rushing into the pleasures of the body. Bunemann reads Quem corporis semper voluptatem tuentem (whom, always guarding the pleasure of the body), and gives the following note on this place. — So I publish it, he says; for many manuscripts and editions [printed "e tediti", for "et editi"] have the singular, voluptatem, more rightly. There is indeed the other reading too, in corporis voluptates ruentem, an elegant one, which the Lipsiensis and the Subiaco, Venice 1471, Rostock, Gryphius, Tornaesius, Thomasius and more recent editions have; as Lactantius book VI, chapter 23: That they rushed most greedily into these passions. BUN.

[11] ‹lemma: Cum foeminas tam rabide consectantur› · col 366 Cum foeminas tam rabide consectantur. Virgilius de equis, seu equabus: Illas ducit amor trans Gargara, transque sonantem / Ascanium. III Georgic., v. 270. FRANCIUS.

When they pursue the females so madly. Virgil, of horses, or mares: "Love leads them across Gargarus and across the roaring Ascanius." Georgics III, verse 270. FRANCIUS.

[12] ‹lemma: Tam rabide consectantur› · col 366 Tam rabide consectantur. Ut Cicero V Tuscul., 6: Quem libidinibus inflammatum et furentem videmus omnia rabide appetentem cum inexplicabili cupiditate. BUN.

Pursue so madly. As Cicero, Tusculans V, 6: Whom we see inflamed and raging with lusts, seeking all things madly with insatiable desire. BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Cyrenaici› · col 366 Cyrenaici. Vide apud Cicer. in fin. III, de Offic.

The Cyrenaics. See Cicero, at the end of De officiis III.

[14] ‹lemma: Virtutem ex eo esse laudandam› · col 366 Virtutem ex eo esse laudandam. Ita cum 5 editis omnes fere mss. At in uno Colbertino et Cauc. ac editis 11 est ex eo ipso; in 1 Colb., ex eo solo.

That virtue is to be praised on this ground. So, with 5 editions, nearly all the manuscripts. But in one Colbertinus and Cauci's and 11 editions is ex eo ipso (on this very ground); in 1 Colbertinus, ex eo solo (on this ground alone).

[15] ‹lemma: Sus et canis› · col 366 Sus et canis. Duo quasi symbola quaedam gulae et (continues)

The pig and the dog. Two, as it were, emblems of gluttony and (continues)

(printed under page 186)

Page

  • running head: 365 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTI[AE] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹sumus quod est melius›; B ‹scilicet datorem simplicis›; C ‹est unicuique generi proprium›; D ‹inducebantur Graeci, sicut togatae› (in the Variorum notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "hominis" (Cum de officio hominis) and "bonum" (summi animalis bonum) show worn type (bominis, bonom), read as hominis and bonum; heading VARIORUM NOTAE printed across the page above the foot notes, cut off at the right edge, not set; Variorum notae at the page foot (Veniamus. Ex mss. ...) left for the later pass
PL 6:366
fuit qui summum bonum credidit animi voluptatem, quoniam illa sive securitas, sive gaudium est, communis est omnibus. Aristippo ne respondendum quidem duco, quem semper in corporis voluptates ruentem, nihilque aliud quam ventri et Veneri servientem, nemini dubium est hominem non fuisse; sic enim vixit, ut nihil inter eum pecudemque distaret, nisi unum, quod loquebatur. Quod si asino, aut cani, aut sui facultas loquendi tribuatur, quaerasque ab his, quid sibi velint, cum feminas tam rabide consectantur, ut vix divelli queant, cibos etiam, potumque negligant? cur aut alios mares violenter abigant, aut ne victi quidem absistant, sed a fortioribus saepe contriti, eo magis insectentur? cur nec imbres, nec frigora pertimescant, laborem suscipiant, periculum non recusent? Quid aliud respondebunt, nisi summum bonum esse corporis voluptatem? eam se appetere, ut afficiantur suavissimis sensibus; eosque esse tanti, ut assequendorum causa, nec laborem sibi ullum, nec vulnera, nec mortem ipsam recusandam putent. Ab hisne igitur praecepta vivendi petemus, qui hoc idem sentiunt, quod animae rationis expertes?
was he who believed the highest good to be pleasure of the mind, since that, whether it is tranquillity or joy, is common to all. Aristippus I do not think even worth answering; no one doubts that he, always rushing into the pleasures of the body and serving nothing else but the belly and Venus, was not a man; for he lived in such a way that nothing separated him from a beast except one thing, that he spoke. But if the faculty of speaking were granted to an ass, or a dog, or a pig, and you were to ask them what they want when they pursue females so madly that they can scarcely be torn away, and even neglect food and drink? why they either drive other males off violently, or even when beaten do not give up, but, though often crushed by stronger ones, pursue all the more? why they fear neither rains nor cold, take on toil, do not refuse danger? What else will they answer but that the highest good is the pleasure of the body? that they seek it in order to be affected by the sweetest sensations; and that these are worth so much that for the sake of obtaining them they think that no toil, nor wounds, nor death itself is to be refused. Shall we then seek precepts for living from these, who think the very same thing as animals devoid of reason?
Aiunt Cyrenaici virtdtem ipsam ex eo esse laudandam, quod sit officiens voluptatis. Verum, inquit obscoenus canis, aut sus ille lutulentus. Nam ideo cum adversario summa virium contentione depugno, ut virtus mea pariat mihi voluptatem, cujus expers sim necesse est, si victus abcessero. Ab his ergo sapere discemus, quos a pecudibus ac belluis, non sententia, sed lingua discernit? Privationem doloris
The Cyrenaics say that virtue itself is to be praised for this reason, that it is productive of pleasure. True, says the obscene dog, or that muddy pig. For I fight it out with my adversary with the utmost exertion of my strength for this reason, that my virtue may produce pleasure for me, which I must necessarily be without if I go away defeated. Shall we then learn to be wise from these, whom not their judgement but their tongue distinguishes from cattle and beasts? As for the absence of pain,
Editors' notes and page, col. 366

Page

  • running head: ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 366 (cut off at left edge; presumably DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.)
  • marginal letters: A fuit qui summum bonum credidit; B periculum non recusent? Quid aliud; C tentia, sed lingua discernit?; D tem atque in hunc locum (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: virtdtem is UNSURE: it may be a damaged u rather than a printed d. officiens is UNSURE: the first letter reads as o on the scan but may be a broken e. The full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE stands below the text block, cut off at the left edge; it is not set. The Variorum Notae beneath it (Sapientiae? quae ... Sus et canis) are left for the later pass.
PL 6:367
summum bonum putare, non plane peripateticorum ac stoicorum, sed clinicorum philosophorum est. Quis enim non intelligat ab aegrotis et in aliquo dolore positis esse hoc disputatum? Quid tam ridiculum, quam id habere pro summo bono, quod medicus possit dare? Dolendum est ergo, ut fruamur bono, et quidem graviter ac saepe, ut sit postea, non dolere, jucundius. Miserrimus est igitur, qui nunquam doluit; quia bono caret: quem nos felicissimum putabamus, quia malo caruit. Ab hac vanitate non longe abfuit, qui, omnino nihil dolere, summum bonum dixit. Nam praeter quod omne animal doloris est fugiens, quis potest sibi hoc bonum praestare, quod nobis ut eveniat, nihil aliud possumus quam optare? Summum autem bonum non potest efficere quemquam beatum, nisi semper fuerit in ipsius potestate: hoc autem non virtus homini, non doctrina, non labor, sed natura ipsa cunctis animantibus praestat. Qui voluptatem cum honestate junxerunt, communionem hanc effugere voluerunt, sed effecerunt repugnans bonum; quoniam qui voluptati deditus est, honestate careat necesse est, qui honestati studet, voluptate.
to think it the highest good is plainly the mark not of Peripatetic and Stoic philosophers, but of clinical, that is bedridden, philosophers. For who would not understand that this was argued by the sick and by people placed in some pain? What is so ridiculous as to hold for the highest good that which a physician can give? One must therefore suffer pain in order to enjoy the good, and indeed severely and often, so that afterwards not being in pain may be the more pleasant. Most wretched, then, is he who has never been in pain, because he lacks the good; whereas we used to think him most happy, because he was free from evil. Not far from this folly was he who said that to feel no pain at all is the highest good. For besides the fact that every animal shuns pain, who can secure for himself this good, which we can do nothing but wish may befall us? But the highest good cannot make anyone happy unless it is always in his own power; and this it is not virtue, not learning, not toil that furnishes to man, but nature itself to all living creatures. Those who joined pleasure with honour wished to escape this sharing in common, but they produced a self-contradictory good; since he who is given over to pleasure must of necessity lack honour, and he who is devoted to honour must lack pleasure.
Peripateticorum bonum nimium multiplex, et exceptis animi bonis, quae ipsa quae sint, magna contentio est, commune cum belluis potest videri. Nam corporis bona, id est, incolumitas, indolentia, valetudo, non minus sunt mutis, quam homini necessaria; ac nescio an etiam magis, quia homo et medelis, et ministeriis sublevari potest, muta non possunt. Item, quae appellant fortunae bona; nam sicut homini opibus ad vitam tuendam, ita illis
The good of the Peripatetics is excessively manifold, and, apart from the goods of the soul, about which there is great dispute as to what they themselves are, it can be seen to be shared with the beasts. For the goods of the body, that is, soundness, freedom from pain, health, are no less necessary to dumb creatures than to man; and I rather think even more so, because man can be relieved both by remedies and by services, whereas dumb creatures cannot. Likewise what they call the goods of fortune; for just as for man there is need of wealth to sustain life, so for them
Editors' notes and page, col. 367

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 367 libidinis. Sic eos conjungit Petrus II Epist., cap. II, 22, ac Virgilius canem obscoenum vocat; et juxta Horatium, amica luto sus.

(continued) of lust. So Peter joins them, 2 Peter 2:22, and Virgil calls the dog obscene; and according to Horace, the sow, friend of mud.

[2] ‹lemma: Non plane peripateticorum› · col 367 Non plane peripateticorum. Janus Guillielmi, in quaest. ad Plaut. Menaech., cap. 4, putat legendum, plano peripateticorum; ut nova compositione verbi, inconstantiam disserendi, et simul erraticam ambulationem Aristotelicorum Lactantius exagitarit: errones enim planos dici notum est. ISAEUS.

Not plainly of the Peripatetics. Janus Gulielmius, in his Questions on Plautus's Menaechmi, chapter 4, thinks one should read plano peripateticorum (of the vagabond Peripatetics), so that by a new compounding of the word Lactantius would have mocked both the inconstancy of the Aristotelians' arguing and at the same time their wandering walk: for it is well known that vagrants are called plani. ISAEUS.

[3] ‹lemma: Sed clinicorum› · cols 367–368 Sed clinicorum. Ms. Clynicorum. Nihil enim certius, quam reliquisse Lactant. Clinicorum philosophorum. Clinicos philosophos ridicule dicit, aegrotos lectis affixos, et de valentium vita beata disputantes, ea quae praesens aegritudo dictat: alludens ad clinicos medicos, qui ex Hippocratis secta lectos aegrotorum ambiunt, et curationes praescribunt. JANUS GUILIELMI. — Hanc emendationem et nos probamus, ac praeter supra laudatum codicem, ita haberi scito in 3 Regiis quorum duo sunt vetustissimi, in 2 Colb., Cauc., Vict., Lips., Pal., Em., Ultr., Brun., itemque in aliis 1 Reg., 1 Colb. et 1, Clarom.; in his 3 postremis videtur fuisse a prima manu, Clinicorum. Mss. Navar. et 1 Clarom. a secunda manu Ethnicorum; ms. Marm., Chinicorum, mendose. pro Clinicorum, quae est genuina lectio. Quippe Lactantius subjungit: Quis enim non intelligat, ab aegrotis et in aliquo dolore positis esse hoc disputatum. Sic apud Cyprianum epist. 69, ad Magnum: Non interrogentur utrumne clinici sint, an peripatetici; id est utrum disputantes ambulent ut peripatetici, aut stoici qui in porticu solebant disserere; an decumbant in lectis gravissimo morbo laborantes, ut clinici. CLINICUS enim vocabatur, qui sine ulla salutis spe de lecto surgere non poterat. Quaedam tamen editiones, atque inter eas Colon. 1544, Betul. 1563, Torn. 1567, legunt Cynicorum loco voculae istius Clinicorum.

But of the bedridden. A manuscript has Clynicorum. Nothing is more certain than that Lactantius left Clinicorum philosophorum (of the bedridden philosophers). He mockingly calls them bedridden philosophers — sick men fastened to their beds, disputing about the happy life of the healthy what their present sickness dictates — alluding to the clinical physicians who, of the school of Hippocrates, go round the beds of the sick and prescribe cures. JANUS GULIELMIUS. — We too approve this emendation; and know that, besides the manuscript cited above, it is so found in 3 Regii, of which two are very old, in 2 Colbertini, Cauci's, the Victorinus, Lipsiensis, Palatinus, Em., Utrecht and Brunsvicensis, and likewise in another 1 Regius, 1 Colbertinus and 1 Claromontanus; in these last 3 Clinicorum seems to have been the first hand. The Navarre manuscript and 1 Claromontanus in a second hand have Ethnicorum (of the heathen); the Marm. manuscript Chinicorum, wrongly, for Clinicorum, which is the genuine reading. For Lactantius adds: For who would not understand that this was argued by sick men and men in some pain. So in Cyprian, letter 69, to Magnus: Let them not be asked whether they are clinici or peripatetici; that is, whether in disputing they walk about like the Peripatetics, or the Stoics who used to discourse in the porch; or whether they lie in bed suffering from a very grave illness, like the clinici. For one was called CLINICUS who could not rise from his bed, without any hope of recovery. Some editions, however, and among them Cologne 1544, Betuleius 1563, Tornaesius 1567, read Cynicorum (of the Cynics) in place of that little word Clinicorum.

[4] ‹lemma: Praeter quod› · col 368 Praeter quod. Heumannus legit, praeterquam quod, juxta editionem 1497.

Besides that. Heumann reads praeterquam quod (except that), following the edition of 1497.

[5] ‹lemma: Quis› · col 368 Quis. Reposui ex mss. et 4 vet. editis; in caeteris vulgatis est, qui.

Who. I have restored this from the manuscripts and 4 old editions; in the other editions is qui.

[6] ‹lemma: Et exceptis› · col 368 Et exceptis. Ex multis antiquioribus et potioribus mss. addidi voculam et, quae recentioribus quatuor vulgatis deest.

And excepting. From many older and better manuscripts I have added the little word et (and), which is missing in the four more recent editions.

[7] ‹lemma: Indolentia› · col 368 Indolentia. Vox Ciceronis aevo non recepta, ab ipso tamen Tullio usurpata, lib. II de Fin., cap. 4, et de Officiis l. III, c. 3.

Freedom from pain. A word not accepted in Cicero's age, yet used by Tully himself, De finibus book II, chapter 4, and De officiis book III, chapter 3.

[8] ‹lemma: Sicut... sic› · col 368 Sicut... sic. Reddidi sicut... sic ex Bon., Tax., Pen., Ultr., Lips. 2, 3. Quia haec particularum consecutio rarior, pro Sic, notius ita editi substituerant. Lactantius l. II, cap. 9: Sicut lux Orientis... sic Occidentis tenebrae; l. III, c. 4: Sicut tollit... sic... tollitur. BUNEMAN.

As... so. I have restored sicut... sic from the Bononiensis, Tax., Pen., Utrecht, and Lipsienses 2 and 3. Because this sequence of particles is rarer, the editions had substituted the better-known ita for sic. Lactantius book II, chapter 9: As the light of the East... so the darkness of the West; book III, chapter 4: As it takes away... so... is taken away. BUNEMAN.

[9] ‹lemma: Zenonem› · col 368 Zenonem. De quo vide apud Cic. lib. IV de Finib., Laert. in Zenon. Cittiaeo.

Zeno. On whom see Cicero, De finibus book IV, and Laertius on Zeno of Citium.

[10] ‹lemma: In iis omnia deprehenduntur› · col 368 In iis omnia deprehenduntur. Ita restitui ex mss. antiquissimis 2 Reg., 1 Bon., 2 al. Reg., Lips., Pal., ed. Tornes. ac Soubron. In 9 rec. scriptis et in excusis est, in his omnibus.

All are found in these. So I have restored from the very old manuscripts, 2 Regii, 1 Bononiensis, 2 other Regii, Lipsiensis and Palatinus, and the Tornaesius and Soubron editions. In 9 recent manuscripts and in the printed editions is in his omnibus (in all these).

[11] ‹lemma: Quae ipsa in deterius prona est› · col 368 Quae ipsa in deterius prona est. Correxi quae, ex cunctis mss. praeter 3 Jun., Tax., Pen. et edit. in quibus est, quia.

Which itself is prone to the worse. I have corrected to quae (which) from all the manuscripts except 3 — Junius, Tax., Pen. — and the editions, in which is quia (because).

[12] ‹lemma: Vel› · col 368 Vel. Reposui ex omnibus mss. et veteribus editis Rom., Tornes. ac Soubron. Caeteri vulgati habent, sed.

Or. I have restored this from all the manuscripts and the old Roman, Tornaesius and Soubron editions. The other editions have sed (but).

[13] ‹lemma: Sed scientiam› · col 368 Sed scientiam, etc. Removet Herilli dogma per causam finalem. Nam si ad studium aliquod hones- (continues)

But knowledge, etc. He sets aside the doctrine of Herillus by means of the final cause. For if to some hon- (continues)

(printed under page 187)

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  • running head: 367 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the right edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A summum bonum putare; B quemquam beatum; C possunt. Item; D tis affixos (in the Variorum notes at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column ends mid-sentence at "ita illis"; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOT[AE]" printed across both columns above the notes, cut off at the right edge, not set; the Variorum notes at the page foot (beginning "libidinis. Sic eos conjungit Petrus") left for the later pass; "clinicorum" rendered "clinical, that is bedridden" to keep the pun
PL 6:368
praeda et pabulis opus est. Ita inducendo bonum, quod non sit in hominis potestate, totum hominem alienae ditioni subjugarunt. Audiamus etiam Zenonem; nam is interdum virtutem somniat. Summum, inquit, est bonum, cum natura consentanee vivere. Belluarum igitur nobis more vivendum est. Nam quae abesse debent ab homine, in iis omnia deprehenduntur: voluptates appetunt, metuunt, fallunt, insidiantur, occidunt; et, quod ad rem maxime attinet, Deum nesciunt. Quid ergo me docet, ut vivam secundum naturam, quae ipsa in deterius prona est, et quibusdam blandimentis lenioribus in vitia praecipitat? Vel si aliam mutorum, aliam hominis dicit esse naturam, quod homo ad virtutem sit genitus, nonnihil dicit: sed tamen non erit definitio summi boni; quia nullum est animal, quod non secundum naturam suam vivat.
there is need of prey and fodder. Thus, by bringing in a good which is not in man's power, they have subjected the whole man to another's dominion. Let us hear Zeno also; for he at times dreams of virtue. The highest good, he says, is to live in agreement with nature. We must therefore live after the manner of beasts. For the things which ought to be absent from man are all found in them: they seek pleasures, they fear, they deceive, they lie in ambush, they kill; and, what most concerns the matter, they do not know God. Why then does he teach me to live according to nature, which is itself prone to the worse, and with certain gentler allurements drives headlong into vices? Or if he says that the nature of dumb animals is one thing and the nature of man another, because man was born for virtue, he says something; but yet it will not be a definition of the highest good, because there is no animal which does not live according to its own nature.
Qui scientiam summum bonum fecit, aliquid homini proprium dedit: sed scientiam alterius rei gratia homines appetunt, non propter ipsam. Quis enim scire contentus est, non expetens aliquem fructum scientiae? Artes ideo discuntur, ut exerceantur: exercentur autem, vel ad subsidia vitae, vel ad voluptatem, vel ad gloriam. Non est igitur summum bonum, quod non propter se expetitur. Quid ergo interest utrum scientiam summum bonum putemus, an illa ipsa, quae scientia ex se parit, id est, victum, gloriam, voluptatem? quae non sunt homini propria, et ideo ne summa quidem bona. Nam voluptatis et victus appetentia non homini solum, sed etiam mutis inest. Quid cupiditas gloriae? nonne in equis deprehenditur, cum victores exultant, victi dolent?
He who made knowledge the highest good gave man something proper to him; but men seek knowledge for the sake of something else, not for its own sake. For who is content to know, without seeking some fruit of knowledge? Arts are learned in order that they may be practised; and they are practised either for the support of life, or for pleasure, or for glory. That, therefore, is not the highest good which is not sought for its own sake. What difference does it make, then, whether we think knowledge the highest good, or those very things which knowledge produces from itself, that is, livelihood, glory, pleasure? These are not proper to man, and therefore are not even highest goods. For the desire of pleasure and of livelihood is present not in man only, but also in dumb animals. What of the desire for glory? Is it not found in horses, when the victors exult and the vanquished grieve?
Editors' notes and page, col. 368

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  • running head: TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 368 (cut off at left edge; LACTANTII)
  • marginal letters: A praeda et pabulis opus est; B nullum est animal; C gloriae? nonne in equis; D Officiis l. III, c. 3. (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence (praeda); "VARIORUM NOTAE." heading printed across both columns, cut off at left, not set; Variorum Notae at page foot (Cynicorum/Clinicorum... Sed scientiam, etc.) left for later pass; praecipitat: ligature faint, read as ae; stray mark after "animal" ignored; Google/OCR watermark not set
PL 6:369
Tantus amor laudum, tantae est victoria curae.
So great is their love of praise, of so great concern is victory.
Nec immerito summus poeta experiendum esse ait,
Nor without reason does the greatest poet say that one must put to the test
Et quis cuique dolor victo, quae gloria palmae.
And what grief each one feels when beaten, what glory in the palm.
Quod si ea, quae parit scientia, communia sunt cum aliis animalibus, non est ergo summum bonum scientia. Praeterea non mediocre hujus definitionis est vitium quod scientia nuda ponitur. Incipient enim beati omnes videri, qui artem aliquam scierint, immo vero qui et res malas scierint; ut tam beatus sit, qui venena didicerit temperare, quam qui mederi. Quaero igitur, ad quam rem scientia referenda sit? Si ad causas rerum naturalium, quae beatitudo erit mihi proposita, si sciero unde Nilus oriatur, vel quidquid de coelo physici delirant? Quid, quod earum rerum non est scientia, sed opinatio, quae pro ingeniis varia est. Restat ut scientia bonorum ac malorum summum bonum sit. Cur ergo scientiam maluit, quam ipsam sapientiam summum bonum dicere, cum sit utriusque significatio et vis eadem? Nemo tamen usque adhuc summum bonum dixit esse sapientiam, quod melius dici potuit. Nam scientia parum est ad bonum suscipiendum, malumque fugiendum nisi accedat et virtus. Multi enim philosophorum, cum de bonis, malisque dissererent, aliter tamen, quam loquebantur, natura cogente, vixerunt, quia virtute caruerunt. Virtus autem cum scientia conjuncta est sapientia.
But if the things which knowledge produces are common to other animals, then knowledge is not the highest good. Moreover, there is no small fault in this definition, in that knowledge is laid down bare. For all will begin to seem blessed who have known some art, nay rather, those too who have known evil things; so that one who has learned to mix poisons would be as blessed as one who has learned to heal. I ask, therefore, to what thing knowledge is to be referred? If to the causes of natural things, what blessedness will be set before me if I know where the Nile rises, or whatever the natural philosophers rave about the heaven? What of the fact that of these things there is no knowledge but opinion, which varies according to men's minds? It remains that the knowledge of goods and evils is the highest good. Why then did he prefer to call knowledge, rather than wisdom itself, the highest good, since the meaning and force of both is the same? Yet no one up to now has said that wisdom is the highest good, which could have been said better. For knowledge is of little avail for taking up the good and fleeing evil unless virtue also be added. For many of the philosophers, when they discoursed about goods and evils, nevertheless lived otherwise than they spoke, nature compelling them, because they lacked virtue. But virtue joined with knowledge is wisdom.
Superest ut eos etiam refellamus qui virtutem ipsam summum bonum putaverunt, in qua opinione etiam M. Tullius fuit; in quo multum inconsiderati fuerunt. Non enim virtus ipsa est summum bonum, sed effectrix et mater est summi boni; quoniam perveniri ad illud sine virtute non potest. Utrumque intellectu est facile. Quaero enim, utrumne ad praeclarum
It remains that we refute also those who thought virtue itself to be the highest good, in which opinion Marcus Tullius also was; in this they were greatly ill-advised. For virtue itself is not the highest good, but is the producer and mother of the highest good, since it cannot be reached without virtue. Both points are easy to understand. For I ask whether, to the splendid
Editors' notes and page, col. 369

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 369 tum applicamus animum, vel opum, vel honoris acquirendi causa, illi incumbimus. Acquisita jam per industriam illius rei scientia, non amplius finalis, sed effectrix illius rei causa erit, quam instituimus. BETULEIUS.

(continued) -ourable pursuit we apply the mind, we devote ourselves to it for the sake of acquiring wealth or honour. Once the knowledge of that thing has been acquired by diligence, it will no longer be the final cause but the efficient cause of the thing we have undertaken. BETULEIUS.

[2] ‹lemma: Tantus› · col 369 Tantus. Carmen est Virgilii ex libro III Georgic., v. 112, ac sequens legitur v. 102, ubi poeta equorum generosorum naturas describit; qua de re extat etiam Xenophontis libellus.

So great. The verse is Virgil's, from Georgics book III, verse 112, and the following one is read at verse 102, where the poet describes the natures of noble horses; on which subject there is also a little book of Xenophon.

[3] ‹lemma: Tantae est› · col 369 Tantae est. In mss. 1 Reg. veterrimo et 1 Clarom. desideratur est; in Regio-Put. et 7 aliis scriptis legitur, tanta est.

Is of such great. In manuscripts 1 very old Regius and 1 Claromontanus est is missing; in the Regio-Puteanus and 7 other manuscripts is read tanta est (is so great).

[4] ‹lemma: Definitionis› · col 369 Definitionis. Restitui ex antiquissimis mss. 2 Reg., 2 Bonon., 16 aliis et 8 editis, accedentibus 8 scriptis in quibus est, diffinitionis; in ms. Tornesiano et 9 impressis est disputationis. At recte emendatum est, definitionis; nam ut recte monet Thomas non agitur eo loci de disputatione, sed definitione, vel potius sententia eorum, qui putabant summum bonum esse scientiam.

Of the definition. I have restored this from the very old manuscripts, 2 Regii, 2 Bononienses, 16 others and 8 editions, with 8 manuscripts besides in which is diffinitionis; in the Tornaesius manuscript and 9 printed editions is disputationis (of the disputation). But definitionis is the right correction; for, as Thomasius rightly observes, the subject in that place is not a disputation but a definition, or rather the opinion of those who thought the highest good was knowledge.

[5] ‹lemma: Scientia nuda› · col 369 Scientia nuda. 1 Colb. et 1 Brun., nude.

Bare knowledge. 1 Colbertinus and 1 Brunsvicensis: nude (barely).

[6] ‹lemma: Beati omnes› · cols 369–370 Beati omnes. Sic restitui ex antiquissimis mss. 1 Reg., Cauc., et 1 Bonon., 3 al. Reg., Betul., Ultr., aliisque multis et editis Tornes. ac Soubron. melius quam beatiores caeterorum: hic enim, ut recte ait Thomasius, auctor noster non loquitur de majori beatitudine; sed simpliciter docet necessario sequi ex illius sententia, qui scientiam summum bonum putabat, ut omnes qui aliquam artem licet turpem sciverint, beati sint appellati.

All happy. So I have restored from the very old manuscripts, 1 Regius, Cauci's and 1 Bononiensis, 3 other Regii, Betuleius's, the Utrecht and many others, and the Tornaesius and Soubron editions — better than the others' beatiores (happier): for here, as Thomasius rightly says, our author is not speaking of greater happiness, but teaches simply that it follows necessarily from the opinion of the one who thought knowledge the highest good that all who have known some art, even a shameful one, would be called happy.

[7] ‹lemma: Opinatio› · col 370 Opinatio. Sic reposui ex omnibus pene mss. et edit. Rom. 1470. Sic et alibi passim Lactantius: mss. 2 rec. et 12 edit. habent opinio.

Supposition. So I have restored from almost all the manuscripts and the Roman edition of 1470. So too Lactantius elsewhere throughout: 2 recent manuscripts and 12 editions have opinio (opinion).

[8] ‹lemma: Usque adhuc› · col 370 Usque adhuc. Plin. l. V, ep. 6, extr.: Usque adhuc certe neminem... amisit. Lib. X, ep. 30: Quod usque adhuc factum. BUNEMAN.

Up to now. Pliny, book V, letter 6, at the end: Up to now certainly it has lost no one. Book X, letter 30: Which has been done up to now. BUNEMAN.

[9] ‹lemma: Qui virtutem ipsam› · col 370 Qui virtutem ipsam. Addidi ipsam ex ms. et editis tribus. Caeteris vulgatis deest, delendumque putat Heumannus.

Who [thought] virtue itself. I have added ipsam (itself) from a manuscript and three editions. It is missing in the other editions, and Heumann thinks it should be deleted.

[10] ‹lemma: M. Tullius› · col 370 M. Tullius. Quam vide Cic. VII Tuscul. et IV et V de Finib. ac I de Legib.

Marcus Tullius. For which [opinion] see Cicero, Tusculans VII [sic], De finibus IV and V, and De legibus I.

[11] ‹lemma: Comprehendat› · col 370 Comprehendat. Aptius ex mss. et editis, quam deprehendat, in vulgatis. Quia comprehendere magis refertur ad intelligentiam, de qua hic tractatur.

Should grasp. More fittingly, from the manuscripts and editions, than deprehendat (should catch) in the common editions; because comprehendere refers rather to understanding, which is the subject here.

[12] ‹lemma: Per quod necesse est ad aliud perveniri› · col 370 Per quod necesse est ad aliud perveniri. Ita rectius legas ex omnibus mss., et sex editis codicibus, quam propter quod, vitiose in caeteris impressis. Lactantius enim loquitur de medio per quod pervenitur; et supra dixerat, per laborem, per virtutem, etc. In scriptis quinque rec. est ad illud pro ad aliud caeterorum. Ex ISAEO.

Through which one must arrive at something else. So you would read more rightly, from all the manuscripts and six printed copies, than propter quod (on account of which), wrongly in the other printed editions. For Lactantius speaks of the means through which one arrives; and above he had said, through labour, through virtue, etc. In five recent manuscripts is ad illud (at that) for the others' ad aliud. From ISAEUS.

[13] ‹lemma: Indigeret› · col 370 Indigeret. Sic plerique mss. cum edit. Gymnic., Tornes., et antiqua Versione Gallica, et se sont constitués en un bien qui en avait besoin d'un autre. In nonnullis mss., et plerisque impressis est indigerent.

Should need. So most manuscripts, with the Gymnicus and Tornaesius editions and the old French translation, "and they set themselves up in a good which needed another one". In some manuscripts and most printed editions is indigerent (plural).

[14] ‹lemma: Aristoteles› · col 370 Aristoteles. Peripatetici, inquit Theodoretus, laudant virtutem, reipsa voluntati student; (continues)

Aristotle. The Peripatetics, says Theodoret, praise virtue, but in fact pursue their own will; (continues)

(printed under page 188)

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  • running head: 369 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT (cut off at the right edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹Tantus amor laudum›; B ‹rerum non est scientia, sed opinatio›; C ‹fuerunt. Non enim virtus›; D ‹Tantae est. In mss.› (in the Variorum Notae at the foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: full-width heading "VARIORUM NOT[AE]" across both columns, below the text block, cut off at the right edge, not set; the Variorum Notae at the page foot (from "tum applicamus animum" onwards) are left for the later pass; column ends mid-sentence at "praeclarum"; "summus poeta" is Vergil, Georgics 3.112 and 3.102.
PL 6:370
illud bonum facile perveniri putent, an cum difficultate ac labore? Expediant acumen suum, erroremque defendant. Si facile ad illud, ac sine labore perveniri potest, summum bonum non est. Quid enim nos cruciemus, quid conficiamus, enitendo diebus et noctibus? quandoquidem tam in promptu id quod quaerimus jacet, ut illud quilibet sine ulla contentione animi comprehendat. Sed si commune quoque ac mediocre quodlibet bonum non nisi labore assequimur quoniam bonorum natura in arduo posita est, malorum in praecipiti, summo igitur labore summum bonum assequi necesse est. Quod si verissimum est, ergo altera virtute opus est, ut perveniamus ad eam virtutem quae dicitur summum bonum: quod est incongruens, et absurdum, ut virtus per seipsam perveniat ad seipsam. Si non potest ad ullum bonum nisi per laborem perveniri, apparet virtutem esse, per quam perveniatur; quoniam in suscipiendis perferendisque laboribus, vis officiumque virtutis est.
good in question, they think that one arrives easily, or with difficulty and toil? Let them bring their acuteness to bear and defend their error. If one can arrive at it easily and without toil, it is not the highest good. For why should we torment ourselves, why should we wear ourselves out, by striving day and night, since what we seek lies so ready to hand that anyone at all may grasp it without any exertion of mind? But if we attain even any common and middling good only by toil, since the nature of goods is set on the steep and that of evils on the downward slope, then it is necessary to attain the highest good by the highest toil. And if this is most true, then there is need of another virtue, so that we may arrive at that virtue which is called the highest good: which is incongruous and absurd, that virtue should arrive at itself through itself. If one cannot arrive at any good except through toil, it is plain that it is virtue through which one arrives; since the force and function of virtue lie in undertaking and enduring toils.
Ergo summum bonum non potest esse id, per quod necesse est ad aliud perveniri. Sed illi, cum ignorarent quid efficeret virtus, aut quo tenderet, honestius autem nihil reperirent, substiterunt in ipsius virtutis nomine, quam nullo proposito emolumento, appetendam esse dixerunt, et bonum sibi constituerunt, quod bono indigeret. Aristoteles ab iis non longe recessit, qui virtutem cum honestate summum bonum putavit: quasi possit ulla esse virtus nisi honesta, ac non, si quid habuerit turpitudinis, virtus esse desinat. Sed vidit fieri posse, ut de virtute pravo judicio male sentiatur; et ideo existimatione hominum serviendum putavit, quod qui facit, a recto bonoque discedit, quia non est in nostra potestate ut virtus pro suis meritis honestetur. Nam quid est honestas, nisi honor perpetuus ad aliquem secundo populi rumore delatus?
Therefore the highest good cannot be that through which one must arrive at something else. But they, since they did not know what virtue effects or towards what it tends, and yet found nothing more honourable, stopped short at the mere name of virtue, which they said was to be sought with no reward set before it, and they established for themselves a good which stood in need of a good. Aristotle did not depart far from them, for he thought virtue together with honourableness to be the highest good: as if there could be any virtue that was not honourable, and as if it would not cease to be virtue if it had anything of baseness in it. But he saw that it could happen that virtue might be ill thought of through a perverse judgement; and therefore he thought that one must defer to the esteem of men; and whoever does this departs from what is right and good, because it is not in our power that virtue be honoured according to its merits. For what is honourableness but lasting honour conferred on someone by the favourable report of the people?
Editors' notes and page, col. 370

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  • running head: [cut at left edge] FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 370
  • marginal letters: A illud bonum facile; B niat ad seipsam; C putavit, quod qui facit; D tribus. Caeteris vulgatis (in the Variorum Notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "non potcst" in the first line of the second paragraph looks like damaged type and is set as potest. The heading "VARIORUM NOTÆ." runs across the page and is cut at the left edge; it is not set. The Variorum Notae at the page foot (from "bat, ut omnes qui aliquam artem" to "reipsa voluntati student;") are left for the later pass. The Google and recognition watermarks are not set. The column ends at "delatus?" with no word broken across the break.
PL 6:371
Quid ergo fiet, si errore ac pravitate hominum, mala existimatio subsequatur? abjiciemusne virtutem, quia flagitiosa et turpis ab insipientibus judicetur? Quae quoniam invidia premi, ac vexari potest, ut sit ipsa proprium ac perpetuum bonum, nullo extrinsecus adjumento indigere debet, quin suis per se viribus nitatur, et constet. Itaque nec ullum ei ab homine bonum sperandum est, nec ullum malum recusandum.
What then will happen if, through the error and depravity of men, a bad reputation follows? Shall we cast away virtue because it is judged shameful and base by the foolish? Since it can be pressed down by envy and harassed, then, if it is itself to be a proper and perpetual good, it ought to need no help from outside, but should rest upon and stand by its own strength. Therefore no good is to be hoped for it from man, and no evil is to be refused.
CAPUT IX.
Chapter IX.
De summo bono, et de cultu veri Dei; atque Anaxagorae refutatio.
On the highest good, and on the worship of the true God; and a refutation of Anaxagoras.
Venio nunc ad verae sapientiae summum bonum, cujus natura hoc modo determinanda est. Primum, ut solius hominis sit, nec cadat in ullum aliud animal; deinde, ut solius animi, nec communicari possit cum corpore; postremo, ut non possit cuiquam sine scientia et virtute contingere. Quae circumscriptio illas omnes sententias excludit, ac solvit; eorum enim quae dixerunt, nihil tale est. Dicam nunc, quid sit; ut doceam (⟨q⟩uod institui) philosophos omnes caecos atque insipientes fuisse qui, quod esset homini summum bonum constitutum, nec videre, nec intelligere, nec suspicari aliquando potuerunt. Anaxagoras, cum ab eo quaereretur cujus rei causa natus esset, respondit, coeli ac solis videndi. Hanc vocem admirantur omnes ac philosopho dignam judicant. At ego hunc puto non invenientem quid responderet, effudisse hoc passim, ne taceret. Quod quidem secum, si sapiens fuisset, commentatum et meditatum habere debuit:
I come now to the highest good of true wisdom, whose nature is to be defined in this way. First, that it belong to man alone and not fall to any other animal; next, that it belong to the soul alone and cannot be shared with the body; lastly, that it cannot come to anyone without knowledge and virtue. This delimitation excludes and dissolves all those opinions; for of the things they said, none is of this kind. I shall now say what it is, so as to show (as I have undertaken) that all the philosophers were blind and foolish, who were never able to see, nor understand, nor even suspect what had been established as the highest good for man. Anaxagoras, when he was asked for what reason he had been born, answered: for the sake of seeing the heaven and the sun. Everyone admires this saying and judges it worthy of a philosopher. But I think that he, not finding what to answer, poured this out at random so as not to be silent. Which indeed, if he had been wise, he ought to have had thought out and meditated within himself:
Editors' notes and page, col. 371

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. No note runs over from page 188 (its last note, Aristoteles, ends on a semicolon as printed). --> [1] ‹lemma: Ipsa› · col 371 Ipsa. Scilicet virtus, de qua supra. Ita correxi ex quampluribus mss. veterrimis et optimis et edit. Cellar. In caeteris vulgatis ac 10 mss. rec. est ipsum.

Itself. That is, virtue, spoken of above. So I have corrected from very many of the oldest and best manuscripts and Cellarius's edition. In the other editions and 10 recent manuscripts is ipsum (neuter).

[2] ‹lemma: Proprium ac perpetuum bonum› · col 371 Proprium ac perpetuum bonum. Scilicet voces junxit, ut Cic. pro I. Manilia, c. 16: Quod ut illi proprium ac perpetuum sit. Proprius enim saepe idem quod perpetuus. BUN.

A good proper and perpetual. He has joined the words, as Cicero, For the Manilian Law, chapter 16: That this may be his own and perpetual. For proprius often means the same as perpetuus. BUN.

[3] ‹lemma: Ut solius animi› · col 371 Ut solius animi. Expunxi sit, quod perperam additum in 4 mss. et 9 editis, a caeteris abest, quippe quod mox praecessit.

As of the mind alone. I have struck out sit, which is wrongly added in 4 manuscripts and 9 editions and is absent from the rest, since it has just gone before.

[4] ‹lemma: Contingere› · col 371 Contingere. Docet S. Augustin. lib. XIX de Civit. Dei, cap. 4, quot sint differentiae inter christianorum et gentilium de summo bono dogmata.

To befall. St Augustine teaches, City of God book XIX, chapter 4, how many differences there are between the doctrines of Christians and of Gentiles about the highest good.

[5] ‹lemma: Quae dixerunt› · col 371 Quae dixerunt. Ita legendum ex 8 antiquioribus et melioribus vulgatis, ac omnibus mss. praeter 2 Colb. rec. et 7 edit. in quibus est, qui, mendose. Is enim Lactantii sensus est, ut dicat nullum eorum, quae ipsi philosophi dixerunt esse summum bonum, tale quid esse. Ita THOMASIUS.

Which they said. So it should be read, from 8 older and better editions and all the manuscripts except 2 recent Colbertini and 7 editions, in which is qui (who), wrongly. For Lactantius's sense is to say that none of the things which the philosophers themselves said was the highest good is anything of the kind. So THOMASIUS.

[6] ‹lemma: Esset homini› · col 371 Esset homini. Reposui ex mss. praeter unum rec. qui cum editis habet, est. In 1 vet. Reg. hominis; in al. rec., hominum.

Were for man. I have restored this from the manuscripts, except one recent one, which with the editions has est (is). In 1 old Regius, hominis (of man); in another recent one, hominum (of men).

[7] ‹lemma: Anaxagoras› · col 371 Anaxagoras. Haec verba vide apud Laert. in Anaxagora.

Anaxagoras. See these words in Laertius on Anaxagoras.

[8] ‹lemma: Passim› · col 371 Passim. Interpretor passim, sine deliberatione, sine ratione, sine consilio, inconsiderate, temere. Sic Lact. l. VII, cap. 7, Incursunt passim sine delectu omnia. BUN.

At random. I interpret passim as without deliberation, without reason, without counsel, inconsiderately, rashly. So Lactantius book VII, chapter 7: All things rush in at random without choice. BUN.

[9] ‹lemma: Commentatum et meditatum› · col 371 Commentatum et meditatum. Haec duo verba passive ponit Lactantius noster, ut et Cicero, Epist. ad diversos, XVI, XXVI, et I de Legib. et Philip. II, cap. 34, et de Officiis l. I. Habes etiam meditata oratio apud Tacit. XIV, 55, 1, Hist. l. LXVIII, 9. Ex WALCHIO.

Thought out and pondered. Our Lactantius uses these two verbs passively, as does Cicero, Letters to Friends XVI, XXVI, and De legibus I, and Philippics II, chapter 34, and De officiis book I. You also have a pondered speech in Tacitus XIV, 55, 1, Histories book LXVIII, 9. From WALCH.

[10] ‹lemma: Nec homo sit quidem› · col 372 Nec homo sit quidem. Nec reposui ex vetustissimis mss. 2 Reg. 1 Colbert. aliisque. In plerisque est ne; in quibusdam, non.

Nor is he even a man. I have restored nec from the very old manuscripts, 2 Regii, 1 Colbertinus and others. In most is ne; in some, non.

[11] ‹lemma: Quid si caecus fuerit, officiumne hominis amittet?› · col 372 Quid si caecus fuerit, officiumne hominis amittet? Ita restitui ex omnibus mss. codicibus, nisi quod in 2 Colb. est, amitteret. In vulgatis erat, fuisset... amitteret.

What if he is blind — will he lose the function of a man? So I have restored from all the manuscripts, except that 2 Colbertini have amitteret. In the editions it was fuisset... amitteret (had been... would lose).

[12] ‹lemma: Num carebunt suis quaeque muneribus?› · col 372 Num carebunt suis quaeque muneribus? Sic lego cum mss. vetustissimis 7 Reg. 2 Bonon., Cauc., 2 Colbert. et 4 aliis, nisi quod in 1 Reg. est, quaecumque; in alio Reg., quoque: in 1 Bonon., nominibus; in 2 al. Reg., 4 Colbert., Em. et Brun., carebuntne suis quaeque muneribus? In Ultr. et in vulgatis decem, anne carebunt suis quoque muneribus?

Will each of them lack its own functions? So I read with the very old manuscripts, 7 Regii, 2 Bononienses, Cauci's, 2 Colbertini and 4 others, except that 1 Regius has quaecumque (whichever); another Regius, quoque (also); 1 Bononiensis, nominibus (names); 2 other Regii, 4 Colbertini, Em. and the Brunsvicensis, carebuntne suis quaeque muneribus? In the Utrecht and ten editions, anne carebunt suis quoque muneribus? (or will they also lack their functions?)

[13] ‹lemma: In hoc spectaculum induxit› · col 372 In hoc spectaculum induxit. Id est, in hunc mundum. Spectaculum enim hic sumitur pro loco ex quo spectatur, ut ex sequentibus patet: Qui te in hunc mundum, quasi testem laudatoremque tanti sui operis induxit.

Brought into this spectacle. That is, into this world. For spectaculum is taken here for the place from which one watches, as is clear from what follows: Who brought you into this world as the witness and praiser of so great a work of his.

[14] ‹lemma: Magnum esse credis› · col 372 Magnum esse credis, etc. Sic. Naso Metamorph. lib. I: Pronaque cum spectent animalia caetera terram, / Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri / Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

You believe it great, etc. So Ovid, Metamorphoses book I: "And while the other animals, bent forward, look at the earth, / He gave man a lofty face, and bade him behold the sky / And lift his face upright to the stars."

[15] ‹lemma: Qui mirabilia perfecit› · col 372 Qui mirabilia perfecit. Ita vetustiores et meliores mss. ac decem editi. At mss. 12 rec. et excusi tres habent, qui mirabilia fecit; sic habent editi 1476 et 1497. Elegantius legeretur, qui tam mirabilia fecit.

Who accomplished wonders. So the older and better manuscripts and ten editions. But 12 recent manuscripts and three printed editions have qui mirabilia fecit (who made wonders); so the editions of 1476 and 1497. It would read more elegantly, qui tam mirabilia fecit (who made such wonders).

[16] ‹lemma: Num sanus viderere?› · col 372 Num sanus viderere? Sic restitui ex omnibus prope mss. et editis Rom. 1470, Torn. ac Soubron., accedentibus aliis 3 scriptis rec. in quibus est, num sanus videre? duobus aliis Reg. rec., numquid sanus videre; in editis 4 rec. non sanus viderere; in 8 aliis, non insanus viderere.

Would you seem sane? So I have restored from almost all the manuscripts and the editions of Rome 1470, Tornaesius and Soubron, with 3 other recent manuscripts besides, in which is num sanus videre?; two other recent Regii, numquid sanus videre; in 4 recent editions, non sanus viderere (would you not seem sane); in 8 others, non insanus viderere (would you not seem insane).

(printed under page 189)

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  • running head: 371 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹Quid ergo fiet, si errore ac pravitate hominum, mala›; B ‹solius hominis sit, nec cadat in ullum aliud animal;›; C ‹fuisset, commentatum et meditatum habere debuit:›; D ‹Quae dixerunt. Ita legendum ex 8 antiquioribus et› (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "fiet" printed with a damaged fi ligature, looks like "flet"; "bono" in the sub-caption appears as "bòno", probably a speck, set bono; "(⟨q⟩uod" q damaged; "VARIORUM NOTAE" heading and notes (Ipsa ... Ex Walchio) at page foot not set, later pass; heading line full-width, cut off at the right edge
PL 6:372
quia si quis rationem sui nesciat, nec homo sit quidem. Sed putemus non ex tempore dictum illud effusum. Videamus, in tribus verbis quot et quanta peccaverit. Primum, quod omne hominis officium in solis oculis posuit, nihil ad mentem referens, sed ad corpus omnia. Quid si caecus fuerit, officiumne hominis amittet, quod fieri sine occasu animae non potest? Quid caeterae corporis partes? num carebunt suis quaeque mun⟨e⟩ribus? Quid, quod plus est in auribus, quam in oculis situm; quoniam et doctrina, et sapientia percipi auribus solis potest, oculis solis non potest. Coeli ac solis videndi causa natus es? Quis te in hoc spectaculum induxit? aut quid coelo rerumque naturae vi⟨s⟩io tua confert? Nimirum, ut hoc immensum et admirabile opus laudes. Confitere ergo rerum omnium esse constitutorem Deum, qui te in hunc mundum, quasi testem laudatoremque tanti sui operis induxit. Magnum esse credis videre coelum ac solem: cur ergo gratias non agis ei, qui hujus beneficii auctor est? cur non ipsius virtutem, providentiam, potestatem metiris animo, cujus opera miraris? Etenim necesse est, ut multo mirabilior sit qui mirabilia perfecit. Si te quispiam vocasset ad coenam, in eaque optime acceptus esses, num sanus viderere si pluris faceres ipsam voluptatem, quam voluptatis auctorem? Adeo philosophi ad corpus omnia referunt, nihil prorsus ad mentem; nec vident amplius quam quod sub oculos venit. Atqui, remotis omnibus officiis corporis, in sola mente ponenda est hominis ratio. Non ergo ideo nascimur, ut ea, qu⟨ae⟩ sunt facta, videamus, sed ut ipsum factorem rerum
because if anyone does not know the reason of himself, he would not even be a man. But let us suppose that this saying was not poured out on the spur of the moment. Let us see how many and how great errors he committed in three words. First, that he placed the whole duty of man in the eyes alone, referring nothing to the mind but everything to the body. What if he should be blind, will he lose the duty of a man, which cannot happen without the death of the soul? What of the other parts of the body? Will they each lack their own functions? What of the fact that more is situated in the ears than in the eyes, since both learning and wisdom can be perceived by the ears alone, but cannot by the eyes alone? Were you born for the sake of seeing the sky and the sun? Who brought you into this spectacle? Or what does your sight contribute to the sky and to the nature of things? Doubtless, that you may praise this immense and admirable work. Confess therefore that God is the establisher of all things, Who brought you into this world as a witness and praiser of so great a work of His. You believe it a great thing to see the sky and the sun: why then do you not give thanks to Him Who is the author of this benefit? Why do you not measure in your mind the power, providence and might of Him Whose works you admire? For it must be that He Who accomplished wonderful things is far more wonderful. If someone had invited you to dinner, and you had been very well received at it, would you seem sane if you valued the pleasure itself more highly than the author of the pleasure? So completely do the philosophers refer everything to the body, nothing at all to the mind; nor do they see further than what comes before their eyes. And yet, all the functions of the body being set aside, the reason of man must be placed in the mind alone. We are not therefore born for this, that we may see the things which have been made, but that the very Maker of things
Editors' notes and page, col. 372

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  • running head: [L]ACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 372 (first letter cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A quia si quis rationem sui nesciat; B rerum omnium esse constitutorem; C sunt facta, videamus; D In hoc spectaculum induxit (in the Variorum notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: left-hand text and notes belong to col. 371, not set; full-width heading [V]ARIORUM NOTAE stands below the text block, cut off at the left edge, not set; Variorum notae (Nec homo sit quidem ... non insanus viderere) left for the later pass; damaged type: mun⟨e⟩ribus, vi⟨s⟩io, qu⟨ae⟩ (last unsure); "nibil" read as nihil (broken h); coelum read as œ ligature, unsure
PL 6:373
omnium contemplemur, id est, mente cernamus. Quare si quis hominem, qui vere sapiat, interroget, cujus rei gratia natus sit, respondebit intrepidus ac paratus, colendi se Dei gratia natum, qui nos ideo generavit, ut ei serviamus. Servire autem Deo, nihil aliud est, quam bonis operibus tueri et conservare justitiam. Sed ille, ut homo divinarum rerum imperitus, rem maximam redegit ad minimum, duo sola deligendo, quae sibi diceret intuenda. Quod si natum se esse dixisset, ut mundum intueretur, quanquam omnia comprehenderet, ac majori uteretur sono, tamen non implesset hominis officium: quia quanto pluris est anima quam corpus, tanto pluris est Deus, quam mundus, quia mundum Deus fecit et regit. Non ergo mundus oculis, quia utrumque est corpus, sed Deus animo contemplandus est: quia Deus, ut est ipse immortalis, sic animum voluit esse sempiternum. Dei autem contemplatio est, venerari et colere communem parentem generis humani. Quod si a philosophis abfuit, projectique in terram fuerunt divina ignorando, existimandus est Anaxagoras, ad quae videnda natum se esse dixit, nec coelum vidisse, nec solem. Expedita est igitur hominis ratio, si sapiat: cujus propria est humanitas. Nam ipsa humanitas quid est, nisi justitia? quid est justitia, nisi pietas? pietas autem nihil aliud est, quam Dei parentis agnitio.
of every kind we may contemplate, that is, perceive with the mind. Therefore if anyone should ask a man who is truly wise for the sake of what thing he was born, he will answer fearlessly and readily that he was born for the sake of worshipping God, Who begot us for this reason, that we might serve Him. But to serve God is nothing other than to protect and preserve justice by good works. But that man, as one unskilled in divine things, reduced the greatest matter to the least, by choosing only two things which he said were to be looked upon by him. But if he had said that he was born to look upon the world, although he would have embraced all things and used a grander sound, yet he would not have fulfilled the duty of a man: because as much as the soul is worth more than the body, so much is God worth more than the world, because God made and rules the world. Therefore it is not the world that is to be contemplated with the eyes, since both are body, but God with the mind: because God, as He Himself is immortal, so willed the mind to be everlasting. Now the contemplation of God is to venerate and worship the common parent of the human race. But if this was absent from the philosophers, and they were cast down to the earth by being ignorant of divine things, Anaxagoras must be judged to have seen neither the sky nor the sun, which he said he was born to see. The reckoning of man is therefore straightforward, if he is wise: and humanity is his proper attribute. For what is humanity itself, if not justice? What is justice, if not piety? And piety is nothing other than the acknowledgement of God as parent.
Editors' notes and page, col. 373

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Qui vere sapiat› · col 373 Qui vere sapiat. Ita restitui ex mss. et ed. Betul. Vulgatis fere cunctis est, sapit. Ed Tornes. et Walch., sapiet.

Who is truly wise. So I have restored from the manuscripts and Betuleius's edition. In almost all the editions is sapit (indicative). The Tornaesius and Walch editions: sapiet (will be wise).

[2] ‹lemma: Deligendo› · col 373 Deligendo. Sic restitui ex edit. Rom. 1470 et 10 manuscriptis, accedentibus aliis decem, in quibus est, diligendo; in sex et in edit. Betul. eligendo; in 2 rec., diligenda; in 12 excusis deligens; in 1 Bonon. antiq., adfigendo; in 1 Reg., rec., figendo; in 1 al. Reg., fingendo. Vide infra circa finem capitis 10, in religione deligenda, in omnibus mss. et editis.

By choosing. So I have restored from the Roman edition of 1470 and 10 manuscripts, with ten others besides, in which is diligendo (by loving); in six, and in Betuleius's edition, eligendo (by selecting); in 2 recent ones, diligenda; in 12 printed editions deligens; in 1 old Bononiensis, adfigendo (by fixing to); in 1 recent Regius, figendo (by fixing); in another Regius, fingendo (by fashioning). See below, near the end of chapter 10, in choosing religion, in all the manuscripts and editions.

[3] ‹lemma: Quia quanto pluris est anima› · col 373 Quia quanto pluris est anima. Sano sensu accipienda est haec sententia, ne ulla Dei cum mundo proportio inducatur, quae nulla esse potest infiniti cum finito. RIVETUS.

Because by how much the soul is worth more. This sentence must be taken in a sound sense, lest any proportion of God to the world be introduced, which there can be none between the infinite and the finite. RIVETUS.

[4] ‹lemma: Utrumque› · col 373 Utrumque. Scilicet, mundus et oculus.

Both. That is, the world and the eye.

[5] ‹lemma: Deus animo contemplandus est› · col 373 Deus animo contemplandus est. Ita restitui ex edit. Gymnic., Betul., Tornes. ac Soubron. et ex cunctis pene mss. In caeteris vulgatis, sicut in 1 Colb. rec. est, anima: sed et animum infra legimus in omnibus tum mss. tum editis.

God is to be contemplated with the mind. So I have restored from the Gymnicus, Betuleius, Tornaesius and Soubron editions and from almost all the manuscripts. In the other editions, as in 1 recent Colbertinus, is anima (with the soul): but we read animum (the mind) below too, in all the manuscripts and editions alike.

[6] ‹lemma: Anaxagoras, ad quae videnda› · col 373 Anaxagoras, ad quae videnda. Secutus sum manuscriptos 1 Reg., Emmanuel. ac 2 Brun. et edit. Torn. Soubron. et Walch. In 2 Clarom, 7 Reg. et editis 4 est, ad ea quae videnda, male. Gymnic. Anaxagoras ea ad quae videnda; in editionibus Thysii et Gallaei, ad ea ad quae videnda.

Anaxagoras, for seeing which. I have followed the manuscripts 1 Regius, Emmanuel and 2 Brunsvicenses, and the Tornaesius, Soubron and Walch editions. In 2 Claromontani, 7 Regii and 4 editions is ad ea quae videnda, badly. Gymnicus: Anaxagoras ea ad quae videnda; in the editions of Thysius and Gallaeus, ad ea ad quae videnda.

[7] ‹lemma: Pietas› · col 373 Pietas. Hoc vide in Pimandro, c. 9.

Piety. See this in the Pimander, chapter 9.

[8] ‹lemma: In sola religione est› · col 373 In sola religione est. Lege Eusebium libro undecimo de Praeparat. Evangelica. cap. 2. Sed Lactantius ita est intelligendus, ut religio sit ratio et modus quibus pervenitur ad summum bonum, quod est aeterna optimi atque maximi Dei fruitio.

Is in religion alone. Read Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel book XI, chapter 2. But Lactantius is to be understood thus: that religion is the way and manner by which one arrives at the highest good, which is the eternal enjoyment of God, the best and greatest.

[9] ‹lemma: Ridendi quoque› · col 373 Ridendi quoque. Sic reposui ex ms. et editis Torn., Soubron. et Walch. Caeteri vulgati habent, ridendique.

Of laughing also. So I have restored from a manuscript and the Tornaesius, Soubron and Walch editions. The other editions have ridendique (and of laughing).

[10] ‹lemma: Alludunt› · col 373 Alludunt. Alludere est adblandiri, blanditiis captare, προσπαίζειν. De Ira, c. 7: Ad lusum gestiunt, Terent. Eunuch. III, 1: Coepit ad id scortum alludere. BUN.

They play up to. Alludere is to fawn on, to catch with blandishments, prospaizein. De ira, chapter 7: They are eager for play; Terence, Eunuch III, 1: He began to play up to that harlot. BUN.

[11] ‹lemma: Reponunt› · col 373 Reponunt. Scilicet formicae, de quibus dicit Scriptura: Vade, piger, ad formicam.

They store up. That is, the ants, of which Scripture says: Go to the ant, you sluggard.

[12] ‹lemma: Providentiam› · col 374 Providentiam. Sic recte legit Heumannus ex antiquis multis edit. De providentia et instinctu belluarum legas, si placet, libros a variis editos, scilicet a Pardiaeo societ. Jesu, et anonymos tum Lugduni, tum Amstelodami, tum etiam Parisiis editos. — Providentiam. Ita persuadet locus geminus de Ira, cap. 7: Quid tam homini proprium, quam... providentia futuri? BUN.

Foresight. So Heumann rightly reads from many old editions. On the foresight and instinct of beasts you may read, if you like, books published by various authors, namely by Pardies of the Society of Jesus, and anonymous ones published at Lyon, at Amsterdam and also at Paris. — Providentiam. The twin passage in De ira, chapter 7, persuades so: What is so proper to man as... foresight of the future? BUN.

[13] ‹lemma: Rationis› · col 374 Rationis, etc. Instar commentarii in h. l. esse potest Hier. Rorarii elegans scriptum, quod animalia bruta saepe ratione utantur melius homine, quod recensuit et doctis annotationibus auxit G. H. Ribovius, Helmst. 1728, 8. BUN.

Of reason, etc. Hieronymus Rorarius's elegant work, That brute animals often use reason better than man, can serve as a commentary on this place; G. H. Ribov edited it and enlarged it with learned notes, Helmstedt 1728, octavo. BUN.

[14] ‹lemma: Dispatentia› · col 374 Dispatentia. Hoc verbum, licet inusitatum, restitui ex veteribus editis tribus Romanis ac Venet. et 24 manuscriptis, accedentibus aliis tribus, in quibus est, disputantia. In 8 rec. scriptis et 12 editis est, disparentia. At dispatentia aptius est huic argumento. Hic loquitur de cuniculis, quorum latibula plures habent exitus. — In plures exitus dispatentia. Huc iterum faciunt, de Ira, cap. 7: Sunt animalia, quae latibulis suis diversos et plures exitus pandant, ut... fuga pateat obsessis. BUN.

Opening out in different directions. This word, though unusual, I have restored from three old Roman editions and the Venetian, and 24 manuscripts, with three others besides in which is disputantia. In 8 recent manuscripts and 12 editions is disparentia. But dispatentia suits this matter better. He is speaking here of rabbits, whose burrows have several exits. — Opening out into several exits. To this point again, De ira, chapter 7: There are animals which open different and several exits to their burrows, so that... flight may lie open to them when besieged. BUN.

[15] ‹lemma: Nam quibus generandi mellis› · col 374 Nam quibus generandi mellis, etc. In apum ingenio describendo ingenii vires triverunt ingeniosissimi homines, Maro et Plinius: hic libro undecimo Naturalis historiae, ille Georgic. quarto; ut interim Aristotelem, Columellam, Palladium, et alios recentiores taceamus, qui et ipsi egregia de his memoriae prodiderunt. GALLAEUS.

For those to whom of producing honey, etc. In describing the cleverness of bees the most gifted of men, Virgil and Pliny, wore out the strength of their talent: the latter in book XI of the Natural History, the former in Georgics IV; to say nothing meanwhile of Aristotle, Columella, Palladius and other more recent writers, who too have handed down excellent things about them. GALLAEUS.

[16] ‹lemma: An non in his perfecta sit prudentia› · col 374 An non in his perfecta sit prudentia Sic lego, approbante doctissimo Francio ex 2 Reg. optimae notae, et 1 Clarom. in quo fuit, non, a prima manu, postea erasum.

Or whether perfect prudence is not in these. So I read, with the approval of the most learned Francius, from 2 Regii of the best quality and 1 Claromontanus, in which non stood in the first hand and was afterwards erased.

[17] ‹lemma: Rationem› · col 374 Rationem. Imperfectam scilicet.

Reason. An imperfect one, that is.

[18] ‹lemma: Ad vitam tuendam› · col 374 Ad vitam tuendam. Nolim a constanti Lactantii phrasi abire, l. III, c. 8: Sicut homini opibus ad vitam tuendam; ita illis praeda et pabulo opus. L. VI, (continues)

For protecting life. I would not depart from Lactantius's constant phrase, book III, chapter 8: As man needs wealth for protecting life, so they need prey and fodder. Book VI, (continues)

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  • running head: 373 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTI[A] (cut off at the right edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹omnium contemplemur, id est, mente cernamus.›; B ‹animo contemplandus est: quia Deus, ut est ipse im-›; C ‹Qui vere sapiat. Ita restitui› (in the Variorum Notae); D ‹est, anima: sed et animum infra legimus in omnibus› (in the Variorum Notae)
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CAPUT X.
Chapter X.
Proprium hominis est Deum cognoscere et colere.
It is proper to man to know and to worship God.
Summum igitur hominis bonum in sola religione est; nam caetera, etiam quae putantur esse homini propria, in caeteris quoque animalibus reperiuntur. Cum enim suas voces propriis inter se notis discernunt atque dignoscunt, colloqui videntur; ridendi quoque ratio apparet in his aliqua, cum demulsis auribus, contractoque rictu, et oculis in lasciviam resolutis, aut homini alludunt, aut suis quisque conjugibus ac foetibus propriis. Nonne aliquid amori mutuo et indulgentiae simile impartiunt? Jam illa quae sibi prospiciunt in futurum, et cibos reponunt, habent utique providentiam. Rationis quoque signa in multis deprehenduntur. Nam quando utilia sibi appetunt, mala cavent, pericula vitant, latibula sibi parant in plures exitus d⟨i⟩spatentia, profecto aliquid intelligunt. Potest aliquis negare illis inesse rationem, cum hominem ip⟨s⟩um saepe deludant? Nam quibus generandi mellis officium est, cum assignatas incolunt sedes, castra muniunt, domicilia inenarrabili arte componunt, regi suo serviunt; nescio an non in his perfecta sit prudentia. Incertum est igitur, utrumne illa, quae homini tribuuntur, communia sint cum aliis viventibus: religionis certe sunt expertia. Equidem sic arbitror, universis animalibus datam esse rationem, sed mutis tantummodo ad vitam tuendam, homini
The highest good of man, therefore, lies in religion alone; for the other things, even those which are thought to be proper to man, are found in the other animals as well. For when they distinguish and recognize their own voices among themselves by their proper marks, they seem to converse; some manner of laughing also appears in them, when, with ears smoothed back, mouth drawn in, and eyes relaxed into playfulness, they sport either with man or each with its own mates and young. Do they not bestow on one another something like mutual love and indulgence? Again, those which provide for themselves for the future and store up food certainly have foresight. Signs of reason too are detected in many. For when they seek things useful to themselves, beware of evils, avoid dangers, and prepare for themselves lairs lying open towards several exits, assuredly they understand something. Can anyone deny that reason is in them, when they often outwit man himself? For as to those whose task is the making of honey, when they inhabit their assigned dwellings, fortify their camps, build their homes with indescribable skill, and serve their king, I do not know whether there is not perfect prudence in them. It is uncertain, therefore, whether those things which are attributed to man are common to him with other living beings: they are certainly without religion. For my part I judge thus, that reason has been given to all animals, but to the dumb ones only for protecting life, to man
Editors' notes and page, col. 374

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etiam ad propagandam. Et quia in homine ipsa ratio perfecta est, sapientia nominatur: quae in hoc eximium facit hominem, quod soli datum est intelligere divina. Qua de re Ciceronis vera est sententia. « Ex tot, inquit, generibus nullum est animal praeter hominem, quod habeat notitiam aliquam Dei; ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est, neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera, quae non, etiamsi ignoret qualem Deum haberi deceat, tamen habendum sciat. » Ex quo efficitur, ut is agnoscat Deum, qui, unde ortus sit, quasi recordetur. Qui ergo philosophi volunt animos omni metu liberare, tollunt etiam religionem, et orbant hominem suo proprio ac singulari bono, quod est a recte vivendo, atque ab omni humanitate disjunctum: quia Deus, ut cuncta viventia subjecit homini, sic ipsum hominem sibi. Nam quid est, cur iidem ipsi disputent, eo dirigendam esse mentem, quo vultus erectus est? Si enim nobis in coelum spectandum est, ad nihil aliud utique quam ob religionem. Si religio tollitur, nulla nobis ratio cum coelo est. Itaque aut eo est spectandum, aut in terram procumbendum. In terram procumbere ne si velimus quidem possumus, quorum status rectus est. In coelum igitur spectandum est, quo natura corporis provocat. Quod si constat esse faciendum, aut ideo est faciendum, ut religioni serviamus, aut ideo, ut rationem rerum coelestium cognoscamus. Sed rationem rerum coelestium cognoscere
also for propagating [life]. And because in man reason itself is perfect, it is called wisdom: which makes man outstanding in this, that to him alone it has been given to understand divine things. On this matter the opinion of Cicero is true. "Of so many kinds," he says, "there is no animal except man that has some knowledge of God; and among men themselves there is no nation, neither so untamed nor so wild, which does not know that a god must be held, even if it does not know what sort of god it is fitting to hold." From which it follows that he acknowledges God who, as it were, remembers whence he has arisen. Therefore those philosophers who wish to free minds from all fear take away religion as well, and bereave man of his own proper and singular good, which is a thing severed from right living and from all humanity: because God, as He subjected all living things to man, so subjected man himself to Himself. For what reason is there why these same men argue that the mind must be directed to that place towards which the face is raised? For if we must look up to heaven, it is surely for nothing else than for the sake of religion. If religion is taken away, we have no relation with heaven. Therefore either we must look there, or bend down to the earth. To bend down to the earth we cannot, even if we wish, we whose posture is upright. Therefore we must look up to heaven, whither the nature of the body summons us. But if it is agreed that this must be done, it must be done either so that we may serve religion, or so that we may come to know the system of heavenly things. But to come to know the system of heavenly things
Editors' notes and page, col. 375

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 375 c. 20: Ut appetant, quibus opus est ad vitam tuendam. Sic Ovidius, l. IV Pont. el. 5, v. 37. Addita praeterea vitae quoque multa tuendae / Munera, ne proprias attenuaret opes. BUN.

(continued) chapter 20: That they may seek the things they need for protecting life. So Ovid, Epistulae ex Ponto book IV, elegy 5, verse 37: "Besides, many gifts were added for protecting life too, / Lest he should thin his own resources." BUN.

[2] ‹lemma: Homini etiam ad propagandam› · col 375 Homini etiam ad propagandam. Ex mss. quampluribus et edit. Tornes., Soubron., Cellar., Walch., reposui etiam; quod concinnius est, quam autem vulgatorum et 4 scriptorum. Non enim negatur homini vitam esse tuendam, sed aliud adjungitur. CELLAR. — Ad propagandam. Inscite quidam Lactantium putant loqui de propagatione per generationem, quum propagare hic sit producere, ut ostendi ad Lact. l. II, c. 12: Quae (vita) in mille annos propagaretur. Hic de vita beata intelligendus. BUN.

For man also, for prolonging. From very many manuscripts and the Tornaesius, Soubron, Cellarius and Walch editions I have restored etiam (also), which is neater than the autem (but) of the editions and 4 manuscripts. For it is not denied that man must protect life; something else is added. CELLAR. — For prolonging. Some ignorantly think Lactantius speaks of propagation by generation, whereas propagare here is to extend, as I showed on Lactantius book II, chapter 12: Which (life) would be extended to a thousand years. Here it is to be understood of the happy life. BUN.

[3] ‹lemma: Nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera› · cols 375–376 Nulla gens est neque tam immansueta, neque tam fera. Sic habent omnes fere excusi, et multi ms. et Cicero ipse, tum. I de Leg. unde haec sententia deprompta est, tum. I Tuscul., unde haec altera consimilis: Quod nulla, inquit, gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. Uterque tamen codex Bonon., Tax., Em., 10 Reg., Brun. et (his adde etiam Ultr.) tres Vatic. habent, neque tam mansueta, etc. Quae lectio magis placet Thomasio. Ego ab ipsius Cicer. lectione discedere nolui. ISAEUS. — Picus Mirandulanus, sui saeculi decus, 1 cap. de Providentia Dei, non modo ex theologis quosdam hoc asseruisse testatur, ut puta Damascenum, Augustinum, et Thomam Aquinatem: sed etiam ex densissimis tenebris id vidisse Epicurum, ex crepusculo quodam Platonicum Jamblychum. Damasceni locus est capite tertio libri de Ineffabili divinitate: Quod, inquit, profecto sit Deus, iis qui sacras admittunt Scripturas, haudquaquam in controversiam venit; neque plurimis quidem Graecorum. Nam cognitio quod Deus sit, nobis natura insita est, atque ingenita. Augustinus, lib. I, contra Cresconium Grammaticum, cap. 29, ex ignoti Dei ara quae Athenis fuit, id ostendit. Jamblichus de Mysteriis, statim ab initio, interprete Marsilio, sic scribit: Ante omnem rationis usum, inest naturaliter insita deorum notio; imo tactus quidam divinitatis melior, quam notitia, ex quo incitatur naturalis appetitus boni, et ratiocinatio atque judicium, etc. Quid quod Cicero alio loco ait, nullam gentem esse tam efferam aut barbaram, quae non sit imbuta aliqua opinione deorum? Augustinus Steuchus in sua Perenni Philosophia hoc unum agit, ut ostendat gentiles quam proxime accessisse ad veram religionem. BETULEIUS. — Vide Huetii Concordiam rationis et fidei.

There is no nation so untamed, nor so wild. So nearly all the printed editions have it, and many manuscripts, and Cicero himself, both in De legibus I, from which this sentence is drawn, and in Tusculans I, from which comes this other very similar one: That no nation, he says, is so wild, no one of all men so savage, that the belief in gods has not imbued his mind. Yet both Bononienses, Tax., Em., 10 Regii, the Brunsvicensis and (add to these the Utrecht too) three Vaticani have neque tam mansueta (nor so tame), etc., a reading Thomasius prefers. I did not wish to depart from the reading of Cicero himself. ISAEUS. — Pico della Mirandola, the glory of his age, in chapter 1 On the Providence of God, testifies not only that certain theologians asserted this — Damascene, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, for example — but also that Epicurus saw it out of the thickest darkness, and the Platonist Iamblichus out of a kind of twilight. Damascene's passage is in the third chapter of the book On the Ineffable Godhead: That God indeed exists, he says, is in no way disputed by those who accept the sacred Scriptures; nor indeed by most of the Greeks. For the knowledge that God exists is implanted and inborn in us by nature. Augustine, Against Cresconius the Grammarian book I, chapter 29, shows it from the altar of the unknown God that was at Athens. Iamblichus, On the Mysteries, right at the beginning, in Marsilio's translation, writes thus: Before all use of reason there is in us, naturally implanted, a notion of the gods; nay, a certain touch of divinity, better than knowledge, by which the natural appetite for good is stirred, and reasoning and judgement, etc. What of Cicero saying in another place that no nation is so savage or barbarous as not to be imbued with some belief in gods? Agostino Steuco in his Perennial Philosophy aims at this one thing: to show how very near the Gentiles came to the true religion. BETULEIUS. — See Huet's Concord of Reason and Faith.

[4] ‹lemma: Sibi› · col 376 Sibi. Scilicet, Deo.

To himself. That is, to God.

[5] ‹lemma: Iidem ipsi› · col 376 Iidem ipsi. Ita passim Lactantius, lib. V, cap. 2; lib. VI, cap. 10 et cap. 12.

The very same. So Lactantius throughout, book V, chapter 2; book VI, chapters 10 and 12.

[6] ‹lemma: Ne si velimus quidem possumus› · col 376 Ne si velimus quidem possumus. Haec est lectio vetustiorum et meliorum codicum mss. Bonon., Reg., Put., 2 al. Reg., Lip., Goth. In antiquissimo Reg. est nec. Haec vocula abest ab octo mss. rec. Duo alii mss. recentiores et quinque impressi habent, nisi. Sed ne, si velimus, legendum esse existimant Jo. Cauci, et Thomasius, quibus etiam adstipulor; hoc enim probare intendit auctor noster, nos non posse, etiamsi vellemus, pecudum more in terram procumbere.

Not even if we wished could we. This is the reading of the older and better manuscripts, Bononiensis, Regius, Puteanus, 2 other Regii, Lipsiensis, Gotha. In the very old Regius is nec. This little word is missing from eight recent manuscripts. Two other more recent manuscripts and five printed editions have nisi (unless). But Jo. Cauci and Thomasius judge that ne, si velimus should be read, and I agree with them; for our author means to prove this: that we could not, even if we wished, sprawl on the ground in the manner of cattle.

[7] ‹lemma: Se abdicat› · col 376 Se abdicat. Abdicare se magistratu frequens est apud Livium et Ciceronem.

Renounces himself. Abdicare se magistratu (to resign from an office) is frequent in Livy and Cicero.

[8] ‹lemma: Naturam hominis› · col 376 Naturam hominis, etc. Utrumque Cicero in I de Legibus probat. Quod vero religio a sapientia divelli nequeat, potest philosophicis demonstrari rationibus. Nam Cicero in lib. Offic., sapientiam cum justitia (sicut virtutes inter se omnes) insolubili vinculo copulat. Justitiae vero forma vel pars est religio. Sed Hebraeorum Sapiens fundamentum sapientiae ponit religionem quum ait: Initium sapientiae timor Domini. BETULEIUS.

The nature of man, etc. Cicero proves both in De legibus I. That religion cannot be torn from wisdom can be demonstrated by philosophical reasons. For Cicero in the books De officiis couples wisdom with justice (as all the virtues with one another) by an indissoluble bond. And religion is a form or part of justice. But the Wise Man of the Hebrews makes religion the foundation of wisdom when he says: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. BETULEIUS.

[9] ‹lemma: Viam deviam› · col 376 Viam deviam. Ita mss. 4 Reg., et Cant. et editi vet. quam lectionem confirmant quae de erroribus adduntur. Sic etiam ait Cicero devium iter.

A pathless way. So 4 Regii manuscripts, the Cambridge and the old editions; a reading confirmed by what is added about errors. So too Cicero says a pathless journey.

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  • running head: 375 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹mini etiam ad propagandam›; B ‹viventia subjecit homini›; C ‹c. 20 : Ut appetant› (in the notes); D ‹prompta est, tum. i Tuscul.› (in the notes)
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PL 6:376
nullo modo possumus: quia nihil ejusmodi potest cogitando inveniri, sicut supra docui. Religioni ergo serviendum est quam qui non suscipit, ipse se prosternit in terram, et vitam pecudum secutus, humanitate se abdicat. Sapientiores ergo imperiti, qui etiam si errant in religione deligenda, tamen naturae suae conditionisque meminerunt.
we are in no way able: because nothing of that kind can be found by reflection, as I showed above. Religion, therefore, must be served; and he who does not take it up throws himself down to the earth and, having followed the life of cattle, renounces his humanity. The unlearned, therefore, are wiser, who, even if they err in choosing a religion, nevertheless remember their own nature and condition.
CAPUT XI.
Chapter XI.
De religione, sapientia, ac summo bono.
On religion, wisdom, and the highest good.
Constat igitur, totius humani generis consensu, religionem suscipi oportere: sed quomodo in ea erretur explicandum est. Naturam hominis hanc Deus esse voluit, ut duarum rerum cupidus et appetens esset, religionis et sapientiae. Sed homines ideo falluntur, quod aut religionem suscipiunt, omissa sapientia, aut sapientiae soli student, omissa religione, cum alterum sine altero esse non possit verum. Cadunt ergo ad multiplices religiones, sed ideo falsas, quia sapientiam reliquerunt, quae illos docere poterat deos multos esse non posse: aut student sapientiae, sed ideo falsae, quia religionem summi Dei omiserunt, qui eos ad veri scientiam potuit erudire. Sic homines, qui alterutrum suscipiunt, viam deviam, maximisque erroribus plenam sequuntur, quoniam in his duobus inseparabiliter connexis, et officium hominis, et veritas omnis inclusa est. Miror itaque nullum omnino philosophorum extitisse, qui sedem,
It is established, therefore, by the consent of the whole human race, that religion ought to be taken up; but how error arises in it must be explained. God willed the nature of man to be such that he should be desirous of and eager for two things, religion and wisdom. But men are deceived for this reason, that they either take up religion, having neglected wisdom, or devote themselves to wisdom alone, having neglected religion, although the one cannot be true without the other. They fall, therefore, into manifold religions, but false ones for this reason, that they have abandoned wisdom, which could have taught them that there cannot be many gods; or they devote themselves to wisdom, but a false one for this reason, that they have neglected the religion of the supreme God, Who could have instructed them in the knowledge of the truth. Thus men who take up either one of the two follow a devious way, full of the greatest errors, since in these two, inseparably joined, both the duty of man and all truth are contained. I wonder, therefore, that there has been no one at all among the philosophers who would find the seat,
Editors' notes and page, col. 376

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  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 376
  • marginal letters: A ‹nullo modo possumus›; B ‹luntur, quod aut religionem›; C ‹nis fuit, id ostendit› (in the notes); D ‹nec. Haec vocula abest› (in the notes)
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PL 6:377
ac domicilium summi boni reperiret. Potuerunt enim sic quaerere. Quodcumque est summum bonum, necesse est omnibus esse propositum. Voluptas est, quae appetitur a cunctis: sed haec et communis est cum belluis, et honesti vim non habet, et satietatem affert, et nimia nocet, et processu minuitur aetatis, et multis non contingit; nam qui opibus carent, quorum major est numerus, etiam voluptate careant necesse est. Non est igitur summum bonum, sed ne bonum quidem voluptas. Quid divitiae? Multo magis. Nam et paucioribus, et plerumque casu, et inertibus saepe, et nonnumquam scelere contingunt, et optantur ab iis qui eas jam tenent. Quid regnum ipsum? Ne id quidem. Non enim cuncti homines regnare possunt; et necesse est universos summi boni capaces esse.
and the dwelling place of the highest good. For they could have inquired thus. Whatever is the highest good must be set before all. There is pleasure, which is sought by everyone: but this is both shared with the beasts, and has not the force of the honourable, and brings satiety, and harms when excessive, and is diminished by the advance of age, and does not fall to many; for those who lack wealth, who are the greater number, must also lack pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, is not the highest good, nor even a good. What of riches? Much more so. For they fall both to fewer people, and mostly by chance, and often to the idle, and sometimes through crime, and they are longed for by those who already hold them. What of kingship itself? Not even that. For not all men can reign; and all must be capable of the highest good.
Quaeramus igitur aliquid, quod propositum sit omnibus. Num virtus? Negari non potest, quin et bonum sit, et omnium certe bonum. Sed si beata esse non potest, quia vis et natura ejus in malorum perferentia posita est, non est profecto summum bonum. Quaeramus aliud. At nihil virtute pulchrius, nihil sapiente dignius inveniri potest. Si enim vitia ob turpitudinem fugienda sunt, virtus igitur appetenda est ob decorem. Quid ergo? Potestne fieri, ut quod bonum, quod honestum esse constat, mercede ac p⟨r⟩aemio careat, sitque tam sterile, ut nihil ex se commodi pariat? Labor ille magnus, et difficultas, et eluctatio adversus mala, quibus haec vita plena est, aliquid magni boni pariat necesse est. Id vero quid esse dicemus?
Let us therefore seek something which is set before all. Is it virtue? It cannot be denied that it is both a good, and certainly a good of all. But if it cannot be happy, because its force and nature are placed in the endurance of evils, it is assuredly not the highest good. Let us seek something else. Yet nothing more beautiful than virtue, nothing more worthy of the wise man, can be found. For if vices are to be shunned on account of their baseness, virtue therefore is to be sought on account of its seemliness. What then? Can it be that what is established to be good, to be honourable, should lack wage and reward, and be so barren that it produces no advantage from itself? That great labour, and the difficulty, and the struggle against the evils with which this life is full, must produce some great good. But what shall we say that this is?
Editors' notes and page, col. 377

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Cum belluis› · col 377 Cum belluis, etc. Hic afferam verba Auli Gellii, etiamsi Gentilis, lib. XIX Noct. Attic., cap. 2: Quinque, inquit, sunt hominum sensus, per quos voluptas animo aut corpori quaeri videtur: gustus, tactus, odoratus, visus, auditus. Ex his omnibus quae immodice voluptas capitur, ea turpis atque improba existimatur. Sed enim quae nimia ex gustu atque tactu est, ea voluptas, sicuti sapientes viri censuerunt, omnium rerum foedissima est.

With the beasts, etc. Here I will bring in the words of Aulus Gellius, Gentile though he was, Attic Nights book XIX, chapter 2: There are five senses of men, he says, through which pleasure seems to be sought for mind or body: taste, touch, smell, sight, hearing. Of all these, the pleasure that is taken without measure is reckoned base and wicked. But the pleasure that is excessive from taste and touch is, as wise men have judged, the foulest of all things.

[2] ‹lemma: Processu aetatis› · col 377 Processu aetatis. Quaestio est apud Ciceronem in Catone majore, utrum senectus voluptate careat.

With the advance of age. It is a question in Cicero's Cato Maior, whether old age lacks pleasure.

[3] ‹lemma: Non est... summum bonum, sed ne bonum quidem› · col 377 Non est... summum bonum, sed ne bonum quidem. Sequitur Senecam de Vita Beata, cap. 10, fin.: Tu illam (voluptatem) summum bonum putas? Ego ne bonum. BUN.

It is not... the highest good, nor even a good. He follows Seneca, De vita beata, chapter 10, end: You think it (pleasure) the highest good? I, not even a good. BUN.

[4] ‹lemma: Multo magis› · col 377 Multo magis. Ita mss. et impressi. Mallem, multo minus.

Much more. So the manuscripts and printed editions. I would prefer multo minus (much less).

[5] ‹lemma: Et optantur› · col 377 Et optantur. Recte sensit Isaeus. non addendam hic negationem, ut in Bonon., 1 Colbert. et Brun. mss. reperitur; probat enim divitias non esse summum bonum, siquidem illi qui illas possident, plures appetunt et optant: summum vero bonum talis debet esse naturae, ut desiderium expleat, Mss. 9 Reg., 5 Colbert., 2 Clarom., Jun. carent hac negatione: Jo. Cauci etiam delendam censet; abest quoque ab impressis tredecim. Ex GALL.

And they are wished for. Isaeus rightly judged that a negative should not be added here, as is found in the Bononiensis, 1 Colbertinus and Brunsvicensis manuscripts; for he proves that riches are not the highest good, since those who possess them seek and wish for more: but the highest good must be of such a nature as to satisfy desire. Manuscripts 9 Regii, 5 Colbertini, 2 Claromontani and Junius lack this negative; Jo. Cauci too judges it should be deleted; it is also missing from thirteen printed editions. From GALL.

[6] ‹lemma: Et necesse est› · col 377 Et necesse est. Heumannus scribit, at necesse est. Quia et est in omnibus libris, interpretor, et tamen. Particula tamen saepe in Cicerone et Lactantio sic subauditur. Lact., lib. IV, cap. 2: Nusquam... sapientiam comprehenderunt, et alicubi esse illam necesse est. BUN.

And it is necessary. Heumann writes at necesse est (but it is necessary). Since et is in all the books, I interpret it as et tamen (and yet). The particle tamen is often understood so in Cicero and Lactantius. Lactantius book IV, chapter 2: Nowhere... have they grasped wisdom, and yet it must be somewhere. BUN.

[7] ‹lemma: Sed si beata› · col 377 Sed si beata. Abest si a ms. Em. In rec. 3 Colbert. et 1 Clarom. est, Sed si bona.

But if happy. Si is missing from the Em. manuscript. In 3 recent Colbertini and 1 Claromontanus is Sed si bona (but if good).

[8] ‹lemma: In malorum perferentia› · cols 377–378 In malorum perferentia. Betul., praeferentia; prave. Lib. III, cap. 12: In perferendis malis tota vis ejus (virtutis) est; et lib. VII, cap. 1: Tolerantia malorum latinius dicitur.

In the enduring of evils. Betuleius: praeferentia (preference); wrongly. Book III, chapter 12: Its (virtue's) whole force lies in enduring evils; and book VII, chapter 1: Tolerantia malorum (the bearing of evils) is said in better Latin.

[9] ‹lemma: Nihil sapiente dignius› · col 378 Nihil sapiente dignius. Ita duo mss. Reg. veterrimi et Goth. In 1 Colb. est sapientiae, mendose. In 16 mss. totidemque editis est, sapientia dignius.

Nothing more worthy of the wise man. So two very old Regii manuscripts and the Gotha. In 1 Colbertinus is sapientiae, wrongly. In 16 manuscripts and as many editions is sapientia dignius (more worthy of wisdom).

[10] ‹lemma: Et eluctatio adversus mala› · col 378 Et eluctatio adversus mala. Mss. rec., 2 Reg. et 1 Colb., et luctatio; Em., et obluctatio, quod cum sequentibus, adversus mala, convenire magis videtur Cellario quam aliorum, eluctatio.

And the struggling out against evils. Recent manuscripts, 2 Regii and 1 Colbertinus: et luctatio (and the struggle); Em.: et obluctatio (and the struggling against), which seems to Cellarius to agree better with what follows, adversus mala, than the others' eluctatio.

[11] ‹lemma: Ex ea› · col 378 Ex ea. Scilicet virtute. Sic emendo ex mss. et editis Rom. 1468, Gymnic., Cellar. In 11 vulgatis est, ex eo, mendose.

From it. That is, from virtue. So I correct from the manuscripts and the editions of Rome 1468, Gymnicus and Cellarius. In 11 editions is ex eo (neuter), wrongly.

[12] ‹lemma: Abstrahi› · col 378 Abstrahi. Ita reposui ex edit. Rom. 1470, Tornes., Soubron., et ex omnibus mss. praeter 4 rec. et edit. 11, in quibus est distrahi.

To be drawn away. So I have restored from the editions of Rome 1470, Tornaesius and Soubron, and from all the manuscripts except 4 recent ones and 11 editions, in which is distrahi (to be torn apart).

[13] ‹lemma: Quam si et proprium sit virtutis› · col 378 Quam si et proprium sit virtutis. Ex mss. ac veteribus excusis est, et elegantius, quam et si duorum mss. rec. et quorumdam editorum.

Than if it is also proper to virtue. This is from the manuscripts and old printed editions, and is more elegant than the et si (even if) of two recent manuscripts and certain editions.

[14] ‹lemma: Eaque omnia› · col 378 Eaque omnia. Ex mss. et editis Rom. 1470, Torn. et Soubron. restitui. In caeteris vulgatis est, atque omnia.

And all these. I have restored this from the manuscripts and the editions of Rome 1470, Tornaesius and Soubron. In the other editions is atque omnia (and all).

[15] ‹lemma: Id est profecto virtutis› · col 378 Id est profecto virtutis. Sic reposui ex vet. edit. Rom. et omnibus mss. praeter 3 Colb., in quibus, sicut in 15 vulgatis. legitur, id est profecto virtutis. In edit. Tornes. et Soubron, id est perfectae virtutis. Profecto virtus, etiam legit Heumannus ex edit. 1472, 1476, 1478 et 1497, ac etiam ex uno e mss. Thomasianis.

That is, surely, of virtue. So I have restored from the old Roman edition and all the manuscripts except 3 Colbertini, in which, as in 15 editions, is read id est profecto virtutis [so printed; the lemma and the variant are identical]. In the Tornaesius and Soubron editions, id est perfectae virtutis (that is, of perfect virtue). Heumann also reads profecto virtus, from the editions of 1472, 1476, 1478 and 1497, and also from one of Thomasius's manuscripts.

[16] ‹lemma: Duo sunt› · col 378 Duo sunt. Juxta B. Paulum tribus homo partibus constat: corpore, anima, et spiritu. Sed animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt Dei. Constituamus igitur in spirituali homine sinceram religionem, qua homines perfectam (quam Cicero somniavit) rationem habentes, multis gradibus a communi illa psychicorum, plurimis a belluina natura distant. Potest videri, Lactantium idem credidisse animum, quod in (continues)

There are two. According to blessed Paul, man consists of three parts: body, soul and spirit. But the natural man does not perceive the things of God. Let us therefore establish sincere religion in the spiritual man, by which men, having perfect reason (which Cicero dreamed of), stand many degrees distant from that common nature of the psychics, and very many from the nature of beasts. It may seem that Lactantius believed the mind to be the same as what in (continues)

(printed under page 192)

Page

  • running head: 377 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTIA P[HILOSOPHORUM] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ac domicilium summi boni reperiret; B Quaeramus igitur aliquid; C Cum belluis, etc. (Variorum notae); D bonum, siquidem illi qui illas possident (Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: p⟨r⟩aemio has a damaged r (printed like p:aemio); satietatem and summum look broken in the type but read clearly. The column ends with di- split at the column break. The Variorum Notae at the page foot are not set. The heading De duplici p[...] belongs to the next column. Multo magis is set as printed, though the editors' note suggests multo minus.
PL 6:378
Num voluptatem? at nihil turpe ex honesto nasci potest. Num divitias? num potestates? at ea quidem fragilia sunt, et caduca. Num gloriam? num honorem? num memoriam nominis? at h⟨ae⟩c omnia non sunt in ipsa virtute, sed in aliorum existimati⟨o⟩ne atque arbitrio posita. Nam saepe virtus et invisa est, et malo afficitur. Debet autem id bonum, quod ex ea nascitur, ita cohaerere, ut divelli atque abstrahi nequeat; nec aliter summum bonum videri potest, quam si et proprium sit virtutis, et tale, ut neque adjici quidquam, nec detrahi possit. Quid, quod in his omnibus contemnendis virtutis officia consistunt. Nam voluptates, opes, potentias, honores, eaque omnia, quae pro bonis habentur, non concupiscere, non appetere, non amare, quod caeteri faciunt victi cupiditate, id est profecto virtutis. Aliud ergo sublimius atque praeclarius efficit; nec frustra his praesentibus bonis reluctatur, nisi quod majora, et veriora desiderat: non desperemus inveniri posse, modo verset se cogitatio in omnia. Neque enim levia aut ludicra petuntur praemia.
Pleasure? But nothing shameful can be born from the honourable. Riches? Powers? But these indeed are fragile and perishable. Glory? Honour? The remembrance of one's name? But all these things are not situated in virtue itself, but in the opinion and judgement of others. For virtue is often both hated and afflicted with evil. But that good which is born from it ought to cohere with it in such a way that it cannot be torn away and drawn off from it; nor can anything appear to be the highest good unless it is both proper to virtue and such that nothing can be added to it or taken from it. What of the fact that the duties of virtue consist in despising all these things? For not to covet, not to seek, not to love pleasures, riches, powers, honours, and all the things that are held to be goods, which the rest do when overcome by desire, this is surely the part of virtue. Therefore it accomplishes something else, more sublime and more excellent; and it does not struggle against these present goods for nothing, but only because it desires greater and truer things: let us not despair that they can be found, provided that our thought turns itself to all things. For it is not light or trifling rewards that are sought.
CAPUT XII.
Chapter XII.
De duplici pugna corporis et animae; atque de appetenda virtute propter vitam aeternam.
On the twofold struggle of body and soul; and on virtue to be sought for the sake of eternal life.
Sed quaeritur quid sit, propter quod nascimur; quid efficiat virtus, possumus sic investigare. Duo sunt, ex quibus homo constat, animus et corpus.
But it is asked what it is for the sake of which we are born; what virtue accomplishes we can investigate thus. There are two things of which man consists, soul and body.
Editors' notes and page, col. 378

Page

  • running head: A SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 378 (cut off at left edge; presumably DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.)
  • marginal letters: A ‹cemus? Num voluptatem›; B ‹ditate, id est profecto virtutis›; C ‹tutis) est; et lib. VII› (in the notes); D ‹omnia.› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: first word "cemus?" is the end of a word broken from the previous column (probably di-cemus); h⟨ae⟩c and existimati⟨o⟩ne have damaged type; full-width heading "...RUM NOTAE" (Variorum notae) cut off at left edge above the notes, not set; editors' Variorum notae at the page foot (Tolerantia malorum..., Nihil sapiente dignius..., Duo sunt...) not set, for the later pass
PL 6:379
Multa sunt propria animi; multa propria corporis, multa utrique communia, sicut est ipsa virtus: quae quoties ad corpus refertur, discernendi gratia fortitudo nominatur. Quoniam igitur utrique subjacet fortitudo, utrique proposita dimicatio est, et utrique ex dimicatione victoria: corpus, quia solidum est et comprehensibile, cum solidis et comprehensibilibus confligat necesse est; animus autem, quia tenuis, et invisibilis est, cum iis congreditur hostibus, qui videri tangique non possunt. Qui sunt autem hostes animi, nisi cupiditates, vitia, peccata? quae si vicerit virtus, ac fugaverit, immaculatus erit animus, ac purus. Unde ergo colligi potest, quid efficiat animi fortitudo? Nimirum ex conjuncto, et pari, hoc est ex corporis fortitudine, quod cum in aliquam congressionem certamenque venerit, quid aliud ex victoria quam vitam petit? Sive enim cum homine, sive cum bestia dimices, pro salute certatur. Ergo ut corpus vincendo id assequitur, ut non intereat: sic etiam animus, ut permaneat; et sicut corpus ab hostibus suis victum, morte mulctatur: ita superatus a vitiis animus moriatur necesse est. Quid ergo intererit inter animi corporisque dimicationem, nisi quod corpus temporalem vitam expetit, animus sempiternam? Si ergo virtus per seipsam beata non est, quoniam in perferendis (ut dixi) malis tota vis ejus est; si omnia, quae pro bonis concupiscuntur, negligit; si summus ejus gradus ad mortem patet, quandoquidem vitam, quae optatur a caeteris, saepe respuit, mortemque, quam caeteri timent, fortiter suscipit; si necesse est ut aliquid ex se magni boni pariat, quia sustentati et superati usque ad mortem labores sine praemio esse non possunt; si nullum praemium, quod ea dignum sit, in terra reperitur, quandoquidem cuncta, quae fragilia sunt et
Many things are proper to the soul, many proper to the body, many common to both, as is virtue itself: which, whenever it is referred to the body, is for the sake of distinction named fortitude. Since, then, fortitude underlies both, a combat is set before both, and for both there is victory out of the combat: the body, because it is solid and graspable, must necessarily clash with things solid and graspable; but the soul, because it is subtle and invisible, engages with those enemies which cannot be seen and touched. And who are the enemies of the soul, if not desires, vices, sins? If virtue has conquered these and put them to flight, the soul will be unstained and pure. From what source, then, can it be gathered what the fortitude of the soul achieves? Surely from its counterpart and equal, that is, from the fortitude of the body, which, when it has come into some encounter and contest, what else does it seek from victory than life? For whether you fight with a man or with a beast, the struggle is for safety. Therefore, as the body by conquering attains this, that it does not perish, so also the soul, that it may endure; and as the body, conquered by its enemies, is punished with death, so the soul, overcome by vices, must necessarily die. What difference, then, will there be between the combat of the soul and that of the body, except that the body seeks temporal life, the soul everlasting life? If, therefore, virtue is not blessed through itself, since (as I have said) its whole force lies in the bearing of evils; if it disregards all things which are desired as goods; if its highest degree lies open to death, since it often rejects life, which is wished for by the rest, and bravely undertakes death, which the rest fear; if it is necessary that it bring forth from itself something of great good, because labours sustained and overcome even unto death cannot be without reward; if no reward that is worthy of it is found on earth, since all things which are fragile and
Editors' notes and page, col. 379

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 379 in sacris Litteris tertia pars est spiritus; nempe apud quem spiritus nomen rarissimum est. Quid autem animus et anima differant, docet idem Lactantius de Opificio Dei, capite 18. BETULEIUS.

(continued) the sacred Scriptures is the third part, the spirit; for in his writing the name of spirit is very rare. How mind and soul differ, the same Lactantius teaches in De opificio Dei, chapter 18. BETULEIUS.

[2] ‹lemma: Ipsa virtus› · col 379 Ipsa virtus. Genus probat ex specie. Robur enim corporis, animi fortitudo esse alias observatur. Vide Erasmum in Enchiridio militis christiani.

Virtue itself. He proves the genus from the species. For it is observed elsewhere that strength belongs to the body, fortitude to the mind. See Erasmus in the Enchiridion of the Christian Soldier.

[3] ‹lemma: Ut aliquid› · col 379 Ut aliquid. Ex mss. et 4 excusis reposui voculam ut, quae caeteris vulgatis deest.

That something. From the manuscripts and 4 printed editions I have restored the little word ut (that), which is missing in the other editions.

[4] ‹lemma: Necesse est, ut... pariat› · col 379 Necesse est, ut... pariat. Lib. II, c. 11; lib. III, c. 9: Necesse est, ut... si. At mox, c. 13: Necesse est, ipsa .. faciat. L. IV, c. 14: Necesse est, habeat. Lib VI, c. 19: Necesse est naturam depravent. L. VII, c. 1: Necesse est, revertatur. L. I, c. 21: Necesse est... ficta sint. BUN.

It is necessary that... it should produce. Book II, chapter 11; book III, chapter 9: It is necessary that... if. But soon after, chapter 13: It is necessary [that] it itself... should make (without ut). Book IV, chapter 14: It is necessary [that] he have. Book VI, chapter 19: It is necessary [that] they deprave nature. Book VII, chapter 1: It is necessary [that] it return. Book I, chapter 21: It is necessary [that]... they be feigned. BUN.

[5] ‹lemma: Sustentati› · col 379 Sustentati. Restitui ex 9 editis et omnibus prope mss. In sex scriptis et 7 editis est suscepti.

Endured. I have restored this from 9 editions and almost all the manuscripts. In six manuscripts and 7 editions is suscepti (undertaken).

[6] ‹lemma: Euclides› · col 379 Euclides. Is fuit Socratis discipulus.

Euclides. He was a disciple of Socrates.

[7] ‹lemma: Conditor Megaricorum› · cols 379–380 Conditor Megaricorum. Orditur jam novam disputationem contra eos, qui imprudentes, et quasi per nebulam summum bonum viderunt. Et est talis argumentatio, qualis Pauli adversus Athenienses, de ara ignoti Dei. Videntur haec ex quarto Academicarum Quaest. Ciceronis desumpta esse. Locum hunc integrum referam: Et quam non multum a Platone Megarici discesserunt, quorum fuit nobilis disciplina, ut scriptum video, princeps Xenophanes, deinde eum secuti Parmenides et Zeno. Itaque ab his Eretriaci philosophici nominabantur. Post Euclides, Socratis discipulus, Megaraeus, a quo iidem illi Megarici dicuntur, qui id bonum solum esse dicebant quod esset unum, simile, et idem semper. Hi quoque multa a Platone: a Menedemo autem, quod is Eretrias fuit, Eretriaci appellati. Quorum omne bonum in mente positum. et mentis acie. qua verum cerneretur. Ex quibus verbis patet, Lactantianam lectionem integram non esse. Nam ad descriptionem summi boni pertinebat etiam. ut unum esset. Galenus ad Stilponem Megaraeum, Euclidis auditorem, disciplinae hujus originem refert in Historia philosophica. Sed ratione ipsa, deinde etiam auctoritate Laertii probabiliora sunt quae retulit Cicero. BETULEIUS.

The founder of the Megarians. He now begins a new disputation against those who saw the highest good unwisely and as if through a mist. And the argument is of the same kind as Paul's against the Athenians about the altar of the unknown God. These things seem to have been taken from the fourth book of Cicero's Academic Questions. I will give the passage entire: And how little the Megarians departed from Plato — a famous school, of which, as I see it written, Xenophanes was the founder, and then Parmenides and Zeno followed him. So from these they were called the Eretrian philosophers [so printed]. After that Euclides, the disciple of Socrates, a Megarian, from whom the same men are called Megarians, who said that alone was good which was one, alike and always the same. These too took much from Plato; but from Menedemus, because he was of Eretria, they were called Eretrians. All their good was placed in the mind and in the sharpness of mind by which the truth is discerned. From these words it is clear that the text of Lactantius is not complete. For "that it be one" also belonged to the description of the highest good. Galen, in his History of Philosophy, refers the origin of this school to Stilpo of Megara, a hearer of Euclides. But both by reason itself and then by the authority of Laertius, what Cicero reported is more probable. BETULEIUS.

[8] ‹lemma: Quod simile sit› · col 380 Quod simile sit. Simile, non πρός τι intelligendum est, sed quod sibi sit simile. Sustulit enim, ut Laertius scribit, de comparatione disputationem. BETULEIUS.

That it be alike. "Alike" is to be understood not relatively, but as what is like itself. For, as Laertius writes, he did away with disputation by comparison. BETULEIUS.

[9] ‹lemma: Seneca› · col 380 Seneca, etc. Nullus hodie Senecae liber sub hoc extat titulo. Extat quidem de Vita beata ad Gallionem liber nobilis. Quin immo omnia Senecae scripta hac sunt doctrina conspersa: praesertim tamen epist. 86, quae est lib. XII. BETULEIUS.

Seneca, etc. No book of Seneca under this title is extant today. There is indeed the noble book On the Happy Life, to Gallio. Indeed all Seneca's writings are sprinkled with this teaching: especially, however, letter 86, which is in book XII. BETULEIUS.

[10] ‹lemma: Negant› · col 380 Negant, etc. De quo vide apud Cicer. V. Tuscul.

They deny, etc. On which see Cicero, Tusculans V.

[11] ‹lemma: Quod› · col 380 Quod. Pro quodnam.

What. For quodnam (what, pray).

[12] ‹lemma: Epicurus Deum beatum› · col 380 Epicurus Deum beatum, etc. In epistola ad quemdam Menecaeum, quae extat in Epicuri vita apud Laertium l. X. Sic etiam veteres XV saeculi editiones.

Epicurus [calls] God happy, etc. In the letter to a certain Menoeceus, which is extant in the life of Epicurus in Laertius, book X. So too the old editions of the fifteenth century.

[13] ‹lemma: Non potest... ut sit miser› · col 380 Non potest... ut sit miser. Infra Seneca, de Provid. c. 3: Bonus vir potest miser dici, non potest miser esse. Cicero, Paradox. II, fin.: Ut improbo, et stulto, (continues)

It cannot be... that he is wretched. Below; Seneca, De providentia chapter 3: A good man can be called wretched; he cannot be wretched. Cicero, Paradoxa II, end: As to the wicked and foolish, (continues)

(printed under page 193)

Page

  • running head: 379 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A Multa sunt propria animi; B sionem certamenque venerit, quid aliud ex victoria; C fortiter suscipit; si necesse est (letter stands between this line and the one above); D Necesse est, ut... pariat (in the notes at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "utrique" (line 5) printed with damaged type as utri·que, read as utrique; column ends mid-sentence at "et"; right-hand column (380) not set; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off at edge) stands above the notes and is not set; the notes beneath (Betuleius, Bunemann etc., beginning "in sacris Litteris tertia pars est spiritus") belong to the later apparatus pass and are not set
PL 6:380
caduca, spernit, quid aliud restat, nisi ut coeleste aliquid efficiat, quia terrena universa contemnit, et ad altiora nitatur, quia humilia despicit? Id vero nihil aliud potest esse, quam immortalitas.
perishable, it despises, what else remains, except that it should accomplish something heavenly, since it scorns all earthly things, and strive towards higher things, since it looks down on lowly things? But this can be nothing other than immortality.
Merito ergo philosophorum non obscurus Euclides, qui fuit conditor Megaricorum disciplinae, dissentiens a caeteris, id esse summum bonum dixit, quod simile sit, et idem semper. Intellexit profecto quae sit natura summi boni, licet id non explicaverit quid sit: id est autem immortalitas, nec aliud omnino quidquam; quia sola nec imminui, nec augeri, nec immutari potest. Seneca quoque imprudens incidit, ut fateretur, nullum esse aliud virtutis praemium, quam immortalitatem. Laudans enim virtutem in eo libro quem de immatura morte conscripsit: « Una, inquit, res est virtus, quae nos immortalitate donare possit, et pares diis facere. » Sed et stoici, quos secutus est, negant sine virtute effici quemqnam beatum posse. Ergo virtutis praemium beata vita est, si virtus (ut recte dictum est) beatam vitam facit. Non est igitur, ut aiunt, propter seipsam virtus expetenda, sed propter vitam beatam, quae virtutem necessario sequitur. Quod argumentum docere eos potuit, quod esset summum bonum. Haec autem vita praesens et corporalis beata esse non potest, quia malis est subjecta per corpus. Epicurus Deum beatum et incorruptum vocat, quia sempiternus est. Beatitudo enim perfecta esse debet, ut nihil sit, quod eam vexare, ac imminuere, aut immutare possit. Nec aliter quidquam existimari beatum potest, nisi fuerit incorruptum. Incorruptum autem nihil est, nisi quod est immortale. Sola ergo immortalitas beata est, quia corrumpi ac dissolvi non potest. Quod si cadit in hominem virtus, quod negare nullus potest, cadit et beatitudo. Non potest enim fieri, ut sit miser, qui virtute est
Rightly, therefore, Euclides, not an obscure one among the philosophers, who was the founder of the school of the Megarians, dissenting from the rest, said that the highest good is that which is alike and always the same. He certainly understood what the nature of the highest good is, although he did not explain what it is: but it is immortality, and nothing else whatever; because it alone can be neither diminished, nor increased, nor changed. Seneca too fell unawares into admitting that there is no other reward of virtue than immortality. For, praising virtue in that book which he wrote on untimely death, he says: "Virtue is the one thing which can endow us with immortality and make us equal to the gods." But the Stoics also, whom he followed, deny that anyone can be made happy without virtue. Therefore the reward of virtue is the happy life, if virtue (as has rightly been said) makes the life happy. Virtue is not, then, as they say, to be sought for its own sake, but for the sake of the happy life, which necessarily follows virtue. This argument could have taught them what the highest good was. But this present and bodily life cannot be happy, because it is subject to evils through the body. Epicurus calls God happy and incorruptible, because He is everlasting. For happiness ought to be perfect, so that there is nothing which can trouble, or diminish, or change it. Nor can anything otherwise be judged happy unless it is incorruptible. But nothing is incorruptible except that which is immortal. Immortality alone, therefore, is happy, because it cannot be corrupted and dissolved. But if virtue falls to man's lot, which no one can deny, happiness also falls to his lot. For it cannot be that he is wretched who is
Editors' notes and page, col. 380

Page

  • running head: LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 380 (initial L cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹caduca, spernit, quid aliud›; B ‹res est virtus, quae nos›; C ‹existimari beatum potest›; D ‹philosophica. Sed ratione ipsa› (in the notes at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: UNSURE whether quemqnam is a turned letter actually printed or merely poor type; ergo in "Merito ergo" has damaged g but reads clearly; the full-width line "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off at the left edge) stands below the text block and is not set; the Variorum notae (Betuleius, Bun., etc.) at the page foot are left for the later pass; column ends mid-sentence at "virtute est"
PL 6:381
praeditus. Si cadit beatitudo, ergo et immortalitas cadit in hominem, quae beata est.
endowed with virtue. If happiness falls to man, then immortality too, which is happy, falls to man.
Summum igitur bonum sola immortalitas invenitur, quae nec aliud animal, nec corpus attingit, nec potest cuiquam sine scientiae virtute, id est, sine Dei cognitione ac justitia provenire. Cujus appetitio quam vera, quam recta sit, ipsa vitae hujusce cupiditas indicat: quae licet sit temporalis, et labore plenissima, expetitur tamen ab omnibus, et optatur; hanc enim tam senes quam pueri, tam reges quam infimi, tam denique sapientes quam stulti cupiunt. Tanti est (ut Anaxagorae visum est) contemplatio coeli ac lucis ipsius, ut quascumque miserias libeat sustinere. Cum igitur laboriosa haec et brevis vita, non tantum hominum, sed etiam caeterorum animantium consensu, magnum bonum esse ducatur: manifestum est eamdem summum ac perfectum fieri bonum, si et fine careat et omni malo. Denique nemo umquam extitisset, qui hanc ipsam brevem contemneret, aut subiret mortem, nisi spe vitae longioris. Nam illi, qui pro salute civium voluntariae se neci obtulerunt, sicut Thebis Menoeceus, Athenis Codrus, Romae Curtius et Mures duo, numquam mortem vitae commodis praetulissent, nisi se immortalitatem opinione civium consequi putavissent: qui tametsi nescierunt immortalitatis vitam, res tamen eos non fefellit. Si enim virtus divitias et opes ideo contemnit, quia fragiles sunt, voluptates ideo, quia breves; ergo et vitam fragilem brevemque ideo contemnit, ut solidam et
The highest good, therefore, is found to be immortality alone, which touches neither any other animal nor the body, and which cannot come to anyone without the virtue of knowledge, that is, without the knowledge of God and justice. How true and how right the desire for it is, the very longing for this life shows: for although this life is temporal and full of toil, it is nevertheless sought after and wished for by all; for old men as well as boys, kings as well as the lowest, and finally the wise as well as fools desire it. Of such worth (as Anaxagoras held) is the contemplation of the heaven and of the light itself, that one is willing to endure any miseries whatever. Since, therefore, this toilsome and brief life is reckoned a great good by the agreement not only of men but also of the other living creatures, it is manifest that the same becomes the highest and perfect good if it lacks both an end and all evil. In short, no one would ever have existed who despised this brief life itself or underwent death, except in the hope of a longer life. For those who offered themselves to a voluntary death for the safety of their fellow citizens, as Menoeceus at Thebes, Codrus at Athens, Curtius and the two Mures at Rome, would never have preferred death to the advantages of life, had they not thought that they were attaining immortality in the esteem of their fellow citizens: and although they did not know the life of immortality, yet the reality did not deceive them. For if virtue despises riches and wealth because they are fragile, and pleasures because they are brief, then it also despises a fragile and brief life in order that a solid and
Editors' notes and page, col. 381

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] (continued) · col 381 et inerti nemini bene esse potest: sic bonus vir, et fortis, et sapiens miser esse non potest. His verius Minuc. Fel., cap. 37: Christianus miser videri, non potest inveniri. BUN.

(continued) and idle man, it cannot be well with anyone: so the good, brave and wise man cannot be wretched. Truer than these, Minucius Felix, chapter 37: the Christian can seem wretched, cannot be found so. BUN.

[2] ‹lemma: Quae› · col 381 Quae. Puta, immortalitas. Recte restituitur quae, ex quampluribus et potioribus mss. et editis. In 6 scriptis ac 9 excusis est quia; in 1 Colb., quod.

Which. That is, immortality. Quae is rightly restored from very many and better manuscripts and editions. In 6 manuscripts and 9 printed editions is quia (because); in 1 Colbertinus, quod.

[3] ‹lemma: Nec corpus attingit› · col 381 Nec corpus attingit. Videtur Lactantius cum Platonicis facere, qui corpus tamquam animae ergastulum habuerunt; quippe qui in ejusdem felicitatis consortium non admittat. Quae sententia pugnat contra istum fidei articulum, quo futuram credimus carnis resurrectionem. Quo nomine ab Epiphanio haereseos insimulatur Hierax Aegyptius. Quin et multos in eodem errore antiquitus versatos fuisse, colligi potest ex Alphonso de Castro lib. de Haeresibus, cap. de Ressurrectione. SPARK. — Nec corpus attingit. At clare docuit Lactantius carnis resurrectionem, l. VII, c. 20: Resurgent mortui. Ibid. cap. 21: Rursus carne induentur. Add. cap. 22. Sensus verborum, Nec corpus attingit, est: Immortalitas non pertinet ad hanc vitam temporalem, ut patet ex lib. III. cap. 12. BUN.

Nor does it touch the body. Lactantius seems to side with the Platonists, who held the body to be a kind of prison-house of the soul, since he does not admit it into the fellowship of the same happiness. This opinion conflicts with that article of faith by which we believe in the future resurrection of the flesh — on which account Hierax the Egyptian is charged with heresy by Epiphanius. Indeed, that many in ancient times were caught in the same error may be gathered from Alphonsus de Castro, book On Heresies, chapter on the Resurrection [printed "Ressurrectione"]. SPARK. — Nec corpus attingit. But Lactantius clearly taught the resurrection of the flesh, book VII, chapter 20: The dead will rise again. Ibid., chapter 21: They will be clothed again with flesh. Add chapter 22. The sense of the words Nor does it touch the body is: immortality does not belong to this temporal life, as is clear from book III, chapter 12. BUN.

[4] ‹lemma: Provenire› · col 381 Provenire. Sic reposui ex cunctis mss. praeter 5 rec. in quibus est pervenire; et 1 Betul. et Walch. edit. obvenire.

To come forth. So I have restored from all the manuscripts except 5 recent ones, in which is pervenire (to arrive); and 1 Betuleius manuscript and the Walch edition, obvenire (to befall).

[5] ‹lemma: Pro salute› · col 381 Pro salute. Editorum est vet. 2 Rom., Tornes., Soubron., Is. et omnium mss. praeter Cauc. in quo, sicut et in editis decem, est, propter salutem.

For the safety. This is the reading of the editions — the 2 old Roman, Tornaesius, Soubron, Isaeus — and of all the manuscripts except Cauci's, in which, as also in ten editions, is propter salutem (on account of the safety).

[6] ‹lemma: Menoeceus› · cols 381–382 Menoeceus. Eteocles Polynicem fratrem parte regni excluserat: hunc quum socer Adrastus restituere vellet, accidit ut Tyresias vates vaticinaretur, victoriam penes Thebanos futuram, si Menoeceus, Creontis filius, sacrificium Marti fieret. Patris autem exilium potius suadentis consilium filius repudians, se pro salute patriae interfecit. Est haec historia tragica apud Euripidem in Phoenissis, apud Statium in X Thebaid.; apud Philostratum, n. 4. Meminit Plut. in Pelopida; Juvenalis, satira 14: Quantus erat patriae Deciorum in pectore: quantum / Dilexit Thebas, si Graecia vera, Menoeceus. Menoecei et Codri, meminit Cicero in primo Tusc. quaest. Codri, Curtii et Deciorum praeterea Valerius Maxim. lib. V, cap. de Amore patriae. BETUL.

Menoeceus. Eteocles had shut his brother Polynices out of his share of the kingdom; when his father-in-law Adrastus wished to restore him, it happened that the seer Tiresias prophesied that victory would lie with the Thebans if Menoeceus, son of Creon, were made a sacrifice to Mars. The son, rejecting the counsel of his father, who urged exile instead, killed himself for the safety of his country. This tragic story is in Euripides' Phoenissae, Statius's Thebaid X, and Philostratus, no. 4. Plutarch mentions it in the Pelopidas; Juvenal, satire 14: "How great a love of country was in the breast of the Decii; how much / Menoeceus loved Thebes, if Greece tells true." Cicero mentions Menoeceus and Codrus in the first Tusculan; Valerius Maximus, besides, Codrus, Curtius and the Decii, book V, chapter On Love of Country. BETUL.

[7] ‹lemma: Athenis Codrus› · col 382 Athenis Codrus. Vide historiam de Codro apud Tzetzen chil. I, hist. 4; Servium, ad eclogam 4; Cic., Tusc. I; Val. Max., lib. V, cap. 6.

At Athens Codrus. See the story of Codrus in Tzetzes, Chiliades I, history 4; Servius on Eclogue 4; Cicero, Tusculans I; Valerius Maximus, book V, chapter 6.

[8] ‹lemma: Et Mures duo› · col 382 Et Mures duo. Lectionem mss. 5 Reg. bonae notae, 11 Vatic., Em. et 2 Br. expressi. Puto quia Mures non satis nota vox erat, quasi mendum hanc fuisse rejectam, unde sit scriptum, et Decii duo, numquam, etc. sicut in 1 Vatic., 2 Reg., 3 Colb., Pen., 1 Clarom., vel τὸ Decii, quod ad oram, quasi glossema illorum verborum et Mures duo, positum erat, demum in textum irrepsisse, et ita factum, et Mures duo Decii, numquam, etc. Sicut habent ms. Cantabrig., 2 Reg. et editi multi. Bon. et Tax. habent Mutius: sed Mures cognomine dictos Decios intelligimus ex Livio initio VIII Dec. I, qui de patre Decio creato consule inquit, creavere Coss. Titum Manlium Torquatum, P. Decium Murem. Quomodo vero sese ambo pro republica devoverint, vide Liv. ibid. et lib. X, Dec. I, Valer., V; Senecam, epist. 68, ut a communibus, etc. Praeter. mss. ab Isaeo laudatos reperio ita etiam haberi in Cauc. Ultr., Em., Jun. Sic etiam legendum censuit Th. Canterus, ut liquet ex illo verbo Decii deleto in edit. Betul. quibus adstipulor. Ex ISAEO.

And the two Mures. I have printed the reading of manuscripts 5 Regii of good quality, 11 Vaticani, Em. and 2 Brunsvicenses. I think that because Mures was a word not well enough known, it was rejected as if an error, whence was written et Decii duo, numquam, etc., as in 1 Vaticanus, 2 Regii, 3 Colbertini, Pen. and 1 Claromontanus; or that the word Decii, which had been put in the margin as a gloss on the words et Mures duo, finally crept into the text, and so it became et Mures duo Decii, numquam, etc., as the Cambridge manuscript, 2 Regii and many editions have it. The Bononiensis and Tax. have Mutius: but we understand that the Decii were called Mures by surname from Livy at the beginning of book VIII, first Decade, who says of the father Decius when made consul: they elected as consuls Titus Manlius Torquatus and Publius Decius Mus. How both devoted themselves for the republic, see Livy in the same place and book X, first Decade; Valerius V; Seneca, letter 68, ut a communibus, etc. Besides the manuscripts cited by Isaeus, I find it so also in Cauci's, the Utrecht, Em. and Junius. Theodorus Canterus also judged it should be read so, as is plain from that word Decii being deleted in Betuleius's edition; with these I agree. From ISAEUS.

[9] ‹lemma: Animi› · col 382 Animi. Haec vox abest, a 6 scriptis rec. et edit. Rom. 1470.

Of the mind. This word is missing from 6 recent manuscripts and the Roman edition of 1470.

[10] ‹lemma: Quaesierunt› · col 382 Quaesierunt. Semel et iterum, haec adduntur in mss. et pluribus editis; in caeteris, quaesiverunt.

They have sought. Once and again — these words are added in the manuscripts and most editions; in the rest, quaesiverunt (fuller form).

(printed under page 194)

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  • running head: 381 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT (cut off at the image edge; presumably SAPIENTIA.)
  • marginal letters: A praeditus. Si cadit beatitudo; B magnum bonum esse ducatur; C fragilem brevemque ideo contemnit; D beside the Variorum notes (clare docuit Lactantius), not in the text block
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "aliud" and "igitur" are read as such though the worn type makes the i look like l. The full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE, cut off at the right edge, stands between the text and the notes and is not set. The Variorum notes at the page foot (et inerti nemini ...; Quae. Puta, immortalitas ...; Nec corpus attingit ...; Provenire ...; Pro salute ...; Menoeceus ...) are not set here. The column ends mid-sentence at "solidam et".
PL 6:382
perpetuam consequatur. Ipsa ergo cogitatio per ordinem gradiens, et universa considerans, perducit nos ad eximium illud et singulare, cujus causa nascimur bonum. Quod si fecissent philosophi; si non, quod semel apprehenderant, tueri pertinaciter maluissent: profecto pervenissent ad verum hoc, ut ostendi modo. Quod si non fuit eorum, qui coelestes animas una cum corporibus extinguunt, illi tamen, qui de immortalitate disputant animi, intelligere debuerunt; ideo propositam nobis esse virtutem, ut, perdomitis libidinibus, rerumque terrestrium cupiditate superata, purae ac victrices animae ad Deum, id est ad originem suam revertantur. Idcirco enim soli animantium ad aspectum coeli erecti sumus ut summum bonum nostrum in summo esse credamus. Ideo religionem soli capimus, ut ex hoc sciamus, ⟨h⟩umanum spiritum non esse mortalem, quod Deum, qui est immortalis, et desiderat, et agnoscit.
perpetual one it may attain. Thought itself, therefore, proceeding in order and considering all things, leads us to that excellent and singular good for the sake of which we are born. And if the philosophers had done this; if they had not preferred obstinately to defend what they had once grasped: they would surely have arrived at this truth, as I have just shown. But if this was not for those who extinguish heavenly souls together with bodies, yet those who argue about the immortality of the soul ought to have understood that virtue is set before us for this reason: that, with lusts thoroughly subdued and the desire for earthly things overcome, souls pure and victorious may return to God, that is, to their origin. For this is why we alone of living creatures are made upright towards the sight of heaven, that we may believe our highest good to be in the highest place. For this reason we alone receive religion, that from this we may know that the human spirit is not mortal, since it both desires and acknowledges God, Who is immortal.
Igitur ex omnibus philosophis, qui aut pro summo bono scientiam, aut virtutem sunt amplexi, tenuerunt quidem viam veritatis, sed non pervenerunt ad summum. Haec enim duo sunt, quae simul efficiant illud, quod quaeritur. Scientia id praestat, ut quomodo, et quo perveniendum sit, noverimus; virtus, ut perveniamus. Alterum sine altero nihil valet, ex scientia enim virtus, ex virtute summum bonum nascitur. Beata igitur vita, quam philosophi quaesierunt semper, et quaerunt, sive in cultu deorum, sive in philosophia nulla est; et ideo ab his non potuit reperiri,
Therefore, of all the philosophers who embraced either knowledge or virtue as the highest good, they held indeed the way of truth, but did not arrive at the summit. For these are two things which together bring about that which is sought. Knowledge provides that we may know how and whither one must arrive; virtue, that we may arrive. The one without the other is worth nothing, for from knowledge virtue is born, from virtue the highest good. The happy life, therefore, which the philosophers have always sought and still seek, exists neither in the worship of the gods nor in philosophy; and therefore by them it could not be found,
Editors' notes and page, col. 382

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  • running head: [F]ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 382 (initial F cut off at left edge of image)
  • marginal letters: A perpetuam consequatur; B capimus, ut ex hoc; C philosophia nulla est; D Clarom., vel τὸ Decii (in the Variorum notae at the page foot, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "⟨h⟩umanum": first letter looks like b (bumanum), probably damaged h, set as lost letter; last word "repe-" split at column break (repe[riri]); full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE." stands between the text block and the notes, cut off at left, not set; Variorum notae at page foot (Thebaid.; apud Philostratum...; Et Mures duo...; Animi...; Quaesierunt...) left for the later pass; first words "perpetuam consequatur" continue a sentence from col. 381 (object presumably there), English begins mid-sentence
PL 6:383
quia summum bonum non in summo quaesierunt, sed in imo. Summum autem quid est, nisi coelum, et Deus, unde animus oritur? Imum quid est, nisi terra, unde corpus est? Itaque licet quidam philosophi summum bonum non corpori, sed animo dederint, tamen, quoniam illud ad hanc vitam retulerunt, quae cum corpore terminatur, ad corpus revoluti sunt, cujus est hoc omne tempus, quod transigitur in terra. Quare non immerito summum bonum non comprehenderunt; quia quidquid ad corpus spectat, et immortalitatis est expers, imum sit necesse est. Non cadit ergo in hominem beatitudo illo modo, quo philosophi putaverunt: sed ita cadit, non ut tunc beatus sit cum vivit in corpore, quod utique, ut dissolvatur, necesse est corrumpi; sed tunc, cum anima societate corporis liberata, in solo spiritu vivit. Hoc uno beati esse in hac vita possumus, si minime beati esse videamur; si fugientes illecebras voluptatum, solique virtuti servientes, in omnibus laboribus miseriisque vivamus, quae sunt exercitia, et corroboramenta virtutis; si denique asperam illam viam difficilemque teneamus, quae nobis ad beatitudinem patefacta est. Summum igitur bonum, quod beatos facit, non potest esse, nisi in ea religione, atque doctrina, cui spes immortalitatis adjuncta est.
because they sought the highest good not in the highest but in the lowest. And what is the highest, if not heaven, and God, from Whom the soul arises? What is the lowest, if not the earth, from which the body is? And so, although certain philosophers assigned the highest good not to the body but to the soul, yet, since they referred it to this life, which is ended together with the body, they were brought back to the body, to which belongs all this time that is spent on earth. Therefore not undeservedly did they fail to grasp the highest good; for whatever pertains to the body and has no share in immortality must necessarily be the lowest. Happiness, then, does not fall to man in the way the philosophers thought: but it falls to him in such a way that he is happy not at the time when he lives in the body, which must certainly be corrupted in order to be dissolved, but at the time when the soul, freed from fellowship with the body, lives in spirit alone. In this one way can we be happy in this life, if we seem least of all to be happy; if, fleeing the allurements of pleasures and serving virtue alone, we live amid all labours and miseries, which are the exercises and strengthenings of virtue; if, finally, we keep to that rough and difficult road which has been opened to us towards happiness. The highest good, therefore, which makes men happy, cannot exist except in that religion and doctrine to which the hope of immortality is joined.
CAPUT. XIII.
Chapter XIII.
De animae immortalitate, deque sapientia, philosophia et eloquentia.
Of the immortality of the soul, and of wisdom, philosophy and eloquence.
Res exigere videtur hoc loco, ut quoniam docuimus
The matter seems to require in this place that, since we have shown that
Editors' notes and page, col. 383

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Quoniam illud ad hanc vitam retulerunt› · col 383 Quoniam illud ad hanc vitam retulerunt. Ita correximus ex mss. vet.. 1 Bonon., 4 Reg. optimae notae, 1 Colbert., Pen., Brun., et editis Thomas., Is., Gall., Spark. Multi mss. rec. et excusi legunt, quoniam ad illud hanc, etc. alii editi, ad illum in hanc vitam.

Because they referred that to this life. So we have corrected from the old manuscripts, 1 Bononiensis, 4 Regii of the best quality, 1 Colbertinus, Pen. and the Brunsvicensis, and the editions of Thomasius, Isaeus, Gallaeus and Sparke. Many recent manuscripts and printed editions read quoniam ad illud hanc, etc. (because [they referred] this to that); other editions, ad illum in hanc vitam.

[2] ‹lemma: Spectat› · col 383 Spectat. Omnium Mss. et editorum est, praeter 1 Lips. cui est pertinet. — Ad corpus spectat. Ediderat Cellarius, ad corpus pertinet, ex uno solo Lips. 1. At quum omnes reliqui mss. etiam Lips., 2 Goth., Guelf., Witterb., Reimm. omnesque editi constanter spectat exhibeant, restitui. Lact. l. IV, cap. 26: Quid ad crucem spectat. Ibid. cap. 4: Sapientia spectat ad filios. De Opif. c. 20: Quae ad vitae beatae statum spectent. Instit. l. III, cap. 17: Ad utilitatem spectat alienam. De Mort. Persec. cap. 7: Quae ad exhibendos milites spectant. De Ira, cap. 1: Error... ad evertendum vitae humanae statum spectat. BUN.

Looks to. This is the reading of all the manuscripts and editions, except 1 Lipsiensis, which has pertinet (belongs). — Looks to the body. Cellarius had published ad corpus pertinet, from the single Lipsiensis 1. But since all the other manuscripts, even the [other] Lipsiensis, 2 Gotha, the Guelferbytanus, Wittenberg and Reimmann's, and all the editions consistently give spectat, I have restored it. Lactantius book IV, chapter 26: What looks to the cross. Ibid., chapter 4: Wisdom looks to the sons. De opificio, chapter 20: Which look to the state of the happy life. Institutes book III, chapter 17: It looks to another's advantage. De mortibus persecutorum, chapter 7: Which look to maintaining soldiers. De ira, chapter 1: Error... looks to overturning the state of human life. BUN.

[3] ‹lemma: Imum› · col 383 Imum. In manu exaratis pene omnibus est, imum, quod summo opponitur. In 4 Reg. et 5 Colbert. legitur unum; quod tot constat tractibus quot imum; in 1 Colb. et Brun. et mortale et periturum sit.; in 2 Reg. rec. esse, pro sit; in excusis vanum. Vide praeced.

Lowest. In almost all the handwritten copies is imum (lowest), which is opposed to summo (highest). In 4 Regii and 5 Colbertini is read unum (one), which consists of as many strokes as imum; in 1 Colbertinus and the Brunsvicensis, et mortale et periturum sit (and is mortal and will perish); in 2 recent Regii, esse for sit; in the printed editions, vanum (empty). See the preceding.

[4] ‹lemma: Corroboramenta› · col 383 Corroboramenta. Nova vox, solius Lactantii auctoritate innixa.

Strengthenings. A new word, resting on the authority of Lactantius alone.

[5] ‹lemma: Beatos› · col 383 Beatos. Sic reposui ex omnibus mss. et octo editis; in 7 vulg. est, beatum.

Happy (plural). So I have restored from all the manuscripts and eight editions; in 7 editions is beatum (singular).

[6] ‹lemma: Id ipsum› · col 383 Id ipsum. Hanc dictionem non ausus sum contra fidem omnium ferme manuscriptorum et editorum codicum immutare. In septem mss. rec. et edit. Tornes. est. eo ipso. Abest ab excusis quatuor.

That very thing. I have not dared to change this word against the authority of almost all the manuscripts and printed copies. In seven recent manuscripts and the Tornaesius edition is eo ipso (by that very thing). It is missing from four printed editions.

[7] ‹lemma: Hujus divinae eruditionis› · cols 383–384 Hujus divinae eruditionis. Haec lectio est omnium fere editorum et 18 mss. codicum vetustiorum ac meliorum. In rec. scriptis 7 et excusis 2 est, traditionis, in 1 Colbert, monitionis. Sed et infra legitur, hanc divina eruditio non desiderat, ex iisdem mss. ut supra.

Of this divine learning. This reading is that of almost all the editions and of 18 older and better manuscripts. In 7 recent manuscripts and 2 printed editions is traditionis (tradition), in 1 Colbertinus, monitionis (admonition). But below too is read divine learning does not need this, from the same manuscripts as above.

[8] ‹lemma: Quibus vincerent› · col 384 Quibus vincerent. Sic omnes. Vincere. idem quod probare, comprobare. Conf. lib. VII. cap. 8 et 9. More Ciceronis, pro Cluent. cap. 23: Si doceo non ab Avito, vinco ab Oppianico. Si ostendo ab Oppianico, purgo Avitum. BUN.

By which they might prevail. So all. Vincere is the same as probare, comprobare (to prove, to establish). Compare book VII, chapters 8 and 9. In Cicero's manner, For Cluentius, chapter 23: If I show [that it was] not from Avitus, I prove [that it was] from Oppianicus. If I show it was from Oppianicus, I clear Avitus. BUN.

[9] ‹lemma: Utare› · col 384 Utare. Restitui ex omnibus pene mss. et 4 editis. In 1 Reg. antiq. est utar; in 1 al. Reg. utaris, in 4 scriptis rec. et 12 vulgatis est, utatur.

You should use. I have restored this from almost all the manuscripts and 4 editions. In 1 old Regius is utar (I should use); in another Regius utaris; in 4 recent manuscripts and 12 editions is utatur (he should use).

[10] ‹lemma: Res enim, non verba› · col 384 Res enim, non verba, etc. Historia memoratu digna scribitur in historiis ecclesiasticis, de quodam arguto disputatore, cujus sophismata cum nemo aequalium eludere valeret, intererat christianus aliquis, nullo alio quam simplicitatis nomine insignis. Hic arroganter disputantis os sua simplicitate ita obstruxit, ut obmutesceret, non sine omnium admiratione. Interrogatus de tam repentino silentio, respondit: alios verba verbis commutasse, hunc vero virtute pugnare. Extant Sozomenis verba lib. I, cap. 18. BETUL. — Simile quid legitur in historia concilii Nicaeni, cum sanctus quidam episcopus verbosum quemdam Arrianum sola dogmatis catholici expositione ad silentium adegit.

For things, not words, etc. A story worth recounting is written in the ecclesiastical histories about a certain clever disputant whose sophisms none of his peers could parry; there was present a certain Christian, distinguished by no other title than his simplicity. He so stopped the mouth of the arrogant disputant by his simplicity that the man fell silent, not without the wonder of all. Asked about so sudden a silence, he answered that the others had traded words for words, but this man fought with power. Sozomen's words are extant, book I, chapter 18. BETUL. — Something similar is read in the history of the Council of Nicaea, when a certain holy bishop reduced a wordy Arian to silence by the mere exposition of the Catholic doctrine.

[11] ‹lemma: Abjectis omnibus› · col 384 Abjectis omnibus. Scil. Philosophiae partibus, e. g. Physica. Vid. l. I, cap. 1, not., et l. III, cap. 21. BUN.

All being cast aside. That is, the parts of philosophy, for example natural science. See book I, chapter 1, the note, and book III, chapter 21. BUN.

[12] ‹lemma: Generati sumus› · col 384 Generati sumus. Sic restitui ex mss. vetustissimis et optimis 1 Bon., 4 Reg., Goth. aliisque. Ad id enim nos omnes generati sumus, non soli philosophi. In decem scriptis rec. et 15 excusis legitur generati sunt; in Em., nati sunt.

We were begotten. So I have restored from the oldest and best manuscripts, 1 Bononiensis, 4 Regii, Gotha and others. For it is for this that we all were begotten, not the philosophers alone. In ten recent manuscripts and 15 printed editions is read generati sunt (they were begotten); in Em., nati sunt (they were born).

[13] ‹lemma: Inanem esse omnem philosophiam› · col 384 Inanem esse omnem philosophiam. Interposui omnem, ex vet. edit. Rom., Tornes., ac Soubron. et omnibus mss. praeter 1 Reg. rec. cui deest, et 11 excusis.

That all philosophy is empty. I have inserted omnem (all) from the old Roman, Tornaesius and Soubron editions and all the manuscripts, except 1 recent Regius, which lacks it, and 11 printed editions.

[14] ‹lemma: Trahantur auctoritate› · col 384 Trahantur auctoritate. Plin. l. VIII, ep. 15, Qui auctoritate ejus trahebantur. BUN.

Let them be drawn by authority. Pliny, book VIII, letter 15: Who were drawn by his authority. BUN.

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  • running head: 383 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A riri, quia summum bonum; B ma societate corporis liberata; C Res exigere videtur hoc loco; D beside the notes, spectant. De Ira, cap. 1
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: first word riri is the end of a word broken from col. 382 (reperiri); last word docui- continues in col. 384 (mus); "a^speram" shows a raised mark, set asperam; "doctrina;," shows a stray speck before the comma, set doctrina,; CAPUT. XIII. set with the stop as printed; VARIORUM NOTAE heading and the editors' notes at the page foot (Quoniam illud ad hanc vitam retulerunt ...) not set, left for the later pass
PL 6:384
immortalitatem esse summum bonum, id ipsum immortalem esse animam comprobemus. Qua de re ingens inter philosophos disceptatio est, nec quidquam tamen exp⟨l⟩icare, aut probare potuerunt ii, qui verum de anima sentiebant; expertes enim hujus divinae eruditionis, nec argumenta vera, quibus vincerent, attulerunt, nec testimonia, quibus probarent. Sed oportunius hanc quaestionem tractabimus in ultimo libro, cum de vita beata nobis erit disserendum. Superest pars illa philosophiae tertia, quam vocant λογικὴν, in qua tota dialectica, et omnis loquendi ratio continetur. Hanc divina eruditio non desiderat: quia non in lingua, sed in corde sapientia est; nec interest, quali utare sermone: res enim, non verba quaeruntur. Et nos non de grammatico, aut oratore, quorum scientia est, quomodo loqui deceat, sed de sapiente disserimus, cujus doctrina est, quomodo vivere oporteat. Quod si neque physica illa ratio necessaria est, neque haec logica, quia beatum facere non possunt: restat ut in sola ethica totius philosophiae ⟨v⟩is contineatur, ad quam se, abjectis omnibus, Socrates contulisse dicitur. In qua etiam parte quoniam philosophos errasse docui, qui summum bonum, cujus capiendi gratia generati sumus, non comprehenderunt; apparet falsam et inanem esse omnem philosophiam, quia nec instruit ad justitiae munera, nec officium hominis rationemque confirmat. Sciant igitur errare se, qui philosophiam putant esse sapientiam: non trahantur auctoritate cujusquam; sed veritati potius faveant, et accedant. Nullus hic temeritati
immortality is the highest good, let us prove that very thing, that the soul is immortal. On this matter there is a great debate among the philosophers, and yet those who held the true view about the soul were unable to explain or prove anything; for, being without this divine learning, they brought forward neither true arguments by which they might win, nor testimonies by which they might prove [it]. But we shall treat this question more fittingly in the last book, when we shall have to discourse on the blessed life. There remains that third part of philosophy, which they call "logic", in which the whole of dialectic and every method of speaking is contained. This the divine learning does not require: because wisdom is not in the tongue but in the heart; nor does it matter what kind of speech you use: for it is things, not words, that are sought. And we are discussing not the grammarian or the orator, whose knowledge is how one ought to speak, but the wise man, whose teaching is how one ought to live. But if neither that physical system is necessary, nor this logical one, because they cannot make a man blessed, it remains that the whole force of philosophy is contained in ethics alone, to which Socrates, having cast aside all else, is said to have devoted himself. And since I have shown that in this part too the philosophers erred, who did not grasp the highest good, for the sake of attaining which we were begotten, it is evident that all philosophy is false and empty, because it neither equips [men] for the duties of justice nor strengthens the duty and reason of man. Let those, then, who think philosophy to be wisdom know that they are in error: let them not be drawn along by anyone's authority; but let them rather favour the truth, and draw near to it. Here rashness has no
Editors' notes and page, col. 384

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  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 384 (left edge cut off; column number printed with damaged first figure)
  • marginal letters: A mus immortalitatem esse summum bonum; B quorum scientia est, quomodo loqui; C ritati potius faveant, et accedant; D xit, ut obmutesceret (beside the Variorum notes, not the text)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "mus" of a word broken from col. 383; last word "temeri-" hyphenated across the column break; full-width line "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." stands between text and notes, cut off at the left edge, not set; "exp⟨l⟩icare" and "⟨v⟩is" have damaged letters; λογικὴν accent read as grave, unsure; "oportunius" printed with a single p, kept as printed; Variorum notes at the foot not set
PL 6:385
locus est: in aeternum stultitiae poena subeunda est, si aut persona inanis, aut opinio falsa deceperit. Homo autem, qualiscumque est, si sibi credit, hoc est si homini credit (ut non dicam stultus, qui suum non videat errorem) certe arrogans est, qui sibi audeat vendicare, quod humana conditio non recipit.
place: in eternity the penalty of folly must be undergone, if either an empty personage or a false opinion has deceived [one]. But a man, of whatever sort he is, if he trusts himself, that is, if he trusts a man (not to say that he is foolish, who does not see his own error), is certainly arrogant, since he dares to claim for himself what the human condition does not admit.
Ille ipse romanae linguae summus auctor quantum fallatur, licet ex illa sententia pervidere: qui cum in libris officiorum philosophiam nihil aliud esse dixisset, quam studium sapientiae, ipsam autem sapientiam, rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam, tum adjecit: « Cujus studium qui vituperat, haud sane intelligo quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet. Nam si oblectatio quaeritur animi, requiesque curarum, quae conferri cum eorum studiis potest, qui semper aliquid inquirunt, quod spectet, et valeat ad bene beateque vivendum? Sive ratio constantiae virtutisque ducitur, aut haec ars est, aut nulla omnino, per quam eas assequamur. Nullam dicere maximarum rerum artem esse, cum minimarum sine arte nulla sit, hominum est parum considerate loquentium, atque in maximis rebus errantium. Si autem est aliqua disciplina virtutis, ubi ea quaeretur, cum ab isto genere discendi discesseris. » Equidem tametsi operam dederim, ut quantulamcumque discendi assequerer facultatem propter studium docendi, tamen eloquens nunquam fui; quippe qui forum ne attigerim quidem: sed necesse est, ipsa me faciat causae bonitas eloquentem; ad quam diserte copioseque defendendam scientia divinitatis, et ipsa veritas sufficit. Vellem igitur Ciceronem paulisper ab inferis surgere, ut vir eloquentissimus ab homunculo non diserto doceretur, primum, quidnam sit, quod laudandum putet, qui
How greatly that very supreme author of the Roman tongue is deceived may be seen from that statement of his: for when in his books on duties he had said that philosophy is nothing other than the pursuit of wisdom, and wisdom itself the knowledge of things divine and human, he then added: « Whoever finds fault with the pursuit of this, I truly do not understand what it is that he thinks worthy of praise. For if delight of the mind and rest from cares is sought, what can be compared with the pursuits of those who are always inquiring into something that looks to and avails for living well and happily? Or if account is taken of constancy and virtue, either this is the art by which we may attain them, or there is none at all. To say that there is no art of the greatest things, when there is none of the least things without art, is the part of men who speak with little consideration and who err in the greatest matters. But if there is some discipline of virtue, where will it be sought, once you have departed from this kind of learning? » For my part, although I have taken pains to acquire some small faculty of speaking for the sake of the pursuit of teaching, yet I have never been eloquent, seeing that I never so much as set foot in the forum; but it must needs be that the very goodness of my cause makes me eloquent; for defending it clearly and copiously the knowledge of the divinity, and the truth itself, suffice. I should wish, therefore, that Cicero might rise for a little while from the dead, so that the most eloquent of men might be taught by a little man who is not skilled in speech, first, what it is that he thinks worthy of praise, who
Editors' notes and page, col. 385

Footnotes

<!-- Variorum notae: lemma notes, no call marks; "col" = the column of the page foot where the note is printed. --> [1] ‹lemma: Homo autem› · col 385 Homo autem, etc. Respicit ad illud Terentii: Censen' me hominem esse? Quo loco poeta proprium hominis esse dicit, errare.

But man, etc. He has in view that line of Terence: Do you think I am a man? In which place the poet says that to err is proper to man.

[2] ‹lemma: Romanae linguae summus auctor› · col 385 Romanae linguae summus auctor. Cicero sic dictus ob latinae linguae facundiam. Locus est in praefatione libri II de Officiis, quam vide, quia in aliquibus differt a textu Lactantii.

The highest author of the Roman tongue. Cicero is so called because of his eloquence in the Latin tongue. The passage is in the preface to book II of De officiis, which see, because in some points it differs from the text of Lactantius.

[3] ‹lemma: Cum eorum studiis potest› · col 385 Cum eorum studiis potest. Ita correxi ex mss. 25, edit. 2 et ex ipso Cicerone. In 5 scriptis et impressis 15 legitur possunt, et pro inquirunt, in vulgatis Ciceronis libris, acquirunt.

Can, with their studies. So I have corrected from 25 manuscripts, 2 editions and from Cicero himself. In 5 manuscripts and 15 printed editions is read possunt (they can); and for inquirunt (they inquire), the editions of Cicero's books have acquirunt (they acquire).

[4] ‹lemma: Ratio... ducitur› · col 385 Ratio... ducitur. L. II, in Verr. cap. 52: Qui non tam coeli rationem, quam caelati argenti duceret. Ibid. cap. 63. BUN.

Account... is taken. Against Verres, book II, chapter 52: Who took account not so much of the heaven as of chased silver. Ibid., chapter 63. BUN.

[5] ‹lemma: Tamen eloquens› · col 385 Tamen eloquens. Vides porro hic discrimen aliquod inter eloquentem et disertum, de quo Quintilianus in prooemio libri octavi, disertis satis putat dicere quae oporteat: ornate autem proprie esse dicere eloquentissimi. Antonius in primo de Oratore apud Ciceronem, disertos dicit se vidisse nonnullos, eloquentem adhuc neminem. Quod enim, inquit, statuebam disertum, qui posset satis acute atque dilucide apud mediocres homines ex communi quadam hominum opinione dicere: eloquentem vero, qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset, atque ornare quae vellet, omnesque omnium rerum, quae ad dicendum pertinerent, fontes animo ac memoria contineret. BETUL.

Yet eloquent. You see here, further, some difference between the eloquent and the fluent, on which Quintilian, in the preface to book VIII, thinks it enough for the fluent to say what they ought, but that to speak ornately is properly the mark of the most eloquent. Antonius, in the first book of Cicero's De oratore, says he has seen some who were fluent, but no one yet eloquent. For I held him fluent, he says, who could speak sharply and clearly enough before ordinary men according to the common opinion of men: but him eloquent, who could amplify and adorn whatever he wished more wonderfully and magnificently, and held in his mind and memory all the sources of all things that pertain to speaking. BETUL.

[6] ‹lemma: Perducere› · col 385 Perducere. Sic restitui ex editis sex et omnibus mss. praeter 2 Reg. rec. et 10 vulg. in quibus est, deducere.

To bring through. So I have restored from six editions and all the manuscripts, except 2 recent Regii and 10 editions, in which is deducere (to bring down).

[7] ‹lemma: Tusculanis› · cols 385–386 Tusculanis. Ciceronem vide in Praefat. V Tuscul. quem etiam consulas velim, ut Lactantii mentem propius intuearis.

In the Tusculans. See Cicero in the preface to Tusculans V, whom I should like you also to consult, so as to see Lactantius's meaning more closely.

[8] ‹lemma: Sic animae› · col 386 Sic animae. Repete, alimentum est. Ad lib. V, c. 1: Veritas est animae pabulum, excitavi similem locum ex Cicerone. BUN.

So of the soul. Supply again alimentum est (is the nourishment). On book V, chapter 1: Truth is the food of the soul, I have cited a similar passage from Cicero. BUN.

[9] ‹lemma: Tanquam tibias ad fontem› · col 386 Tanquam tibias ad fontem. Decem mss. Vat. quibus adde 9 alios, habent tanquam tibi vas ad fontem, ut testatur Isaeus. qui et illorum lectionem est secutus; nos vero nihil mutare voluimus, simplicem lectionem secuti, et ab omnibus impressis et plerisque optimae notae mss. et 6 Reg., 4 Colb., 2 Vatic., Em., Brun., exhibitam. GALLAEUS. — Tanquam tibias. Proverb. casus fortuiti, natum ex fabula Marsyae Phrygis. Sed sic eam ex Hygino referre duco. Minerva tibias dicitur prima ex osse cervino fecisse, et ad epulum deorum cantatum venisse. Juno et Venus cum eam irriderent, quod et caesia erat, et buccas inflaret, foeda visa, et in cantu irrisa, in Idam sylvam ad fontem venit, ibique cantans in aqua se aspexit, et vidit se merito irrisam. Unde tibias ibi abjecit, et imprecata est, ut quisque eas sustulisset, gravi afficeretur supplicio; quas Marsyas, OEagri filius, pastor, unus ex Satyris, invenit, quibus assidue commeletando, sonum suaviorem in dies faciebat, adeo ut Apollinem ad citharae cantum in certamen provocaret. Quo ut Apollo venit, Musas judices sumpserunt; et cum jam Marsyas inde victor discederet, Apollo citharam versabat, idemque sonus erat: quod Marsyas tibiis facere non potuit. Itaque Apollo victum Marsyam ad arborem religatum Scythae tradidit, e cujus sanguine flumen Marsyan est appellatum. Mythologiam vide apud (continues)

Like the pipes at the spring. Ten Vatican manuscripts, to which add 9 others, have tanquam tibi vas ad fontem (like a vessel for you at the spring), as Isaeus testifies, who also followed their reading; but we wished to change nothing, following the simple reading given by all the printed editions and most manuscripts of the best quality, 6 Regii, 4 Colbertini, 2 Vaticani, Em. and the Brunsvicensis. GALLAEUS. — Like the pipes. A proverb of a chance find, born of the fable of Marsyas the Phrygian. I think I should tell it as Hyginus does. Minerva is said to have been the first to make pipes from a deer's bone, and to have come to the banquet of the gods to play. When Juno and Venus laughed at her, because she was grey-eyed and puffed out her cheeks, she, looking ugly and mocked in her playing, came to the forest of Ida, to a spring, and there, playing, looked at herself in the water and saw that she had been rightly mocked. So she threw the pipes away there, and laid a curse that whoever picked them up should suffer a heavy punishment. Marsyas, son of Oeagrus, a shepherd, one of the Satyrs, found them, and by constant practice made the sound sweeter day by day, so that he challenged Apollo to a contest against the song of the lyre. When Apollo came, they took the Muses as judges; and when Marsyas was already leaving as victor, Apollo turned his lyre upside down and the sound was the same — which Marsyas could not do with the pipes. So Apollo bound the defeated Marsyas to a tree and handed him to a Scythian; from his blood the river was called Marsyas. See the mythology in (continues)

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  • running head: 385 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[IA] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹tati locus est: in aeternum›; B ‹semper aliquid inquirunt›; C ‹eloquentissimus ab homunculo›; D ‹tam coeli rationem, qaam caelati› (in the Variorum notae, not in the text block)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "tati", the rest of a word broken from col. 384; the guillemets are set as printed; the second "discendi" (quantulamcumque discendi) appears to be a misprint for "dicendi" and is translated as "speaking"; the first "discendi" (genere discendi) is Cicero's text and is correct; UNSURE: "defendendam" may be printed "defendeudam" (turned n), so check against a cleaner scan; the Variorum notae at the page foot (from "Homo autem, etc. Respicit ad illud Terentii") are not set; the right-hand column (386) is cut off and not set; no full-width line other than the "VARIORUM NOTAE" heading, which belongs to the notes and is not set
PL 6:386
vituperat id studium, quod vocatur philosophia; deinde, neque illam esse artem, qua virtus et justitia discatur, nec aliam ullam, sicut putavit; postremo, quoniam est virtutis disciplina, ubi quaerenda sit, cum ab illo discendi genere discesseris: quod ille non audiendi discendique gratia quaerebat. A quo enim posset audire, cum sciret id nemo? Sed ut in causis facere solebat, interrogatione voluit urgere, ad confessionemque perducere; tanquam confideret responderi prorsus nihil posse, quominus philosophia esset magistra virtutis. Quod quidem in Tusculanis disputationibus aperte professus est, ad eam ipsam conversa oratione, tamquam se declamatorio dicendi genere jactaret. « O vitae philosophia dux, inquit, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum: quid non modo nos, sed omnino vita hominum sine te esse potuisset? Tu inventrix legum, tu magistra morum ac disciplinae fuisti. » Quasi vero aliquid per se ipsa sentiret, ac non potius ille laudandus esset, qui eam tribuit. Potuit eodem modo gratias agere cibo et potui, quia sine his rebus vita constare non possit; in quibus ut sensus, ita beneficii nihil est. Atqui ut illa corporis alimenta sunt, sic animae, sapientia.
censures that pursuit which is called philosophy; next, that it is not the art by which virtue and justice are learned, nor is any other, as he supposed; lastly, since there is a discipline of virtue, where it is to be sought, once you have departed from that kind of learning: a thing which he was asking not for the sake of hearing and learning. For from whom could he have heard it, when no one knew it? But, as he was accustomed to do in lawsuits, he wished to press by questioning and to bring [his opponent] to an admission; as though he were confident that nothing at all could be answered to prevent philosophy from being the teacher of virtue. This indeed he openly declared in the Tusculan Disputations, turning his speech to philosophy herself, as though he were showing himself off in the declamatory manner of speaking. "O philosophy, guide of life," he says, "O searcher-out of virtue and expeller of vices: what could not only we, but the life of men altogether, have been without you? You have been the inventress of laws, you the teacher of morals and of discipline." As if indeed she perceived anything by herself, and as if he were not rather to be praised who bestowed her. In the same way he could have given thanks to food and drink, because without these things life cannot hold together; in which, as there is no sense, so there is nothing of a benefit. And yet, as those are the nourishment of the body, so wisdom is that of the soul.
CAPUT XIV.
Chapter XIV.
Quod Lucretius et alii erraverunt, ac ipse Cicero, in statuenda sapientiae origine.
That Lucretius and others erred, and Cicero himself, in determining the origin of wisdom.
Rectius itaque Lucretius, cum eum laudat, qui sapientiam primus invenit: sed hoc inepte, quod ab homine inventam putavit. Quasi vero illam alicubi jacentem homo ille, quem laudabat, invenerit, tanquam tibias ad fontem, ut poetae aiunt. Quod si
More rightly, therefore, does Lucretius [speak], when he praises him who first discovered wisdom: but in this he is foolish, that he thought it was discovered by a man. As if indeed that man whom he was praising had found it lying somewhere, like the pipes at the spring, as the poets say. But if
Editors' notes and page, col. 386

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  • running head: ...ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. (cut off at the left edge; probably [DE F]ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.)
  • marginal letters: A ‹vituperat id studium›; B ‹non modo nos, sed omnino›; C ‹jacentem homo ille›; D ‹verb. casus fortuiti› (beside the Variorum notes, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with a whole word "vituperat", the sentence continuing from the previous column; "discatur" has a damaged t, read as discatur; stray mark after "nihil" before "est" ignored; "tanquam" and "tamquam" both printed and kept as printed; full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." stands across the page above the foot notes, cut off at the left edge, not set; the Variorum notes at the page foot (Sic animae..., Tanquam tibias ad fontem..., Marsyas fable from Hyginus) are left for the later pass; "Digitized by Google" stamp and recognition stamp ignored
PL 6:387
repertorem sapientiae, ut deum, laudavit; ita enim dicit:
he praised the discoverer of wisdom as a god; for thus he says:
Nemo (ut opinor) erit mortali corpore cretus. Nam si, ut ipsa petit majestas cognita rerum, Dicendum est, Deus ille fuit, Deus, inclyte Memmi:
No one (as I think) will be [found], sprung from a mortal body. For if, as the acknowledged majesty of things itself demands, it must be said, he was a god, a god, illustrious Memmius:
tamen non erat sic laudandus Deus, quod sapientiam invenerit, sed quod hominem fecerit, qui posset capere sapientiam. Minuit enim laudem, qui partem laudat ex toto. Sed ille, ut hominem, laudavit, qui tamen ob id ipsum deberet pro Deo haberi, quod sapere invenerit. Nam sic ait:
yet God was not to be praised in this way, because He discovered wisdom, but because He made man, who could grasp wisdom. For he diminishes the praise who praises a part out of the whole. But that man praised as a man one who nevertheless ought to be held for a god on that very account, that he discovered how to be wise. For he speaks thus:
Nonne decebit, Hunc hominem numero divum dignarier esse?
Will it not be fitting that this man be deemed worthy to be in the number of the gods?
Unde apparet, aut Pythagoram voluisse laudare, qui se primus, ut dixi (supra cap. 2), philosophum nominavit; aut Milesium Thalem, qui de rerum natura primus traditur disputasse. Ita dum hominem quaerit
From which it appears that he wished to praise either Pythagoras, who first, as I said (above, ch. 2), named himself a philosopher, or Thales of Miletus, who is said to have been the first to discourse on the nature of things. Thus, while he seeks a man
Editors' notes and page, col. 387

Footnotes

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(0) ‹continued from page 196: Tanquam tibias› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Fulgentium libro iii. Plato et Ovidius satyrum fuisse scribunt. Qui plura volet, videat Plutarchum in Musica, et Apuleium lib. i Florid. Caeterum de illius certamine cum Apolline, deque Marsyae excoriatione, lege Ovidium lib. vi Metam., Diodorum Siculum lib. iv Antiquit. BETULEIUS.

Fulgentius, book III. Plato and Ovid write that he was a satyr. Whoever wants more, let him see Plutarch, On Music, and Apuleius, Florida book I. As for his contest with Apollo and the flaying of Marsyas, read Ovid, Metamorphoses book VI, and Diodorus Siculus, Antiquities book IV. Betuleius.

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(1) ‹anchor: Quod si repertorem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod si repertorem. Ita reposui ex omnibus mss. et vet. edit. Rom. 1470, Tornes., Soubron. In 12 vulgatis est, quod sic.

"But if [he call] the discoverer." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts and the old Rome edition of 1470, Tornesius and Soubron. In 12 common editions it is "quod sic" ("which thus").

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(2) ‹anchor: Nemo› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nemo. Haec ex initio lib. v de natura rerum a Lucretio.

"No one." These words are from Lucretius, the beginning of book 5 of On the Nature of Things.

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(3) ‹anchor: Nam, si ut ipsa› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nam, si ut ipsa. Sic Lucretius cum mss. a Lambino collatus; nec secus ferunt mss. nostri Lactantiani vetustissimi et optimi, ac duodecim excusi. Scripti 9 rec. et duo impressi, Nam sicut ipsa, contra metri legem. 2 Colb. rec., Nam sic ipsa. Vera lectio, Nam si ut, dactylus apud Lucretium, sine elisione, ut recte observat Lambinus ad hunc locum.

"For, if as [the very majesty]." So Lucretius reads, as collated with the manuscripts by Lambinus; and our oldest and best manuscripts of Lactantius give the same, as do twelve printed editions. Nine recent manuscripts and two printed editions have "Nam sicut ipsa", against the law of the metre; two recent Colbert manuscripts, "Nam sic ipsa". The true reading is "Nam si ut", a dactyl in Lucretius, without elision, as Lambinus rightly observes on this passage.

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(4) ‹anchor: Non erat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non erat. Ita restitui ex quampluribus et potioribus mss. et editis Gymnic., Tornes., Soubron. Legitur non erit in quinque scriptis rec. et 11 vulgatis.

"Was not." So I have restored it from a great many of the better manuscripts and the editions of Gymnicus, Tornesius and Soubron. "Non erit" ("will not be") is read in five recent manuscripts and 11 common editions.

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(5) ‹anchor: Nonne› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nonne. Idem Lucretius lib. v, paulo infra.

"Is it not." The same Lucretius, book 5, a little further on.

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(6) ‹anchor: Aut Pythagoram... aut Milesium Thalem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Aut Pythagoram... aut Milesium Thalem. Erravit Lactantius: Epicurum voluit laudare. Vide Tan. Fabrum ad Lucret. l. v, v. 8. Bun.

"Either Pythagoras ... or Thales of Miletus." Lactantius was mistaken: [Lucretius] meant to praise Epicurus. See Tanneguy Le Fèvre (Faber) on Lucretius, book 5, line 8. Bünemann.

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(7) ‹anchor: Thalem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Thalem. Is fuit auctor philosophiae Ionicae, de quo supra lib. i, cap. 5, et infra cap. 15. Vide etiam Laertium in Vitis philosophor. et Cic. Tuscul.

"Thales." He was the founder of the Ionian philosophy; on him see above, book 1, chapter 5, and below, chapter 15. See also Laertius in the Lives of the Philosophers, and Cicero's Tusculans.

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(8) ‹anchor: Ita dum hominem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ita dum hominem. Sic reposui ex vetustissimis et optimis mss. 1 Bonon., 4 Regiis, aliisque tribus. In 5 aliis et 10 vulgatis est, sed dum hominem; in duobus aliis, sed dum is hominem.

"Thus, while [he wishes the] man." So I have restored it from the oldest and best manuscripts: 1 Bologna, 4 Royal and three others. In 5 others and 10 common editions it is "sed dum hominem"; in two others, "sed dum is hominem".

(printed under page 197)

(9) ‹anchor: Idem perfectus orator, idem summus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Idem perfectus orator, idem summus. Sic Bon., Tax., Pen., Lips., Reimm. et Thomasium secuti; at reliqui, idem perfectus orator, summusque. Idque Heum. probat. Bun.

"The same a perfect orator, the same the highest." So the Bologna, Tax., Pen. and Leipzig manuscripts, and Reimmann, following Thomasius; but the rest have "idem perfectus orator, summusque". And Heumann approves that. Bünemann.

(printed under page 197)

(10) ‹anchor: Quaerit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quaerit. Id est, studet, l. iii, c. 20, Profanare impiis disputationibus quaerunt. Bun.

"Seeks." That is, "is eager to"; book 3, chapter 20: "they seek to profane [it] with impious disputations." Bünemann.

(printed under page 197)

(11) ‹anchor: Et Graecos reprehendit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et Graecos reprehendit. Ita juxta Thomasium codex antiquus Bononiensis, quia revera saepe Graecos Cicero reprehendit. Si vero cum vulgatis legas, ne Graecos reprehendam, non videtur ad quem referri possit. Hanc tamen ultimam lectionem habent omnes editi, ac pene mss. omnes. Ita quippe Thomasius.

"And he rebukes the Greeks." So, according to Thomasius, the old Bologna codex, because Cicero did in fact often rebuke the Greeks. But if you read with the common editions "ne Graecos reprehendam" ("lest I rebuke the Greeks"), it is not clear to whom it could refer. Yet all the printed editions, and almost all the manuscripts, have this last reading. So says Thomasius.

(printed under page 197)

(12) ‹anchor: Levitatem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Levitatem. Haec de Cicerone praecipue in oratione pro L. Flacco.

"Fickleness." This is from Cicero, chiefly in the speech for Lucius Flaccus.

(printed under page 197)

(13) ‹anchor: Inventum deorum vocat, poetice figuratam laudat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Inventum deorum vocat, poetice figuratam laudat. Sic reposui ex omnibus mss. et plurimis editis. Vide Ciceron. in i Tusculan. cujus haec sunt verba: Philosophia vero omnium mater artium, quid est aliud, nisi ut Plato ait, donum, at ego inventum deorum. Platonis locum vide in Timaeo.

"He calls it the invention of the gods; he praises it in a poetic figure." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts and most editions. See Cicero, Tusculans 1, whose words are these: "But philosophy, mother of all the arts, what is it but, as Plato says, a gift, but as I say, an invention of the gods?" For Plato's passage see the Timaeus.

(printed under page 197)

(14) ‹anchor: Laudat in faciem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Laudat in faciem. Scite, ut Horatius l. i, Serm. 5: In faciem permulta jocatus. Idem est Terentii Adelph. ii, 4, Coram in os laudare. Bun.

"He praises to the face." Aptly, as Horace, Satires, book I, 5: "joking a great deal to his face." The same is Terence's "to praise to one's face", Adelphoe II, 4. Bünemann.

(printed under page 197)

(15) ‹anchor: Quisquamne› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quisquamne. Cum mss. et omnibus fere editis sic lego. In impressis Graph., Thys., Gall., est, Quisnamne.—Sic edo ex Emman., Cant., Reimm. et omnibus antiquis edd. ab anno 1465-1513. Lact. l. v, c. 10: Quisquamne putet? Cic. ii Phil. 32: Quisquamne divinare potest? l. 5. Tuscul. 2: Vituperare quisquam audet? Bun.

"Would anyone." So I read with the manuscripts and almost all the editions. In the printed editions of Graph. [as printed], Thysius and Gallaeus it is "Quisnamne". — So I edit it from the Emmanuel, the Cambridge, Reimmann and all the old editions from the year 1465 to 1513. Lactantius, book 5, chapter 10: "Would anyone think?" Cicero, Philippic 2, 32: "Can anyone divine?" Tusculans 5, 2: "Does anyone dare to find fault?" Bünemann.

(printed under page 197)

(16) ‹anchor: Insuendi, te judice, in culeum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Insuendi, te judice, in culeum. Haec olim poena fuit parricidarum, qui patrem matremve interemissent. Isidor. Hispal. in glossis: Culeus, tunica ex spartho in modum crumenae facta, quae linebatur a publico pice et bitumine, in qua includebantur parricidae cum simia, serpente et gallo, insuta mittebatur in mare, et contendentibus inter se animantibus, homo majoribus poenis afficiebatur. Haec sententia sane intelligenda; nam a principio nihil in culeo cum parricida insuebatur. Valer. Max., lib. i, c. 1; Plautus, de Mari, in Vidularia quae periit, sed citat Priscianus: Jube hunc insui culeo, / Atque in altum deportari, si vis bonam / Aunonam. Accessit, crescente in dies parricidarum numero, gravitas supplicii. Ante igitur virgis sanguineis caedebantur, ut prodidit Modestin., lib. ix, ff. ad L. Pompeiam, de parricid. caput item obvolvebantur, teste Festo in voce obvolvere: cum vero culeo insuerentur, cum noxio serpentes includere coepere, ut de C. Villio scriptum reliquit Plutarch. L. Sen., lib. v, controv. 4; Livius, v Decad., lib. viii; Val. Max., lib. i, c. 1. Postea addiderunt simiam (Juvenal., sat. 13). Denique etiam insuebant culeo canem et gallum, teste Isidoro loco supra citato: quod a Constantino primum adjectum videtur L. un. C. de his qui par. vel lib. Occid. Dempsterus. — Mss. 8 Reg. inter quos sunt duo veterrimi, 3 Colbert., 2 Brun., Ultr., Lips., 1 Clarom. ac edit. Rom. 1468, 1470, habent culleum; et sic antiqui pronuntiabant. Huic insuti parricidae lege romana projiciebantur in fluenta vel mare. Cicero pro S. Roscio, c. 11; Senec., de Clem., lib. xxiii; Sueton., August., 33. Hoc ita, si mare proximum sit; alioqui bestiis subjicientur, secundum divi Hadriani constitutionem.

"To be sewn, by your judgement, into the sack." This was once the punishment of parricides, who had killed father or mother. Isidore of Seville in the Glosses: "The culeus, a covering of esparto made in the manner of a purse, which was lined at public cost with pitch and bitumen; parricides were shut in it with an ape, a serpent and a cock, and, sewn up, it was thrown into the sea; and as the animals fought among themselves, the man was afflicted with greater torments." This statement must be rightly understood, for at the beginning nothing was sewn into the sack with the parricide. Valerius Maximus, book 1, chapter 1; Plautus, on the sea [as printed], in the Vidularia, which is lost, but Priscian quotes it: "Have this man sewn into a sack / And carried out to the deep, if you want a good / harvest" [Aunonam, as printed]. As the number of parricides grew day by day, the severity of the punishment was increased. First they were beaten with blood-red rods, as Modestinus records, book 9, Digest, on the Lex Pompeia on parricides; their heads were also wrapped, as Festus attests under the word "obvolvere"; and when they were sewn into the sack, they began to shut serpents in with the guilty man, as Plutarch left written of Gaius Villius; Lucius Seneca, book 5, Controversy 4; Livy, Decade 5, book 8; Valerius Maximus, book 1, chapter 1. Later they added an ape (Juvenal, Satire 13). Finally they also sewed a dog and a cock into the sack, as Isidore attests in the place cited above; this seems first to have been added by Constantine, the single law in the Code "on those who kill parents or children" (de his qui parentes vel liberos occiderunt). Dempster. — Eight Royal manuscripts, among them the two oldest, 3 Colbert, 2 Brun., the Utrecht, the Leipzig, 1 Clermont, and the Rome editions of 1468 and 1470 have "culleum"; and so the ancients pronounced it. Sewn into it, parricides were thrown by Roman law into rivers or the sea. Cicero for Sextus Roscius, chapter 11; Seneca, On Clemency, book 23 [as printed]; Suetonius, Augustus, 33. This, if the sea is near; otherwise they are to be thrown to the beasts, according to the constitution of the deified Hadrian.

(printed under page 197)

(17) ‹anchor: Hominemque generavit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Hominemque generavit. Sic legunt mss. 1 Bonon. antiq., 7 Reg. quorum duo sunt veterrimi, Cauc., Pen., Pal., Jun., Ultr., Goth., 5 Oxon., 6 Colbert., Sorbon., 3 Lips., Tornes., 2 Clarom., Brun., et 5 editi, generare, pro creare, hic et alibi passim apud Lactantium. Mss. rec. 2 Reg. et Cant. ac 12 vulgati habent, figuravit, quae vox est quoque Lactantio familiaris, Divin. Institut., l. iv, c. 4; l. vii, c. 14, Epitom. c. 65, etc. (continues)

"And begot man." So read the manuscripts: 1 old Bologna, 7 Royal (two of them the oldest), Cauc., Pen., Palatine, Junius, Utrecht, Gotha, 5 Oxford, 6 Colbert, Sorbonne, 3 Leipzig, Tornesius, 2 Clermont, Brun., and 5 printed editions: "generare" for "creare", here and elsewhere throughout Lactantius. Two recent Royal manuscripts and the Cambridge, with 12 common editions, have "figuravit" ("fashioned"), a word also familiar to Lactantius: Divine Institutes, book 4, chapter 4; book 7, chapter 14; Epitome, chapter 65, etc. (continues)

(printed under page 197)

Page

  • running head: 387 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A repertorem sapientiae, ut deum; B minavit; aut Milesium Thalem; C Scripti 9 rec. et duo impressi (in the notes); D Pen., Lips., Reimm. (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the page-foot images crop the first lines of both note columns; (0) and the head of (14)–(15) were read from the column images (c387_1–2, c388_1–2). UNSURE in (0): the print is weak at "Fulgentium" (looks like "Fulzentium"), "Plutarchum" (looks like "Plujarchum") and "Florid." (looks like "Floral."); set as the evident words.
PL 6:388
extollere, rem ipsam depressit. Non est enim magna, si ab homine potuit inveniri. Verum potest, ut poetae, dari venia. At ille idem perfectus orator, idem summus philosophus, et Graecos reprehendit, quorum levitatem semper accusat, et tamen sequitur; ipsam sapientiam, quam alias donum, alias inventum deorum vocat, poetice figuratam laudat in faciem. Graviter etiam queritur extitisse aliquos, qui eam vituperarent. « Quisquamne, inquit, vituperare vitae parentem, et hoc parricidio se inquinare audeat, et tam impie ingratus esse? »
to extol, he has debased the thing itself. For it is not great, if it could be discovered by a man. But pardon can be granted to him, as to a poet. Yet that same man, the perfect orator, the same consummate philosopher, both censures the Greeks, whose levity he always accuses, and yet follows them; wisdom itself, which he calls at one time a gift, at another an invention of the gods, he praises to its face, poetically figured. He also complains gravely that there have been some who disparaged it. «Would anyone, he says, dare to disparage the parent of life, and to defile himself with this parricide, and to be so impiously ungrateful?»
Nos ergo, Marce Tulli, parricidae sumus, et insuendi te judice in culeum, qui philosophiam negamus parentem esse vitae? An tu, qui adversus Deum tam impie ingratus es (non hunc cujus effigiem veneraris in Capitolio sedentem, sed illum qui mundum fecit, hominemque generavit, qui sapientiam quoque
Are we then, Marcus Tullius, parricides, and, with you as judge, to be sewn into the sack, we who deny that philosophy is the parent of life? Or you, who are so impiously ungrateful towards God (not this one whose image you venerate seated on the Capitol, but Him Who made the world and generated man, Who also wisdom
Editors' notes and page, col. 388

Page

  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 388 (left part of the head cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A extollere, rem ipsam depressit; B neraris in Capitolio sedentem; C Isidor. Hispal. glossa line in the Variorum Notae (apparatus, not set); D sat. 13). Denique etiam insuebant (Variorum Notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence with "extollere"; last word "quo-" (quoque) split at the column break; Variorum Notae at the page foot (In faciem permulta jocatus ... Hominemque generavit) left for the later pass; fragments of the neighbouring column at the left edge not set; no editors' matter in the text block; no full-width line other than the VARIORUM NOTAE heading (apparatus, not set)
PL 6:389
ipsam inter coelestia sua beneficia largitus est) magistram tu virtutis, aut parentem vitae vocas, ad quam si quis accesserit, multo sit incertior necesse est, quam prius fuerit? Cujus enim virtutis? quae ipsa, ubi sita sit, adhuc philosophi non expediunt. Cujus vitae? cum ipsi doctores ante fuerint senectute ac morte confecti, quam constituerint quomodo vivi deceat. Cujus veritatis indagatricem profiteri potes? qui saepe testaris, cum tanta multitudo fueri⟨t⟩ philosophorum, sapientem tamen extitisse adhuc neminem. Quid ergo te magistra illa vitae docuit? An ut potentissimum consulem maledictis incesseres, eumque hostem patriae venenatis orationibus faceres? Sed omittamus illa, quae possunt excusari fortunae nomine. Studuisti nempe philosophiae, et quidem sic, ut nullus umquam diligentius; quippe qui omnes cognoveris disciplinas, sicut ipse gloriari soles, eamque ipsam latinis litteris illustraveris, imitatoremque te Platonis ostenderis. Cedo igitur quid didiceris, aut in qua secta veritatem deprehenderis. In academia scilicet, quam secutus es, quam probasti. At haec nihil docet, nisi ut scias te nihil scire. Tui ergo te libri arguunt, quam nihil a philosophia disci possit ad vitam. Haec tua verba sunt: « Mihi autem non modo ad sapientiam caeci videmur, sed ad ea ipsa, quae aliqua ex parte cerni videantur, hebetes et obtusi. » Si ergo philosophia est magistra vitae, cur tibi ipse caecus, et hebes, et obtusus videbare, quem oportuit, illa docente, et sentire, et sapere, et in clarissima luce versari? At quam confessus fueris philosophiae
itself has bestowed among His heavenly benefits) you call the mistress of virtue or the parent of life, though whoever approaches her must necessarily be far more uncertain than he was before? For of what virtue? Where virtue itself is situated, the philosophers do not yet make clear. Of what life? since the teachers themselves were worn out by old age and death before they had established how it is fitting to live. Of what truth can you profess her to be the searcher, you who often testify that, though there has been so great a multitude of philosophers, no one has yet existed who was wise? What then did that mistress of life teach you? Was it that you should assail a most powerful consul with abuse, and make him an enemy of the fatherland by venomous speeches? But let us pass over those things which can be excused under the name of fortune. You studied philosophy, of course, and indeed in such a way that no one ever did so more diligently; seeing that you came to know all the schools, as you yourself are accustomed to boast, and shed lustre on philosophy itself in Latin letters, and showed yourself an imitator of Plato. Tell me then what you learned, or in what sect you discovered the truth. In the Academy, no doubt, which you followed, which you approved. But this teaches nothing except that you should know that you know nothing. Your own books therefore convict you, showing how nothing can be learned from philosophy for life. These are your words: « But to me we seem not only blind with respect to wisdom, but dull and obtuse even with respect to those very things which seem to be discerned in some part. » If therefore philosophy is the mistress of life, why did you seem to yourself blind, and dull, and obtuse, you who ought, under her teaching, both to perceive, and to be wise, and to dwell in the clearest light? But how you have confessed philosophy's
Editors' notes and page, col. 389

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. The left note column runs to the start of note 11; the right note column completes it and holds 12–19. --> (printed under page 198)

(1) ‹anchor: Hominemque generavit (p. 197)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) Frequens etiam loquendi modus apud Ciceronem, ut Deus dicatur hominem generare, id est creare. Verum eam vocabuli vim non intelligentes editores quidam, posuerunt figuravit.

(printed under page 198)

(2) ‹anchor: Inter coelestia sua beneficia› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Inter coelestia sua beneficia. Ita mss. omnes cum vet. edit. Rom. et Paris. Caeteri editi, inter caetera coelestia beneficia.

"Among his heavenly benefits." So all the manuscripts, with the old Rome and Paris editions. The other printed editions have "inter caetera coelestia beneficia" ("among the other heavenly benefits").

(printed under page 198)

(3) ‹anchor: Profiteri potes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Profiteri potes. Sic emendavi ex 9 editis et 19 manu exaratis codicibus. Vide seqq. In 2 aliis Reg. et editis quatuor legitur profiteri potest.

"You can profess." So I have corrected it from 9 printed editions and 19 handwritten codices. See what follows. In 2 other Royal manuscripts and four printed editions it reads "profiteri potest" ("he can profess").

(printed under page 198)

(4) ‹anchor: Adhuc› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Adhuc. Id est hactenus.

"Hitherto." That is, "up to this point".

(printed under page 198)

(5) ‹anchor: Potentissimum consulem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Potentissimum consulem. Marcum Antonium, qui cum C. Caesare eo anno consulatum gessit, quo Caesar fuit interfectus, ab U. C. 710, in quem novem scripsit orationes invectivas, quas, teste Fabio, ad Demosthenis imitationem Philippicas nominavit. Betuleius.

"A most powerful consul." Mark Antony, who held the consulship with Gaius Caesar in the year Caesar was killed, 710 from the founding of the City; against him [Cicero] wrote nine invectives, which, as Fabius [Quintilian] attests, he named Philippics in imitation of Demosthenes. Betuleius.

(printed under page 198)

(6) ‹anchor: Illustraveris› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Illustraveris. Vide Cic. in Praefat., lib. i Tusculan.

"You have illustrated." See Cicero in the preface to book 1 of the Tusculans.

(printed under page 198)

(7) ‹anchor: Cedo› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cedo. Est verbum antiquum imperativum, et significat dic: quo sensu saepissime apud Terentium occurrit. Ponitur quoque pro da, porrige. Phaedr. fab. 2 lib. v, Cedo (inquit), illum. Vide Vide Paraei Lexicon Criticum, p. 185.

"Cedo." It is an old imperative verb, and means "say": in this sense it occurs very often in Terence. It is also used for "give, hand over". Phaedrus, fable 2 of book 5: "Hand him over (he says)". See See [as printed] Pareus's Lexicon Criticum, p. 185.

(printed under page 198)

(8) ‹anchor: Te nihil scire› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Te nihil scire. De hac sententia, vide Cicer. in i Academic. quaestion. de Socrate.

"That you know nothing." On this saying, see Cicero, Academic Questions 1, on Socrates.

(printed under page 198)

(9) ‹anchor: Mihi autem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Mihi autem. Locus ille Ciceronis desideratur integer: est tantum in fragmentis Academicar. quaestion. id tantum legitur lib. i Officiorum, sub finem: Omne officium, inquit, quod ad conjunctionem hominum et ad societatem tuendam valet, anteponendum est illi officio, quod cognitione et scientia continetur.

"But to me." That passage of Cicero is missing entire: it is only among the fragments of the Academic Questions. Only this is read in book 1 of On Duties, near the end: "Every duty," he says, "that serves to keep men joined together and to protect society is to be preferred to that duty which consists in knowledge and learning."

(printed under page 198)

(10) ‹anchor: Illa docente› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Illa docente. Haec lectio manuscriptorum est, ac edit. Is. in marg. Cellar. Walch., illa docentem, caeter. edit.

"With her teaching." This is the reading of the manuscripts, and of the edition of Is[aeus] in the margin, Cellarius and Walch; "illa docentem", the other editions.

(printed under page 198)

(11) ‹anchor: At quam confessus fueris philosophiae veritatem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

At quam confessus fueris philosophiae veritatem. Sic legunt mss. 19 et omnes editi. Thomasius mavult legere confisus... veritate, prout in i Bonon. antiq. et 3 Reg. legitur, vel confisus... veritati, ut in altero Bonon. rec., Balliol., Cauc., Pal., Lips. Nihil ego mutandum censui, et aliorum mss. lectionem retinui, eo quod vox confessus satis sit apta, et in omnibus excusis expressa.

"But what truth of philosophy you have confessed." So read 19 manuscripts and all the printed editions. Thomasius prefers to read "confisus ... veritate" ("having trusted ... in the truth"), as is read in 1 old Bologna and 3 Royal manuscripts, or "confisus ... veritati", as in the other, recent Bologna manuscript, the Balliol, Cauc., Palatine and Leipzig. I judged that nothing should be changed, and kept the reading of the other manuscripts, because the word "confessus" is apt enough, and is printed in all the editions.

(printed under page 198)

(12) ‹anchor: Ad filium, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ad filium, etc. In officiis quidem negat extra consociationem justitiae officia conservari posse, et ob id otiosam et inertem philosophorum vitam damnat, ut infra, c. 16, ipse Lactantius indicabit. Sed haec verba in Cicerone nuspiam invenio. Betuleius.—Sunt tantum inter fragmenta.

"To his son," etc. In On Duties he does indeed deny that duties can be kept outside the fellowship of justice, and for that reason condemns the idle and inactive life of the philosophers, as Lactantius himself will point out below, chapter 16. But I find these words nowhere in Cicero. Betuleius. — They are only among the fragments.

(printed under page 198)

(13) ‹anchor: Stultitiae inanitatisque› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Stultitiae inanitatisque. Emman. et Lips., vanitatisque, quod congruentius rei et materiae, non autem oratorio numero. Bun.

"Of folly and emptiness." The Emmanuel and Leipzig manuscripts have "vanitatisque" ("and vanity"), which fits the subject and matter better, but not the oratorical rhythm. Bünemann.

(printed under page 198)

(14) ‹anchor: Stultitiae inanitatisque› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Stultitiae inanitatisque. Ita plures mss. Sparkii, Goth., Reimm., Bon., Rom., Sublac., Rost., Ven. 1471, 97, immo omnes editi, ut lib. iii, c. 13: Apparet inanem esse omnem philosophiam. Lib. vii, c. 26: Qui inanem philosophiam tuentur. Bun.

"Of folly and emptiness." So read most of Spark's manuscripts, the Gotha, Reimmann's, Bologna, Rome, Subiaco, Rostock, Venice 1471 and [14]97, indeed all the printed editions; as in book 3, chapter 13: "It is plain that all philosophy is empty"; book 7, chapter 26: "Those who defend an empty philosophy." Bünemann.

(printed under page 198)

(15) ‹anchor: Verum fateris› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Verum fateris. Ita reposui ex antiquiss. mss. 2 Bonon., Cauc., 3 Reg., Tax. et Pen. In 13 mss. rec. et ed. 2 vet. Rom. et 13 excusis, fatebaris.

"You confess the truth." So I have restored it from the oldest manuscripts: 2 Bologna, Cauc., 3 Royal, Tax. and Pen. In 13 recent manuscripts and the 2 old Rome editions and 13 printed editions, "fatebaris" ("you were confessing").

(printed under page 198)

(16) ‹anchor: Seneca› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Seneca. Sententiam sparsim quidem invenimus venimus in ejus libris, non autem integra verba; aut ex deperdito libro depromta sunt. Cell.

"Seneca." We do indeed find the thought here and there [venimus, as printed] in his books, but not the exact words; or else they are drawn from a lost book. Cellarius.

(printed under page 198)

(17) ‹anchor: Philosophia nihil aliud est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Philosophia nihil aliud est. Doctrina quidem Senecae hujusmodi notionibus conspersa est passim. Quae vero hic citantur, perierunt cum aliis plerisque. Philosophiam vitae legem esse, disputat epist. 90 et 95. Betul.

"Philosophy is nothing other." Seneca's teaching is indeed sprinkled throughout with notions of this kind. But what is quoted here has perished with most of the rest. That philosophy is the law of life he argues in Letters 90 and 95. Betuleius.

(printed under page 198)

(18) ‹anchor: Recta ratio vivendi› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Recta ratio vivendi. Sic edit. Cellarii et Walch. cum mss. omnibus, praeter 2 Reg. rec. et Jun., in quibus est recte, sicut et in excusis.

"The right rule of living." So the editions of Cellarius and Walch, with all the manuscripts except 2 recent Royal and the Junius, in which it is "recte" ("rightly"), as also in the printed editions.

(printed under page 198)

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  • running head: 389 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTI[A] (cut off at the image's right edge; column 390 number not visible)
  • marginal letters: A ‹que ipsam inter coelestia›; B ‹ut nullus umquam diligentius›; C ‹luce versari? At quam›; D ‹sar fuit interfectus› (beside the notes, not the text block)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "que" of a word broken from column 388 (probably atque), rendered "and"; "fueri⟨t⟩": final t not visible in the type; "his" in the first line left lower-case as the subject is uncertain (Cicero's god/gods); full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTA[E]" cut off at the right edge, stands between the text block and the notes, not set; the notes at the page foot are not set
PL 6:390
veritatem, docent ad filium composita praecepta, quibus mones philosophiae quidem praecepta noscenda, vivendum autem esse civiliter.
truth, the precepts composed for your son teach, in which you advise that the precepts of philosophy are indeed to be learned, but that one must live as a citizen.
Quid tam repugnans dici potest? Si noscenda sunt praecepta philosophiae, ideo utique noscenda sunt ut recte sapienterque vivamus. Vel, si civiliter vivendum est, non est igitur philosophia sapientia; siquidem melius est civiliter, quam philosophice vivere. Nam si sapientia est, quae dicitur philosophia, stulte profecto vivit, qui non secundum philosophiam vivit. Si autem non stulte vivit, qui civiliter vivit, sequitur ut stulte vivat, qui philosophice vivit. Tuo itaque judicio philosophia stultitiae, inanitatisque damnata est. Idem in Consolatione, id est, in opere non joculari, hanc de philosophia sententiam tulisti: « Sed nescio quis nos teneat error, aut miserabilis ignoratio veri. » Ubi est ergo philosophiae magisterium? aut quid te docuit illa vitae parens, si verum miserabiliter ignoras? Quod si haec erroris ignorationisque confessio pene invito tibi ab intimo pectore expressa est, cur non tibi verum fateris aliquando, philosophiam, quam tu nihil docentem in coelum laudibus extulisti, magistram virtutis esse non posse?
What can be said that is so self-contradictory? If the precepts of philosophy are to be learned, they are surely to be learned for this reason, that we may live rightly and wisely. Or, if one must live as a citizen, then philosophy is not wisdom, since it is better to live as a citizen than as a philosopher. For if what is called philosophy is wisdom, he who does not live according to philosophy certainly lives foolishly. But if he who lives as a citizen does not live foolishly, it follows that he who lives as a philosopher lives foolishly. By your own judgement, therefore, philosophy has been condemned of folly and emptiness. Likewise in the Consolation, that is, in a work not written in jest, you pronounced this opinion about philosophy: "But some error or other holds us, or a wretched ignorance of the truth." Where, then, is the teaching authority of philosophy? Or what did that parent of life teach you, if you are wretchedly ignorant of the truth? But if this confession of error and ignorance was wrung from your inmost breast almost against your will, why do you not at last admit the truth to yourself, that philosophy, which you extolled to the heavens with praises though it teaches nothing, cannot be the teacher of virtue?
CAPUT XV.
Chapter XV.
Senecae error in philosophia; et quomodo philosophorum oratio cum eorum vita pugnet.
Seneca's error in philosophy; and how the discourse of the philosophers conflicts with their life.
Eodem ductus errore Seneca (quis enim veram viam teneret, errante Cicerone? « Philosophia, inquit, nihil aliud est quam recta ratio vivendi, vel
Led by the same error, Seneca (for who would keep to the true way, when Cicero goes astray? "Philosophy," he says, "is nothing other than the right method of living, or
Editors' notes and page, col. 390

Page

  • running head: ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. (cut off at the left edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A veritatem, docent ad filium; B quis nos teneat error; C quit, nihil aliud est; D sque, quod congruentius (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence with "veritatem"; the Seneca parenthesis and quotation run on into the next column; the full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE", which the image cuts off, stands below "recta ratio vivendi, vel" and is not set; the Variorum notae at the page foot are not set (later pass); head reading uncertain at left because of the crop
PL 6:391
honeste vivendi scientia, vel ars rectae vitae agendae. Non errabimus, si dixerimus philosophiam esse legem bene honesteque vivendi. Et qui dixerit illam regulam vitae, suum illi reddidit. » Hic plane non respexit ad commune philosophiae nomen, quae cum sit in plures sectas disciplinasque diffusa, nihilque habeat certi, nihil denique, de quo universi una mente ac voce consentiant, quid potest esse tam falsum, quam regulam vitae philosophiam nominari, in qua diversitas praeceptorum rectum iter impediat, et turbet? aut legem bene vivendi, cujus capita longe dissonant? aut scientiam vitae agendae, in qua nihil aliud efficitur, contraria saepe dicendo, quam ut nemo quidquam sciat? Quaero enim, utrumne academiam philosophiam putet esse, an non? Negaturum non arbitror: quod si est, nihil ergo illorum cadit in philosophiam, quae omnia reddit incerta, legem abrogat, artem nullam putat, rationem subvertit, regulam depravat, scientiam funditus tollit. Falsa igitur illa omnia, quia in rem semper incertam et adhuc nihil explicantem cadere non possunt. Nulla itaque ratio, vel scientia, vel lex bene vivendi, nisi in hac unica, et vera, et coelesti sapientia constituta est, quae philosophis fuerat ignota. Nam illa terrena, quoniam falsa est, fit varia, et multiplex, sibique tota contraria est. Et sicut unus est hujus mundi constitutor et rector Deus, una veritas: ita unam esse ac simplicem sapientiam necesse est, quia quidquid est verum, ac
the knowledge of living honourably, or the art of leading a right life. We shall not err if we say that philosophy is the law of living well and honourably. And whoever has called it the rule of life has given it what is its own." Here he plainly did not look to the common name of philosophy, which, since it is spread out into many sects and schools, and holds nothing certain, nothing in short on which all agree with one mind and voice, what can be so false as for philosophy to be called the rule of life, when in it the diversity of precepts hinders and disturbs the right path? or the law of living well, when its heads are widely discordant? or the knowledge of leading life, when in it nothing else is achieved, by frequently saying contrary things, than that no one knows anything? For I ask whether he thinks the Academy to be philosophy or not. I do not think he will deny it: and if so, then none of those things applies to philosophy, since it renders all things uncertain, abolishes law, holds nothing to be an art, overturns reason, distorts the rule, removes knowledge utterly. All those things, therefore, are false, because they cannot apply to a thing always uncertain and as yet explaining nothing. Therefore there is no method, or knowledge, or law of living well, except as established in this one, true and heavenly wisdom, which had been unknown to the philosophers. For that earthly wisdom, since it is false, becomes varied and manifold, and is wholly contrary to itself. And just as there is one God, the Founder and Ruler of this world, and one truth, so it is necessary that wisdom be one and simple, because whatever is true, and
Editors' notes and page, col. 391

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 11 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. --> (printed under page 199)

(1) ‹anchor: Ars rectae vitae agendae› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ars rectae vitae agendae. Francius malebat legere recte, cum mss. 4 Reg., 2 Clarom. et Brun.

"The art of leading a right life." Francius preferred to read "recte" ("rightly"), with 4 Royal manuscripts, 2 Clermont and Brun.

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(2) ‹anchor: Et qui dixerit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et qui dixerit. Ita reposui ex vulgatis 5 et omnibus mss. praeter Cauc., Em., ac editis 7 in quibus est, dixit.

"And [the one] who said." So I have restored it from 5 common editions and all the manuscripts except the Cauc. and Emmanuel, and 7 printed editions, in which it is "dixit".

(printed under page 199)

(3) ‹anchor: Quia dixerit illam regulam vitae, suum illi nomen reddidit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quia dixerit illam regulam vitae, suum illi nomen reddidit. Inclusum nomen volui, quod deest mss. anglis et lipsiensibus, et quo dempto satis compta ornataque est oratio. Cell.

"Because he called it the rule of life, he gave it back its own name." I wanted "nomen" bracketed, since it is missing in the English and Leipzig manuscripts, and with it removed the sentence is neat and polished enough. Cellarius.

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(4) ‹anchor: Suum illi reddidit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Suum illi reddidit. Expunxi nomen, quod abest ab omnibus prope mss. et ab edit. Rom. 1470, Ald. 1515, et quod perperam addiderunt script. 4 et vulgati 12. Mox enim sequitur nomen. Heumannus tamen putat nomen hic esse legendum.

"He gave it back its own." I have struck out "nomen", which is absent from almost all the manuscripts and from the Rome edition of 1470 and the Aldine of 1515, and which 4 manuscripts and 12 common editions wrongly added. For "nomen" follows shortly after. Heumann, however, thinks "nomen" should be read here.

(printed under page 199)

(5) ‹anchor: Ad commune philosophiae nomen› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ad commune philosophiae nomen. Ita philosophorum pro se quisque non ad alias, sed ad suam potissimum sectam respexit. Sed miror cur Lactantius hic Senecam academicum faciat, quum ex professo stoicus fuerit? quod eum non ignorasse, ex aliis locis manifestum est. Ex Betuleio.

"To the common name of philosophy." Thus each of the philosophers for his own part looked not to other sects but chiefly to his own. But I wonder why Lactantius here makes Seneca an Academic, when he was an avowed Stoic — which, it is clear from other passages, he was not unaware of. From Betuleius.

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(6) ‹anchor: Nominari› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nominari. Ita restitui ex ed. Torn., Cellar., Walch cunctisque mss. praeter 2 Reg. rec. et 13 vulgatos, in quibus, est vocari; in edit. Florent. vocare.

"To be named." So I have restored it from the editions of Tornesius, Cellarius and Walch and all the manuscripts, except 2 recent Royal and 13 common editions, in which it is "vocari" ("to be called"); in the Florence edition, "vocare".

(printed under page 199)

(7) ‹anchor: Quae omnia reddit incerta› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quae omnia reddit incerta. Sic Regio Put. aliique multi mss. Alii cum editis, quae ut omnia reddat incerta.

"Which makes all things uncertain." So the Royal-Puteanus and many other manuscripts. Others, with the printed editions, have "quae ut omnia reddat incerta".

(printed under page 199)

(8) ‹anchor: Fuerat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Fuerat. Omnium fere mss. est. In recentioribus 1 Reg., 3 Colbert. et Brun. et edit. Rom. 1470, legitur fuerit; in 1 al. Reg. rec. et 12 vulgatis, fuit.

"Had been." This is the reading of almost all the manuscripts. In the more recent 1 Royal, 3 Colbert and Brun., and the Rome edition of 1470, "fuerit" is read; in 1 other recent Royal and 12 common editions, "fuit".

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(9) ‹anchor: Quoniam falsa est, fit varia et multiplex› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quoniam falsa est, fit varia et multiplex. In mss. 1 Reg., Em. et ed. Rom. 1470, Ald., Paris. 1525, Graph., Grat., est fallax, pro falsa. Ex mss. fit restitutum, et ex impressis Torn., Soubr., Cellar., Walch.

"Because it is false, it becomes varied and manifold." In the manuscripts 1 Royal and Emmanuel, and the editions Rome 1470, Aldine, Paris 1525, Gryphius [Graph., as printed], Grat., it is "fallax" ("deceitful") for "falsa". "Fit" has been restored from the manuscripts and from the printed editions of Tornesius, Soubron, Cellarius and Walch.

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(10) ‹anchor: Vitam... instruere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vitam... instruere. Lips. alter et Rost., vitam instituere. Recepta recta. L. iii, c. 30: Vitam non instruunt, sed turbant. Hinc l. iii, c. 13: Nec instruit (Philosophia) ad justitiae munera. Bun.

"To equip ... life." The other Leipzig manuscript and the Rostock have "vitam instituere" ("to order life"). The received reading is right. Book 3, chapter 30: "They do not equip life but disturb it." Hence book 3, chapter 13: "Nor does it (philosophy) equip for the duties of justice." Bünemann.

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(11) ‹anchor: Sine doctrina boni› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sine doctrina boni. Cic. pro Archia, c. 7: Ego multos homines excellenti animo ac virtute fuisse, et sine doctrina... et moderatos, et graves extitisse fateor, etc. Bun.

"Good without learning." Cicero, for Archias, chapter 7: "I admit that many men have been of excellent spirit and virtue, and without learning ... have been both temperate and serious," etc. Bünemann.

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(12) ‹anchor: Cum vero innumerabiles existant... laude dignum, quis est tandem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum vero innumerabiles existant... laude dignum, quis est tandem. Ita omnes prope mss. tali interpunctione. At Cauc., Jun. et 8 editi ferunt, cum innumerabiles existant... laude dignum. Quis est tandem.

"But when there are countless ... worthy of praise, who, pray, is." So almost all the manuscripts, with this punctuation. But the Cauc., the Junius and 8 printed editions give "cum innumerabiles existant ... laude dignum. Quis est tandem."

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(13) ‹anchor: Si quis in mores eorum diligenter inquirat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Si quis in mores eorum diligenter inquirat. Melius mss. Regio-Put., 2 al. Reg., 2 Colb., 2 Clarom., Cotton. et Mertoniensis, quam caeteri qui praepositionem non habent.

"If anyone inquires carefully into their morals." The manuscripts Royal-Puteanus, 2 other Royal, 2 Colbert, 2 Clermont, the Cotton and the Merton read better than the rest, which lack the preposition.

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(14) ‹anchor: Domi facientes ea› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Domi facientes ea. Mss. 9 praeponunt tum. Alii 4 cum domi faciant ea.

"Doing those things at home." Nine manuscripts put "tum" before it. Four others have "cum domi faciant ea" ("when they do those things at home").

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(15) ‹anchor: Fatetur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Fatetur. Locus est apud Cic. ii Tusc. sub initium.

"He admits." The passage is in Cicero, Tusculans 2, near the beginning.

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(16) ‹anchor: Qui disciplinam veram, non ostentationem scientiae› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui disciplinam veram, non ostentationem scientiae. Sic codices antiqui, juxta Thomasium: alii vero omittunt veram, et scribunt suae scientiae; sed Thomasiana lectio commodior et aptior videtur.

"Who [think their] teaching a true one, not a display of knowledge." So the old codices, according to Thomasius; but others omit "veram" and write "suae scientiae" ("of their own knowledge"). But Thomasius's reading seems more suitable and apt.

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(17) ‹anchor: Videre licet› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Videre licet. Sic mss. et editi fere omnes. In 3 scriptis totidemque excusis est, videre liceat; in mss. Cauc. et 4 edd., videre autem liceat.

"One may see." So almost all the manuscripts and printed editions. In 3 manuscripts and as many printed editions it is "videre liceat"; in the Cauc. manuscript and 4 editions, "videre autem liceat".

(printed under page 199)

(18) ‹anchor: Ut cum eorum vita› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut cum eorum vita. Ita mss. et cuncti prope typis excusi. In Regio-Put. est, ut cum eorum vitiis; in Jun., Cauc., 1 Clarom. et 3 vet. editis Rom., Paris., Gymnic., ut cum eorum vita et vitiis; in 4 Colb. desideratur et. Ed. Sublac. habet: Eorum vita et vitiis. In hanc additionem vide quoque Bunem. qui notam sequentem exhibet. — Vita et vitiis. Addo, et vitiis, ex mss. Cant., Guelp. 2, Subl., Rost., Ven. 1471, 72, utraque 78, 93, 97, Paris., Parrhas., Junt., Ald., Gymn., Torn. 1548, Gryph., Betul., Isaeo.

"That with their life." So the manuscripts and almost all the printed editions. In the Royal-Puteanus it is "ut cum eorum vitiis" ("with their vices"); in the Junius, Cauc., 1 Clermont and the 3 old editions of Rome, Paris and Gymnicus, "ut cum eorum vita et vitiis"; in 4 Colbert "et" is lacking. The Subiaco edition has "Eorum vita et vitiis". On this addition see also Bünemann, who gives the following note. — "Vita et vitiis." I add "et vitiis" from the manuscripts Cambridge, 2 Wolfenbüttel, Subiaco, Rostock, and Venice 1471, [14]72, both [14]78, [14]93, [14]97, Paris, Parrhasius, Junta, Aldine, Gymnicus, Tornesius 1548, Gryphius, Betuleius, Isaeus.

(printed under page 199)

(19) ‹anchor: Nepos quoque Cornelius› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nepos quoque Cornelius. Plenius exhibent mss. et 4 editi, quam 2 Reg. rec. et 11 vulgati, Neposque Cornelius. Id in fragmentis Cornelii Nepotis legitur, non in ipso Cornelio.

"Cornelius Nepos too." The manuscripts and 4 printed editions give it more fully than 2 recent Royal and 11 common editions, which have "Neposque Cornelius". This is read in the fragments of Cornelius Nepos, not in Cornelius himself.

(printed under page 199)

Page

  • running head: 391 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹honeste vivendi scientia›; B ‹bitror : quod si est›; C ‹pientiam necesse est›; D ‹cus fuerit? quod eum› (in the Variorum notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE stands below the text block, cut off at right edge, not set; Variorum notae (Ars rectae vitae agendae ... Nec instruit) left for later pass; right-hand column belongs to the next column, not set; column ends mid-sentence at "ac"
PL 6:392
bonum, id perfectum esse non potest, nisi fuerit singulare. Quod si philosophia vitam posset instruere, nulli alii nisi philosophi essent boni, et qui eam non didicissent, essent omnes semper mali. Cum vero innumerabiles existant, et semper exstiterint, qui sint, aut fuerint sine ulla doctrina boni, ex philosophis autem perraro fuerit, qui aliquid in vita fecerit laude dignum, quis est tandem, qui non videat, eos homines virtutis, qua ipsi egent, non esse doctores? Nam si quis in mores eorum diligenter inquirat, inveniet iracundos, cupidos, libidinosos, arrogantes, protervos, et sub obtentu sapientiae sua vitia celantes, domi facientes ea quae in scholis arguissent.
good, it cannot be perfect unless it is unique. But if philosophy could order life, none but philosophers would be good, and all who had not learned it would always be bad. Yet since there are, and always have been, countless people who are or were good without any learning, while among the philosophers there has very rarely been one who did anything in life worthy of praise, who, pray, does not see that these men are not teachers of the virtue which they themselves lack? For if anyone inquires carefully into their characters, he will find them irascible, greedy, lustful, arrogant, insolent, and hiding their vices under a cloak of wisdom, doing at home the things they had censured in the schools.
Fortasse mentior accusandi gratia. Nonne id ipsum Tullius et fatetur, et queritur? « Quotus quisque, inquit, philosophorum invenitur. qui sit ita moratus, ita animo et vita constitutus, ut ratio postulat? qui disciplinam veram, non ostentationem scientiae, sed legem vitae putet? qui obtemperet ipse sibi, et decretis pareat suis? Videre licet alios tanta levitate et jactatione, ut his fuerit non didicisse melius: alios pecuniae cupidos, alios gloriae; multos libidinum servos, ut cum eorum vita mirabiliter pugnet oratio. » Nepos quoque Cornelius ad eumdem Ciceronem ita scribit: « Tantum abest, ut ego magistram esse putem vitae philosophiam, beataeque vitae perfectricem, ut nullis magis existimem opus esse magistris vivendi, quam plerisque, qui in ea disputanda versantur.
Perhaps I am lying for the sake of accusing. Does not Tullius both admit and complain of this very thing? "How few of the philosophers," he says, "are found who are so mannered, so constituted in mind and life, as reason demands? who consider true teaching to be not a display of knowledge but a law of life? who obey themselves and comply with their own decrees? One may see some of such levity and boastfulness that it would have been better for them not to have learned; others greedy for money, others for glory; many slaves of their lusts, so that their speech is wonderfully at odds with their life." Cornelius Nepos also writes thus to the same Cicero: "So far am I from thinking philosophy to be the teacher of life and the perfecter of the happy life, that I consider none to need teachers of living more than most of those who are engaged in discussing it.
Editors' notes and page, col. 392

Page

  • running head: …CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 392 (left edge of the head cut off in the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹bonum, id perfectum esse›; B ‹quit, philosophorum invenitur›; C ‹vendi, quam plerisque›; D ‹tunt veram, et scribunt› (in the Variorum Notae at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column ends mid-word, "versan-" (continues in col. 393); the full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." and the notes beneath it are not set (later pass); the left column visible in the images belongs to col. 391 and is not set; type is worn throughout (t often looks like l), read as the evident letters; Cicero quotation is Tusc. 2.11-12
PL 6:393
Video enim magnam partem eorum, qui in schola de pudore et continentia praecipiant argutissime, eosdem in omnium libidinum cupiditatibus vivere. Item Seneca in Exhortationibus: « Plerique, inquit, philosophorum tales sunt, diserti in convitium suum, quos si audias in avaritiam, in libidinem, in ambitionem perorantes, indicium sui professos putes, adeo redundant ad ipsos maledicta in publicum missa; quos non aliter intueri decet, quam medicos, quorum tituli remedia habent, pyxides venena. Quosdam vero nec pudor vitiorum tenet: sed patrocinia turpitudini suae fingunt, ut etiam honeste peccare videantur. Faciet sapiens, inquit idem Seneca, etiam quae non probabit, ut etiam ad majora transitum inveniat: nec relinquet bonos mores, sed tempori aptabit; et quibus alii utuntur in gloriam, aut voluptatem, utetur agendae rei causa. » Deinde paulo post: « Omnia quae luxuriosi faciunt, quaeque imperiti, faciet et sapiens, sed non eodem modo, eodemque proposito. Atqui nihil interest quo animo facias, quod fecisse vitiosum est: quia facta cernuntur, animus non videtur. »
For I see that a great part of those who in the school teach most subtly about modesty and continence live, these same men, in the desires of all lusts. Likewise Seneca in the Exhortations: « Most philosophers, he says, are of this kind, eloquent in reproach of themselves; if you hear them perorating against avarice, against lust, against ambition, you would think they had laid information against themselves, so much do the curses sent out in public flow back upon themselves; it is fitting to look upon them in no other way than upon physicians whose labels hold remedies and their boxes poisons. Some, indeed, are not even restrained by shame for their vices, but invent defences for their own baseness, so that they may seem even to sin honourably. The wise man, says the same Seneca, will do even things that he will not approve, so that he may also find a passage to greater things; nor will he abandon good morals, but will adapt them to the occasion; and the things which others use for glory or pleasure he will use for the sake of the business to be done. » Then a little after: « All the things which the luxurious do, and which the unskilled do, the wise man too will do, but not in the same manner nor with the same purpose. Yet it makes no difference with what intent you do what it is vicious to have done: because deeds are seen, the intent is not seen. »
Aristippo Cyrenaicorum magistro cum Laide nobili scorto fuit consuetudo, quod flagitium gravis ille philosophiae doctor sic defendebat, ut diceret, multum inter se et caeteros Laidis amatores interesse,
Aristippus, the master of the Cyrenaics, had an intimacy with Lais, a notorious harlot, a disgraceful act which that weighty teacher of philosophy defended in this way, saying that there was much difference between himself and the other lovers of Lais,
Editors' notes and page, col. 393

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Notes 1–8 in the left note column, 9–14 in the right. The sheet signature "PATROL. VI." and "13" at the page foot are not notes. --> (printed under page 200)

(1) ‹anchor: Exhortationibus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Exhortationibus. Hic liber infra l. vi, c. ultimo citabitur, et jamdiu est ex quo periit, sicut et alii ejusdem philosophi.

"In the Exhortations." This book will be cited below, book 6, last chapter; it perished long ago, as did other works of the same philosopher.

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(2) ‹anchor: Diserti in convitium suum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Diserti in convitium suum. Minuc., c. 38, philosophos dicit, Adversus sua vitia facundos. Hieronymus ad Rusticum Mon. f. m. 47: Accusamus saepe quod facimus, et contra nosmetipsos diserti, in nostra vitia invehimur. Bun.

"Eloquent to their own reproach." Minucius, chapter 38, calls the philosophers "eloquent against their own vices." Jerome to Rusticus the monk, fol. m. 47: "We often accuse what we do, and, eloquent against ourselves, we inveigh against our own vices." Bünemann.

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(3) ‹anchor: Indicium sui professos putes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Indicium sui professos putes. Sic emendavi ex veterrimis et optimis mss. 3 Reg., 1 Bonon., Cauc., Jun., 1 Colb. et vulgatis Ald., Paris. 1525, Gymnic., Junt., Graph., Torn. 1553. At in duobus deest sui; in 3 editis est in judicium sui; in mss. septem rec. et ed. Rom. 1468 est, judicium suum professos putes; in decem scriptis praecedit praepositio in. In 1 Reg. rec., proferre in se judicium. Genuina lectio, indicium sui professos; id est perorando, vel disserendo nihil aliud efficere videntur, quam sese ultro sicuti eorumdem vitiorum reos, ita eadem vituperatione ac poena dignos fateri; nec alios tantum, sed et una semetipsos apud populum accusare atque deferre. Hoc autem est, judicium profiteri. Ex Isaeo, quem consule si lubet.

"You would think they had laid information against themselves." So I have corrected it from the oldest and best manuscripts — 3 Royal, 1 Bologna, Cauc., Junius, 1 Colbert — and the common editions Aldine, Paris 1525, Gymnicus, Junta, Gryphius [Graph., as printed], Tornesius 1553. But in two "sui" is lacking; in 3 printed editions it is "in judicium sui"; in seven recent manuscripts and the Rome edition of 1468 it is "judicium suum professos putes"; in ten manuscripts the preposition "in" comes first. In 1 recent Royal, "proferre in se judicium". The genuine reading is "indicium sui professos": that is, by their perorations or discourses they seem to achieve nothing but to confess of their own accord that, being guilty of the same vices, they are worthy of the same censure and punishment; and to accuse and denounce before the people not others only, but themselves along with them. And this is "to profess a judgement". From Isaeus, whom consult if you please.

(printed under page 200)

(4) ‹anchor: Pyxides› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Pyxides. Vasa sunt vel ferrea, vel cornea, vel lignea, aut etiam terrea, quibus Pharmacopolae utuntur.

"Boxes." They are vessels of iron, horn or wood, or even earthenware, which apothecaries use.

(printed under page 200)

(5) ‹anchor: Patrocinia turpitudini› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Patrocinia turpitudini. Idem Seneca, de Vita beata, c. 12: Quaerentes libidinibus suis patrocinium aliquod ac velamentum. Cf. Lact., l. iv, c. 24. Bun.

"Defences for shamefulness." The same Seneca, On the Happy Life, chapter 12: "Seeking some defence and cover for their lusts." Compare Lactantius, book 4, chapter 24. Bünemann.

(printed under page 200)

(6) ‹anchor: Probabit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Probabit. Haec lectio est omnium pene mss. et editorum, cui respondent sequentia... relinquit... aptabit... utetur. In 2 Bonon., 2 Reg. et Tax. est tamen probavit.

"Will approve." This is the reading of almost all the manuscripts and printed editions, and what follows corresponds to it: "relinquit ... aptabit ... utetur". In 2 Bologna, 2 Royal and the Tax. manuscript, however, it is "probavit" ("approved").

(printed under page 200)

(7) ‹anchor: Et quibus... utetur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et quibus... utetur. Ita reposui ex vetustissimis mss. 1 Bonon., 4 Reg., 3 Colb. et Brun. In 10 rec. et in editis est ut quibus.. utatur.

"And which ... he will use." So I have restored it from the oldest manuscripts: 1 Bologna, 4 Royal, 3 Colbert and Brun. In 10 recent manuscripts and in the printed editions it is "ut quibus .. utatur".

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(8) ‹anchor: Cum Laide› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum Laide. Lais, famosissima meretrix, dicitur Corinthia, eo quod ex Sicilia in Peloponesum inter alios captivos puellula abducta, Corinthi habitaverit. Ovid., l. i Amor., eleg. 5, v. 13, / Et multis Lais amata viris. / Ex Walchio.

"With Lais." Lais, a most notorious courtesan, is called the Corinthian because, carried off as a little girl from Sicily to the Peloponnese [Peloponesum, as printed] among other captives, she lived at Corinth. Ovid, Amores book 1, elegy 5, line 13: "And Lais, loved by many men." From Walch.

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(9) ‹anchor: Haberet Laidem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Haberet Laidem. Paulo aliter haec verba Laertius habet in Aristippo: « Possideo quidem Laidem, sed ipsa me non possidet. » Vide etiam Cic., Epist., l. ix, ep. ultima; Athenaeum, l. xii. Deipnosophist.; Theodoretum, l. ii de Vita activa; et de Laidis amatoribus lege Athenaeum, l. xiii, ac Gellium, l. i, c. 8, et Pausaniam in Corinthiacis.

"He had Lais." Laertius gives these words a little differently in his Aristippus: "I possess Lais, but she does not possess me." See also Cicero, Letters, book 9, last letter; Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, book 12; Theodoret, book 2 On the Active Life; and on the lovers of Lais read Athenaeus, book 13, and Gellius, book 1, chapter 8, and Pausanias in the Corinthiaca.

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(10) ‹anchor: Plane sapientior meretrix fuit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Plane sapientior meretrix fuit. Reposui plane ex mss. veterrimis 1 Bonon., 1 Regio-Put., alio item Regio bonae notae, 1 Colbert., 2 Brun, et quibusdam editis. In 1 al. Reg. bonae notae est plano pro plane; in 1 al. Reg. et 9 excusis, sane; deest in 1 Reg. antiquissimo; in Cauc. et 18 scriptis rec. et 8 vulgatis, tamen.

"Plainly the courtesan was the wiser." I have restored "plane" from the oldest manuscripts — 1 Bologna, 1 Royal-Puteanus, another Royal likewise of good quality, 1 Colbert, 2 Brun — and certain printed editions. In 1 other Royal of good quality it is "plano" for "plane"; in 1 other Royal and 9 printed editions, "sane" ("truly"); it is lacking in 1 very old Royal; in the Cauc. and 18 recent manuscripts and 8 common editions, "tamen" ("yet").

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(11) ‹anchor: Quae philosophum habuit pro lenone› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quae philosophum habuit pro lenone. Ita mss. 2 Bonon., 2 Reg. antiquissimi, aliique 3 Reg. et plures editi. Recentiores scripti 20 ac 9 editi habent, quae sic philosophum habuit, etc.

"Who had the philosopher for a pander." So the manuscripts 2 Bologna, 2 very old Royal, and 3 other Royal, and most printed editions. Twenty more recent manuscripts and 9 printed editions have "quae sic philosophum habuit", etc.

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(12) ‹anchor: Ad meretricem famosissimam› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ad meretricem famosissimam. Isaeus et Gallaeus in variis dicunt, alias habere, formosissimam: sed nullas indicarunt. Famosus, est vox media. Veteres in malam partem, recentiores in utramque, bonam et malam adhibebant. — Ad meretricem... commearet. Terent. Heautont. iii, 1, dixit, filium commeare ad mulierem. Bun.

"To a most notorious courtesan." Isaeus and Gallaeus say in their variants that others have "formosissimam" ("most beautiful"); but they named none. "Famosus" is a neutral word: the ancients used it in a bad sense, later writers in both, good and bad. — "Went to and fro to a courtesan." Terence, Heautontimorumenos 3.1, said that a son "went to and fro to a woman". Bünemann.

(printed under page 200)

(13) ‹anchor: Disserens voluptatem, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Disserens voluptatem, etc. Quamobrem Xenophon, infesto in ipsum animo, contra voluptatem librum composuit, ut tradit Laert. in Aristippo. Isaeus.

"Discoursing on pleasure," etc. For this reason Xenophon, being hostile to him, wrote a book against pleasure, as Laertius reports in his Aristippus. Isaeus.

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(14) ‹anchor: Quid ego de Cynicis loquar?› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quid ego de Cynicis loquar? Sic etiam Augustinus multis in locis a canina inverecundia Cynicos dictos putat: ob quam etiam ipsos a decori disputatione in Off. Cicero excludere videtur. Alii tamen ab allatratu et mordacitate canina ipsos dictos putant. Laertius quidem ἀπὸ τῶν σκωμμάτων hanc nominationem ortam esse testatur: Galen. δι' ἔνστασιν. Apud Lucian. vero in Auctione vitarum notantur, quasi ὑλακτοῦντες καὶ δάκνοντες. Betul. — Cynicorum princeps fuit Antisthenes, Socratis discipulus, ac praeceptor Diogenis; homo acutus magis, quam eruditus.

"What shall I say of the Cynics?" So too Augustine in many places thinks the Cynics were named from a dog-like shamelessness; and for this Cicero, in On Duties, seems to exclude them from the discussion of propriety. Others, however, think they were named from their dog-like barking and biting. Laertius indeed attests that the name arose "from their jibes"; Galen, "on account of their resistance". In Lucian's Sale of Lives they are marked as, so to speak, "barking and biting". Betuleius. — The founder of the Cynics was Antisthenes, a disciple of Socrates and teacher of Diogenes; a man sharp rather than learned.

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  • running head: 393 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTI (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹tur. Video enim magnam partem›; B ‹aptabit; et quibus alii utuntur›; C ‹Exhortationibus. Hic liber infra› (in the notes); D ‹una semetipsos apud populum› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the word fragment "tur." carried over from the previous column; the English starts at "For I see" and does not render the fragment. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" is cut off at the image edge and is not set. The Variorum notae at the page foot (Exhortationibus ... Ex Walchio) are left for the later pass. The signature "PATROL. VI." is omitted. UNSURE: "eosdem" (line 3) may be printed "cosdem" through worn type; the image is not clear enough to call it a misprint.
PL 6:394
quod ipse haberet Laidem, alii vero a Laide haberentur. O praeclara et imitanda bonis sapientia! Huic vero liberos in disciplinam dares, ut discerent habere meretricem? Aliquid inter se ac perditos interesse dicebat; scilicet quod illi bona sua perderent, ipse gratis luxuriaretur. In quo plane sapientior meretrix fuit, quae philosophum habuit pro lenone, ut ad se omnis juventus, doctoris exemplo et auctoritate corrupta, sine ullo pudore concurreret. Quid ergo interfuit, quo animo philosophus ad meretricem famosissimam commearet, cum eum populus et rivales sui viderent omnibus perditis nequiorem? Nec satis fuit ita vivere: sed docere etiam libidines coepit, ac mores suos de lupanari ad scholam transtulit, disserens voluptatem corporis esse summum bonum. Quae doctrina execrabilis et pudenda, non in corde philosophi, sed in sinu meretricis est nata.
that he himself possessed Lais, whereas others were possessed by Lais. O splendid wisdom, and worthy of imitation by good men! Would you really give your children to this man for instruction, so that they might learn to possess a harlot? He used to say that there was some difference between himself and the profligate: namely, that they squandered their goods, while he indulged himself in luxury for nothing. In this the harlot was plainly the wiser, who had the philosopher for her procurer, so that all the youth, corrupted by the example and authority of the teacher, might flock to her without any shame. What difference, then, did it make with what intention the philosopher frequented a most notorious harlot, when the people and his rivals saw him to be more worthless than all the profligate? Nor was it enough to live thus: but he also began to teach lusts, and carried his morals over from the brothel to the school, arguing that the pleasure of the body is the highest good. This execrable and shameful doctrine was born not in the heart of a philosopher but in the bosom of a harlot.
Nam quid ego de Cynicis loquar? quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit. Quid mirum, si a canibus, quorum vitam imitantur, etiam vocabulum nomenque traxerunt? Nullum igitur in hac disciplina magisterium virtutis est, cum etiam illi, qui honestiora praecipiunt, aut non faciant ipsi quae suadent, aut si faciunt (quod raro accidit) non disciplina eos ad rectum, sed natura perducat, quae saepius etiam indoctos impellit ad laudem.
For why should I speak of the Cynics? whose custom it was to have intercourse with their wives in the open. What wonder, if from dogs, whose life they imitate, they have also drawn their appellation and name? There is therefore no teaching of virtue in this discipline, since even those who prescribe more honourable things either do not themselves do what they urge, or, if they do (which has rarely happened), it is not discipline that leads them to what is right but nature, which quite often drives even the unlearned to praiseworthy conduct.
Editors' notes and page, col. 394

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  • running head: ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 394 (cut off at the left edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A quod ipse haberet Laidem; B num. Quae doctrina execrabilis; C Haberet Laidem. Paulo aliter (in the Variorum Notae); D variis dicunt, alias habere (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence (quod ipse haberet Laidem); fragments of column 393 at left edge not set; full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE (cut off at left, stands below the text block after "impellit ad laudem") not set; the Variorum Notae at page foot (Haberet Laidem ... homo acutus magis, quam eruditus) left for the later pass; signature 13 and Google/OCR watermark not set; coepit printed with oe-ligature
PL 6:395
CAPUT XVI.
Chapter XVI.
Quod rectè docentes philosophi male vivant, teste Cicerone; unde non tam philosophiae, quam sapientiae studendum est.
That the philosophers, though they teach rightly, live badly, as Cicero testifies; and that therefore one must devote oneself not so much to philosophy as to wisdom.
Verum cum se perpetuae desidiae tradant, nullamque virtutem capessant, et omnem suam vitam nihil aliud quam in eloquendo peragant, quid aliud quam inertes putari debent? Sapientia enim, nisi in aliquo actu fuerit quo vim suam exerceat, inanis et falsa est; recteque Tullius civiles viros, qui rempublicam gubernent, qui urbes aut novas constituant, aut constitutas aequitate tueantur, qui salutem libertatemque civium vel bonis legibus, vel salubribus consiliis, vel judiciis gravibus conservent, philosophiae doctoribus praefert. Bonos enim facere oportet potius quam inclusos in angulis facienda praecipere, quae ne ipsi quidem faciunt, qui loquuntur; et quoniam se a veris actibus removerunt, apparet eos exercendae linguae causa, vel advocandi gratia, artem ipsam philosophiae reperisse. Qui autem docent tan⟨t⟩um, nec faciunt, ipsi praeceptis suis detrahunt pondus; quis enim obtemperet, cum ipsi praeceptores doceant non obtemperare? Bonum est autem recta et honesta praecipere: sed nisi et facias, mendacium est; et est incongruens atque ineptum, non in pectore, sed in labris habere bonitatem.
But since they give themselves over to perpetual idleness, take up no virtue, and spend their whole life in nothing other than speaking, what else ought they to be thought but inactive? For wisdom, unless it is engaged in some action in which it may exercise its force, is empty and false; and rightly does Tullius prefer to the teachers of philosophy the men of civic life, who govern the commonwealth, who either found new cities or protect with equity those already founded, who preserve the safety and liberty of the citizens by good laws, by wholesome counsels, or by weighty judgements. For good men ought to act rather than, shut away in corners, to prescribe what is to be done, things which not even those who speak of them do themselves; and since they have withdrawn themselves from real activities, it is evident that they devised the very art of philosophy for the sake of exercising the tongue, or for the purpose of gathering a crowd. But those who only teach and do not act themselves take the weight away from their own precepts; for who would obey, when the teachers themselves teach not to obey? Now it is good to prescribe what is right and honourable: but unless you also do it, it is a lie; and it is incongruous and absurd to have goodness not in the breast but on the lips.
Non ergo utilitatem ex philosophia, sed oblectationem petunt. Quod quidem Cicero testatus est: « Profecto, inquit, omnis istorum disputatio, quanquam uberrimos fontes virtutis et scientiae contineat, tamen collata cum horum actis perfectisque rebus, vereor ne non tantum videatur attulisse negotiis hominum utilitatis, quantam oblectationem otiis. » Vereri quidem non debuit, cum verum diceret: sed
Therefore they seek from philosophy not usefulness but delight. Cicero indeed bore witness to this: 'Surely,' he says, 'all the discussion of these men, although it contains the richest fountains of virtue and knowledge, yet, when compared with the deeds and accomplishments of those others, I fear may seem to have brought not so much usefulness to the business of men as delight to their leisure.' He indeed ought not to have feared, since he was speaking the truth: but
Editors' notes and page, col. 395

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 6 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. --> (printed under page 201)

(1) ‹anchor: Verum cum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Verum cum. Sic optima coloniensis edito anno 1544, aliae vero atque mss. plures habent, verum enim cum; ac tandem, sed pauciores, legunt verum enim vero: at meliorem amplectimur lectionem.

"But when." So the excellent Cologne edition [edito, as printed] of the year 1544; but other editions and most manuscripts have "verum enim cum"; and finally a few read "verum enim vero". But we embrace the better reading.

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(2) ‹anchor: Vitam nihil aliud, quam in eloquendo peragant› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vitam nihil aliud, quam in eloquendo peragant. Heumannus dicit dictionem lactantianam. Ego hoc amplius (salva tamen modestia) pronuntio, esse dictionem optimorum quorumque Scriptorum, atque exemplis a Gronovio ex Livio, et a Burmanno ex Cicerone aliisque excitatis. Bun.

"That they spend their life in nothing but speaking." Heumann calls it a Lactantian expression. I declare further (with due modesty) that it is an expression of all the best writers, and is borne out by examples cited by Gronovius from Livy and by Burmann from Cicero and others. Bünemann.

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(3) ‹anchor: Sapientia enim› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sapientia enim. Ex mss. reposui enim, quod rectius est, quam autem editorum. Sapientia. Nam si virtutis laus in actione consistit, certe etiam sapientiae. Docet hoc Cic. in primo Offic., cap. de Prudentia. Unde etiam Aristoteles in magnis Moralibus ait, quod sapientia quae in actionem cadit, virtutis nomen mereatur, non vero alia.

"For wisdom." From the manuscripts I have restored "enim", which is more correct than the "autem" of the printed editions. "Wisdom": for if the praise of virtue consists in action, surely that of wisdom does too. Cicero teaches this in book 1 of On Duties, the chapter on prudence. Hence Aristotle too says in the Magna Moralia that the wisdom which issues in action deserves the name of virtue, but not any other.

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(4) ‹anchor: Recteque Tullius› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Recteque Tullius. Desideratur hic locus in Cicerone: attamen libro i de Officiis, c. de Prudentia, damnat ignaram philosophiam.

"And rightly Tullius." This passage is missing from Cicero; yet in book 1 of On Duties, the chapter on prudence, he condemns an ignorant philosophy.

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(5) ‹anchor: Vel advocandi› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vel advocandi. Hic ponit Lactantius vocem advocandi, pro causam agendi. In 3 mss. est avocandi; in 8 rec. vacandi. — Vel advocandi gratia. Ego putavi subaudiendum: vel auditores, concionem, populum, advocandi gratia. Agit enim de Philosophis ib. et seq. et de Epicuro, c. 17, ait: Ut ad se multitudinem contrahat. Ibidem inf. Circulum colligit; atque integra phrasis occurrit de Mort. persec., c. 28, Advocavit populum. Bun.

"Or of calling in." Here Lactantius uses the word "advocandi" for "pleading a case". In 3 manuscripts it is "avocandi"; in 8 recent ones, "vacandi". — "Or for the sake of calling in." I thought there should be understood: "for the sake of calling in hearers, an assembly, the people". For he is dealing with the philosophers there and in what follows, and of Epicurus, chapter 17, he says: "that he may draw a crowd to himself". In the same place below: "he gathers a circle"; and the whole phrase occurs in On the Deaths of the Persecutors, chapter 28: "He called the people together." Bünemann.

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(6) ‹anchor: In labris habere bonitatem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

In labris habere bonitatem. Ita reposui ex editis Cellar. et Walch. et omnibus mss. praeter duos rec. ac caeteros vulgatos quibus est labiis. In rec. 1 Colb. et Brun. pro bonitatem, est voluntatem; in Tornes. et Cotton. veritatem.

"To have goodness on the lips." So I have restored it from the editions of Cellarius and Walch and all the manuscripts, except two recent ones and the other common editions, which have "labiis". In the recent 1 Colbert and Brun., for "bonitatem" it is "voluntatem" ("will"); in Tornesius and the Cotton, "veritatem" ("truth").

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(7) ‹anchor: Profecto, inquit, omnis istorum disputatio, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Profecto, inquit, omnis istorum disputatio, etc. Excidisse hic locus putatur ex Hortensio Cic. seu de Philosophia, in quo legendum est, istorum, ut reperitur in 8 vetustioribus editis, et in omnibus mss. praeter 2 Reg. rec. in quibus est ipsorum; in 5 excusis justorum, inepte; in uno Colb. est philosophorum.

"Surely, he says, all the disputation of these men," etc. This passage is thought to have fallen out of Cicero's Hortensius, or On Philosophy; in it "istorum" is to be read, as found in 8 older printed editions and in all the manuscripts except 2 recent Royal, in which it is "ipsorum"; in 5 printed editions "justorum" ("of the just"), absurdly; in one Colbert, "philosophorum".

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(8) ‹anchor: Vereor ne... otiis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vereor ne... otiis. Sic emendavi ex vetustissimis et optimis mss. 1 Bon., 2 Reg., 4 al. Reg., 1 Colb. Et vox negotiis postulare videtur otiis. Et ex his optimis mss. forsan restituendus hic Ciceronis locus. In 22 scriptis rec. vet. editis est ne non.... quamdam oblectationem otii. Plerisque aliis editionibus, etiamque Ciceronianae Gothofredi, deest non.

"I fear lest ... to leisure." So I have corrected it from the oldest and best manuscripts: 1 Bologna, 2 Royal, 4 other Royal, 1 Colbert. And the word "negotiis" ("business") seems to call for "otiis" ("leisure"). And perhaps this passage of Cicero should be restored from these excellent manuscripts. In 22 recent manuscripts and old editions it is "ne non .... quamdam oblectationem otii". In most other editions, and also in Godefroy's Cicero, "non" is lacking.

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(9) ‹anchor: Abjicienda est igitur omnis philosophia› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Abjicienda est igitur omnis philosophia. Errat Lactantius, si intelligat de vera et genuina philosophia; sin autem philosophiae nomine insigniat philosophantium nugas et errores, verum est, omnem illam philosophiam tollendam esse. Apostolus Paulus non vult exterminari omnem philosophiam, sed tantum vanam et fallacem, ut videre est Coloss. cap. ii, vers. 8. Haec igitur sententia cum grano salis accipienda. Ex Davenantio.

"All philosophy, then, is to be cast away." Lactantius errs if he means true and genuine philosophy; but if by the name of philosophy he marks the trifles and errors of those who philosophize, it is true that all that philosophy is to be done away with. The apostle Paul does not want all philosophy abolished, but only the vain and deceitful, as may be seen in Colossians chapter 2, verse 8. This statement, then, is to be taken with a grain of salt. From Davenant.

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(10) ‹anchor: Caret› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Caret. Manuscriptorum est ac vet. 2 edit. Rom., Tornes., Soubron. et Walch., careat, caeterorum vulgatorum.

"Lacks." This is the reading of the manuscripts and of the 2 old Rome editions, Tornesius, Soubron and Walch; "careat", of the other common editions.

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  • running head: 395 · FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[...] (cut off at the right edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A CAPUT XVI.; B tius quam inclusos in angulis; C tamen collata cum horum actis; D ctius est, quam autem editorum (in the Variorum notae, not set)
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  • other: editors' matter: the italic chapter summary "Quod rectè docentes philosophi..." is set as its own line, and the accent in rectè is kept as printed. "tan⟨t⟩um" has a damaged t (printed tan'um). The punctuation after "Sapientia enim" and "removerunt" is unclear (a comma or a semicolon), and commas were set. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" at the page foot is cut off at the right edge and is not set; the Variorum notes beneath it are deferred to a later pass. The column ends mid-sentence at "sed".
PL 6:396
quasi timeret, ne proditi mysterii reus a philosophis citaretur, non est ausus confidenter pronuntiare, quod fuit verum, illos non ideo disputare, ut doceant, sed ut se oblectent in otio: qui quoniam auctores sunt rerum gerendarum, nec ipsi quidquam gerunt, pro loquacibus sunt habendi. Sed profecto, quia nihil boni ad vitam afferebant, nec ipsi decretis suis obtemperaverunt, nec quisquam per tot saecula inventus est, qui eorum legibus viveret. Abjicienda est igitur omnis philosophia, quia non studendum est sapientiae, quod fine ac modo caret: sed sapiendum est, et quidem mature. Non enim nobis altera via conceditur, ut, cum in hac sapientiam quaeramus, in illa sapere possimus: in hac utrumque fieri necesse est. Cito inveniri debet, ut cito suscipi possit, ne quid pereat ex vita cujus finis incertus est. Ciceronis Hortensius contra philosophiam disserens, circumvenitur arguta conclusione; quod cum diceret philosophandum non esse, nihilominus philosophari videbatur, quoniam philosophi est, quid in vita faciendum, vel non faciendum sit, disputare. Nos ab hac calumnia immunes ac liberi sumus, qui philosophiam tollimus, quia humanae cogitationis inventio est; sophiam defendimus, quia divina traditio est, eamque ab omnibus suscipi oportere testamur. Ille, cum philosophiam tolleret, nec melius aliquid afferret, sapientiam tollere putabatur, eoque facilius de sententia pulsus est: quia constat hominem non ad stultitiam, sed ad sapientiam nasci.
as if he feared that he would be summoned by the philosophers as guilty of a betrayed mystery, he did not dare to declare boldly what was true, that they do not dispute in order to teach, but in order to amuse themselves in leisure; and since they are advocates of action and yet themselves do nothing, they are to be regarded as mere talkers. But certainly, because they brought nothing of good to life, neither did they themselves obey their own decrees, nor has anyone been found through so many ages who lived by their laws. All philosophy, therefore, is to be cast aside, because one ought not to be devoted to the study of wisdom, which has no end or limit, but one ought to be wise, and that early. For another course is not granted to us, so that, while in this one we seek wisdom, in that one we may be able to be wise: in this one both must come about. It must be found quickly, so that it may be taken up quickly, lest any part be lost of a life whose end is uncertain. Cicero's Hortensius, arguing against philosophy, is caught by a clever conclusion; for when he said that one ought not to philosophize, he nonetheless seemed to be philosophizing, since it is the part of a philosopher to dispute what ought or ought not to be done in life. We are immune and free from this cavil, we who do away with philosophy because it is the invention of human thought, and defend wisdom because it is a divine tradition, and bear witness that it ought to be taken up by all. He, since he did away with philosophy and brought nothing better in its place, was thought to be doing away with wisdom, and was all the more easily driven from his opinion, because it is established that man is born not for folly but for wisdom.
Praeterea illud quoque argumentum contra philosophiam valet plurimum, quo idem est usus Hortensius; ex eo posse intelligi, philosophiam non esse sapientiam, quod principium et origo ejus appareat. Quando, inquit, philosophi esse coeperunt? Thales
Moreover, that argument too has very great force against philosophy, which the same Hortensius used: that from this it can be understood that philosophy is not wisdom, because its beginning and origin are evident. When, he says, did philosophers begin to exist? Thales
Editors' notes and page, col. 396

Page

  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 396 (left edge cut off)
  • marginal letters: A ‹quasi timeret, ne proditi›; B ‹quid pereat ex vita cujus finis›; C ‹phiam valet plurimum, quo idem›; D ‹phorum. (in the Variorum Notae at the page foot)›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: citaretur: first letter blurred (looks like eitaretur), read as citaretur; sophiam (broken so-phiam) set as printed, the usual text reads sapientiam, translated as wisdom; the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE above the page-foot notes is not set; the Variorum Notae (Cellar. et Walch. ... gatorum) are left for the later pass; the cut-off left column belongs to col. 395 and is not set; editors' matter set: (none)
PL 6:397
(ut opinor) primus, recens haec quidem aetas; ubi ergo apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandae veritatis? Item Lucretius ait:
(as I think) was the first; this age is indeed recent; where, then, among the more ancient did this love of investigating the truth lie hidden? Likewise Lucretius says:
Denique natura haec rerum, ratioque reperta est / Nuper; et hanc primus cum primis ipse repertus / Nunc ego sum, in patrias qui possum vertere voces.
Finally, this nature of things and its system was discovered / recently; and I myself have now been found first among the first / who can turn it into our native words.
Et Seneca: «Nondum sunt, inquit, mille anni, ex quo initia sapientiae mota sunt.» Multis ergo saeculis humanum genus sine ratione vixit. Quod irridens Persius:
And Seneca: «Not yet,» he says, «are there a thousand years since the beginnings of wisdom were set in motion.» For many ages, therefore, the human race lived without reason. Mocking this, Persius [says]:
Postquam (inquit) sapere urbi / Cum pipere et palmis venit;
After (he says) wisdom came to the city / with pepper and dates;
tanquam sapientia cum saporis mercibus fuerit invecta: quae si secundum hominis naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Sed quia recepit, igitur a principio fuisse sapientiam necesse est; ergo philosophia, quia non a principio fuit, non est eadem vera sapientia. Sed videlicet Graeci, quia sacras veritatis litteras non attigerant, quemadmodum depravata esset sapientia, nesciverunt. Et ideo cum vacare sapientia humanam vitam putarent, philosophiam commenti sunt; id est, latentem atque ignotam sibi veritatem disserendo eruere voluerunt, quod studium, per ignorantiam veri, sapientiam putaverunt.
as though wisdom had been imported along with wares of flavour: if it accords with the nature of man, it must have begun with man himself; but if it does not, human nature could not even receive it. But since it has received it, wisdom must therefore have existed from the beginning; therefore philosophy, because it did not exist from the beginning, is not the same thing as true wisdom. But evidently the Greeks, because they had not touched the sacred writings of truth, did not know how wisdom had been corrupted. And so, since they thought human life empty of wisdom, they devised philosophy; that is, they sought by discussion to dig out a truth that was hidden from them and unknown to them, and this pursuit, through ignorance of the truth, they took to be wisdom.
Editors' notes and page, col. 397

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 8 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right; note 17 runs over to page 203. --> (printed under page 202)

(1) ‹anchor: Recens.... aetas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Recens.... aetas. Natus siquidem est Thales anno 2, Olympiad. xxxv, denatus autem an. 1 Olymp. lviii.

"A recent ... age." For Thales was born in the 2nd year of the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 1st year of the 58th Olympiad.

(printed under page 202)

(2) ‹anchor: Item Lucretius ait› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Item Lucretius ait. Ita reposui ex mss. vet. Regio-Put. per emendationem, 1 al. Reg., 4 Colb., 2 Brun., ed. Betul. Et recte. In 13 scriptis totidemque impressis est, Idem Lucretius ait, male; nihil enim de Lucretio exstat in hoc capite, neque in praecedenti. Locus Lucretii est libri v initio.

"Likewise Lucretius says." So I have restored it from the manuscripts: the old Royal-Puteanus by correction, 1 other Royal, 4 Colbert, 2 Brun., and Betuleius's edition. And rightly. In 13 manuscripts and as many printed editions it is "Idem Lucretius ait" ("The same Lucretius says"), wrongly; for nothing of Lucretius stands in this chapter, nor in the preceding one. The passage of Lucretius is at the beginning of book 5.

(printed under page 202)

(3) ‹anchor: Primus cum primis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Primus cum primis. Sic restitui ex mss. Jun., Lips., Pal., et edit. 12 ac Lucretio ipso ad 5 mss. codices emendato a Lambino. Alii primum cum primis, vel primum cum primus.

"First among the first." So I have restored it from the manuscripts Junius, Leipzig, Palatine, and 12 printed editions, and from Lucretius himself as corrected by Lambinus against 5 manuscript codices. Others have "primum cum primis", or "primum cum primus".

(printed under page 202)

(4) ‹anchor: Mille anni› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Mille anni. Haec ad Thaletem referri non possunt, qui ante Senecam annis ne septingentis quidem vixit: sed haec vel ad Homerum sunt referenda, vel ad barbaricam, ut vocant, philosophiam.

"A thousand years." These words cannot refer to Thales, who lived not even seven hundred years before Seneca; they must be referred either to Homer or to the "barbarian" philosophy, as they call it.

(printed under page 202)

(5) ‹anchor: Mota sunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Mota sunt. Ita correxi ex cunctis ferme mss. ac. vet. edit. 2 Rom., Venet. 1490, Cellar. In caeteris excusis et 1 Colb. rec. legitur nota sunt, in 2 Reg. nata sunt, in 1 Colb., orta sunt. Puto cum Cellario et Walchio initia moveri, esse fundamentum jaci, seu coeptum esse primum de re disputari. Hic locus hodie non exstat in Senecae Operibus.—Initia... mota. Retineo, mota, quia movere valet incipere. Virgil. l. vii Aen., v. 45: Majus opus moveo. Conf. v. 40: Exordia; v. 44: Nascitur. Unde Ciofanus ad Ovidii lib. iii, Fast. 6, / Quod mea quaerebam musa moveret opus, / recte exponit movendi verbum per exordiri. Bun.

"Were set in motion." So I have corrected it from almost all the manuscripts and the 2 old Rome editions, Venice 1490, and Cellarius. In the other printed editions and 1 recent Colbert "nota sunt" ("were known") is read; in 2 Royal "nata sunt" ("were born"); in 1 Colbert "orta sunt" ("arose"). I think, with Cellarius and Walch, that "beginnings were moved" means that the foundation was laid, or that discussion of the matter first began. This passage does not survive today in Seneca's works. — "Beginnings ... moved." I keep "mota", because "movere" can mean "to begin". Virgil, Aeneid book 7, line 45: "I set in motion a greater work." Compare line 40: "beginnings"; line 44: "is born". Hence Ciofanus, on Ovid, Fasti book 3, [line] 6, "What work my muse should set in motion, I was seeking," rightly explains the verb "movere" as "to begin". Bünemann.

(printed under page 202)

(6) ‹anchor: Quod irridens Persius, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod irridens Persius, etc. Hunc Persii locum Lactantius levorsum accipit, quasi Persii esset tam odiosa in philosophos declamatio, cum sit Bestii. Neque tamen Bestius, nec post ipsum Lactantius philosophos omnes sub eadem causa obstruere voluit, sed illos vanos ac fallaces philosophantes, de quibus paulo superius. Partim ex Theodoro Marcilio in Persii Satyram 6, vers. 38.

"Which Persius, mocking," etc. Lactantius takes this passage of Persius the wrong way round, as though so hateful a declamation against the philosophers were Persius's own, when it is Bestius's. Yet neither Bestius nor, after him, Lactantius meant to bar all philosophers under the same charge, but those vain and deceitful philosophizers spoken of a little above. Partly from Theodore Marcile on Persius, Satire 6, line 38.

(printed under page 202)

(7) ‹anchor: Cum saporis mercibus, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum saporis mercibus, etc. Robertus Titius locorum controvers. lib. ix, cap. 3, veram ac sinceram, ut reor, interpretationem attulit, Lactantium videlicet putavisse, eo loci Persium significare, philosophiam in Urbem advectam fuisse cum saporis, id est saporatis et sapidis mercibus, quae ex Asia deferri non multo ante coeperant, cujusmodi est piper atque alia ejus generis aromata; interimque allusisse ad sapientiae nomen, quod a sapore, quasi per contemptum vult deduci, quem illa traxerit a mercibus illis, quibuscum ad nos delata fuit; atque adeo censet Titius, illud, saporis, esse ablativum plurale ab adjectivo saporus, ra, rum, nove quidem a Lactantio formatum, imitatione tamen et exemplo aliarum dictionum consimilium, ut ab odore, odorus, ra, rum; a vapore, vaporus; a canore, canorus; ab honore, honorus. Isae.

"With savoury wares," etc. Robert Titius, in his Disputed Passages, book 9, chapter 3, has offered the true and sound interpretation, as I think: namely, that Lactantius believed Persius meant in that place that philosophy was brought into the City with "saporis", that is, seasoned and savoury wares, which had begun to be imported from Asia not long before, such as pepper and other spices of that kind; and that he was meanwhile alluding to the name of wisdom (sapientia), which he would derive, contemptuously as it were, from "sapor" (flavour), as if it had taken it from those wares with which it was brought to us. And so Titius holds that "saporis" is the ablative plural of the adjective "saporus, -a, -um", newly formed by Lactantius, but in imitation and on the model of other similar words, as "odorus, -a, -um" from "odor"; "vaporus" from "vapor"; "canorus" from "canor"; "honorus" from "honor". Isaeus.

(printed under page 202)

(8) ‹anchor: Quia› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quia. Ita reposui ex omnibus mss. praeter rec. 1 Reg., 1 Colb. et editos, in quibus est qui.

"Because." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts except the recent 1 Royal and 1 Colbert and the printed editions, in which it is "qui" ("who").

(printed under page 202)

(9) ‹anchor: Nesciverunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nesciverunt. Alii nescierunt.

"They did not know." Others have "nescierunt".

(printed under page 202)

(10) ‹anchor: Per ignorantiam veri› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Per ignorantiam veri. Ms. quo usus est Coloniensis editor anni 1544, habet prae ignorantia veri, quod non est injucundum.

"Through ignorance of the truth." The manuscript used by the Cologne editor of 1544 has "prae ignorantia veri" ("for ignorance of the truth"), which is not unpleasing.

(printed under page 202)

(11) ‹anchor: Cum his decertemus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum his decertemus. Sic lego cum multis mss. et 8 impressis. Scripti 16 et editi tres cum iisdem certemus; 4 excusi cum 1 Clarom. eisdem. In Regio-Put., est veniam .. decertem. In al. mss. 3, veniam... certem.

"Let us contend with these." So I read with many manuscripts and 8 printed editions. Sixteen manuscripts and three editions have "cum iisdem certemus"; 4 printed editions with 1 Clermont, "eisdem". In the Royal-Puteanus it is "veniam .. decertem"; in 3 other manuscripts, "veniam ... certem".

(printed under page 202)

(12) ‹anchor: Multos populare nomen voluptatis invitat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Multos populare nomen voluptatis invitat. Ita omnes prope mss. et septem editi. In 1 Reg. rec. et excusis septem est ad populare nomen. Vetus versio Gallica sic habet, parce qu'elle invite et appelle plusieurs à ce nom de volupté, tant aimé et désiré par le peuple. In ed. Sublac. legitur multos ad populare.

"The popular name of pleasure invites many." So almost all the manuscripts and seven printed editions. In 1 recent Royal and seven printed editions it is "ad populare nomen". The old French version has: "because it invites and calls many to this name of pleasure, so loved and desired by the people." In the Subiaco edition "multos ad populare" is read.

(printed under page 202)

(13) ‹anchor: Praeterea› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Praeterea. Sic ferunt omnes ferme mss. et editi. In Cauc., 1 Reg. rec. et 6 rec. editis est Propterea.

"Moreover." So almost all the manuscripts and printed editions give it. In the Cauc., 1 recent Royal and 6 recent editions it is "Propterea" ("therefore").

(printed under page 202)

(14) ‹anchor: Vetat litteras discere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vetat litteras discere. Reprehenditur ipse Epicurus, quod non ea addidicerit, quae hominem vere eruditum faciunt. Hic philosophus scribens ad Philoclem, ait omnem doctrinam esse fugiendam.

"He forbids the learning of letters." Epicurus himself is blamed for not having learned [addidicerit, as printed] the things that make a man truly educated. This philosopher, writing to Philocles, says that all learning is to be shunned.

(printed under page 202)

(15) ‹anchor: Pigrum exerceri› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Pigrum exerceri. Ita restitui ex mss. et editis Rom. 1470, Torn., Soubr., Walch. Caeteris vulgatis est exercere, mendose.

"That the sluggard be exercised." So I have restored it from the manuscripts and the editions Rome 1470, Tornesius, Soubron, Walch. In the other common editions it is "exercere", faultily.

(printed under page 202)

(16) ‹anchor: Nihil curare› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nihil curare. De hoc vide librum de Ira Dei, c. 27.

"To care for nothing." On this see the book On the Wrath of God, chapter 27.

(printed under page 202)

(17) ‹anchor: Vitam posse tolerari› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vitam posse tolerari. Sic reposui ex antiquissimo ms. Reg. et 4 al. Reg., 5 Colb., 2 Clarom. aliisque, nec non ex editis 2 vet. Rom., Torn., Soubr. Walch., (continues)

"That life can be sustained." So I have restored it from the very old Royal manuscript and 4 other Royal, 5 Colbert, 2 Clermont and others, and also from the printed editions, the 2 old Rome, Tornesius, Soubron, Walch, (continues)

(printed under page 202)

Page

  • running head: 397 · LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[IA] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹(ut opinor) primus›; B ‹cesse est; ergo philosophia›; C ‹Put. per emendationem› (in the notes); D ‹esse primum de re disputari› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the scan renders several t's like l (ul opinor, el hanc, Ilem, lalentem); I read these as worn t and set ut, et, Item, latentem. nescive-runt is hyphenated across a line end and joined. The VARIORUM NOTAE heading runs across both columns and is cut off at the edge; it is not set. The Variorum notae (Recens... aetas; Item Lucretius ait; Primus cum primis; Mille anni; Mota sunt; Quod irridens Persius; Cum saporis mercibus) are page-foot commentary and are left for the later pass. Verse lines are joined with " / ".
PL 6:398
CAPUT XVII.
Chapter XVII.
A Philosophia ad philosophos transit, initio ab Epicuro sumpto; et quomodo Leucippum et Democritum habuerit auctores erroris.
He passes from philosophy to the philosophers, making a beginning with Epicurus; and how he had Leucippus and Democritus as the authors of his error.
Dixi de philosophia ipsa quam breviter potui: nunc ad philosophos veniamus; non ut cum his decertemus, qui stare non possunt, sed ut eos fugientes atque dejectos nostro campo insequamur. Epicuri disciplina multo celebrior semper fuit, quam caeterorum; non quia veri aliquid afferat, sed quia multos populare nomen voluptatis invitat. Nemo enim non in vitia pronus est. Praeterea, ut ad se multitudinem contrahat, apposita singulis quibusque moribus loquitur. Desidiosum vetat litteras discere, avarum populari largitione liberat, ignavum prohibet accedere ad rempublicam, pigrum exerceri, timidum militare. Irreligiosus audit deos nihil curare; inhumanus, et suis commodis serviens jubetur nihil cuiquam tribuere; omnia enim sua causa facere sapientem. Fugienti turbam solitudo laudatur. Qui nimium parcus est, discit aqua et polenta vitam posse tolerari. Qui
I have spoken of philosophy itself as briefly as I could: now let us come to the philosophers; not in order to contend with them, who cannot stand, but in order to pursue them, as they flee and lie thrown down, on our own field. The school of Epicurus was always much more celebrated than that of the others; not because it brings anything of truth, but because the popular name of pleasure invites many. For there is no one who is not prone to vices. Moreover, in order to draw the multitude to itself, it speaks in a manner suited to each and every character. It forbids the slothful man to learn letters; it frees the avaricious man from popular largesse; it prohibits the cowardly man from approaching public affairs, the lazy man from exerting himself, the timid man from serving as a soldier. The irreligious man hears that the gods care for nothing; the inhumane man, and he who serves his own advantage, is told to grant nothing to anyone, for the wise man does everything for his own sake. To him who flees the crowd, solitude is praised. He who is excessively sparing learns that life can be sustained on water and barley-meal. He who
Editors' notes and page, col. 398

Page

  • running head: ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 398 (beginning of head cut off at the left edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹CAPUT XVII. (at the level of the head of the column)›; B ‹pronus est. Praeterea›; C ‹ejus generis aromata (in the Variorum notes)›; D ‹Multos populare nomen voluptatis invitat (in the Variorum notes)›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column ends mid-sentence at "Qui"; editors' matter set: the italic chapter summary "A Philosophia ad philosophos transit"; the full-width heading "[V]ARIORUM NOTAE", cut off at the left edge, stands below the text block and is not set; the notes below it ("in Urbem advectam fuisse" ... "Walch.,") are not set, being left for the later apparatus pass; the running head is only partly visible
PL 6:399
odit uxorem, huic enumerantur coelibatus bona: habenti malos liberos orbitas praedicatur; adversus impios parentes nullum esse vinculum naturae. Impatienti ac delicato dolorem esse omnium malorum maximum dicitur: forti, etiam in tormentis beatum esse sapientem. Qui claritati ac potentiae studet, huic praecipitur reges colere: qui molestiam ferre non potest, huic regiam fugere. Ita homo astutus ex variis diversisque moribus circulum cogit, et dum studet placere omnibus, majore discordia secum ipse pugnavit, quam inter se universi. Unde autem disciplina ejus tota descendat, quam originem habeat, explicandum est.
hates his wife, to him the goods of celibacy are enumerated; to one who has bad children, childlessness is praised; against impious parents, that there is no bond of nature. To the impatient and delicate it is said that pain is the greatest of all evils; to the brave, that the wise man is happy even in torments. He who strives after renown and power is instructed to court kings; he who cannot bear annoyance, to flee the court. Thus the cunning man gathers a circle out of various and diverse characters, and while he strives to please everyone, he has fought with himself in greater discord than all of them among themselves. But whence his whole teaching descends, and what origin it has, must be explained.
Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, charorum amissiones; malos contra beatos esse, augeri potentia, bonoribus affici: videbat innocentiam minus tutam, scelera impune committi: videbat, sine delectu morum, sine ordine ac discrimine annorum saevire mortem: sed alios ad senectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam robustos interire, alios in primo adolescentiae flore immaturis funeribus extingui, in bellis potius
Epicurus saw that adversities always befall the good: poverty, labours, exiles, the loss of dear ones; that the wicked, on the contrary, are happy, are increased in power, are loaded with honours; he saw that innocence is less safe, that crimes are committed with impunity; he saw that death rages without discrimination of character, without order or distinction of years; but that some reach old age, some are snatched away as infants, others perish when already robust, others are extinguished by untimely deaths in the first flower of youth, in wars rather
Editors' notes and page, col. 399

Footnotes

<!-- Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 1 continues from page 202. Note 7 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. --> (printed under page 203)

(1) ‹anchor: Vitam posse tolerari (p. 202)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) In 6 rec., 1 Colb. et 12 excusis est tolerare. Tantae autem erat frugalitatis, ut solo pane et aqua vesceretur; nec ulli deditus erat voluptati, ut ait S. Hieronymus lib. ii, adversus Jovinianum: additur tamen, quod eam solum respuebat propter incommoda, quae inde sequebantur. Qua de re vide Stobaeum.—Vitam... tolerari. Tenuitatem et parcimoniam verbo tolerare indicari, auctor est Taubmann. ad Virgil. viii, Aen. v. 409. Bun.

(printed under page 203)

(2) ‹anchor: Qui odit uxorem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui odit uxorem. De quo vide S. Hieronym. sub finem lib. i, ad Jovinianum.

"Who hates his wife." On this see St Jerome near the end of book 1 Against Jovinian.

(printed under page 203)

(3) ‹anchor: Adversus parentes impios› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Adversus parentes impios. Hoc ordine Goth. unde una dempta littera fingo, adversus parentes impio, sc. dicitur, ut statim sequitur paulo ante: Habenti malos liberos; nunc impio filio adversus parentes blanditur. Buneman.

"Against impious parents." So the Gotha manuscript, in this order; whence, taking away one letter, I conjecture "adversus parentes impio", understanding "dicitur", as just before there follows: "to one who has bad children"; now he flatters the impious son against his parents. Bünemann.

(printed under page 203)

(4) ‹anchor: Reges colere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Reges colere. De hoc vide Plutarch. De Tranquillitate animi, et Stobaeum sermone 27.

"To court kings." On this see Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Mind, and Stobaeus, discourse 27.

(printed under page 203)

(5) ‹anchor: Moribus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Moribus. Ita restitui ex 31 mss. et 7 editis., 1 Reg. rec. habet motibus, corrupte; 2 Reg. rec., Torn., 1 Colbert. et 10 edit. modis.

"By [their] characters." So I have restored it from 31 manuscripts and 7 printed editions. One recent Royal has "motibus" ("by movements"), corruptly; 2 recent Royal, Tornesius, 1 Colbert and 10 editions, "modis" ("by ways").

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(6) ‹anchor: Cogit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cogit. Vetustissimorum et optimorum codicum est, 2 Bon., 9 Reg., 4 Colb., Tornes., 2 Clarom., Cantabrig. nec non edit. vet. Rom. et 8 al. In rec. 1 Reg., 2 Colb., Goth., Em., Brun. et 5 edit., colligit.—Circulum cogit. Exactum a Cellario et Walchio, et jam ante a Tornesio 1587 verbum cogit, revocavi. Habent enim vetustissimi plurimique libri scripti, editi, Cogere circulum, eleganter: idem est quod coetum colligere, congregare, sive, ut hoc capite sup., Ad se multitudinem contrahere. De circulo pro coetu, corona, Apul. Metam. lib. ii, pag. 120: Quum frequentis populi circulo conseptus coronae circumstantium fata enodaret. Bu.

"Gathers." This is the reading of the oldest and best codices: 2 Bologna, 9 Royal, 4 Colbert, Tornesius, 2 Clermont, Cambridge, and also the old Rome edition and 8 others. In the recent 1 Royal, 2 Colbert, Gotha, Emmanuel, Brun. and 5 editions, "colligit". — "Gathers a circle." I have recalled the verb "cogit", which had been driven out by Cellarius and Walch, and already before them by Tornesius in 1587. For the oldest and most numerous books, manuscript and printed, have "cogere circulum", elegantly: it is the same as to collect or assemble a gathering, or, as earlier in this chapter, "to draw a multitude to oneself". For "circulus" meaning a gathering or ring of people, Apuleius, Metamorphoses book 2, page 120: "When, hedged in by a circle of the thronging people, he was unravelling the fates of the ring of bystanders." Bünemann.

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(7) ‹anchor: Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Videbat Epicurus bonis adversa semper accidere, etc. Hinc concludebat nullam esse providentiam, ac Deum nullam hominum curam gerere: sed omnia fortuito casu evenire. Hinc non solum Epicurus, verum et alii, Seneca in Hippol. act. iii; Lucanus lib. 7: / Sunt nobis nulla profecto / Numina: cum caeco rapiantur singula casu, / Mentimur regnare Jovem. / Ovid. lib. iii Amor., eleg. 8: / Cum rapiant mala fata bonos, ignoscite fasso, / Sollicitor nullos esse putare deos. / Gallaeus. — Ita falso opinabantur ii, qui rerum post mortem futurarum nil certi habebant.

"Epicurus saw that adversity always befalls the good," etc. From this he concluded that there is no providence, and that God takes no care of men, but that everything happens by blind chance. So thought not Epicurus only but others too: Seneca in the Hippolytus, act 3; Lucan, book 7: "Surely we have no gods: since all things are swept along by blind chance, we lie when we say that Jupiter reigns." Ovid, Amores book 3, elegy 8: "When evil fates snatch away the good — forgive me for confessing it — I am tempted to think there are no gods." Gallaeus. — So those falsely supposed who had nothing certain about the things to come after death.

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(8) ‹anchor: Infantes rapi› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Infantes rapi. More veterum. Sueton. C. Caes. Caligul. cap. 7: Infantes adhuc rapti. Plin. vi, ep. 6: Doleo, illum immatura morte indignissime raptum. Justin. lib. vii, cap. 2: Immatura morte raptus. Bun.

"That infants are snatched away." In the manner of the ancients. Suetonius, Gaius Caesar Caligula, chapter 7: "snatched away while still infants." Pliny, book 6, letter 6: "I grieve that he was snatched away most undeservedly by an untimely death." Justin, book 7, chapter 2: "snatched away by an untimely death." Bünemann.

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(9) ‹anchor: Ipse suas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ipse suas. Lucretius in editis habet: Saepe suas.

"He himself his own." Lucretius in the printed editions has "Saepe suas" ("often his own").

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(10) ‹anchor: Capitolium› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Capitolium. De Capitolii incendiis, ex antiquioribus nemo copiosius quam Plutarchus, in Vita Publicolae, et Cornelius Tacitus, lib xix Annalium. Tarquinius Priscus, Demarati filius, Sabino bello templum Jovi, in monte Tarpeio, qui ante Saturnius dictus fuerat, aedificare coepit. Dum opifices fundamenta aperirent, caput hominis est repertum. Quod omen Augures significare dicebant, arcem hanc caput orbis futurum, et ob id monti nomen est inditum Capitolini. Sed morte interceptus ille Priscus inchoatam structuram reliquit. Quam post Tarquin. Superbus, illius nepos, ex spoliis captae Pometiae absolvit: qui priusquam dedicationem obiret, propter tyrannidem expulsus fuit. Et haec quidem dedicatio post Tarquinium facta fuit, anno ab U. C. 247. Capitolium saxo quadrato substructum, opus vel postera magnificentia conspiciendum, incendio absumptum est bellis Marianis L. Scip. Asiat. et C. Norbano Balbo Coss., hoc est, anno U. C. 671, a dedicatione annis 424, non 415, ut asserit Tacitus, cujus errorem postea secutus est et Alexander Neapolitanus. Restituit hoc Sylla. Consecravit restauratum Qu. Catulus, cujus Plinius etiam meminit lib. xix, cap. 1. Duravit hoc ad bellum usque Vitellianum, quo secundo a militibus incensum. Restituit Vespasianus; eoque adhuc vivente, tertio igne absumptum, cumque ipso Capitolio Vespasianus quoque mortem obiit. Domitianus deinde magnificentius illud fecit, quam antea unquam fuisset. Verba autem Lucretii referenda sunt ad incendium Marianum. At non video quando Jovis fulmine conflagrarit. Betul. — Capitolium..... fulmine ictum. Vid. Arnob., l. vi, pag. 245, ed. in 8 Elmenh. Quum Capitolium toties edax ignis absumeret, Jovemque ipsum capitolinum cum uxore corripuisset ac filia, ubinam fulminator tempore illo fuit... vindicaret. Buneman.

"The Capitol." On the burnings of the Capitol, none of the ancients writes more fully than Plutarch in his Life of Publicola, and Cornelius Tacitus, book 19 of the Annals. Tarquinius Priscus, son of Demaratus, began in the Sabine war to build a temple to Jupiter on the Tarpeian hill, which had earlier been called Saturnian. While the workmen were opening the foundations, a man's head was found. The augurs said this omen signified that this citadel would be the head of the world, and for that reason the hill was given the name Capitoline. But that Priscus, cut off by death, left the building unfinished. Tarquin the Proud, his grandson, afterwards completed it from the spoils of captured Pometia; but before he could perform the dedication he was expelled for his tyranny. And this dedication was made after Tarquin, in the year 247 from the founding of the City. The Capitol, built on squared stone, a work to be admired even by later magnificence, was consumed by fire in the Marian wars, in the consulship of Lucius Scipio Asiaticus and Gaius Norbanus Balbus, that is, in the year 671 of the City, 424 years after its dedication, not 415, as Tacitus asserts — an error that Alexander of Naples later followed. Sulla restored it. Quintus Catulus consecrated it when restored; Pliny also mentions him, book 19, chapter 1. It lasted until the war of Vitellius, in which it was burnt a second time by the soldiers. Vespasian restored it; and while he was still living it was consumed by fire a third time, and Vespasian too died along with the Capitol itself. Domitian then made it more magnificent than it had ever been before. The words of Lucretius are to be referred to the Marian fire. But I do not see when it burned from Jupiter's thunderbolt. Betuleius. — "The Capitol ..... struck by lightning." See Arnobius, book 6, page 245, Elmenhorst's octavo edition: "When devouring fire so often consumed the Capitol, and had seized Capitoline Jupiter himself with his wife and daughter, where was the Thunderer at that time ... to avenge?" Bünemann.

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(11) ‹anchor: Consulatus sui› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Consulatus sui. Hunc librum non habemus: sed vide lib. ii de Div., cap. 20, ubi iidem versus leguntur.

"Of his consulship." We do not have this book; but see On Divination book 2, chapter 20, where the same verses are read.

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Page

  • running head: FIRM. LACTANTII DI (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A odit uxorem, huic enumerantur; B malos contra beatos esse; C tolerari. Tenuitatem et parcimoniam (in the Variorum notes); D ante a Tornesio 1587 (in the Variorum notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: Column begins mid-sentence (odit) and ends mid-sentence (potius). The Variorum notes at the page foot (heading "VARIORUM N..." cut off at the edge, notes beginning "In 6 rec., 1 Colb. et 12 excusis") are not set and are left for the later pass.
PL 6:400
meliores, et vinci, et perire. Maxime autem commovebat, homines in primis religiosos gravioribu⟨s⟩ malis affici: iis autem, qui aut deos omnino negligerent, aut non pie colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire vel nulla: ipsa etiam saepe templa fulminibus conflagrare. Quod Lucretius queritur (lib. II, de Natura rerum), cum dicit de Deo:
the better [men] are both conquered and perish. But what disturbed [him] most of all was that men who were especially religious were afflicted with heavier evils, while to those who either neglected the gods altogether or did not worship them piously, either lesser misfortunes befell or none at all; and that even the temples themselves were often burned up by thunderbolts. This is what Lucretius complains of (book 2, On the Nature of Things), when he says of God:
Tum fulmina mittat, et aedes / Ipse suas disturbet; et in deserta recedens, / Saeviat exercens telum, quod saepe nocentes / Praeterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merentes.
Then he should hurl thunderbolts, and himself overthrow his own temples; and, withdrawing into deserts, should rage, plying his weapon, which often passes by the guilty and strikes lifeless the unworthy and the undeserving.
Quod si vel exiguam veritatis auram colligere potuisset, numquam diceret, aedes illum suas disturbare; cum ideo disturbet, quod non sunt suae. Capitolium, quod est Romanae urbis et religionis caput summum, non semel, sed saepius fulmine ictum conflagravit. Homines autem ingeniosi quid de hoc existimaverint, ex dicto Ciceronis apparet, qui ait, divinitus extitisse illam flammam, non quae terrestre illud domicilium Jovis deleret, sed quae sublimius magnificentiusque deposceret. Qua de re etiam in libris Consulatus sui eadem dixit quae Lucretius:
But if he had been able to catch even a slight breath of the truth, he would never have said that he overthrows his own temples, since he overthrows them precisely because they are not his own. The Capitol, which is the highest head of the Roman city and religion, was struck by lightning and burned not once but quite often. Now what men of talent thought about this is evident from a saying of Cicero, who says that that flame arose by divine agency, not to destroy that earthly dwelling of Jupiter, but to demand a loftier and more magnificent one. On this matter also, in the books of his Consulship, he said the same things as Lucretius:
Editors' notes and page, col. 400

Page

  • running head: LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 400
  • marginal letters: A meliores, et vinci, et perire; B non semel, sed saepius fulmine; C Ipse suas. Lucretius in editis (in the Variorum Notae); D est, anno U. C. 671 (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: gravioribu⟨s⟩: final s printed as a broken mark like a semicolon, taken as damaged type; Lucretius verses set as one paragraph with lines divided by " / "; Variorum Notae at page foot (Gallaeus ... Buneman; Consulatus sui ...) not set, for the later pass; column ends mid-sentence before the quoted verses; "de Deo" printed with capital D, pagan deity rendered with lowercase pronouns
PL 6:401
Nam pater altitonans stellanti nixus Olympo,
For the high-thundering father, resting upon starry Olympus,
Ipse suas arces, atque inclyta templa petivit,
himself struck at his own citadels and renowned temples,
Et Capitolinis injecit sedibus ignes.
and hurled fires upon the Capitoline seats.
Pertinaci ergo stultitia non modo vim majestatemque veri Dei non intellexerunt: sed etiam impietatem sui erroris auxerunt, qui templum coelesti judicio saepe damnatum restituere contra fas omne contenderint.
By obstinate folly, therefore, they not only failed to understand the power and majesty of the true God, but also increased the impiety of their error, in that they strove, against all that is lawful, to restore a temple often condemned by heavenly judgement.
Cum haec igitur cogitaret Epicurus, earum rerum velut iniquitate inductus (sic enim causam rationemque ignoranti videbatur) existimavit nullam esse providentiam. Quod cum sibi persuasisset, suscepit etiam defendendum: sic in errores inextricabiles se ipse conclusit. Si enim providentia nulla est, quomodo tam ordinate, tam disposite mundus effectus est? Nulla, inquit, dispositio est; multa enim facta sunt aliter, quam fieri debuerunt. Et invenit homo divinus, quae reprehenderet. Quae singula si vacaret refellere, facile ostenderem, nec sapientem hunc fuisse, nec sanum. Item si nulla providentia est, quomodo animalium corpora tam providenter ordinata sunt, ut singula quaeque membra mirabili ratione disposita sua officia conservent? Nihil, inquit, in procreandis animalibus providentiae ratio molita est; nam neque oculi facti sunt ad videndum, neque aures ad audiendum, neque lingua ad loquendum, neque pedes sd ambulandum: quoniam prius haec nata sunt quam esset loqui, audire, videre, ambulare. Itaque non haec ad usum nata sunt: sed usus ex illis natus est. Si nulla providentia est, cur imbres cadunt, fruges oriuntur, arbusta frondescunt? Non, inquit, semper causa animantium ista fiunt, quoniam providentiae nihil prosunt: sed omnia sua sponte fieri necesse est. Unde ergo nascuntur (Vide Lucret., lib. II) aut quomodo fiunt omnia quae geruntur? Non est,
When Epicurus, then, was pondering these things, led on as it were by the injustice of these matters (for so it seemed to him, ignorant as he was of the cause and reason), he judged that there is no providence. And when he had persuaded himself of this, he undertook also to defend it: thus he shut himself up in inextricable errors. For if there is no providence, how was the world made so orderly, so well arranged? There is, he says, no arrangement; for many things have been made otherwise than they ought to have been made. And the divine man found things to find fault with! If I had leisure to refute these one by one, I would easily show that he was neither wise nor sane. Again, if there is no providence, how are the bodies of animals so providently ordered that each and every member, arranged with marvellous design, keeps its own functions? Nothing, he says, did the design of providence contrive in the generation of animals; for neither were the eyes made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the tongue for speaking, nor the feet for walking: since these came into being before there was speaking, hearing, seeing, walking. Therefore these did not come into being for use, but use arose from them. If there is no providence, why do rains fall, crops spring up, trees come into leaf? These things do not always happen, he says, for the sake of living creatures, since they are of no use to providence: but all things must necessarily happen of their own accord. Whence, then, do they arise (see Lucretius, book 2), or how do all the things that take place come about? There is not,
Editors' notes and page, col. 401

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Notes 1–7 in the left note column, 8–14 in the right; note 14 runs over to page 205. Note 7 ends the left column on a comma ("de Ira Dei,") and the right column opens with a new lemma: set as printed. --> (printed under page 204)

(1) ‹anchor: Ipse, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ipse, etc. Hic secundus versus hoc modo legitur apud Cicer., lib. ii de Divin.: / Ipse suos quondam tumulos, ac templa petivit.

"He himself," etc. This second line is read thus in Cicero, On Divination book 2: "He himself once assailed his own mounds and temples."

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(2) ‹anchor: Se ipse conclusit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Se ipse conclusit. Sic restitui ex optimo et veterr. ms. Regio Put. et 1 al. recentiori, 3 Colb., 1 Lips., Em., Brun., suffragantibus 16 aliis in quibus est inclusit, ut in 10 vet. impressis. Hic concludere Terentianum est hac significatione, pro se immittere, implicare se, Gallice s'engager, s'embarrasser, 3 Reg. et 6 editi ferunt, se ipse conjecit.

"He shut himself in." So I have restored it from the best and oldest manuscript, the Royal-Puteanus, and 1 other more recent one, 3 Colbert, 1 Leipzig, Emmanuel, Brun., with the support of 16 others in which it is "inclusit", as in 10 old printed editions. "Concludere" here is Terentian in this sense, for "to thrust oneself in, entangle oneself", in French "s'engager, s'embarrasser". Three Royal manuscripts and 6 editions give "se ipse conjecit" ("he threw himself").

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(3) ‹anchor: Nulla dispositio est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nulla dispositio est. Vide Lucret. ii et v, sub initium. Vide etiam Ciceron. de Natura deorum, lib. i.

"There is no ordering." See Lucretius 2 and 5, near the beginning. See also Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, book 1.

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(4) ‹anchor: Et invenit homo divinus, quae reprehenderet› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et invenit homo divinus, quae reprehenderet. Perperam haec verba in multis edd. ita impressa, ac si essent Epicuri verba, quum sunt verba ironica Lactantii. Hinc typis ordinariis impressa volui. Buneman.

"And the divine man found things to find fault with." In many editions these words are wrongly printed as if they were Epicurus's words, when they are Lactantius's, ironic. So I wanted them printed in ordinary type. Bünemann.

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(5) ‹anchor: Providenter› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Providenter. Goth. prudenter. Conf. l. vi, c. 15. De Ira, cap. 10. Legitur quoque in Plini Panegyric., cap. 1: Quod nihil rite nihilque providenter homines sine deorum immortalium consilio honore auspicarentur. Buneman.

"With foresight." The Gotha has "prudenter" ("prudently"). Compare book 6, chapter 15; On the Wrath, chapter 10. It is also read in Pliny's Panegyric, chapter 1: "Because men would begin nothing duly and nothing with foresight without the counsel and honour of the immortal gods." Bünemann.

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(6) ‹anchor: Sunt enim semina› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sunt enim semina. Reservabimus hanc de atomis disputationem in caput 10 libri de Ira Dei. Vide interea S. Basilium super hac re homilia εἰς τὸ ἑξαήμερον prima, et caput tertium libri primi Placitorum apud Plut. Betuleius.

"For there are seeds." We shall reserve this discussion of atoms for chapter 10 of the book On the Wrath of God. Meanwhile see St Basil on this matter in the first homily "On the Hexaemeron", and the third chapter of the first book of the Placita in Plutarch. Betuleius.

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(7) ‹anchor: Praeter unum Leucippum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Praeter unum Leucippum. De illo Galenus in Historia philosophica. Sed de his in libro de Ira Dei,

"Except Leucippus alone." On him, Galen in the History of Philosophy. But on these matters, in the book On the Wrath of God, [as printed]

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(8) ‹anchor: Si sunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Si sunt. Manuscriptum est; si sint, editorum.

"If they are." This is the manuscript reading; "si sint", that of the printed editions.

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(9) ‹anchor: Vario ordine› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vario ordine. De quo vide Lucret. ii lib.

"In varied order." On this see Lucretius, book 2.

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(10) ‹anchor: Si autem laevia sunt et hamis indigent› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Si autem laevia sunt et hamis indigent. Sic legit Bonon. ex quo locus hic corrigendus est, etiamsi enim in aliis mss. ac cunctis editis legatur, et humoris indigent, vitiosa tamen est lectio; quod constat hac ratione, quam solide allegat Thomasius, quia nempe humor additus laevitati, non solum nullam cohaesionem, sed lapsum potius efficiet. Gallaeus.

"But if they are smooth and lack hooks." So the Bologna manuscript reads, from which this passage is to be corrected; for although "et humoris indigent" ("and lack moisture") is read in other manuscripts and all the printed editions, the reading is faulty. This is clear from the reason Thomasius soundly alleges: namely, that moisture added to smoothness would produce not cohesion but rather slipping. Gallaeus.

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(11) ‹anchor: Ut..... dissici valeant› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut..... dissici valeant. Hic rursum habes verbum antiquum dissicio, cujus explicationem supra vide, lib. ii, cap. 8. Nota, male in rec. 2 Reg., 1 Colb. et in editis haberi disjici. Gall.

"That ..... they can be split apart." Here again you have the old verb "dissicio"; for its explanation see above, book 2, chapter 8. Note that "disjici" is wrongly given in the recent 2 Royal, 1 Colbert and the printed editions. Gallaeus.

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(12) ‹anchor: Construatur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Construatur. In 1 Bonon. antiq. conseratur. In 12 mss. rec. et 10 editis constituatur.

"May be built." In 1 old Bologna, "conseratur" ("may be joined"). In 12 recent manuscripts and 10 printed editions, "constituatur" ("may be set up").

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(13) ‹anchor: Hic est ille› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Hic est ille. Scilicet Epicurus, ad quem haec carmina respiciunt ex Lucretii lib. iii, in fine.

"This is he." Namely Epicurus, to whom these lines, from the end of Lucretius book 3, refer.

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(14) ‹anchor: Praestinxit stellas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Praestinxit stellas. Mss. 4 Reg., Cauc., Lips., Pal., Jun., Cant. et 4 editi ferunt restinxit; 6 typis excusi restrinxit; 6 Reg., 6 Colbert., 1 Sorbon., 1 Clarom., Brun., et 2 vet. edit. Rom., Extinxit. At Lucretius a Lambino emendatus legit Praestinxit, eodemque verbo utitur lib. ii et iv. Praestinguere autem (ut docet Nonius) valet obtenebrare vel obscurare, quemadmodum sol exoriens stellarum fulgorem obscurat. Dubitari non potest quin legendum sit praestinxit, non restinxit, aut extinxit; non enim sol exoriens stellarum splendorem extinguit, sed duntaxat praestinguit. Restinguit autem multo minus: nam Res- (continues)

"Outshone the stars." The manuscripts 4 Royal, Cauc., Leipzig, Palatine, Junius, Cambridge and 4 printed editions give "restinxit" ("quenched"); 6 printed editions "restrinxit"; 6 Royal, 6 Colbert, 1 Sorbonne, 1 Clermont, Brun., and the 2 old Rome editions, "extinxit" ("extinguished"). But Lucretius as corrected by Lambinus reads "praestinxit", and uses the same verb in books 2 and 4. "Praestinguere" (as Nonius teaches) means to darken or obscure, as the rising sun obscures the brightness of the stars. There can be no doubt that "praestinxit" is to be read, not "restinxit" or "extinxit"; for the rising sun does not extinguish the splendour of the stars but only outshines it. Still less does it "quench" it: for "res- (continues)

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Page

  • running head: 401 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[IA] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹Nam pater altitonans›; B ‹sunt aliter, quam fieri›; C ‹inquit, semper causa›; D ‹et 6 editi ferunt› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the three verse lines are set one per line as printed; C stands between "dunt, fruges" and "inquit, semper", placement unsure; D stands beside the Variorum notae, not the text; the Variorum notae at the page foot ("Ipse, etc. Hic secundus versus...") are not set; the right-hand column belongs to col. 402 and is not set
PL 6:402
inquit, providentiae opus; sunt enim semina per inane volitantia, quibus inter se temere conglobatis, universa gignuntur atque concrescunt. Cur igitur illa non sentimus aut cernimus? Quia nec colorem habent, inquit, nec calorem ullum, nec odorem; saporis quoque et humoris expertia sunt, et tam minuta, ut secari ac dividi nequeant.
he says, the work of providence; for there are seeds flying about through the void, and when these are massed together at random among themselves, all things are begotten and grow together. Why then do we not perceive or see them? Because, he says, they have neither colour, nor any heat, nor smell; they are also without taste and moisture, and so minute that they cannot be cut and divided.
Sic eum, quia in principio falsum susceperat, consequentium rerum necessitas ad deliramenta perduxit. Ubi enim sunt, aut unde ista corpuscula? Cur illa nemo praeter unum Leucippum somniavit? a quo Democritus eruditus haereditatem stultitiae reliquit Epicuro. Quae si sunt corpuscula, et quidem solida, ut dicunt, sub oculos certe venire possunt. Si eadem est natura omnium, quomodo res varias efficiunt? Vario, inquit, ordine ac positione conveniunt: sicut litterae, quae cum sint paucae, varie tamen collocatae, innumerabilia verba conficiunt. At litterae varias formas habent. Ita, inquit, et haec ipsa primordia; nam sunt aspera, sunt hamata, sunt laevia. Secari ergo et dividi possunt, si aliquid inest illis quod emineat. Si autem laevia sunt et hamis indigent, cohaerere non possunt. Hamata igitur esse oportet, ut possint invicem concatenari. Cum vero tam minuta esse dicantur, ut nulla ferri acie dissici valeant, quomodo hamos, aut angulos habent? Quos, quia extant, necesse est posse divelli. Deinde quo foedere inter se, qua mente conveniunt, ut ex his aliquid construatur? Si sensu carent, nec coire tam disposite possunt; quia non potest quidquam rationale perficere, nisi ratio. Quam multis coargui haec vanitas potest! sed properat oratio. Hic est ille,
Thus, because he had taken up something false at the beginning, the necessity of the consequences led him on to ravings. For where are these little bodies, or whence do they come? Why did no one dream of them except Leucippus alone? Instructed by him, Democritus left the inheritance of folly to Epicurus. If these little bodies exist, and solid ones at that, as they say, they can certainly come before the eyes. If the nature of all of them is the same, how do they produce varied things? They come together, he says, in varied order and position: just as letters, though they are few, yet when variously arranged make up innumerable words. But letters have varied shapes. So too, he says, do these first beginnings themselves; for some are rough, some are hooked, some are smooth. Then they can be cut and divided, if there is anything in them that projects. But if they are smooth and lack hooks, they cannot cohere. They must therefore be hooked, so that they can be linked to one another. But since they are said to be so minute that they cannot be split apart by any edge of iron, how do they have hooks, or angles? Since these project, it follows that they can be torn off. Then by what compact among themselves, by what mind, do they come together, so that something may be constructed out of them? If they lack sense, they cannot come together in so orderly a way either; for nothing can bring about anything rational except reason. By how many arguments can this vanity be refuted! But my discourse hastens on. This is he
Qui genus humanum ingenio superavit, et omnes Praestinxit stellas, exortus uti aetherius sol.
who surpassed the human race in genius, and outshone all the stars, as the ethereal sun when it has risen.
Editors' notes and page, col. 402

Page

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  • marginal letters: A inquit, providentiae opus; B Vario, inquit, ordine; C Quam multis coargui; D beside "tiquum dissicio" in the Variorum Notae at the page foot
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Quos equidem versus numquam sine risu legere possum. Non enim de Socrate, aut Platone hoc saltem dicebat, qui velut reges habentur philosophorum: sed de homine, quo sano et vigente, nullus aeger ineptius deliravit. Itaque poeta inanissimus leonis laudibus murem non ornavit, sed obruit et obtrivit. At idem nos metu liberat mortis, de qua haec ipsius verba sunt expressa: « Quando nos sumus, mors non est: quando mors est, nos non sumus; mors ergo nihil ad nos. » Quam argute nos fefellit! quasi vero transacta mors timeatur, qua jam sensus ereptus est, ac non ipsum mori, quo sensus eripitur. Est enim tempus aliquod, quo nos etiamnum sumus, et mors tamen nondum est; idque ipsum videtur miserum esse, cum et mors esse incipit, et nos esse desinimus.
These verses, indeed, I can never read without laughing. For he was not saying this, at least, about Socrates or Plato, who are held to be, as it were, the kings of philosophers, but about a man than whom, while he was sound and flourishing, no sick man ever raved more foolishly. And so the most empty-headed poet did not adorn a mouse with the praises of a lion, but overwhelmed and crushed it. Yet the same man frees us from the fear of death, about which these words of his own are recorded: "When we are, death is not; when death is, we are not; death, therefore, is nothing to us." How cleverly he has deceived us! As if it were death already past that is feared, by which sensation has already been taken away, and not dying itself, by which sensation is being taken away. For there is some time in which we still are, and yet death is not yet; and that very thing seems to be wretched, when both death is beginning to be and we are ceasing to be.
Nec frustra dictum est: Mors misera non est. Aditus ad mortem est miser: hoc est, morbo tabescere, ictum perpeti, ferrum corpore excipere, ardere igni, dentibus bestiarum laniari. Haec sunt quae timentur, non quia mortem afferunt, sed quia dolorem magnum. Quin potius effice ne dolor malum sit. Omnium, inquit, malorum maximum est. Qui ergo non possum non timere, si id, quod mortem antecedit, aut efficit, malum est? Quid, quod totum illud argumentum falsum est? quia non intereunt animae. Animae vero, inquit, intereunt. Nam quod cum corpore nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est. Jam superius dixi, differre me hunc locum melius, et operi ultimo reservare, ut hanc Epicuri persuasionem, sive illa Democriti, sive Dicaearchi fuit, et argumentis, et divinis testimoniis redarguam. Verum ille fortasse impunitatem
Nor was it said in vain: Death is not wretched; the approach to death is wretched; that is, to waste away with disease, to suffer a blow, to receive the sword in one's body, to burn in fire, to be torn by the teeth of beasts. These are the things that are feared, not because they bring death, but because they bring great pain. Rather, then, bring it about that pain is not an evil. It is, he says, the greatest of all evils. How then can I not fear, if that which precedes or brings about death is an evil? What of the fact that that whole argument is false, because souls do not perish? But souls do perish, he says. For what is born with the body must perish with the body. I have already said above that I would better defer this topic and reserve it for the last book, so that I may refute this persuasion of Epicurus, whether it was that of Democritus or of Dicaearchus, both with arguments and with divine testimonies. But perhaps he promised impunity
Editors' notes and page, col. 403

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Praestinxit stellas (p. 204)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) tinguere de ardore aut calore dicitur, non de lumine aut fulgore. Ex Lambino.

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(2) ‹anchor: Quando mors est, nos non sumus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quando mors est, nos non sumus. Hanc esse genuinam lectionem constat ex Bonon., Tax., Pen., 2 Brun., 6 Colb., 2 Clarom. et omnibus Vatic. et ex Epicuro ipso in epist. ad Moeneceum apud Laert. non quae vulgo habetur, quando nos non sumus, mors est. Isaeus. Haec Isaei correctio confirmatur a mss. Lips., Pal., Ult., Jun., editis Plantin., Gymn., Genev., Ald., Cratand., Is. et Thysii. Locus Epicuri ad Moenec. sic habet: Ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος ἄπρη, τόθ' ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. Gallaeus: De hac ratiocinatione vide Lucretium, lib. iii; Laertium, in Epicuro; Aul. Gellium, lib. ii, cap. 8; Plutarch. de Tranquillitate Vitae, et Stobaeum Sermone 15.

"When death is, we are not." That this is the genuine reading is established from the Bologna, Tax., Pen., 2 Brun., 6 Colbert, 2 Clermont and all the Vatican manuscripts, and from Epicurus himself in the letter to Menoeceus [Moeneceum, as printed] in Laertius — not what is commonly given, "when we are not, death is." Isaeus. This correction of Isaeus is confirmed by the manuscripts Leipzig, Palatine, Utrecht, Junius, and the editions of Plantin, Gymnicus, Geneva, Aldus, Cratander, Isaeus and Thysius. The passage of Epicurus to Menoeceus runs thus: "But when death is present [ἄπρη, as printed], then we are not." Gallaeus. On this reasoning see Lucretius, book 3; Laertius, in his Epicurus; Aulus Gellius, book 2, chapter 8; Plutarch, On Tranquillity of Life; and Stobaeus, discourse 15.

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(3) ‹anchor: Qua jam sensus ereptus est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qua jam sensus ereptus est. Ita reposui ex vet. edit. Rom. ac Venet. nec non Tornes., Cellar. et cunctis mss. praeter 1 Reg. et 17 edit. in quibus est quia. Vide infra, quo sensus eripitur.

"In which sense has now been taken away." So I have restored it from the old Rome and Venice editions, and also Tornesius, Cellarius and all the manuscripts except 1 Royal and 17 editions, in which it is "quia" ("because"). See below: "by which sense is taken away".

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(4) ‹anchor: Quo nos etiamnum sumus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quo nos etiamnum sumus. Placet Isaei ad hunc locum observatio, qui pro eo quod in impressis habetur, quo et nos jam non sumus, legendum putat eo modo quo excudi curavimus. Ratio ejus solidissima est; si enim tempus est aliquod, quo et nos jam non sumus, et mors nondum est, recte dictum est ab Epicuro, quod eo tempore mors nihil ad nos. Lactantius vero contrarium intenuit, ut patet ex scopo, si textus attente expendatur. Et sane, lapsus facilis fuit non pro num substituendi. Edit. Graphei et Gymnici et ms. Jun. nostram hanc emendationem confirmant; carent enim illa negatione quae in reliquis, tum mss. cum editis invenitur. Gallaeus.

"In which we still are." Isaeus's observation on this passage is approved: instead of what is in the printed editions, "quo et nos jam non sumus" ("in which we too no longer are"), he thinks it should be read as we have had it printed. His reasoning is very sound; for if there is some time in which we no longer are and death not yet is, Epicurus rightly said that at that time death is nothing to us. But Lactantius meant [intenuit, as printed] the contrary, as is plain from his aim if the text is weighed attentively. And indeed it was an easy slip to substitute "non" for "num". The editions of Gryphius [Graphei, as printed] and Gymnicus and the Junius manuscript confirm this emendation of ours, for they lack that negation which is found in the rest, manuscripts and printed editions alike. Gallaeus.

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(5) ‹anchor: Cum et mors esse incipit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum et mors esse incipit. Mss. 17 et edit. 5, quod et mors. 1 Bonon. antiq. et Brun., quo et mors.

"When death too begins to be." Seventeen manuscripts and 5 editions have "quod et mors"; 1 old Bologna and Brun., "quo et mors".

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(6) ‹anchor: Afferunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Afferunt. Ex mss. et 9 veteribus editis est; in recentioribus excusis est afferant.

"They bring." It comes from the manuscripts and 9 old editions; in the more recent printed editions it is "afferant".

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(7) ‹anchor: Quin potius effice ne dolor malum sit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quin potius effice ne dolor malum sit. Sic restitui ex 10 editis, ac vetustissimis mss. 2 Reg. et 21 aliis, nisi quod in duobus est effici, in sex efficit; in 1 al. Reg. ut dolor malum non sit. Sed et nostram lectionem secutus est gallicus interpres: O Epicure, fais plutôt que douleur ne soit point mal. In sex editis legitur, Quae res potius efficit, ut dolor malum sit.

"Rather, bring it about that pain is not an evil." So I have restored it from 10 printed editions and the oldest manuscripts, 2 Royal and 21 others, except that in two it is "effici", in six "efficit"; in 1 other Royal, "ut dolor malum non sit". The French translator too followed our reading: "O Epicurus, rather make it so that pain is no evil." In six editions is read: "Which thing rather brings it about that pain is an evil."

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(8) ‹anchor: Quia non intereunt animae. Animae vero intereunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quia non intereunt animae. Animae vero intereunt. Ita emendavi ex ms. Reg. 400 annor. optimae notae, succurrentibus 2 veterrimis Regiis, alioque Reg. rec. et ed. Betul. in quibus semel est animae; et in 15 scriptis et 11 vulgatis, vere, inquit; in tribus, verum.

"Because souls do not perish. But souls do perish." So I have corrected it from a Royal manuscript four hundred years old, of the best quality, with the help of 2 very old Royal manuscripts and another recent Royal, and Betuleius's edition, in which "animae" stands once; and in 15 manuscripts and 11 common editions, "vere, inquit"; in three, "verum".

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(9) ‹anchor: Necesse est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Necesse est. Id post Epicurum somniat Lucretius lib. iii.

"It must be." Lucretius dreams this after Epicurus, book 3.

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(10) ‹anchor: Operi ultimo› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Operi ultimo. Hoc exequitur Lactantius lib. vii, capitib. 7, 8, etc.; et Epitome, cap. 10.

"For the last part of the work." Lactantius carries this out in book 7, chapters 7, 8, etc.; and in the Epitome, chapter 10.

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(11) ‹anchor: Democriti, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Democriti, etc. Ille fuit Abderites, qui atomos excogitaverit: quinto saeculo vixit ante vulgarem aeram, obiitque annos natus 109, Olympiad. lxxiv. Dicaearchus vero Misenius fuit philosophus, qui opinatus genus humanum semper fuisse, atque omnia in homine simul interire,

"Of Democritus," etc. He was the man of Abdera who devised the atoms; he lived in the fifth century before the common era, and died aged 109, in the 74th Olympiad. Dicaearchus of Messene [Misenius, as printed] was a philosopher who held that the human race has always existed, and that everything in man perishes together, [as printed]

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(12) ‹anchor: Turpissimae voluptatis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Turpissimae voluptatis. Hic sui fuit oblitus auctor noster; supra enim dixerat, Epicurum collocasse summum bonum in voluptate animi.

"Of the most shameful pleasure." Here our author forgot himself; for above he had said that Epicurus placed the highest good in pleasure of the mind.

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(13) ‹anchor: Impunitatis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Impunitatis. Sic Cicero pro Milone ait: Impunitatis spes maxima est illecebra peccandi.

"Of impunity." So Cicero says in the speech for Milo: "The hope of impunity is the greatest enticement to sin."

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(14) ‹anchor: Malefacere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Malefacere. At e contra Cicero, de Officiis, docet, bonum virum numquam peccaturum, etiamsi impunitas sit proposita. Nihil enim utile, quod non sit honestum.

"To do wrong." But Cicero, on the contrary, teaches in On Duties that a good man will never sin, even if impunity is offered. For nothing is useful that is not honourable.

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(15) ‹anchor: Ita qui audit haec flagitia› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ita qui audit haec flagitia. Sic reposui ex mss. In vulgatis est, Itaque qui audit, etc.

"So he who hears these shameful things." So I have restored it from the manuscripts. In the common editions it is "Itaque qui audit", etc.

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Page

  • running head: 403 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the right edge)
  • marginal letters: A Quos equidem versus numquam; B Nec frustra dictum est; C illa Democriti, sive Dicaearchi; D Qua jam sensus ereptus est (in the Variorum notae, not set)
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PL 6:404
vitiis suis spopondit; fuit enim turpissimae voluptatis assertor, cujus capiendae causa, nasci hominem putavit. Quis, cum hoc affirmari audiat, vitiis et sceleribus abstineat? Nam si periturae sunt animae, appetamus divitias, ut omnes suavitates capere possimus: quae si nobis desunt, ab iis qui habent, auferamus clam, dolo, vi; eo magis, si humanas res Deus nullus curat, quandocumque spes impunitatis arriserit, rapiamus, necemus. Sapientis est enim malefacere, si et utile sit, et tutum; quoniam si quis in coelo Deus est, non irascitur cuiquam. Aeque stulti est et benefacere; quia sicut ira non commovetur, ita nec gratia tangitur. Voluptatibus igitur, quoquo modo possumus, serviamus. Brevi enim tempore nulli erimus omnino. Ergo nullum diem, nullum denique temporis punctum fluere nobis sine voluptate patiamur; ne, quia ipsi quandoque perituri sumus, id ipsum quod viximus pereat.
for his vices; for he was the champion of the most shameful pleasure, for the sake of enjoying which he thought man was born. Who, when he hears this affirmed, would abstain from vices and crimes? For if souls are destined to perish, let us seek riches, so that we may enjoy all delights: and if these are lacking to us, let us take them from those who have them, by stealth, by guile, by force; all the more, if no God cares for human affairs, whenever the hope of impunity has smiled upon us, let us plunder, let us kill. For it is the part of a wise man to do evil, if it is both profitable and safe; since if there is any God in heaven, He is angry with no one. Equally it is the part of a fool to do good; because just as He is not moved by anger, so neither is He touched by favour. Let us therefore serve pleasures in whatever way we can. For in a short time we shall be nothing at all. Therefore let us suffer no day, indeed no point of time, to flow past us without pleasure; lest, since we ourselves are to perish at some time, the very fact that we have lived should perish.
Hoc ille tametsi non dicit verbo, re tamen ipsa docet. Nam cum disputat, omnia sapientem sua causa facere, ad utilitatem suam refert omnia quae agit. Ita qui audit haec flagitia, nec boni quidquam faciendum putabit, quoniam benefacere ad utilitatem spectat alienam, nec a scelere abstinendum, quia maleficio praeda conjuncta est. Archipyrata quisquam, vel latronum ductor, si suos ad grassandum cohortetur; quo alio sermone uti potest, quam ut eadem dicat, quae dicit Epicurus? Deos nihil curare; non ira, non gratia tangi; inferorum poenas non esse metuendas, quod animae post mortem occidant, nec ulli omnino sint inferi; voluptatem esse maximum bonum; nullam
This, although he does not say it in words, he nevertheless teaches by the substance itself. For when he argues that the wise man does all things for his own sake, he refers everything that he does to his own advantage. Thus whoever hears these outrages will think that nothing good is to be done, since doing good looks to another's advantage, nor that one should abstain from crime, because plunder is joined to wrongdoing. If some arch-pirate, or leader of robbers, were to exhort his men to violent raiding, what other speech could he use than to say the same things that Epicurus says? That the gods care for nothing; that they are touched neither by anger nor by favour; that the punishments of the underworld are not to be feared, because souls perish after death, and there is no underworld at all; that pleasure is the greatest good; that no
Editors' notes and page, col. 404

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  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 404
  • marginal letters: A ‹punitatem vitiis suis spopondit›; B ‹temporis punctum fluere nobis›; C ‹quod animae post mortem occidant›; D ‹Operi ultimo. Hoc exequitur› (in the notes at the page foot)
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  • other: column begins with "punitatem", the rest of a word (im-punitatem) broken from the previous column; last word "nul-" is broken across the column break; "spopondit" is unsure, as the heavy type could read "spepondit"; the column number in the running head is blurred and could read 401 or 404; the left-hand column fragments and the VARIORUM NOTAE at the page foot were not set (they are for a later pass)
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esse humanam societatem; sibi quemque consulere; neminem esse qui alterum diligat, nisi sua causa; mortem non esse metuendam forti viro, nec ullum dolorem, qui etiamsi torqueatur, si uratur, nihil curare se dicat. Est plane, cur quisquam putet, hanc vocem viri esse sapientis, quae potest latronibus aptissime commodari?
human society exists; that each looks out for himself; that there is no one who loves another except for his own sake; that death is not to be feared by a brave man, nor any pain, since he, even if he is tortured, even if he is burned, should say that he cares nothing for it. Is there plainly any reason why anyone should think that this utterance, which can most fittingly be lent to robbers, is the utterance of a wise man?
CAPUT XVIII.
Chapter XVIII.
Pythagorici et Stoici, animarum immortalitatem statuentes, voluntariam mortem inaniter persuadent.
The Pythagoreans and Stoics, while establishing the immortality of souls, vainly urge voluntary death.
Alii autem contraria his disserunt, superesse animas post mortem; et hi sunt maxime Pythagorici ac Stoici: quibus etsi ignoscendum est, quia verum sentiunt, non possum tamen non reprehendere eos, quia non sententia, sed casu inciderunt in veritatem. Itaque in eo ipso quod recte sentiebant aliquid errarunt.
Others, however, argue the contrary of these things, that souls survive after death; and these are chiefly the Pythagoreans and Stoics: and although they are to be pardoned, because they hold what is true, I nevertheless cannot fail to censure them, because they fell upon the truth not by judgement but by chance. And so in that very point in which they thought rightly they went somewhat astray.
Editors' notes and page, col. 405

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Nisi sua causa› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nisi sua causa. Atqui Cicero in Laelio damnat quaestuosam amicitiam, nec alium amicitiae finem quam honestatis admittit: atque Plato ipse docet, hominem non tam sibi natum quam proximo cuique.

"Except for his own sake." Yet Cicero in the Laelius condemns friendship for gain, and admits no other end of friendship than that of honour: and Plato himself teaches that man is born not so much for himself as for each one near him.

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(2) ‹anchor: Qui etiamsi torqueatur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui etiamsi torqueatur. Qui ex plurimis mss. restitui, quod congruentius est quam quin aliorum.

"Who, even if he is tortured." I have restored "qui" from most of the manuscripts, as it fits better than the "quin" of the others.

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(3) ‹anchor: Non nasci animas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non nasci animas. Antonin. lib. iv, § 21, vult animas solvi, immutari, refundi, redaccendi, ut aliis succedentibus et subeuntibus quotidie locum faciant, prout de corporibus dixerat in terram resolutis. Atque hoc est fortasse quod Epiphanius voluit, ubi de Stoicis dixit, ii, Haer., 5: Μεταγγισμούς τε ψυχῶν καὶ μετεμσωματώσεις; et ex Epiphanio Joan. Damasc. in lib. de Haeres.: Stoici animam de corpore in corpus migrare volunt. Quo nomine Pythagoreis adjungit Stoicos Lactant. hoc loco. Servius ait, ad Aeneid. lib. iii: Stoicos mediam viam secutos, cum Plato animam perpetuam dixerit, et ad diversa corpora transitum facere statim pro meritis vitae prioris: Pythagoras vero, non μετεμψύχωσιν, sed παλιγγενεσίαν esse dicat, hoc est, redire, sed post tempus. Gatakerus. Vide Augustinum, lib. x de Civit. Dei, cap. 30.

"That souls are not born." Antoninus, book 4, § 21, holds that souls are dissolved, changed, poured back and rekindled, so that they make room daily for others succeeding and coming in, just as he had said of bodies resolved into earth. And this is perhaps what Epiphanius meant where he said of the Stoics (Heresies 2, 5): "transfusions of souls and re-embodiments"; and, from Epiphanius, John of Damascus in his book On Heresies: "The Stoics hold that the soul migrates from body to body." On this ground Lactantius joins the Stoics to the Pythagoreans in this place. Servius says, on the Aeneid book 3, that "the Stoics followed a middle way, since Plato called the soul everlasting, and said it passes at once into different bodies according to the merits of its former life; while Pythagoras says it is not transmigration (metempsychosis) but rebirth (palingenesis), that is, that it returns, but after a time." Gataker. See Augustine, City of God book 10, chapter 30.

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(4) ‹anchor: Et de aliis in alia migrare› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et de aliis in alia migrare. Hanc de animarum μετεμψυχώσει opinionem primi tradidere Aegyptii. Ab illis autem hausit illam Pythagoras, teste Herodoto in Euterpe. Hoc idem sensere Galli. Lib. vi de Bello Gallico: In primis hoc volunt persuadere, non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios. Sed haec inter Gallorum et Pythagorae opinionem differentia est, quod Galli putarint, animas tantum transire ad homines alios, Pythagoras vero etiam ad alia animantia. Huic etiam opinioni fidem habuere Pharisaei, teste Josepho lib. xviii, cap. 2 Antiq. Etiam modernis Judaeis haec arrident. Gallaeus.

"And migrate from some into others." The Egyptians were the first to hand down this opinion of the transmigration of souls. From them Pythagoras drew it, as Herodotus attests in the Euterpe. The Gauls held the same. Gallic War book 6: "Above all they wish to persuade that souls do not perish, but after death pass from some to others." But there is this difference between the opinion of the Gauls and that of Pythagoras: the Gauls thought souls pass only into other men, Pythagoras into other living creatures as well. The Pharisees also believed this opinion, as Josephus attests, Antiquities book 18, chapter 2. These things please modern Jews too. Gallaeus.

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(5) ‹anchor: Et nasci animas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et nasci animas. Videtur hoc loco Lactantius a seipso dissentire. Tradit enim supra libro ii, cap. 12, circa finem, quod Deus animam qua spiramus infundit in corpus: hic vero docet animas nasci. Sed ea de re videndus est S. Hieronymus lib. ii Apologiae adversus Rufinum, cujus haec verba sunt: Legi, inquit Hieronymus, quosdam dicentes, quod pariter cum corpore, per humani corporis traducem etiam animae diffundantur; et haec quibus poterant assertionibus confirmabant. Quod puto inter Latinos Tertullianum sensisse et Lactantium, fortassis, et nonnullos alios. Alii asserunt, quod formatis in utero corporibus, Deus quotidie faciat animas et infundat. Alii factas jam olim, id est, tunc cum omnia creavit Deus ex nihilo, nunc eas judicio suo nasci dispenset in corpore... Ego vero cum haec singula legerim (Deo teste dico) quia usque ad praesens certi et definiti aliquid de hac quaestione non teneo; sed Deo relinquo scire quid sit in utero, et si cui ipse revelare dignabitur. De hoc etiam videas Eusebium Praeparat. Evang. lib. xiii, c. 10; et Cassiodorum, de Anima, cap. 9.

"And that souls are born." Lactantius seems in this place to disagree with himself. For above, book 2, chapter 12, near the end, he teaches that God pours into the body the soul by which we breathe; but here he teaches that souls are born. But on this matter St Jerome should be consulted, book 2 of the Apology against Rufinus, whose words are these: "I have read," says Jerome, "some who say that souls too are propagated together with the body, through the transmission of the human body; and they confirmed this with what assertions they could. I think that among the Latins Tertullian held this, and perhaps Lactantius, and some others. Others assert that when bodies have been formed in the womb, God makes souls daily and pours them in. Others, that they were made long ago, that is, when God created all things from nothing, and that he now dispenses them by his judgement to be born in a body ... But having read each of these, I say (God is my witness) that up to the present I hold nothing certain and defined on this question; but I leave it to God to know what is in the womb, and to anyone to whom He Himself shall deign to reveal it." On this see also Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica book 13, chapter 10; and Cassiodorus, On the Soul, chapter 9.

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(6) ‹anchor: Quae ratio esset hominis, nescierunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quae ratio esset hominis, nescierunt. Sic est legendum ex mss. vet. 1 Bonon., 2 Reg. ut judicat Thomasius; non homines, ut vulgo est in impressis ac aliis mss. non enim de hominibus in genere quid illi noverint, sed de Pythagoricis ac Stoicis, quos dicit hominis rationem ignorasse. Gallaeus. — Ita fere lib. vii, cap. 3 et cap. 5 Divin. Institut.

"They did not know what the nature of man was." So it is to be read from the old manuscripts, 1 Bologna and 2 Royal, as Thomasius judges; not "homines", as is commonly in the printed editions and other manuscripts. For [he speaks] not of what men in general knew, but of the Pythagoreans and Stoics, whom he says were ignorant of the nature of man. Gallaeus. — So too, roughly, Divine Institutes book 7, chapter 3 and chapter 5.

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(7) ‹anchor: Ut Cleanthes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut Cleanthes. Philosophus Stoicus, qui φρεάντλης dictus, quod noctu in hortis hauriret aquas, unde se alere posset, ut interdiu philosophari liceret: is sponte inedia vitam finivit, ut Laertius libro septimo in ejus Vita refert. Meminit Lucianus in Macrobiis. Betuleius.

"As Cleanthes." A Stoic philosopher, called "the well-drawer" because at night he drew water in gardens to support himself, so that he could do philosophy by day. He ended his life of his own will by starvation, as Laertius reports in book 7, in his Life. Lucian mentions him in the Macrobii. Betuleius.

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(8) ‹anchor: Ut Chrysippus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut Chrysippus. Zenonis discipulus, et post Cleanthem sectae Stoicorum princeps fuit. Duae sunt de hujus obitu apud Laertium sententiae: una, quod largiore dulcis meri haustu, altera, quod risu nimio emortuus sit. Seneca epist. 57 memorat, quod assidua salutatio ipsum perduxerit ad mortem. Betul.

"As Chrysippus." A disciple of Zeno, and after Cleanthes head of the Stoic school. There are two accounts of his death in Laertius: one, that he died from too large a draught of sweet unmixed wine; the other, from excessive laughter. Seneca, letter 57, records that constant receiving of callers brought him to his death. Betuleius.

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(9) ‹anchor: Ut Zeno› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut Zeno. Citticus, sectae Stoicae princeps. De hujus interitu Laert. sic scribit: Cum abiret a schola, offendit, digitumque perfregit. Manu vero terram feriens, dixit illud ex Niobe: Ἔρχομαι, τί μ' ἀύεις; Venio, quid me clamas? In ed. Laertii Parisiensi an. 1585 legitur Ἔρχομαι, τί με καλεῖς; Venio, quid me vocas? continuoque se strangulans interiit. Betuleius.

"As Zeno." Of Citium, founder of the Stoic school. Of his death Laertius writes thus: "As he was leaving the school he stumbled and broke a finger. Striking the earth with his hand, he spoke that line from the Niobe: 'I come; why do you cry out for me?'" In the Paris edition of Laertius of 1585 is read "I come; why do you call me?" "And at once he strangled himself and died." Betuleius.

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(10) ‹anchor: Ut Empedocles› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut Empedocles. Philosophus et poeta. Variae de hujus obitu referuntur a Laertio opiniones: haec tamen constantior fama obtinuit, quae a Strabone quoque refertur lib. vi. Apud Lucianum, in dialogo Menippi et Aeaci, quaerit ex ipso Menippus causas praecipitationis; respondet Empedocles: Μελαγχολία τις, ὦ Μένιππε. Menippus factum in fastum, atque in inanis gloriae affectationem transfert. Notatur etiam in Icaromenippo. Tertullianus, in libro ad Martyres, pro exemplo contemnendae mortis adducit. Meminit etiam Tatianus adversus Gentes, et Greg. Nazianzenus in egregio ad Nemesium carmine. / Ἐμπεδόκλεις, etc., quae sic latine reddas: / Empedocles, fastu tumidum te valde superbo / Aetnaei monstrant crateres morte caducum. / Sandalia en jactant amentis numinis aestus / Aerea. Ridendum mortalibus illa dederunt, / Quem grave in exitium te Gloria pellit inanis.

"As Empedocles." Philosopher and poet. Laertius reports various opinions about his death; but the more consistent report has prevailed, which Strabo also gives in book 6. In Lucian, in the dialogue of Menippus and Aeacus, Menippus asks him the reasons for his leap; Empedocles answers: "A fit of melancholy, Menippus." Menippus turns the deed into pride and the affectation of empty glory. He is noted also in the Icaromenippus. Tertullian, in the book To the Martyrs, adduces him as an example of contempt for death. Tatian also mentions him, Against the Greeks, and Gregory Nazianzen in his fine poem to Nemesius: "Empedocles," etc., which you may render in Latin thus: "Empedocles, swollen with overweening pride, the craters of Etna show you fallen in death. See, the fires of the mad would-be god toss up the bronze sandals. They have given mortals a thing to laugh at: into what grievous ruin empty Glory drives you!"

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(11) ‹anchor: Socraticae vanitatis imitator› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Socraticae vanitatis imitator. Sic restituo ex omnibus mss. et editis, praeter Betul., Spark. et Gall., qui contra cunctorum mss. fidem reposuerant Stoicae, quia revera Stoicus erat Cato. At nihil obstat quin (continues)

"Imitator of Socratic vanity." So I restore it from all the manuscripts and printed editions, except Betuleius, Spark and Gallaeus, who against the testimony of all the manuscripts had put "Stoicae", because Cato was in fact a Stoic. But nothing prevents (continues)

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Editors' prose

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  • marginal letters: A ‹lam esse humanam societatem›; B ‹tiunt, non possum tamen non›; C ‹petuam dixerit, et ad diversa› (in the Variorum notae); D ‹risaei, teste Josepho› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
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PL 6:406
Nam cum timerent argumentum illud, quo colligitur necesse esse, ut occidant animae cum corporibus, quia cum corporibus nascuntur, dixerunt non nasci animas, sed insinuari potius in corpora, et de aliis in alia migrare. Non putaverunt aliter fieri posse, ut supersint animae post corpora, nisi videantur fuisse ante corpora. Par igitur, ac prope similis error est partis utriusque. Sed haec in praeterito falsa est, illa in futuro. Nemo enim vidit, quod est verissimum, et nasci animas, et non occidere; quia, cur id fieret, aut quae ratio esset hominis, nescierunt. Multi ergo ex iis, quia aeternas esse animas suspicabantur, tamquam in coelum migraturi essent, sibi ipsis manus intulerunt: ut Cleanthes, ut Chrysippus; ut Zeno, ut Empedocles, qui se in ardentis Aetnae specum intempesta nocte dejecit, ut, cum repente non apparuisset, abiisse ad deos crederetur; et ex Romanis Cato, qui fuit in omni sua vita Socraticae vanitatis imitator.
For since they feared that argument by which it is inferred that souls must perish together with bodies, because they are born together with bodies, they said that souls are not born, but rather are introduced into bodies, and migrate from some into others. They did not think it could come about in any other way that souls should survive after bodies, unless they should be seen to have existed before bodies. Equal, therefore, and nearly alike is the error of each party. But this one is false with regard to the past, that one with regard to the future. For no one saw what is most true, both that souls are born and that they do not perish; because they did not know why this should happen, or what the purpose of man was. Many of them, therefore, because they supposed souls to be eternal, laid hands on themselves, as though they were about to migrate to heaven: as Cleanthes, as Chrysippus; as Zeno, as Empedocles, who threw himself into the cavern of burning Etna in the dead of night, so that, since he had suddenly disappeared, he might be believed to have departed to the gods; and of the Romans Cato, who was throughout his whole life an imitator of Socratic vanity.
Editors' notes and page, col. 406

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  • running head: [DE] FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 406 (left edge cut off in the image)
  • marginal letters: A runt. Nam cum timerent; B pesta nocte dejecit (between the Empedocles and pesta lines); C Ut Chrysippus. Zenonis discipulus (in the notes); D refertur lib. VI. Apud Lucianum (in the notes)
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PL 6:407
Nam Democritus in alia fuit persuasione. Sed tamen
For Democritus was of another persuasion. But nevertheless
Sponte sua letho caput obvius obtulit ipse,
Of his own accord he himself went to meet death and offered up his head,
quo nihil sceleratius fieri potest. Nam si homicida nefarius est, quia hominis extinctor est, eidem sceleri obstrictus est, qui se necat, quia hominem necat. Imo vero majus esse id facinus existimandum est, cujus ultio Deo soli subjacet. Nam sicut in hanc vitam non nostra sponte venimus, ita rursus ex hoc domicilio corporis, quod tuendum nobis assignatum est, ejusdem jussu recedendum est, qui nos in hoc corpus induxit, tamdiu habituros, donec jubeat emitti; et si vis aliqua inferatur, aequa mente id patiendum est, cum extincta innocentis anima inulta esse non possit, habeamusque judicem magnum, cui soli vindicta in integro semper est.
than which nothing more criminal can be done. For if a murderer is wicked because he is the destroyer of a man, he who kills himself is bound by the same crime, because he kills a man. Indeed, that deed must rather be judged the greater, since its punishment lies with God alone. For just as we did not come into this life of our own accord, so in turn we must withdraw from this dwelling of the body, which has been assigned to us to guard, at the command of the same One Who led us into this body to keep it so long, until He bids us be sent forth; and if some violence is inflicted on us, it must be borne with an even mind, since the soul of an innocent person, once extinguished, cannot remain unavenged, and we have a great Judge, with Whom alone vengeance always remains entire.
Homicidae igitur illi omnes philosophi, et ipse romanae
Therefore all those philosophers are murderers, and the very prince of Roman
Editors' notes and page, col. 407

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Socraticae vanitatis imitator (p. 206)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) Cato, etsi Stoicus, a Lactantio potuerit dici Socraticae vanitatis imitator, quandoquidem ille Socratem imitatus, non sine magno fastu mortem aspernatus est; et cum se occideret, librum perlegerit Platonis de animarum Aeternitate, ubi scilicet Socratis mors describitur. Nonne autem id sufficit, ut Socraticae vanitatis imitator diceretur? Nourry. De Catonis morte vide Plutarchum, tom. ii; et Augustinum, lib. i de Civit. Dei, cap. 23. — Stoicae vanitatis imitator. Reclamantibus licet mss. et edd. ab 1465 ad 1650 editis, recepi Stoicae, pro Socraticae, adductus maxime his: Cato, ut Stoicorum decretis obtemperaret, quos sectatur. Conf. Plutarch. in Catone Minori, fol. 792, sqq. Devenit (Cato) ad Stoicorum paradoxa. Bun.

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(2) ‹anchor: Nam Democritus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nam Democritus. Laetitiam hic optimum dixit, tristitiam pessimum, alienissimus a Stoica severitate. Lucretii locum, unde hic versus desumptus est, integrum adscribemus: / Denique Democritum postquam natura, vetustas / Admonuit, memores motus languescere mentis, / Sponte sua letho caput obvius obtulit ultro. / Sed apud Laertium diversum legitur; nempe quod panes calidos naribus admovendo, tribus diebus fata impleverit. Sed intelligendum est ipsum antehac mori per inediam decrevisse. Itaque de mortis ejus genere variant auctores: quippe quod Lucianus eum interiisse affirmet τῆς τροφῆς ἀποσχόμενον, quod etiam tradit Laertius; Athenaeus, melle tantisper vitam sustentasse, dum praeterierint θεσμοφορίων festa, ne privato luctu publica interpellarentur gaudia. Ab omnibus diversus Antoninus pediculis consumptum refert. Ex Betuleio (lib. iii, § 3.)

"For Democritus." He called gladness the highest good and sadness the worst, very far from Stoic severity. We shall write out in full the passage of Lucretius from which this line is taken: "Then Democritus, when ripe old age warned him that the remembering motions of his mind were growing faint, of his own accord went to meet death and offered it his head." But in Laertius a different account is read: that by putting hot loaves to his nostrils he fulfilled his fate over three days. But it is to be understood that he had previously resolved to die by starvation. So the authors differ on the manner of his death: Lucian affirms that he died "abstaining from food", which Laertius also reports; Athenaeus, that he sustained his life with honey for a while until the festival of the Thesmophoria had passed, so that the public rejoicing should not be interrupted by private mourning. Differing from all, Antoninus reports that he was consumed by lice. From Betuleius (book 3, § 3).

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(3) ‹anchor: Sponte sua› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sponte sua. Apud Lucretium, lib. iii de Natura rerum, in fine. Variant tamen auctores de mortis genere, ut dixi: vel per cibi abstinentiam, vel ex vermibus aut pediculis consumptum referunt antiquiores.

"Of his own accord." In Lucretius, On the Nature of Things book 3, at the end. But the authors differ on the manner of death, as I said: the older writers report that he was consumed either through abstinence from food, or by worms or lice.

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(4) ‹anchor: Sicut in hanc vitam, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sicut in hanc vitam, etc. Sequitur Ciceronem in Catone Maj., c. 20; et in Somnio Scipion. apud Macrobium, lib. i, cap. 23. Bun.

"As into this life," etc. He follows Cicero in the Cato Maior, chapter 20, and in the Dream of Scipio in Macrobius, book 1, chapter 23. Bünemann.

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(5) ‹anchor: Ita rursus ex hoc domicilio corporis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ita rursus ex hoc domicilio corporis. Cicero in Catone majore haec ad Pythagoram refert: Vetat, inquit, Pythagoras injussu imperatoris, id est Dei, de praesidio et statione vitae decedere. Et in fragmento de Repub. Scipio Nepoti loquens sic ait: Quare et tibi, Pub. et piis omnibus retinendus est animus in custodia corporis; nec injussu ejus a quo ille est nobis datus, ex hominum vita migrandum est, ne munus humanum assignatum a Deo defugisse videamini. Apparent ex Platone desumpta esse. Betuleius. — Qua de re vide Platonem in Phaedone.

"So again from this dwelling of the body." Cicero in the Cato Maior refers this to Pythagoras: "Pythagoras forbids," he says, "to leave the guard-post and station of life without the command of the general, that is, of God." And in the fragment of the Republic Scipio, speaking to his grandson, says: "Wherefore you too, Publius, and all the devout must keep the soul in the custody of the body; and one must not depart from the life of men without the command of him by whom it was given us, lest you seem to have shirked the human duty assigned by God." They appear to be taken from Plato. Betuleius. — On this see Plato in the Phaedo.

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(6) ‹anchor: Patiendum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Patiendum. Sic restitui ex vet. sex editis et omnibus mss., praeter Marm. in quo a prima manu scriptum est, ut in plerisque vulgatis.

"Must be endured." So I have restored it from six old editions and all the manuscripts, except the Marm., in which the first hand wrote as most of the common editions have it.

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(7) ‹anchor: Extincta innocentis anima› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Extincta innocentis anima. Id est, vita, f. extinctus innocens inultus. Noto ad lib. vi, c. 11, 20; lib. vii, c. 11. Terent. in Adelp. iii, 2: Seni animam extinguerem. Bun.

"The extinguished soul of the innocent." That is, the life; perhaps [read] "extinctus innocens inultus". I note it at book 6, chapters 11 and 20; book 7, chapter 11. Terence in the Adelphoe III, 2: "that I might extinguish the old man's soul." Bünemann.

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(8) ‹anchor: Judicem magnum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Judicem magnum. Ita reposui ex cunctis mss. et edit. vet. rom. ac Cellar. quidquid dicat Walchius; quasi vindicta ad Judicem magnum non pertineat. In 13 impressis legitur vindicem magnum.

"The great Judge." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts and the old Rome edition and Cellarius, whatever Walch may say, as though vengeance did not belong to the great Judge. In 13 printed editions is read "vindicem magnum" ("the great avenger").

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(9) ‹anchor: Vindicta in integro semper est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vindicta in integro semper est. Sic cum tribus editis omnes pene mss. Et sic Lactantius in totum, in integro; et nos Galli etiam dicimus, en tout, en son entier. Sex mss. rec. et 10 typis excusi habent vindicta integra. — In integro. Sic solet noster, ut, lib. i, c. 11: Illud in vero est; ibid., cap. 17: Quid sit in vero, l. v, c. 1: Cujus rei causa in aperto est. Sic in Cicerone lib. iii Orat., cap. 4: Sed quoniam haec jam neque in integro nobis esse possunt, quidam integra subornarant. Bun.

"Vengeance is always intact." So almost all the manuscripts, with three printed editions. And so Lactantius says "in totum", "in integro"; and we French also say "en tout, en son entier". Six recent manuscripts and 10 printed editions have "vindicta integra". — "In integro." So our author is wont, as in book 1, chapter 11: "That is in truth"; ibid., chapter 17: "What may be in truth"; book 5, chapter 1: "The cause of which is in the open." So in Cicero, On the Orator book 3, chapter 4: "But since these things can no longer be untouched for us," some had substituted "integra". Bünemann.

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(10) ‹anchor: Et ipse Romanae sapientiae princeps, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et ipse Romanae sapientiae princeps, etc. Ut cujus consilium oraculum sit habitum, teste Plutarcho, qui in ejus Vita easdem causas spontaneae necis assignat. Cicero, Officiorum i, de decoro personarum loquens, dicit hoc Catonis gravitatem decuisse maxime: caeteros, qui in eadem causa fuerunt, minime. Nos Augustinum rectius audiemus, qui voluntariae necis jus omne hominibus aufert. Is lib. i de Civit. Dei, c. 23, hoc exemplum examinans, causas non Platonis lectionem credit, sed quod turpe duxerit, in Caesaris victoris manus venire, atque hoc facinus imbecillioris, quam fortioris animi factum esse. In hoc etiam Josephus invehitur, libro Excidii Hierosolymitani iii, cap. 21. Jure civili non lugebantur, nec cognati eos in pollinctura nominabant, qui manus sibi mala conscientia injecerant. l. Liberorum, § Non solent. ff. de iis qui infam. not. Sed stulte, quod non etiam illos qui taedio vitae. Betul.

"And the very chief of Roman wisdom," etc. As one whose counsel was held an oracle, as Plutarch attests, who in his Life assigns the same reasons for his voluntary death. Cicero, On Duties 1, speaking of what befits different persons, says that this befitted Cato's gravity above all, but not at all the others who were in the same case. We shall more rightly listen to Augustine, who takes from men every right to a voluntary death. In City of God book 1, chapter 23, examining this example, he believes the reason was not his reading of Plato, but that he thought it shameful to fall into the hands of Caesar the victor, and that this deed was the act of a weaker rather than a braver spirit. Josephus too inveighs against this, in book 3 of the Destruction of Jerusalem, chapter 21. By civil law those who had laid hands on themselves from a bad conscience were not mourned, nor did their kinsmen name them at the laying-out of the body: the law "Liberorum", § "Non solent", Digest, "on those who are branded with infamy". But foolishly, in that [it did] not [include] also those [who did so] from weariness of life. Betuleius.

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(11) ‹anchor: Platonis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Platonis. Liber iste est Phaedon.

"Of Plato." That book is the Phaedo.

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(12) ‹anchor: Philosophi auctoritate compulsus est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Philosophi auctoritate compulsus est. Plato hoc non docuit; ex initio Phaedonis contrarium patet: non itaque philosophi auctoritate, sed suimet insania, philosophi mentem non percipiens, ad illud facinus fuit compulsus. Isaeus.

"He was driven by the philosopher's authority." Plato did not teach this; the contrary is plain from the beginning of the Phaedo. So it was not by the philosopher's authority but by his own madness, failing to grasp the philosopher's meaning, that he was driven to that deed. Isaeus.

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(13) ‹anchor: Ambraciotes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ambraciotes. Is est Cleombrotus adolescens, Ambraciae urbe Graeca in Epiro natus, qui se praecipitem dedit in mare. — Quid Ambraciotes ille. Cleombrotus est, quem supra nominavit. De eo Cicero Tusc. 1, c. 34: Callimachi epigramma in Ambraciotam Cleombrotum est, quem ait, quum nihil ei accidisset adversi, e muro se in mare abjecisse, lecto Platonis libro. (continues)

"The Ambraciot." He is the young Cleombrotus, born at Ambracia, a Greek city in Epirus, who threw himself headlong into the sea. — "What of that Ambraciot?" It is Cleombrotus, whom he named above. On him Cicero, Tusculans 1, chapter 34: "There is an epigram of Callimachus on Cleombrotus of Ambracia, who, he says, though nothing adverse had befallen him, threw himself from a wall into the sea after reading Plato's book." (continues)

(printed under page 207)

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  • running head: 407 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A Nam Democritus in alia fuit persuasione; B Homicidae igitur illi omnes philosophi; C beside the foot note Devenit (Cato) ad Stoicorum paradoxa (in the Variorum Notae, not set); D beside the foot note Sponte sua. Apud Lucretium (in the Variorum Notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
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  • other: the word romanae was split at the column break and stands whole here (joined on receipt); check that the English reads whole across the break into col 408
  • other (Q1b): the English still splits the word across the break ("the very Ro-" here, "[Ro]man wisdom's" in col 408). To mend, end this column's English "the very Roman" and begin col 408's "wisdom's foremost man"; the two files must change together, so neither was changed in this pass.
  • other (Q1b): in note 13 the chapter number of "Tusc. 1, c. 34" is faint (it could be read as 31); 34 is set, which is the correct reference.
PL 6:408
sapientiae princeps Cato, qui antequam se occideret, perlegisse Platonis librum dicitur, qui est scriptus de aeternitate animarum, et ad summum nefas philosophi auctoritate compulsus est; et hic tamen aliquam moriendi causam videtur habuisse, odium servitutis. Quid Ambraciotes ille, qui, cum eumdum librum perlegisset praecipitem se dedit, nullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod Platoni credidit? Execrabilis prorsus ac fugienda doctrina, si abigit homines a vita. Quod si scisset Plato, atque docuisset, a quo, et quomodo, et quibus, et quae ob facta, et quo tempore immortalitas tribuatur, nec Cleombrotum impegisset in mortem voluntariam, nec Catonem, sed eos ad vitam et justitiam potius erudisset. Nam Cato videtur mihi causam quaesisse moriendi, non tam ut Caesarem fugeret, quam ut Stoicorum decretis obtemperaret, quos sectabatur, nomenque suum grandi aliquo facinore
wisdom, Cato, who before he killed himself is said to have read through the book of Plato that is written on the eternity of souls, and was driven to the supreme wickedness by the authority of the philosopher; and yet this man seems to have had some reason for dying, hatred of servitude. What of that Ambraciot, who, when he had read through the same book, threw himself headlong for no other reason than that he believed Plato? Utterly execrable and to be shunned is a doctrine, if it drives men away from life. But if Plato had known and taught by whom, and how, and to whom, and for what deeds, and at what time immortality is granted, he would neither have driven Cleombrotus into a voluntary death, nor Cato, but would rather have trained them for life and justice. For Cato seems to me to have sought a reason for dying not so much in order to escape Caesar as to obey the decrees of the Stoics, whom he followed, and to make his name illustrious by some great
Editors' notes and page, col. 408

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  • marginal letters: A manae sapientiae princeps Cato; B fugeret, quam ut Stoicorum; C gro; et nos Galli etiam dicimus (in the notes); D invehitur, libro Excidii (in the notes)
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  • other: the word facinore was split at the column break and stands whole here (joined on receipt); check that the English reads whole across the break into col 409
PL 6:409
clarificaret: cui quid mali accidere potuerit, si viveret, non invenio. Caius enim Caesar, ut clemens erat, nihil aliud efficere volebat, etiam in ipso belli civilis ardore, quam ut bene mereri de Republica videretur, duobus optimis civibus Cicerone et Catone servatis. Sed redeamus ad eos qui mortem pro bono laudant. De vita quereris, quasi vixeris, aut umquam tibi ratio constiterit, cur omnino sis natus. Nonne igitur tibi verus ille et communis omnium pater Terentianum illud (Vid. Ter. Heautontimor., act. V, sc. 2) jure increpaverit:
deed: what evil could have befallen him if he had lived, I do not find. For Gaius Caesar, merciful as he was, wished to bring about nothing else, even in the very heat of the civil war, than that he should be seen to deserve well of the Republic, with the two best citizens, Cicero and Cato, preserved. But let us return to those who praise death as a good. You complain about life, as if you had lived, or as if it had ever been clear to you why you were born at all. Would not, then, that true and common Father of all justly rebuke you with that saying of Terence (see Ter. Heautontimorumenos, act 5, sc. 2):
Prius disce, quid sit vivere;
First learn what it is to live;
Si displicebit vita, tum isthoc utitor.
if life displeases you, then make use of that.
Indigaris te malis esse subjectum: quasi quidquam merearis boni, qui patrem, qui dominum, qui regem tuum nescis; qui quamvis clarissimam lucem intuearis oculis, mente tamen caecus es, et in profundis ignorantiae tenebris jaces. Quae ignorantia effecit, ut quosdam dicere non puderet, idcirco nos esse natos, ut scelerum poenas lueremus: quo quid delirius dici possit, non video. Ubi enim, vel quae scelera potuimus admittere, qui omnino non fuimus? Nisi forte credemus inepto illi seni, qui se in priori vita Euphorbum fuisse mentitus est. Hic, credo, quod erat ignobili genere natus, familiam sibi ex Homeri carminibus adoptavit. O miram et singularem Pythagorae memoriam! O miseram oblivionem nostrum omnium, qui nesciamus, qui ante fuerimus! Sed fortasse, vel errore aliquo, vel gratia sit effectum, ut ille solus lethaeum gurgitem non attigerit, nec oblivionis aquam gustaverit: videlicet senex vanus (sicut otiosae aniculae solent) fabulas tamquam
You are indignant that you are subject to evils: as if you deserved anything good, you who do not know your Father, your Lord, your King; you who, although you look upon the brightest light with your eyes, are nevertheless blind in mind and lie in the deep darkness of ignorance. This ignorance brought it about that certain men were not ashamed to say that we were born for this reason, that we might pay the penalties of crimes: and I do not see what could be said more insane than this. For where, or what crimes, could we have committed, who did not exist at all? Unless perhaps we are to believe that foolish old man who falsely claimed that in a former life he had been Euphorbus. He, I suppose, because he was born of an obscure family, adopted for himself a family out of the poems of Homer. O wonderful and singular memory of Pythagoras! O wretched forgetfulness of all of us, who do not know who we were before! But perhaps it came about, either by some error or by favour, that he alone did not touch the Lethaean flood, nor taste the water of forgetfulness: evidently the vain old man (as idle old women are wont to do) tales as though
Editors' notes and page, col. 409

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 1 continues p. 207's "Ambraciotes" note. Note 6 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. --> (printed under page 208)

(1) ‹anchor: Ambraciotes (p. 207)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) Epigramma est 24, edit. Th. Graevii, 28 Annae Tanaquilli. Cell.

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(2) ‹anchor: Clarificaret› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Clarificaret. Ecclesiastica vox, qua usi sunt Auctor Vulgatae Versionis passim in novo Testamento, Sedulius, aliique.

"Would glorify." A Church word, used by the author of the Vulgate version throughout the New Testament, by Sedulius, and others.

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(3) ‹anchor: Clemens erat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Clemens erat. De Caesaris clementia lege Plutarchum, Suetonium, Paterculum et alios historicos; sed praecipue Ciceronem in orationibus pro Marcello et pro Ligario.

"He was merciful." On Caesar's clemency read Plutarch, Suetonius, Paterculus and other historians; but especially Cicero in the speeches for Marcellus and for Ligarius.

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(4) ‹anchor: Video› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Video. Sic repono ex edit. Tornes., Soubr., Walch. cunctisque mss. praeter 2 Reg. rec. in quibus est, ut et in editis, invenio.

"I see." So I restore it from the editions of Tornesius, Soubron and Walch and all the manuscripts except 2 recent Royal, in which, as in the printed editions, it is "invenio" ("I find").

(printed under page 208)

(5) ‹anchor: Inepto illi seni› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Inepto illi seni. Pythagorae scilicet, de quo Laertius, Philostrat. lib. viii de Vita Apollon.; Gell. quarto, cap. 11. Atque hic observa, quomodo irrideat dogma de animabus ante corpora conditis, quod ipsi Lactantio quidam affinxerunt. Isaeus.—Euphorbus igitur ille, quem se fuisse olim mentiebatur Pythagoras, fuit nobilis Trojanus a Menelao in Trojano bello occisus.

"That foolish old man." Pythagoras, namely, on whom see Laertius; Philostratus, Life of Apollonius book 8; Gellius book 4, chapter 11. And note here how he mocks the doctrine of souls created before bodies, which some have ascribed to Lactantius himself. Isaeus. — That Euphorbus, then, whom Pythagoras falsely claimed to have once been, was a Trojan noble killed by Menelaus in the Trojan war.

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(6) ‹anchor: Qui se in priori vita, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui se in priori vita, etc. Altera pars hujus confutationis continet παλιγγενεσίαν, sive μετεμψύχωσιν Pythagoricam: de qua ex Gentilibus nemo copiosius Ovidio lib. xv. Metamorph. Post Laertium vero lege Gellium lib. iv cap. 11; Philostratum lib. viii de Vita Apollonii. Exploditur dignis modis a Luciano, cum alibi, tum etiam in Gallo. Ex ecclesiasticis scriptoribus notant Tertull. in Apolog. cap. 46, Tatianus adversus Gentes; Orig. lib. i contra Celsum, atque rursus noster Lactantius lib. vii, cap. 23; Hieronymus lib. ii adversus Jovin. et in Apologia adversus Ruffinum; Augustinus de Trinitate lib. xii. Chrysost. homilia quadam in xii caput Joannis; Cyrillus contra Julianum, lib. vii. Betuleius.

"Who [said] that in a former life he," etc. The second part of this refutation deals with the Pythagorean rebirth, or transmigration: on which no pagan writes more fully than Ovid, Metamorphoses book 15. After Laertius, read Gellius book 4, chapter 11; Philostratus, Life of Apollonius book 8. It is hissed off the stage in fitting fashion by Lucian, elsewhere and also in the Cock. Among Church writers it is censured by Tertullian, Apology chapter 46; Tatian, Against the Greeks; Origen, Against Celsus book 1; and again our Lactantius, book 7, chapter 23; Jerome, book 2 Against Jovinian and in the Apology against Rufinus; Augustine, On the Trinity book 12; Chrysostom in a homily on chapter 12 of John; Cyril, Against Julian, book 7. Betuleius.

(printed under page 208)

(7) ‹anchor: Euphorbum fuisse› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Euphorbum fuisse. Euphorbus Trojanus a Menelao interfectus. Cell.

"That he had been Euphorbus." Euphorbus, a Trojan killed by Menelaus. Cellarius.

(printed under page 208)

(8) ‹anchor: Singularem Pythagorae memoriam› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Singularem Pythagorae memoriam. Ipse de se apud Ovidium, Metam. xv, v. 160: / Isne ego (nam memini) Trojani tempore belli. / Panthoides Euphorbus eram; cui pectore quondam / Sedit in adverso gravis hasta minoris Atridae. / Cell.

"The remarkable memory of Pythagoras." He says of himself in Ovid, Metamorphoses 15, line 160: "I myself (for I remember) in the time of the Trojan war was Euphorbus, son of Panthous, in whose breast once the heavy spear of the younger son of Atreus lodged." [Isne, as printed, for Ipse.] Cellarius.

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(9) ‹anchor: Qui vitam non esse poenam putet› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui vitam non esse poenam putet. Haec lectio permultorum mss. est, editorum quatuor. Scripti 7 addunt malis; quinque exhibent malis plenam, ut et vulgati sex.

"Who would think life is not a punishment." This is the reading of very many manuscripts and of four printed editions. Seven manuscripts add "malis" ("for the wicked"); five give "malis plenam" ("full of evils"), as do six common editions.

(printed under page 208)

(10) ‹anchor: Praefatus est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Praefatus est. Ita veterrimi mss. 1 Bonon., 3 Reg., Lips., Pal., 1 Colbert. a secunda manu. In 15 rec. et in excusis legitur profatus; in 4 scriptis rec. professus est. Praefatus est, id est, supra dixit.

"He said beforehand." So the oldest manuscripts: 1 Bologna, 3 Royal, Leipzig, Palatine, and 1 Colbert in a second hand. In 15 recent ones and in the printed editions "profatus" ("spoke out") is read; in 4 recent manuscripts, "professus est" ("professed"). "Praefatus est", that is, "he said above".

(printed under page 208)

(11) ‹anchor: Gratulemur, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Gratulemur, etc. Haec non leguntur apud Ciceronem in libris de Legibus; leguntur equidem, sed non iisdem verbis, in i Tusculanar. quaestion. sub initium.

"Let us rejoice," etc. These words are not read in Cicero's books On the Laws; they are indeed read, but not in the same words, in Tusculan Disputations 1, near the beginning.

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(12) ‹anchor: Sensu carente› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sensu carente. Mss. 1 Bonon. antiq. et Cotton. habent sensu pereunte. Apud Ciceronem et in 5 editis, necnon et 1 Reg. rec. est sensu carenti.

"When it lacks sense." The manuscripts 1 old Bologna and the Cotton have "sensu pereunte" ("when sense perishes"). In Cicero and in 5 printed editions, and also in 1 recent Royal, it is "sensu carenti".

(printed under page 208)

(13) ‹anchor: Ut sibi videbatur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut sibi videbatur. Refertur ad Ciceronem qui praecessit, et mox sequitur. Mss. tres addunt, locutus est. In 7 mss. et in totidem editis est videtur; in 8 scriptis, videntur.

"As it seemed to him." It refers to Cicero, who went before and follows shortly. Three manuscripts add "locutus est" ("he spoke"). In 7 manuscripts and as many printed editions it is "videtur"; in 8 manuscripts, "videntur".

(printed under page 208)

(14) ‹anchor: Litterae› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Litterae. Scilicet. Daniel. xii, Matth. III, xiii, xxv, Joan. XII, l.

"The Scriptures." Namely Daniel 12; Matthew 3, 13, 25; John 12, [verse] 50 [l., as printed].

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(15) ‹anchor: Ut idem Tullius› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut idem Tullius. Hanc ultimam vocem addidi ex 13 excusis, et ex omnibus mss. praeter 1 Reg. rec. cui est Cicero: abest autem a tribus rec (Vide infra).

"As the same Tullius." I have added this last word from 13 printed editions and from all the manuscripts except 1 recent Royal, which has "Cicero"; but it is absent from three recent ones (see below).

(printed under page 208)

Page

  • running head: 409 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIEN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A nore clarificaret; B gem tuum nescis; C vanus ( sicut otiosae
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with "nore", the rest of a word (presumably honore) broken from the previous column; column ends with "tam-" hyphenated across the column break (tamquam); the two Terence verse lines are set as two lines as printed; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" stands above the foot apparatus, cut off at the right edge, not set; Variorum Notae at the page foot not set (later pass); "[told]" in the last English sentence is a supplement for the verb carried into the next column; "nihil" in line 3 looks like "nibil" in the worn type, taken as nihil
PL 6:410
infantibus credulis finxit. Quod si bene sensisset de iis, quibus haec locutus est, si homines eos existimasset, nunquam sibi tam petulanter mentiendi licentiam vindicasset. Sed deridenda est hominis levissimi vanitas. Quid Ciceroni faciemus? qui cum in principio Consolationis suae dixisset, luendorum scelerum causa nasci homines, iteravit id ipsum postea, quasi objurgans eum, qui vitam non esse poenam putet. Recte ergo praefatus est, errore, ac miserabili veritatis ignorantia se teneri.
for credulous infants made up. But if he had thought well of those to whom he said these things, if he had considered them men, he would never have claimed for himself so wanton a licence for lying. But the vanity of a most frivolous man is to be laughed at. What shall we do with Cicero? who, after saying at the beginning of his Consolation that men are born to atone for crimes, repeated that very thing afterwards, as if rebuking anyone who should think that life is not a punishment. Rightly, then, did he state beforehand that he was held fast by error and by a wretched ignorance of the truth.
CAPUT XIX.
Chapter XIX.
Cicero et alii sapientissimi animarum immortalitatem, sed infideliter docent; et quod bona vel mala mors ex ante acta vita sit ponderanda.
Cicero and other very wise men teach the immortality of souls, but without faith; and that death, whether good or bad, is to be weighed by the life previously lived.
At illi, qui de mortis bono disputant quia nihil veri sciunt, sic argumentantur: Si nihil est post mortem, non est malum mors; aufert enim sensum mali. Si autem supersunt animae, est etiam bonum, quia immortalitas sequitur. Quam sententiam Cicero de Legibus sic explicavit: « Gratulemurque nobis, quoniam mors aut meliorem, quam qui est in vita, aut certe non deteriorem allatura est statum. Nam sine corpore animo vigente, divina vita est; sensu carente, nihil profecto est mali. » Argute, ut sibi videbatur, quasi nihil esse aliud possit. Atqui utrumque hoc falsum est. Docent enim divinae Litterae, non extingui animas: sed aut pro justitia praemio affici, aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna. Nec enim fas aut eum qui sceleratus in vita feliciter fuerit, effugere quod meretur; aut eum, qui ob justitiam miserrimus fuerit, sua mercede fraudari. Quod adeo verum est,
But those who argue about the good of death, because they know nothing of the truth, reason thus: If there is nothing after death, death is not an evil, for it takes away the sense of evil. But if souls survive, it is even a good, because immortality follows. This opinion Cicero set out in the De Legibus thus: «And let us congratulate ourselves, since death will bring either a better state than that which is in life, or at any rate not a worse one. For if the mind is vigorous without the body, the life is divine; if it is without sensation, there is surely nothing evil.» Cleverly, as it seemed to him, as if nothing else could be. And yet both of these are false. For the divine Scriptures teach that souls are not extinguished, but are either rewarded for justice or [visited with] everlasting punishment for crimes. For it is not right either that he who has been wicked and lived prosperously in life should escape what he deserves, or that he who has been most wretched on account of justice should be cheated of his reward. This is so true,
Editors' notes and page, col. 410

Page

  • running head: FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 410 (start of head cut off at image edge)
  • marginal letters: A quam infantibus credulis finxit; B At illi, qui de mortis bono; C fuerit, sua mercede fraudari
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with "quam", the second half of "tam-quam" split from the foot of the previous column; "allatura cst" printed with damaged e, set as est; CAPUT XIX heading and italic summary (Cicero et alii sapientissimi) set on own lines; VARIORUM NOTAE at page foot (contra Julianum...; Euphorbum fuisse...) not set, for later pass; "Digitized by Google" watermark ignored
PL 6:411
ut idem Tullius in Consolatione non easdem sedes incolere justos atque impios praedicaverit. Nec enim omnibus, inquit, iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt, eumdem cursum in coelum patere: nam vitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in coeno jacere docuerunt; castos autem animos, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi qnodam et facili lapsu ad deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare. Quae sententia superiori illi argumento repugnat. Illud enim sic assumptum est, tamquam necesse sit, omnem hominem natum immortalitate donari. Quod igitur erit discrimen virtutis, ac sceleris, si nihil interest, utrumne Aristides sit aliquis, an Phalaris? utrum Cato, an Catilina? Sed hanc repugnantiam rerum sententiarumque non cernit, nisi qui tenet veritatem. Si quis igitur nos roget, utrumne bonum sit mors, an malum? respondebimus, qualitatem ejus ex vitae ratione pendere. Nam sicut vita ipsa bonum est, si cum virtute vivatur, malum, si cum scelere: sic et mors ex praeteritis vitae actibus ponderanda est. Ita fit, ut si vita in Dei religione transacta sit, mors malum non sit; quia translatio est ad immortalitatem. Sin autem, malum sit necesse est; quoniam ad aeterna (ut dixi) supplicia transmittit.
that the same Tullius in the Consolation declared that the just and the impious do not inhabit the same abodes. For those same wise men, he says, did not judge that the same course into heaven lies open to all: for they taught that those defiled by vices and crimes are thrust down into darkness and lie in the mire; but that chaste souls, pure, whole, uncorrupted, polished also by good pursuits and arts, fly away by a certain light and easy gliding to the gods, that is, to a nature like their own. This opinion conflicts with that former argument. For that was assumed as though it were necessary that every man born be endowed with immortality. What difference, then, will there be between virtue and crime, if it makes no difference whether someone is an Aristides or a Phalaris? whether a Cato or a Catiline? But this conflict of things and opinions no one perceives except him who holds the truth. If anyone, then, should ask us whether death is a good or an evil, we shall answer that its quality depends on the manner of the life. For just as life itself is a good if it is lived with virtue, an evil if with crime, so also death is to be weighed by the past acts of the life. Thus it comes about that, if the life has been spent in the religion of God, death is not an evil, because it is a passage to immortality. But if otherwise, it must necessarily be an evil, since it sends one across (as I have said) to eternal punishments.
Quid ergo dicemus, nisi errare illos, qui aut mortem appetunt, tamquam bonum, aut vitam fugiunt, tamquam malum? nisi quod sunt iniquissimi, qui
What then shall we say, except that those err who either seek death as a good or flee life as an evil? except that they are most unjust who
Editors' notes and page, col. 411

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 11 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. The two Euripides lines in note 11 are in very small type; their accents are set as best legible. --> (printed under page 209)

(1) ‹anchor: Easdem sedes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Easdem sedes. Homeri et Virgilii poemata hoc idem docent.—Non easdem sedes. Intercidit quidem hic Ciceronis locus: sed superest huic plane geminus l. i, Tuscul. c. 30 dignissimus lectu. Conf. Lact. l. vii, c. 7 et Pfanner. Theolog. Gentil. c. 21. Buneman.

"The same abodes." The poems of Homer and Virgil teach the same thing. — "Not the same abodes." This passage of Cicero has indeed been lost; but a plain twin of it survives, Tusculans 1, chapter 30, most worth reading. Compare Lactantius book 7, chapter 7, and Pfanner, Theology of the Gentiles, chapter 21. Bünemann.

(printed under page 209)

(2) ‹anchor: Castos autem animos, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Castos autem animos, etc. Euripides in Supplicibus, ait animum e corpore egredientem in coelum, unde lapsus erat, avolare: corpus autem terrae, unde ortum erat, reddi. Herald.

"But chaste souls," etc. Euripides, in the Suppliants, says that the soul, going out of the body, flies away to heaven, whence it had fallen, while the body is given back to the earth, whence it had arisen. Hérault.

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(3) ‹anchor: Facili lapsu ad deos... pervolare› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Facili lapsu ad deos.,. pervolare. Cicero c. l. His ad illos (deos) a quibus essent profecti, reditum facilem patere. Bun.

"To fly with an easy glide to the gods." Cicero in the place cited: "For these the return to them (the gods), from whom they had set out, lies easy and open." Bünemann.

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(4) ‹anchor: Hominem natum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Hominem natum. Elegantia vocibus his junctis subest. lib. vi, c. 3: Immortalitatem nulli homini nato negat. Lib. vii, c. 5: Siquidem omnis homo natus immortalis fieret. Seneca, de Const. Sap. c. 6: Non est, quod dubites, an tollere se homo natus supra humana possit. Bun.

"A man born." There is elegance in these words joined together. Book 6, chapter 3: "He denies immortality to any man born." Book 7, chapter 5: "If indeed every man born were to become immortal." Seneca, On the Constancy of the Wise Man, chapter 6: "There is no reason for you to doubt whether a man born can raise himself above human things." Bünemann.

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(5) ‹anchor: Aristides› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Aristides. Hic sumitur pro quovis justo. sicut Phalaris pro tyranno, atque Cato pro bono cive, sic et Catilina pro nefario homine; horum historiae sunt notissimae.

"Aristides." He is taken here for any just man, as Phalaris for a tyrant, and Cato for a good citizen, and so too Catiline for a wicked man; their stories are very well known.

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(6) ‹anchor: An Phalaris› · no call (lemma-keyed)

An Phalaris. Is est famosus Agrigentinorum in Sicilia tyrannus cum tauro suo aeneo. De eo vide Ciceronem in Verrem vi, n. 33.

"Or Phalaris." He is the notorious tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily, with his bronze bull. On him see Cicero, Against Verres 6, no. 33.

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(7) ‹anchor: Non cernit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non cernit. Sic habent antiquiores et meliores mss. et 13 typis excusi. At 15 scripti rec. cum 2 edit. vet. Rom. habent, non sentit.

"Does not perceive." So the older and better manuscripts and 13 printed editions. But 15 recent manuscripts with the 2 old Rome editions have "non sentit" ("does not feel").

(printed under page 209)

(8) ‹anchor: Ex vitae ratione pendere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ex vitae ratione pendere. Juxta illud verbum, finem vitae expectandum esse. Hinc Plinius lib. vii, cap. 40. Ita est profecto, inquit; alius de alio judicat dies, et tamen supremus de omnibus.

"To depend on the course of life." According to that saying, that the end of life must be waited for. Hence Pliny, book 7, chapter 40: "So it is indeed," he says; "one day judges of one thing, another of another, and yet the last day judges of all."

(printed under page 209)

(9) ‹anchor: Sin autem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sin autem. Ita reposui ex duobus optimis et antiquissimis 1 Bonon. et Regio-Put. In caeteris est sin aliter; vel si aliter.

"But if." So I have restored it from the two best and oldest, 1 Bologna and the Royal-Puteanus. In the rest it is "sin aliter", or "si aliter" ("if otherwise").

(printed under page 209)

(10) ‹anchor: Non pensant› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non pensant. In editione Sublac. legitur compensant.

"They do not weigh." In the Subiaco edition "compensant" ("they compensate") is read.

(printed under page 209)

(11) ‹anchor: Inepta illa sententia› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Inepta illa sententia. Vide Eurip. apud Plat. in Geor. et apud Stob. Serm. 121; Aristoph. in Ran.; Cicer. in Somn. Scip. et Tusc. i. Hanc tamen sententiam, quam ineptam dicit Lactantius, non veretur probare Cicero, Epist. lib. xvi, epist. 8. — Inepta sententia, etc. Euripidem notat, cujus versus servavit Origenes contra Celsum, lib. vii, pag. 366. / Τίς οἶδεν, εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν / Τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν. / Add. Spencer. h. l. p. 89. His gemini sunt Euripid. versus, Troad., v. 631, 632, et incert. Trag. v 331. Bun.

"That foolish saying." See Euripides in Plato's Gorgias [Geor., as printed], and in Stobaeus, discourse 121; Aristophanes in the Frogs; Cicero in the Dream of Scipio and Tusculans 1. Yet Cicero is not afraid to approve this saying, which Lactantius calls foolish: Letters book 16, letter 8. — "A foolish saying," etc. He censures Euripides, whose lines Origen preserved, Against Celsus book 7, page 366: "Who knows whether to live is to die, and to die is to live?" Add Spencer on this passage, p. 89. Twin to these are the lines of Euripides, Trojan Women, lines 631–632, and an uncertain tragedy, line 331. Bünemann.

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(12) ‹anchor: Sileno attribuitur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sileno attribuitur. Cicero, i Tusculan., 48: Affertur de Sileno fabella quaedam: qui cum a Mida captus esset, hoc ei muneris pro sua missione dedisse scribitur, docuisse regem, non nasci homini longe optimum esse, proximum autem, quamprimum mori. De Sileno conf. Perizon. ad Aelian., Var. Hist. l. iii, c. 18. Bun.

"It is attributed to Silenus." Cicero, Tusculans 1, 48: "A little tale is told of Silenus: when he had been captured by Midas, he is written to have given him this gift for his release: he taught the king that not to be born is by far the best for man, and the next best, to die as soon as possible." On Silenus compare Perizonius on Aelian, Varia Historia book 3, chapter 18. Bünemann.

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(13) ‹anchor: Non nasci› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non nasci. Est et hic locus in i Tuscul. quaest., non longe a fine. Sic et Plinius in praefatione lib. vii. ait: Itaque multi extitere, qui non nasci optimum censerent, aut quam ocissime aboleri.

"Not to be born." This passage too is in Tusculan Disputations 1, not far from the end. So too Pliny, in the preface to book 7, says: "And so there have been many who judged it best not to be born, or to be done away with as quickly as possible."

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(14) ‹anchor: Quamprimum mori, tamquam ex incendio effugere violentiam fortunae› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quamprimum mori, tamquam ex incendio effugere violentiam fortunae. Verbum mori quod 25 mss. rec. et 6 editis deest, restitui ex mss. 3 Reg., 6 Vatic., Cauc., Jun., 1 Clarom. vet., edit. Rom. ac 9 aliis, et ex Cicerone ipso unde desumptus est hic locus: sed ibi desideratur vox violentiam, quam nobis exhibent 37 mss. codices ac 14 impressi, quam et sensus postulat. — Quamprimum mori, et tamquam. Addidi mori et ex sex Vaticanis edd. ab anno 1465, ad ann. 1539, tum omnibus Tornaes. 1548, 1614. Bun.

"To die as soon as possible, to escape the violence of fortune as from a fire." The word "mori", which is lacking in 25 recent manuscripts and 6 printed editions, I have restored from the manuscripts 3 Royal, 6 Vatican, Cauc., Junius, 1 old Clermont, the Rome edition and 9 others, and from Cicero himself, from whom this passage is taken; but there the word "violentiam" is lacking, which 37 manuscript codices and 14 printed editions give us, and which the sense also demands. — "To die as soon as possible, and as." I have added "mori et" from six Vatican editions from the year 1465 to 1539, and from all those of Tornesius, 1548, 1614. Bünemann.

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(15) ‹anchor: Effugere violentiam fortunae› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Effugere violentiam fortunae. Verba, violentiam fortunae habent decem Vaticani, quinque Sparkii, Emman., Cantabr., tres Lips. (nisi quod in tertio, violentiaque fortunae). Hoc amplius Heumannus pronuntiat, verba, violentiam fortunae, proscribendo. Videntur mihi retinenda; quia in refutatione, infra, fortunae facit mentionem. Bun.

"To escape the violence of fortune." The words "violentiam fortunae" are in ten Vatican manuscripts, five of Spark's, the Emmanuel, the Cambridge, three Leipzig (except that the third has "violentiaque fortunae"). Heumann goes further and declares for striking out the words "violentiam fortunae". They seem to me worth keeping, because in the refutation, below, he mentions fortune. Bünemann.

(printed under page 209)

(16) ‹anchor: Non dissimile Platonis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Non dissimile Platonis. De quo Platonis dicto vide Plutarch. ad fin. Marii.

"Not unlike [is that] of Plato." On this saying of Plato see Plutarch at the end of the Marius.

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Page

  • running head: 411 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹ut idem Tullius in Consolatione›; B ‹sententiarumque non cernit›; C ‹tamquam malum? nisi quod sunt›; D ‹laris pro tyranno› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "qnodam" read as printed (possibly a turned u), unsure; "tamquam" in "tamquam necesse sit" is faintly printed, read as tamquam; column ends mid-sentence at "qui"; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" stands across both columns above the notes, cut off at the right edge, not set; the Variorum notae (Easdem sedes ... Inepta illa sententia) left for the later pass; no editors' matter in the text block
PL 6:412
pauciora mala non pensant bonis pluribus. Nam cum omnem vitam per exquisitas et varias traducant voluptates, mori cupiunt, si quid forte his amaritudinis supervenit; et sic habent, tamquam illis nunquam fuerit bene, si aliquando fuerit male. Damnant igitur vitam omnem, plenamque nihil aliud, quam malis opinantur. Hinc nata est inepta illa sententia, hanc esse mortem, quam nos vitam putemus; illam vitam, quam nos pro morte timeamus: ita primum bonum esse, non nasci, secundum citius mori. Quae, ut majoris sit auctoritatis, Sileno attribuitur. Cicero, in Consolatione: « Non nasci, inquit, longe optimum, nec in hos scopulos incidere vitae; Proximum autem, si natus sis, quamprimum mori, tamquam ex incendio effugere violentiam fortunae. » Credidisse illum vanissimo dicto exinde apparet, quod adjecit aliquid de suo, ut ornaret. Quaero igitur, cui esse optimum putet non nasci, cum sit nullus omnino, qui sentiat: nam ut bonum sit aliquid, aut malum, sensus efficit. Deinde, cur omnem vitam nihil aliud esse, quam scopulos, et incendium putaverit; quasi aut in nostra fuerit potestate, ne nasceremur, aut vitam nobis fortuna tribuat, non Deus, aut vivendi ratio quidquam simile incendio habere videatur.
do not weigh the fewer evils against the more numerous goods. For although they pass their whole life amid exquisite and varied pleasures, they long to die if some bitterness happens to come upon them; and they regard it as though things had never gone well for them, if at some time they have gone badly. They therefore condemn the whole of life, and think it full of nothing else but evils. Hence arose that foolish saying, that this which we think life is death, and that which we fear as death is life: so that the first good is not to be born, the second to die sooner. And this, that it may carry greater authority, is attributed to Silenus. Cicero, in the Consolation: « Not to be born, he says, is by far the best, and not to fall upon these rocks of life; but the next best, if you have been born, is to die as soon as possible, and as from a fire to escape the violence of fortune. » That he believed this most empty saying is evident from the fact that he added something of his own to embellish it. I ask therefore for whom he thinks it best not to be born, since there is no one at all who would perceive it: for it is perception that makes anything good or bad. Next, why he thought the whole of life to be nothing else than rocks and a fire; as if either it had been in our power not to be born, or fortune assigned life to us, not God, or the manner of living could seem to have anything like a fire.
Non dissimile Platonis illud est. quod aiebat, se gratias agere naturae: primum, quod homo natus esset potius, quam mutum animal; deinde, quod
Not unlike this is that saying of Plato, that he said he gave thanks to nature: first, because he had been born a man rather than a dumb animal; next, because
Editors' notes and page, col. 412

Page

  • running head: [cut off at left edge]TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 412
  • marginal letters: A ‹pauciora mala non pensant›; B ‹didisse illum vanissimo dicto›; C ‹esset potius, quam mutum animal›; D ‹rent, aut quam ocissime aboleri› (in the notes area, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: full-width line "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." printed across the page between the text and the notes, cut off at left, not set; the Variorum notes (Commentarius) below it left for the later pass; "Proximum" capitalized mid-quotation as printed; column ends mid-sentence at "quod"
PL 6:413
mas potius, quam foemina; quod Graecus, quam Barbarus; postremo, quod Atheniensis, et quod temporibus Socratis. Dici non potest, quantam mentibus caecitatem, quantosque pariat errores ignoratio veritatis. Ego plane contenderim, numquam quidquam dictum esse in rebus humanis delirius. Quasi vero si aut Barbarus, aut mulier, aut asinus denique natus esset, idem ipse Plato esset, ac non ipsum illud, quod natum fuisset. Sed videlicet Pyhagorae credidit, qui ut vetaret homines animalibus vesci, dixit, animas de corporibus in aliorum animalium corpora commeare: quod et vanum et impossibile est. Vanum, quia necesse non fuit veteres animas in nova corpora inducere, cum idem artifex, qui primas aliquando fecerat, potuerit semper novas facere. Impossibile, quia rectae rationis anima tam immutare naturam status sui non potest, quam ignis aut deorsum niti, aut in transversum, fluminis modo, flammam suam fundere. Existimavit igitur homo sapiens, potuisse fieri, ut anima, quae tunc erat in Platone, in aliquod mutum animal includeretur, essetque humano sensu praedita, ut intelligeret ac doleret incongruenti se corpore oneratam. Quanto sanius faceret, si gratias agere se diceret, quod ingeniosus, quod docilis natus esset, quod in iis opibus, ut liberaliter erudiretur. Nam quod Athenis natus est, quid in eo beneficii
he was male rather than female; that he was a Greek rather than a barbarian; lastly, that he was an Athenian, and that he was born in the times of Socrates. It cannot be told how great a blindness of minds, and how many errors, ignorance of the truth brings forth. I should plainly maintain that nothing more crazed was ever said in human affairs. As though, indeed, if he had been born a barbarian, or a woman, or in the end an ass, he would have been the same Plato himself, and not that very thing which had been born. But evidently he believed Pythagoras, who, in order to forbid men to feed on animals, said that souls pass from bodies into the bodies of other animals: which is both vain and impossible. Vain, because there was no need to bring old souls into new bodies, since the same Craftsman Who had once made the first ones could always make new ones. Impossible, because a soul of right reason can no more change the nature of its state than fire can either press downwards or pour out its flame sideways after the manner of a river. The wise man, then, thought that it could have come about that the soul which was then in Plato should be shut up in some dumb animal, and should be endowed with human sense, so that it would understand and grieve that it was burdened with an unsuitable body. How much more sanely would he have acted, if he had said that he gave thanks because he had been born gifted, because teachable, because in such means that he might be liberally educated. For as to his having been born at Athens, what benefit
Editors' notes and page, col. 413

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 9 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. --> (printed under page 210)

(1) ‹anchor: Quod mas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod mas. Sic reposui ex vet. editis 3 Rom., Venet. 1490, et aliis octo, necnon ex omnibus mss. praeter quinque, quibus est, ut 7 vulgatis, quod masculus.

"That [he was born] a male." So I have restored it from the 3 old Rome editions, Venice 1490 and eight others, and also from all the manuscripts except five, which, like 7 common editions, have "quod masculus".

(printed under page 210)

(2) ‹anchor: Quam foemina› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quam foemina. Ita Judaeorum magistri in Pesachim f. 65, et alibi: Bene illi, cujus liberi sunt masculi; vae illi, cujus liberi sunt foeminae. Bun.

"Than a female." So the Jewish masters in Pesachim, fol. 65, and elsewhere: "Well for him whose children are males; woe to him whose children are females." Bünemann.

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(3) ‹anchor: Quod Atheniensis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod Atheniensis. Ms. Cantabrig. et editi 7 addunt, non Thebanus, quod glossema videtur. Idem a Laertio, lib. i, tribuitur Socrati. Sublac. addit. non Thebanus.

"That [he was born] an Athenian." The Cambridge manuscript and 7 printed editions add "non Thebanus" ("not a Theban"), which seems a gloss. The same saying is ascribed to Socrates by Laertius, book 1. The Subiaco edition adds "non Thebanus".

(printed under page 210)

(4) ‹anchor: Numquam quidquam dictum esse delirius› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Numquam quidquam dictum esse delirius. Non reticendum quod Judaei habent in preculis suis virorum peculiaribus: Benedictus esto, o Domine Deus, quod me virum creasti, non mulierem; quod Israelitam, non alienigenam. Gataker.

"That nothing more crazed was ever said." It should not be passed over that the Jews have in their prayers proper to men: "Blessed be thou, O Lord God, that thou hast created me a man, not a woman; an Israelite, not a foreigner." Gataker.

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(5) ‹anchor: Quod natum fuisset› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod natum fuisset. Legitur natus fuisset apud Buneman., qui hujus mutationis sic rationem reddit.— Restituo natus ex Lips. tert., Reimm., Rost, Venet. 1471, 72, utraque 78, 93, Parrh., Paris., Junt, Gymn., Ald., Isaeo, Grat. Bun.

"That it had been born." "Natus fuisset" is read in Bünemann, who gives his reason for the change thus: — I restore "natus" from the third Leipzig, Reimmann's, the Rostock, and Venice 1471, [14]72, both [14]78, [14]93, Parrhasius, Paris, Junta, Gymnicus, Aldus, Isaeus, Grat. Bünemann.

(printed under page 210)

(6) ‹anchor: Sed videlicet Pythagorae, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Sed videlicet Pythagorae, etc. Platonem Pythagorae doctrinam secutum fuisse, testatur etiam August. de doct. Christiana. Atque idem August. contra Julianum, lib. ii, ex Ambrosii libro contra Plat. haec recitat verba: Miror tantum philosophum, quomodo animam, cui potestatem conferendae mortalitatis attribuit, in noctuis includat, et ramulis, feritate quoque induat bestiarum: cum in Timaeo eam Dei opus esse memoraverit, inter immortalia a Deo facta; corpus autem non videri opus summi Dei asseruit; quia natura carnis humanae nihil a natura corporis bestialis differat. Emit autem Plato Philolai Pythagorici libros a mulierculis pauperibus: unde quidquid de immortalitate animae scripsit, furatus est. Tzetz. Chil. ii, Variae hist. Betuleius.

"But evidently of Pythagoras," etc. That Plato followed the teaching of Pythagoras, Augustine also attests in On Christian Teaching. And the same Augustine, Against Julian book 2, quotes these words from Ambrose's book against Plato: "I wonder how so great a philosopher shuts up in owls and in [ramulis, as printed] the soul to which he attributed the power of conferring mortality, and clothes it also with the savagery of beasts; when in the Timaeus he has recorded that it is the work of God, among the immortal things made by God; but he asserted that the body does not appear to be the work of the supreme God, since the nature of human flesh differs in nothing from the nature of a beast's body." Plato, moreover, bought the books of Philolaus the Pythagorean from some poor women; from which he stole whatever he wrote about the immortality of the soul. Tzetzes, Chiliades 2, Various Histories. Betuleius.

(printed under page 210)

(7) ‹anchor: Commeare› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Commeare. Exprimit Minuc. Fel. cap. 37: Animas... in alia nova corpora saepius commeare. Bun.

"To pass to and fro." Minucius Felix expresses it, chapter 37: "that souls ... pass again and again into other new bodies." Bünemann.

(printed under page 210)

(8) ‹anchor: Quod et vanum, et impossibile est› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod et vanum, et impossibile est. Videtur Lactantius aliter sensisse de animis impiorum; ut in quos potestatem habeat spiritus malignus, unde in arte magica verti possint in lupos. Cujusmodi conversionem non solum agnoscunt Maro Eglog. ix et poetarum alii; sed Plinius quoque lib viii, cap. 22. Sed parum ad rem facit, piine, an impii sint, quorum animae in bestias transeant. Omnino enim, ut ex perfecto animali aliud fiat animal perfectum, longe exsuperat vim creatam; quodque Deus creaturis omnibus negavit, id non absque impietate illis adscribitur, etc. Vossius.

"Which is both vain and impossible." Lactantius seems to have thought otherwise of the souls of the wicked: that the evil spirit has power over them, so that by magic art they can be turned into wolves. Such a transformation is acknowledged not only by Virgil, Eclogue 9, and other poets, but also by Pliny, book 8, chapter 22. But it matters little whether those whose souls pass into beasts are pious or impious. For that from one complete animal another complete animal should be made far surpasses created power; and what God has denied to all creatures is not ascribed to them without impiety, etc. Vossius.

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(9) ‹anchor: Fluminis modo› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Fluminis modo. mss. 8 rec., fulminis.

"In the manner of a river." Eight recent manuscripts have "fulminis" ("of a thunderbolt").

(printed under page 210)

(10) ‹anchor: Includeretur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Includeretur. mss. 6 rec., induceretur.

"Would be shut in." Six recent manuscripts have "induceretur" ("would be brought in").

(printed under page 210)

(11) ‹anchor: Gratulari› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Gratulari. Ex omnibus mss. ita reposui, praeter 2 Reg. rec. in quibus, ut et in excusis, est gloriari. Sic infra, cujus temporibus natum esse se homo sapiens gratulatur; et prius, gratias agere naturae: nullibi tamen legitur gloriari.

"To rejoice." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts except 2 recent Royal, in which, as in the printed editions, it is "gloriari" ("to boast"). So below: "in whose times the wise man rejoices that he was born"; and earlier: "to give thanks to nature"; but "gloriari" is read nowhere.

(printed under page 210)

(12) ‹anchor: Commodare› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Commodare. Scripti 11, dare.

"To lend." Eleven manuscripts have "dare" ("to give").

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(13) ‹anchor: Alcibiadem quoque et Critiam› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Alcibiadem quoque et Critiam. Isocrates Alcibiadem Socratis discipulum fuisse negat in Busiride, Polycratem id asserentem redarguens. Et in Gorgia Platonis ipse Socrates ipsum ἑταῖρον suum dicit. Caeterum de rebus Alcibiadis lege Justin. lib. v; Thucyd. lib. vi; Plutarchum in Nicia, et alibi, de triginta tyrannis; lege Xenophontem, lib. ii rerum Graecarum, Justin. lib. v. Betul. — Alcibiadem... Socratis auditores. Nepos in Alcib., cap. 2; pr. eruditus a Socrate; nec aliter Xenophon. lib. i Memorab. f. m. 715, sqq. quem prae caeteris hic sequitur, Alcibiadem patriae hostem vocans. Nepos quidem contrarium affirmat: at Cicero, lib. i de Orat. c. 34: Quid Critias? Quid Alcibiades? Civitatibus quidem suis non boni, sed certe docti atque eloquentes, nonne Socraticis disputationibus erant eruditi? Conf. Maxim. Tyr. Diss. viii, p. 90. Bun.

"Alcibiades too, and Critias." Isocrates, in the Busiris, denies that Alcibiades was a disciple of Socrates, refuting Polycrates, who asserted it. And in Plato's Gorgias Socrates himself calls him his "companion". For the history of Alcibiades read Justin book 5; Thucydides book 6; Plutarch in the Nicias, and elsewhere; on the Thirty Tyrants read Xenophon, Hellenica book 2; Justin book 5. Betuleius. — "Alcibiades ... hearers of Socrates." Nepos, Alcibiades, chapter 2, near the beginning: "taught by Socrates"; and Xenophon no differently, Memorabilia book 1, fol. m. 715 and following, whom he follows here above the rest, calling Alcibiades an enemy of his country. Nepos indeed affirms the contrary; but Cicero, On the Orator book 1, chapter 34: "What of Critias? What of Alcibiades? Not good men to their cities, but certainly learned and eloquent — were they not trained in the Socratic disputations?" Compare Maximus of Tyre, Dissertation 8, p. 90. Bünemann.

(printed under page 210)

(14) ‹anchor: Illius se temporibus esse natum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Illius se temporibus esse natum. Reimm.: illis temporibus esse se natum. Sed non minus eleganter pronomina, illius se, conjuncta.

"That he was born in his times." Reimmann's manuscript: "illis temporibus esse se natum". But the pronouns "illius se" joined together are no less elegant.

(printed under page 210)

(15) ‹anchor: Curiosos oculos› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Curiosos oculos. Si hic simul legas quae inf., intelliges nostrum hic imitari Ciceronem de Haruspicum Responsis, c. 17, ubi de sacris Bonae Deae: Quod (sacrificium) non solum curiosos oculos excludit, etc. Bun.

"Prying eyes." If you read here together what follows below, you will see that our author is imitating Cicero, On the Responses of the Soothsayers, chapter 17, where he speaks of the rites of the Good Goddess: "Which (sacrifice) shuts out not only prying eyes," etc. Bünemann.

(printed under page 210)

(16) ‹anchor: Immittere› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Immittere. De his vide S. Augustinum de Civit. Dei, lib. viii, cap. 5.

"To thrust in." On these see St Augustine, City of God book 8, chapter 5.

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Page

  • running head: 413 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[cut off at image edge]
  • marginal letters: A ‹mas potius, quam foemina›; B ‹rectae rationis anima tam immutare›; C ‹(in the notes) Quod mas. Sic reposui›; D ‹(in the notes) Sed videlicet Pythagorae, etc.›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins and ends mid-sentence (continues in col. 414 after "beneficii"); full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" stands between text block and page-foot notes, cut off at right edge, not set; page-foot Variorum notes (Quod mas ... Quod et vanum) not set, left for later pass; editors' matter set: (none)
PL 6:414
fuit? An non plurimi extiterunt in aliis civitatibus excellenti ingenio atque doctrina viri, qui meliores singuli, quam omnes Athenienses fuerunt? Quanta hominum millia fuisse credamus, qui et Athenis nati, et temporibus Socratis, indocti tamen, ac stulti fuerunt? Non enim aut parietes, aut locus in quo quisque est effusus ex utero conciliat homini sapientiam. Quid vero attinuit Socratis se temporibus natum gratulari? Num Socrates ingenia discentibus potuit commodare? Non venit in mentem Platoni Alcibiadem quoque et Critiam ejusdem Socratis assiduos auditores fuisse; quorum alter hostis patriae acerrimus fuit, alter crudelissimus omnium tyrannorum.
was there in that? Did there not arise in other cities very many men of outstanding talent and learning, who were each of them better than all the Athenians together? How many thousands of men are we to believe there were who were both born at Athens and in the times of Socrates, and yet were unlearned and foolish? For neither walls nor the place in which each person has been poured forth from the womb confer wisdom on a man. And what did it avail to congratulate oneself on having been born in the times of Socrates? Could Socrates lend talents to those who learned from him? It did not come into Plato's mind that Alcibiades also and Critias had been constant hearers of that same Socrates; of whom the one was the fiercest enemy of his fatherland, the other the cruellest of all tyrants.
CAPUT XX.
Chapter XX.
Socrates aliis prudentior fuit in philosophia, quamvis in multis desipuerit.
Socrates was wiser than others in philosophy, although in many things he was foolish.
Videamus nunc, quid in Socrate ipso tam magnum fuerit, ut homo sapiens merito gratias ageret, illius se temporibus esse natum. Non inficior fuisse illum paulo cordatiorem, quam caeteros, qui naturam rerum putaverunt ingenio posse comprehendi. In quo illos non excordes tantum fuisse arbitror, sed etiam impios; quod in secreta coelestis illius providentiae curiosos oculos voluerint immittere. Romae, et in plerisque urbibus scimus esse quaedam sacra, quae
Let us see now what there was in Socrates himself so great that a wise man should deservedly give thanks that he had been born in his times. I do not deny that he was somewhat more sensible than the others, who thought that the nature of things could be comprehended by the intellect. In this I judge them to have been not only senseless but also impious, because they wished to thrust curious eyes into the secrets of that heavenly providence. At Rome, and in most cities, we know that there are certain sacred rites which
Editors' notes and page, col. 414

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  • running head: [F]ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 414 (left part cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A fuit? An non plurimi; B Socrates aliis prudentior fuit; C nem non solum agnoscunt (in the Variorum Notae); D lib. VI; Plutarchum in Nicia (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
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PL 6:415
aspici a viris nefas habeatur. Abstinent igitur aspectu, quibus contaminare illa non licet: et si forte, vel errore, vel casu quopiam vir aspexerit, primo poena ejus, deinde instauratione sacrificii, scelus expiatur. Quid his facias, qui inconcessa scrutari volunt? Nimirum multo sceleratiores, qui arcana mundi, et hoc coeleste templum profanare impiis disputationibus quaerunt, quam qui aedem Vestae, aut Bonae Deae, aut Cereris intraverint. Quae penetralia quamvis adire viris non liceat, tamen a viris fabricata sunt. Hi vero non tantum impiet⟨a⟩tis crimen effugiunt: sed, quod est multo indignius, eloquentiae famam, et ingenii gloriam consequuntur. Quid, si aliquid investigare possent? Sunt enim tam stulti in asseverando. quam improbi in quaerendo; cum neque invenire quidquam possint, nec defendere, etiamsi invenerint. Nam si verum vel fortuito viderint, quod saepius contingit, committunt, ut ab aliis id pro falso refellatur. Non enim descendit aliquis de coelo, qui sententiam de singulorum opinionibus ferat: quapropter nemo dubitaverit, eos, qui ista conquirant, stultos, ineptos, insanos esse.
it is held unlawful for men to look upon. Those, therefore, who are not permitted to defile those things abstain from looking; and if by chance a man has looked, whether by mistake or by some accident, the crime is expiated first by his punishment, then by the renewal of the sacrifice. What would you do with those who wish to search out things not granted? Doubtless those who seek to profane the secrets of the world, and this heavenly temple, with impious disputations are far more wicked than those who have entered the shrine of Vesta, or of the Good Goddess, or of Ceres. These inner sanctuaries, although men may not approach them, were nevertheless built by men. But these people not only escape the charge of impiety, but, what is far more unworthy, they gain a reputation for eloquence and the glory of genius. What if they were able to investigate anything? For they are as foolish in asserting as they are wicked in inquiring, since they can neither find anything nor defend it even if they have found it. For if they have seen the truth even by chance, which happens rather often, they bring it about that it is refuted by others as false. For no one comes down from heaven to pass sentence on the opinions of each individual; wherefore no one will doubt that those who search out these things are foolish, inept and insane.
Aliquid ergo Socrates habuit cordis humani, qui cum intelligeret haec non posse inveniri, ab ejusmodi quaestionibus se removit; vereorque ne in eo solo. Multa enim sunt ejus non modo laude indigna, sed etiam reprehensione dignissima, in quibus fuit suorum
Socrates, therefore, had something of human good sense, since, understanding that these things could not be found out, he withdrew himself from questions of that kind; and I fear that it was in this alone. For there are many things of his not only unworthy of praise but even most deserving of reproof, in which he was, to his own [people],
Editors' notes and page, col. 415

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 6 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right. A stray mark before "Bonae deae" (note 4) is not set. --> (printed under page 211)

(1) ‹anchor: Nefas habeatur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nefas habeatur. Comparatio est a minori ad majus, juxta Gentilium tamen opinionem.

"Should be held unlawful." It is an argument from the lesser to the greater, though according to the opinion of the pagans.

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(2) ‹anchor: Vel casu quopiam› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Vel casu quopiam. Sic restitui ex veteribus editis octo, et omnibus mss. praeter 3 Reg. et 2 Lips. in quibus, ut in 7 excusis, legitur quispiam, in 1 Colb. quoquam. Nota obiter quopiam in sexto casu, ut apud Arnobium, lib. vi, ante finem, et lib. vii, post initium.

"Or by some chance." So I have restored it from eight old editions and all the manuscripts except 3 Royal and 2 Leipzig, in which, as in 7 printed editions, "quispiam" is read; in 1 Colbert, "quoquam". Note in passing "quopiam" in the sixth case [the ablative], as in Arnobius, book 6, near the end, and book 7, after the beginning.

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(3) ‹anchor: Hoc coeleste templum, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Hoc coeleste templum, etc. Sic Scipio in Somnio apud Cic. appellavit mundum. Quo loco Macrob. Bene autem, inquit, universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos qui existimant nihil aliud esse Deum, nisi coelum ipsum, et coelestia ista quae cernimus. Ideo ut summi potentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam videri; quidquid humano subjicitur aspectui, templum ejus vocavit, qui sola mente concipitur; ut qui haec veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori, sciatque quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis, etc. Betul.

"This heavenly temple," etc. So Scipio named the world in the Dream, in Cicero. On that passage Macrobius says: "Well is the whole world called the temple of God, on account of those who think that God is nothing other than the sky itself and these heavenly things that we see. So, to show that the power of the supreme God can scarcely be understood and never seen, he called whatever lies open to human sight the temple of him who is conceived by the mind alone; so that whoever venerates these things as temples should yet owe the greatest worship to their maker, and whoever is brought into the use of this temple should know that he must live after the manner of a priest," etc. Betuleius.

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(4) ‹anchor: Bonae deae, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Bonae deae, etc. De qua mox Lactantius, et supra l. i, c. 22; Propert. l. iv, Eleg. 9, de sacris Bonae deae. / Foemineae loca clausa deae, fontesque piandos, / Impune et nullis sacra retecta viris. / Et non solum viris templum Bonae deae ingredi nefas erat; sed et picturae masculae in templo velatae, ut testantur Juvenal. Satyr. 6, et Senec. epist. 97. De his Bonae deae aut Vestae Mysteriis vide Dionys. Halycarn. lib. ii; Ciceronem, oratione pro Domo sua, et Macrob., lib. i Saturnal., c. 11 et 12, atque Servium in iv lib. Aeneidos.

"Of the Good Goddess," etc. On her see Lactantius shortly, and above, book 1, chapter 22; Propertius, book 4, elegy 9, on the rites of the Good Goddess: "The closed precinct of the women's goddess, and the springs to be kept pure, and rites revealed with impunity to no men." And not only was it unlawful for men to enter the temple of the Good Goddess; even male pictures in the temple were veiled, as Juvenal, Satire 6, and Seneca, letter 97, attest. On these mysteries of the Good Goddess, or of Vesta, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus [Halycarn., as printed], book 2; Cicero, in the speech On His House; Macrobius, Saturnalia book 1, chapters 11 and 12; and Servius on Aeneid book 4.

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(5) ‹anchor: Cordis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cordis. Hic cor ponitur pro animo, prudentia, sapientia. — Aliquid..... habuit cordis. Id est, ut sup., fuit paulo cordatior. Lactantius cum aliis sapientiam in corde ponebat: hinc, l. iii, cap. 13: In corde sapientia est. De Opif., cap. 10: Cor sapientiae domicilium. Cap. 12: Primum cor hominis effingi, quod in eo sit vita omnis et sapientia. Bun.

"Of heart." Here "cor" is put for mind, prudence, wisdom. — "He had ..... something of heart." That is, as above, he was a little more sensible. Lactantius, with others, placed wisdom in the heart: hence book 3, chapter 13: "Wisdom is in the heart." On the Workmanship [of God], chapter 10: "The heart is the dwelling of wisdom." Chapter 12: "The heart of man is formed first, because in it is all life and wisdom." Bünemann.

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(6) ‹anchor: Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos. Meminit etiam Hieronymus in Apologia adversus Rufinum. At videtur Lactantius Socrati paulo iniquior, et sibi contraria dicit, cum aliis in locis multum Socratem laudaverit. Verumtamen non eo veniendum est, ut dicamus, velut Erasmus Rotterod., qui saepe vix abstinere se posse aiebat, quin diceret: Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis.

"What is above us is nothing to us." Jerome also mentions it in the Apology against Rufinus. But Lactantius seems somewhat unfair to Socrates, and contradicts himself, since in other places he has praised Socrates much. Still, we must not go so far as to say, like Erasmus of Rotterdam, who often said he could scarcely keep himself from saying: "Saint Socrates, pray for us."

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(7) ‹anchor: Procumbamus..... in terram› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Procumbamus..... in terram. Aequius interpretatur Minuc. Felix, c. 8. Tertullianus, l. ii ad Nationes, c. 4, dictum hoc Epicuro tribuit. Jure vero, qui de Socrate scripserunt, Lactantium ob hanc sinistram interpretationem castigarunt. Bun.

"Let us fall down ..... to the ground." Minucius Felix interprets it more fairly, chapter 8. Tertullian, To the Nations book 2, chapter 4, ascribes this saying to Epicurus. Those who have written on Socrates have rightly rebuked Lactantius for this perverse interpretation. Bünemann.

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(8) ‹anchor: Diffluit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Diffluit. Ita antiquiores ac potiores mss. undecim et nonnulli editi; in caeteris defluit, minus bene.

"Flows apart." So eleven older and better manuscripts and some printed editions; in the rest "defluit" ("flows down"), less well.

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(9) ‹anchor: Verum idem per canem, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Verum idem per canem, etc. Meminit hujus juramenti Athenaeus, lib. ix. Deipnos. Excusat hunc Appollonius apud Philost., lib. vi, quod juraverit per ea, non tamquam per deos, sed ne per deos juraret. Quid dicam de Theologis? Tertul., cap. 14 Apolog. Taceo, inquit, de philosophis, Socrate contentus, qui in contumeliam deorum, Quercum, et Hircum, et Canem dejerabat. Sed propterea damnatus est Socrates, quia deos destruebat. Augustinus, item cap. 2 libri de Vera religione, clementius hoc interpretatur. Interea non negabimus, canem apud Aegyptios deum fuisse; quod non modo Euseb. in Praeparat. Evangelica testatur, sed ipse etiam Plato in Gorgia. Betul. — Socrates dictus scurra Atticus, quia ridibundus pleraque docebat. Praeter Ciceronem, libro i de Natura deorum, cap. 34, et lib. v de Finibus, vide Minucium in Octavio, paulo ante finem.

"But the same man [swore] by the dog," etc. Athenaeus mentions this oath, Deipnosophists book 9. Apollonius [Appollonius, as printed], in Philostratus book 6, excuses him on the ground that he swore by these things not as by gods, but so as not to swear by the gods. What shall I say of the theologians? Tertullian, Apology chapter 14: "I say nothing of the philosophers, content with Socrates, who in contempt of the gods swore by the oak, the goat and the dog. But Socrates was condemned for this very reason, that he was destroying the gods." Augustine likewise, chapter 2 of the book On True Religion, interprets this more mildly. Meanwhile we shall not deny that the dog was a god among the Egyptians, as not only Eusebius attests in the Preparation for the Gospel, but Plato himself in the Gorgias. Betuleius. — Socrates was called "the Attic buffoon" because he taught most things laughing. Besides Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods book 1, chapter 34, and On Ends book 5, see Minucius in the Octavius, a little before the end.

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(10) ‹anchor: O hominem scurram... . Zeno Epicureus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

O hominem scurram... . Zeno Epicureus. Sequitur Ciceronem, lib. i de Nat. deor., cap. 34: Zeno non eos solum qui tum erant, Appollodorum, Syllum, caeteros figebat maledictis; sed Socratem ipsum, parentem philosophiae, latino verbo utens, scurram Atticum fuisse dicebat. Bun.

"O buffoon of a man ... . Zeno the Epicurean." He follows Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods book 1, chapter 34: "Zeno pierced with abuse not only those who were living then, Apollodorus [Appollodorum, as printed], Syllus and the rest; but he said that Socrates himself, the father of philosophy, using a Latin word, was an Attic buffoon (scurra)." Bünemann.

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(11) ‹anchor: Ut ait Zeno Epicureus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut ait Zeno Epicureus. Ideo distinguendus a Zenone Cittio, sive stoico, etiam ab Eleate. Inter octo Zenones Laertius Epicureum hunc octavum ponit, Sidonium genere. Bun.

"As Zeno the Epicurean says." So he is to be distinguished from Zeno of Citium, the Stoic, and also from the Eleatic. Among eight Zenos Laertius puts this Epicurean eighth, a Sidonian by birth. Bünemann.

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Page

  • running head: 415 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN.
  • marginal letters: A aspici a viris nefas habeatur; B invenire quidquam possint; C Nefas habeatur. Comparatio (in the notes area); D c. 22; Propert. l. IV (in the notes area)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: running head cut off at the right edge after DIVIN.; the "a" in impiet⟨a⟩tis is damaged type; a small mark before "Aliquid ergo Socrates" was omitted as a note call; the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE (between the text and the notes) was not set; the Variorum notes at the page foot (Nefas habeatur ... Hieronymus in Apologia) were left for the later pass; the column ends with "suo-", which is split across the column break (suorum).
PL 6:416
simillimus. Ex his unum eligam, quod ab omnibus sit probatum. Celebre hoc proverbium Socrates habuit: « Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos. » Procumbamus igitur in terram, et manus nobis ad praeclara opera datas convertamus in pedes. Nihil ad nos coelum, ad cujus contemplationem sumus excitati; nihil denique lux ipsa pertineat: certe victus nostri causa de coelo est. Quod si hoc sensit, non esse de rebus coelestibus disputandum, ne illorum quidem rationem poterat comprehendere, quae sub pedibus habebat. Quid ergo? num erravit in verbis? Verisimile non est: sed nimirum id sensit, quod locutus est, religioni minime serviendum: quod si aperte diceret, nemo pateretur.
most similar. Of these I shall choose one which is approved by all. Socrates had this celebrated proverb: "What is above us is nothing to us." Let us then fall prostrate on the ground, and turn the hands given to us for splendid works into feet. Heaven, to the contemplation of which we were raised up, is nothing to us; in short, let not even the light itself concern us: yet surely the cause of our sustenance comes from heaven. But if he meant this, that there should be no disputing about heavenly things, he could not even grasp the reason of those things which he had under his feet. What then? Did he err in his words? It is not likely; but no doubt he meant what he said, that religion should by no means be served: and if he had said this openly, no one would have tolerated it.
Quis enim non sentiat, hunc mundum tam mirabili ratione perfectum, aliqua providentia gubernari? quandoquidem nihil est, quod possit sine ullo moderatore consistere. Sic domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur; navis sine gubernatore abit pessum; et corpus, relictum ab anima, diffluit: nedum putemus, tantam illam molem aut construi sine artifice, aut stare tamdiu sine rectore potuisse. Quod si publicas illas religiones voluit evertere, non improbo, quin etiam laudabo, si ipse quod est melius invenerit. Verum idem per canem et anserem dejerabat. O hominem scurram (ut ait Zeno epicureus) inept⟨u⟩m, perditum, desperatum, si cavillari voluit religionem; dementem,
For who would not perceive that this world, completed with such wonderful design, is governed by some providence? since there is nothing that can subsist without any ruler. So a house deserted by its inhabitant falls to pieces; a ship without a helmsman goes to the bottom; and the body, abandoned by the soul, dissolves: much less should we think that so vast a mass could either have been constructed without a craftsman or have stood so long without a governor. But if he wished to overturn those public religions, I do not disapprove; indeed I shall even praise him, if he himself has found what is better. But the same man used to swear by a dog and a goose. O what a buffoon of a man (as Zeno the Epicurean says), foolish, ruined, desperate, if he wished to mock religion; demented,
Editors' notes and page, col. 416

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  • running head: …TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 416 (left part of the head cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A rum simillimus. Ex his unum; B ratione perfectum, aliqua providentia; C Lactantius Socrati paulo iniquior (in the notes); D nem dejerabat. Sed propterea (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-word with the fragment "rum" (sense of "simillimus" supplied tentatively in the English); column ends with "de-" hyphenated across the column break; "inept⟨u⟩m": the vowel is damaged/unclear in the type; full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." stands across both columns above the notes, cut off at the left edge, not set; the Variorum notes at the page foot (Lactantius Socrati paulo iniquior … Bun.) are left for the later apparatus pass
PL 6:417
si hoc serio fecit, ut animal turpissimum pro Deo haberet! Quis jam superstitiones Aegyptiorum audeat reprehendere, quas Socrates Athenis auctoritate confirmavit sua? Illud vero nonne summae vanitatis, quod ante mortem familiares suos rogavit, ut Aesculapio gallum, quem voverat, pro se sacrarent? Timuit videlicet, ne apud Rhadamanthum reciperatorem voti reus fieret ab Aesculapio. Dementissimum hominem putarem, si morbo affectus periisset. Cum vero hoc sanus fecerit, est ipse insanus, qui eum putat fuisse sapientem. En, cujus temporibus natum esse se homo sapiens gratulatur.
if he did this in earnest, so as to hold a most foul animal for a god! Who now would dare to censure the superstitions of the Egyptians, which Socrates confirmed at Athens by his own authority? And is not this a mark of the utmost vanity, that before his death he asked his intimates to sacrifice on his behalf to Aesculapius a cock which he had vowed? He feared, evidently, lest before Rhadamanthus as judge of recovery he be made a defendant on the vow by Aesculapius. I should think him a man utterly demented if he had died afflicted with disease. But since he did this while sound, he himself is unsound who thinks that he was wise. Behold, the man in whose times the wise man congratulates himself on having been born.
CAPUT XXI.
Chapter XXI.
De Platonis doctrina, quae respublicas destrueret.
On the doctrine of Plato, which would destroy commonwealths.
Videamus tamen, quid illum Socrates docuerit, qui cum totam Physicam repudiasset, eo se contulit, ut de virtute atque officio quaereret. Itaque non dubito, quin auditores suos justitiae praeceptis erudierit. Docente igitur Socrate, non fugit Platonem, justitiae vim in aequitate consistere; siquidem omnes pari conditione nascuntur. Ergo nihil (inquit) privati ac proprii habeant: sed ut pares esse possint, quod
Let us see, however, what Socrates taught him, who, having rejected all of Physics, betook himself to inquiring into virtue and duty. And so I do not doubt that he instructed his hearers in the precepts of justice. Under the teaching of Socrates, therefore, it did not escape Plato that the force of justice consists in equity, since all are born in equal condition. Therefore, he says, let them have nothing private and their own; but, so that they may be able to be equal, which
Editors' notes and page, col. 417

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 7 runs from the foot of the left note column to the head of the right; note 16 runs over to page 213. --> (printed under page 212)

(1) ‹anchor: Aesculapio gallum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Aesculapio gallum. Qua de re vide Tertullianum de Corona militis.

"A cock to Aesculapius." On this see Tertullian, On the Soldier's Crown.

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(2) ‹anchor: Pro se sacrarent› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Pro se sacrarent. Sic ferunt omnes editi cunctique fere mss. inter quos sunt 4, veterrimi. Duo Reg. vet. habent, ut et in Epitom., cap. 37, prosecrarent, quod verbum non admittit lingua latina. Recentiores duo, prosecant; alii, procurarent; 3, consecrarent.— At Legitur prosecrarent apud Buneman, qui hujus vocis sic rationem reddit:— In tanta librorum variatione tutius putavi antiquissimorum codicum scripturam exhibere. Stephanus Baluzius ad libr. de Mort. Persec., c. 33: Melius, inquit, ut arbitror, codex regius 3735, prosecrarent. Bun.

"That they should consecrate for themselves." So all the printed editions give it, and almost all the manuscripts, among them 4 of the oldest. Two old Royal manuscripts have, as also in the Epitome, chapter 37, "prosecrarent", a word the Latin language does not admit. Two more recent ones, "prosecant"; others, "procurarent"; 3, "consecrarent". — But "prosecrarent" is read in Bünemann, who gives his reason for this word thus: — In so great a variation among the books I thought it safer to present the reading of the oldest codices. Étienne Baluze on the book On the Deaths of the Persecutors, chapter 33: "Better," he says, "as I judge, the Royal codex 3735: prosecrarent." Bünemann.

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(3) ‹anchor: Rhadamanthum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Rhadamanthum. Inferorum judicem. Virgil. Aeneid. vi, v. 566.

"Rhadamanthus." Judge of the underworld. Virgil, Aeneid 6, line 566.

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(4) ‹anchor: Reciperatorem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Reciperatorem. Ita reposui ex antiquissimo 900 annor. ms. codice Regio; et sic legendum esse censebant eruditi viri Th. Canterus, Jo. Cauci, et Gallaeus. Recuperator enim et recupero sunt ab antiquo verbo reciperare, ut recte annotavit Paulus Franciscus Bescoviensis in suo Thesauro eruditionis scholasticae, in-folio, Francofurti, 1622. Huic lectioni nostrae favent mss. Marm. cui est receperatorem; ms. 29 et edit. 9, per compendium, receptorem; 1 Reg. rec. et 9 edit. rec., recuperatorem; ms. Ultr. imperatorem, corrupte. Reciperatores autem, vel si mavis, recuperatores dicti sunt, qui de rebus privatis recipiendis reddendisque suo domino dolo ac fraude subductis cognoscebant. Gell. xx, 1; Livius, xxvi, 48.

"Recoverer." So I have restored it from the very old Royal manuscript codex, nine hundred years old; and so the learned men Theodore Canter, John Cauci and Gallaeus judged it should be read. For "recuperator" and "recupero" come from the old verb "reciperare", as Paulus Franciscus of Bescow rightly noted in his Thesaurus of Scholastic Learning, folio, Frankfurt, 1622. In favour of this reading of ours are the Marm. manuscript, which has "receperatorem"; manuscript 29 and 9 editions, in abbreviation, "receptorem"; 1 recent Royal and 9 recent editions, "recuperatorem"; the Utrecht manuscript "imperatorem", corruptly. "Reciperatores", or if you prefer "recuperatores", was the name for those who heard cases about recovering private property taken from its owner by deceit or fraud, and restoring it. Gellius 20, 1; Livy 26, 48.

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(5) ‹anchor: Putat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Putat. Ex 18 mss. est, inter quos sunt vetustissimi Regii. Caeteri cum editis habent, putet.

"He thinks." It comes from 18 manuscripts, among them the oldest Royal ones. The rest, with the printed editions, have "putet".

(printed under page 212)

(6) ‹anchor: Fuisse› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Fuisse. Haud secus legi debet ex mss. antiquissimis., 1 Bonon., 2 Reg. aliisque tribus; melius quam esse in caeteris.

"To have been." It must be read no otherwise, from the oldest manuscripts, 1 Bologna, 2 Royal and three others; better than "esse" in the rest.

(printed under page 212)

(7) ‹anchor: Justitiae, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Justitiae, etc. Mallem cum Thysio legere aequalitate, ob ea quae sequuntur, pari conditione... ut pares esse possint. Sed et aequitas pro aequalitate usurpatur a Seneca. Justitiae vim in aequitate. Aequalitatem ego malim, non quod aequitas, quae Graecis ἐπιεικὲς dicitur, fundamentum justitiae non sit, ut ipse Plato, Arist. et post hos Cic. quoque docet abunde: sed Lactantium τὸ ἴσον, sive τὴν ἰσότητα, quam Cic. solet aequalitatem interpretari, intelligere, ipsa communio de qua quaestio est, evincit. Quamquam non desint, qui ἰσότητα etiam aequitatem transferunt, eam intelligentes, quae Varroni est parilitas. Plato de Legibus quinto et sexto, necnon Aristoteles in quinto Ethicor. Betul.

"Of justice," etc. I would rather read with Thysius "aequalitate" ("in equality"), because of what follows: "on equal terms ... that they may be equal". But Seneca too uses "aequitas" for "aequalitas". "The force of justice [lies] in equity." I would prefer "equality", not because equity, which the Greeks call "the reasonable", is not the foundation of justice, as Plato himself, Aristotle, and after them Cicero too teach abundantly; but that Lactantius means "the equal", or "equality", which Cicero is wont to render "aequalitas", is proved by the very community of goods that is in question. Though there are those who translate "isotes" also as "aequitas", meaning by it what in Varro is "parilitas" (likeness). Plato, Laws books 5 and 6; also Aristotle in book 5 of the Ethics. Betuleius.

(printed under page 212)

(8) ‹anchor: In aequitate› · no call (lemma-keyed)

In aequitate. Legitur vero in aqualitate apud Buneman, qui notam sequentem exhibet. — In aequalitate. Sic l. v, cap. 14, sq.: Aequitatem dico... se cum caeteris coaequandi, quam Cicero aequabilitatem vocat... omnes aequos, id est, pares esse....... omnibus aequitatem... largitur... aequo jure.

"In equity." But "in aqualitate" [as printed] is read in Bünemann, who gives the following note. — "In equality." So book 5, chapter 14 and following: "I mean equity ... of making oneself equal with the rest, which Cicero calls 'aequabilitas' ... that all are equal (aequos), that is, on a par ....... he bestows equity on all ... with equal right."

(printed under page 212)

(9) ‹anchor: Possideant› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Possideant. Ms. 1 Bonon. antiq., possidebunt.

"Let them possess." The 1 old Bologna manuscript has "possidebunt" ("they will possess").

(printed under page 212)

(10) ‹anchor: Ferri hoc potest› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ferri hoc potest. Mss. 2 rec. cum 5 editis, fieri; 1 Reg. rec., Fieri hoc non potest.— Ferri hoc potest, quamdiu. Pro recepta, est Epitom. cap. 38: De patrimoniis tolerabile est... potest aliquo modo ferri. Bun.

"This can be borne." Two recent manuscripts with 5 printed editions have "fieri" ("be done"); 1 recent Royal, "Fieri hoc non potest". — "This can be borne, as long as." For the received reading is the Epitome, chapter 38: "As to patrimonies it is tolerable ... it can be borne in some fashion." Bünemann.

(printed under page 212)

(11) ‹anchor: Matrimonia quoque, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Matrimonia quoque, etc. Cum alibi, tum. in 5 de Rep. Disputat contra hanc Aristoteles in ii de Rep. item ex Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus Eusebius lib. xiii de Praeparat. Evang., cap. 12. Notatur ab Epiphanio tom. ii, lib. iii, a Chrysostomo, homilia 1 in Matth. et Actis capite ii. Atque idem Epiph. t. ii, l. i. Bet.

"Marriages too," etc. Both elsewhere and in book 5 of the Republic. Aristotle argues against this in book 2 of the Politics; likewise, among Church writers, Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel book 13, chapter 12. It is censured by Epiphanius, volume 2, book 3; by Chrysostom, homily 1 on Matthew, and on Acts, chapter 2. And the same Epiphanius, volume 2, book 1. Betuleius.

(printed under page 212)

(12) ‹anchor: Si patientes sunt› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Si patientes sunt. In scriptis 10 et vulgatis 4 legitur, patientes. Ald., sapientes.

"If they are long-suffering." In 10 manuscripts and 4 common editions "patientes" is read. The Aldine has "sapientes" ("wise").

(printed under page 212)

(13) ‹anchor: Ut vicibus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut vicibus. Sic reposui ex melioribus cunctis ferme mss. et 9 vetustioribus editis. In 7 scriptis et 8 rec. vulgatis est, et vicibus.

"So that by turns." So I have restored it from almost all the better manuscripts and 9 older editions. In 7 manuscripts and 8 recent common editions it is "et vicibus".

(printed under page 212)

(14) ‹anchor: Beatas civitates futuras› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Beatas civitates futuras. Haec Socratis sententia est in v de Rep. Vide Cic. ad Quintum fratrem epist. 1, cujus haec sunt verba: Atque ille quidem princeps ingenii et doctrina Plato, tum denique fore beatas Respublicas putavit, si aut docti, aut sapientes homines eas regere coepissent, aut qui regerent, omne suum studium in doctrina ac sapientia collocassent. Extat de eodem argumento libellus Plutarchi. Non id vero agit Lactantius, ut velit hoc dictum improbare: sed ut appareat, nec Socratem, nec Platonem inter sapientes esse numerandos, idque ex eventu; et ut ait S. Ambrosius, quod non veram, sed fictam et adumbratam dumtaxat Rempublicam descripserint. Betul.

"That cities would be happy." This saying of Socrates is in book 5 of the Republic. See Cicero to his brother Quintus, letter 1, whose words are these: "And that prince of genius and learning, Plato, thought that commonwealths would at last be happy if either learned or wise men began to rule them, or those who ruled them devoted all their effort to learning and wisdom." There is a little book of Plutarch on the same subject. But Lactantius does not aim at condemning this saying, but at showing that neither Socrates nor Plato is to be counted among the wise, and that from the outcome; and, as St Ambrose says, because they described not a real commonwealth but only a feigned and shadowy one. Betuleius.

(printed under page 212)

(15) ‹anchor: Qui› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui. Hanc vocem restitui ex mss. 6 Reg., 6 Colb. aliisque septem, editis octo vet. et 3 rec. Deest in 3 Regiis totidemque excusis.

"Who." I have restored this word from the manuscripts 6 Royal, 6 Colbert and seven others, and eight old and 3 recent printed editions. It is lacking in 3 Royal manuscripts and as many printed editions.

(printed under page 212)

(16) ‹anchor: Quam vero intulit rationem turpissimi hujus consilii› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quam vero intulit rationem turpissimi hujus consilii. Editi octo rec. Cum vero. Reposui Quam interroga- (continues)

"But what reason did he bring for this most shameful plan?" Eight recent editions have "Cum vero". I have restored "Quam" as an interroga- (continues)

(printed under page 212)

Page

  • running head: 417 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHIL[OSOPHORUM] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A mentem, si hoc serio fecit; B Videamus tamen, quid illum Socrates docuerit; C verbum non admittit lingua latina (in the Variorum Notae); D corrupte. Reciperatores autem (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "sanusfecerit" printed without a word space, set as sanus fecerit; a stray mark after "ante" before "mortem" ignored; the VARIORUM NOTAE heading, centred across the page, and the notes beneath it (Aesculapio gallum ... qui isoteta) are page-foot apparatus, not set; the column ends mid-sentence at "quod"
PL 6:418
justitiae ratio desiderat, omnia in commune possideant. Ferri hoc potest, quamdiu de pecunia dici videtur. Quod ipsum quam impossibile sit, et quam injustum, poteram multis rebus ostendere. Concedamus tamen, ut possit fieri. Omnes enim sapientes erunt, et pecuniam contemnent. Quo ergo illum communitas ista perduxit? Matrimonia quoque inquit, communia esse debebunt: scilicet ut ad eamdem mulierem multi viri, tamquam canes confluant; et is utique obtineat, qui viribus vicerit: aut si patientes sunt, ut philosophi, expectent, ut vicibus, tamquam lupanar obeant. O miram Platonis aequitatem! Ubi est igitur virtus castitatis? ubi fides conjugalis? quae si tollas, omnis justitia sublata est. At idem dixit, beatas civitates futuras fuisse, si aut philosophi regnarent, aut reges philosopharentur. Huic vero tam justo, tam aequo viro regnum dares, qui aliis abstulisset sua, aliis condonasset aliena; prostituisset pudicitiam foeminarum: quae nullus unquam non modo rex, sed ne tyrannus quidem fecit.
the principle of justice requires, they should possess all things in common. This can be borne, so long as it seems to be said of money. How impossible and how unjust this very thing is, I could show by many considerations. Let us grant, however, that it can be done. For all will be wise, and will despise money. To what, then, did that community lead him? Marriages too, he says, will have to be common: that is, so that many men may flock together to the same woman like dogs; and that he certainly should obtain her who has prevailed by strength: or, if they are patient, like philosophers, that they should wait, so as to visit her by turns, as they would a brothel. O the wonderful equity of Plato! Where then is the virtue of chastity? where is conjugal fidelity? If you take these away, all justice is removed. But the same man said that states would have been happy if either philosophers reigned or kings philosophized. Yet to this man, so just, so equitable, you would give a kingdom, who would have taken from some what was theirs, and bestowed on others what belonged to others; who would have prostituted the chastity of women: things which no one ever did, not only no king, but not even a tyrant.
Quam vero intulit rationem turpissimi hujus consilii? Sic inquit: Civitas concors erit, et amoris mutui constricta vinculis, si omnes omnium fuerint
But what reason did he bring forward for this most shameful counsel? Thus he says: The state will be harmonious, and bound by the bonds of mutual love, if all shall belong to all
Editors' notes and page, col. 418

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  • running head: [cut off at left edge] APIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 418
  • marginal letters: A ‹justitiae ratio desiderat›; B ‹philosophi regnarent, aut reges›; C ‹tate. Sic l. v, cap. 14› (in the editors' notes, not set); D ‹vulgatis est, et vicibus› (in the editors' notes, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: full-width line ‹[...]UM NOTAE.› (heading of the editors' notes, cut off at the left edge) stands between the text block and the page-foot notes, not set; the editors' notes at the page foot (from ‹etiam aequitatem transferunt› to ‹Reposui Quam interroga-›) are left for the later pass; column ends mid-sentence at ‹fuerint›; the slight mark over ‹quam› in ‹et quam injustum› is taken as a stray mark, not a letter; foeminarum printed with œ ligature
PL 6:419
et mariti, et patres, et uxores, et liberi. Quae ista confusio generis humani est! Quomodo servari potest caritas, ubi nihil est certum quod ametur? Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diliget, nisi habitaverint semper una, nisi devota mens, et servata invicem fides individuam fecerit charitatem? quae virtus in illa promiscua voluptate locum non habet. Item si omnes omnium liberi sint, quis amare liberos tamquam suos poterit, cum suos esse aut ignoret, aut dubitet? quis honorem tamquam patri deferet, cum unde natus sit nesciat? Ex quo fit, ut non tantum alienum pro patre habeat, sed etiam patrem pro alieno. Quid, quod uxor potest esse communis, filius non potest, quem concipi non nisi ex uno necesse est. Perit ergo illi uni communitas, ipsa reclamante natura. Superest, ut tantummodo concordiae causa uxores velit esse communes. At nulla vehementior discordiarum causa est, quam unius foeminae a multis maribus appetitio. In quo Plato, si ratione non potuit, exemplis certe potuit admoneri, et mutorum animalium, quae ob hoc vel acerrime pugnant, et hominum, qui semper ob eam rem gravissima inter se bella gesserunt.
both husbands, and fathers, and wives, and children. What a confusion of the human race this is! How can love be preserved where there is nothing certain to be loved? What man will love a woman, or what woman a man, unless they have always lived together, unless a devoted mind and faith kept towards each other have made their love indivisible? This virtue has no place in that promiscuous pleasure. Likewise, if all are the children of all, who will be able to love children as his own, when he either does not know or doubts that they are his own? Who will pay honour [to anyone] as to a father, when he does not know from whom he was born? From this it comes about that he not only holds a stranger to be his father, but also his father to be a stranger. What of the fact that a wife can be common, but a son cannot, since he must necessarily be conceived from one man alone? Therefore for that one the community perishes, nature herself protesting. It remains that he wishes wives to be common only for the sake of concord. But there is no more violent cause of discords than the seeking of one woman by many males. In this Plato, if he could not be admonished by reason, could certainly have been admonished by examples, both of the dumb animals, which for this reason fight most fiercely, and of men, who on this account have always waged the gravest wars among themselves.
CAPUT XXII
Chapter XXII.
De Platonis praeceptis, iisdemque reprehensis.
On the precepts of Plato, and the same refuted.
Restat ut communio ista nihil aliud habeat, praeter adulteria, et libidines; propter quas funditus eruendas, virtus est vel maxime necessaria. Itaque non invenit conco⟨r⟩diam, quam quaerebat; quia non videbat, unde oriatur. Nam justitia in extrapositis nihil
It remains that this community has nothing else but adulteries and lusts, for the uprooting of which virtue is most especially necessary. Therefore he did not find the concord which he was seeking, because he did not see whence it arises. For in external things justice has nothing
Editors' notes and page, col. 419

Footnotes

<!-- Headed "VARIORUM NOTAE". Notes keyed by lemma, not call letters; numbered here in print order. Note 1 continues from page 212. Notes 1–8 in the left note column, 9–13 in the right. --> (printed under page 213)

(1) ‹anchor: Quam vero intulit rationem turpissimi hujus consilii (p. 212)› · no call (lemma-keyed)

(continued) tionis sensu ex veteribus impressis et omnibus mss. nisi quod 15 pro vero legunt tamen.

(printed under page 213)

(2) ‹anchor: Devota mens› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Devota mens. Thysio devota mens explicatur votis adstricta; sed majorem vim devotus in se habet, et subst. devotio. Perpende, l. v, cap. 7: Devota Deo suo fides. L. ii, cap. 12: Devotione summa servire. De Opif., cap. xix: Non fidem devotionemque prodere. Bun.

"A devoted mind." By Thysius "devota mens" is explained as "bound by vows"; but "devotus", and the noun "devotio", carry a greater force. Weigh book 5, chapter 7: "faith devoted to its God"; book 2, chapter 12: "to serve with the highest devotion"; On the Workmanship [of God], chapter 19: "not to betray faith and devotion." Bünemann.

(printed under page 213)

(3) ‹anchor: Individuam... charitatem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Individuam...charitatem. Stylo Cypriani, l. ii, ep. 4, ed. Erasm., Honori nos vestro charitas individua connectit. Bun.

"Undivided ... love." In the style of Cyprian, book 2, letter 4, Erasmus's edition: "Undivided love binds us to your honour." Bünemann.

(printed under page 213)

(4) ‹anchor: Perit ergo illi uni communitas› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Perit ergo illi uni communitas. Reposuit illi uni, scilicet filio. Quae lectio maxime omnium probatur ex 19 mss. et edit. vet. Rom., Egnat., Fasit., Betul. Legitur in 3 Reg. et 5 vulgatis recentioribus, illi una; in Goth. illa una; quorum vice est matrimonii in impressis quinque.

"So community perishes for that one alone." He restored "illi uni", namely the son. This reading is the best supported of all, by 19 manuscripts and the old Rome edition, Egnatius, Fasit., Betuleius. In 3 Royal and 5 more recent common editions is read "illi una"; in the Gotha, "illa una"; in place of which five printed editions have "matrimonii".

(printed under page 213)

(5) ‹anchor: Velit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Velit. Sic reposui ex antiquissimo codice Regio aliisque sex, referendo ad Platonem; et illud requirunt ea quae praecedunt, et quae sequuntur. Mss. septem cum editis, velint.

"He would wish." So I have restored it from the very old Royal codex and six others, referring it to Plato; and what precedes and what follows require this. Seven manuscripts, with the printed editions, have "velint" ("they would wish").

(printed under page 213)

(6) ‹anchor: Qui semper› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui semper. Mss. 7 rec., Qui saepe.

"Who always." Seven recent manuscripts have "Qui saepe" ("who often").

(printed under page 213)

(7) ‹anchor: In extrapositis› · no call (lemma-keyed)

In extrapositis. Stoici non modo res fortuitas, sed etiam corpora ipsa extra nos esse credunt, ut ex Epicteti Enchiridio manifestum est. Non male cum ipsius Christi doctrina congruit, qui rapinas, adulteria, hoc est ὀρέξεις, quae e nobis egrediantur, hominem duntaxat inquinare affirmavit. Betuleius.

"In things placed outside." The Stoics believe that not only chance things but even bodies themselves are outside us, as is clear from Epictetus's Enchiridion. It agrees not badly with the teaching of Christ himself, who affirmed that robberies and adulteries, that is, the appetites that come out of us, are what defile a man. Betuleius.

(printed under page 213)

(8) ‹anchor: Cum animi pares fuerint› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Cum animi pares fuerint. Par animi Lactantius dicit per Graecismum. Fuerint reposui ex mss. et editis Betul., Tornes., Walch., Soubron. Sint caeterorum vulgatorum est.

"When they are equal in mind." Lactantius says "par animi" by a Grecism. I have restored "fuerint" from the manuscripts and the editions of Betuleius, Tornesius, Walch and Soubron. "Sint" is the reading of the other common editions.

(printed under page 213)

(9) ‹anchor: Nam si justitia, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Nam si justitia, etc. Justitia namque virtutes in se complectitur omnes, ut Aristoteles in v Moralium dicit. Matrem aliarum virtutum vocat, quod reliquas veluti filias in suo quasi sinu et gremio fovet. De quo vide etiam Joannem Stobeum.

"For if justice," etc. For justice embraces all the virtues in itself, as Aristotle says in book 5 of the Ethics. He calls it the mother of the other virtues, because it cherishes the rest like daughters, as it were in its bosom and lap. On this see also John Stobaeus.

(printed under page 213)

(10) ‹anchor: Tulit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Tulit. Tulit haud raro ponitur pro sustulit, abstulit. Iterum ipse Lactantius in Epit. c. 29, ex Gellio: Si tuleris unum, abstuleris utrumque. Ambros. l. i, Off., cap. 32: Tolle ex usu hominum benevolentiam, tamquam solem e mundo tuleris, ita erit. L. iii. Off., cap. 5: Solum lanceam... et lenticulam tulit aquae. Bun.

"Took." "Tulit" is not rarely used for "sustulit, abstulit" ("took away"). Again Lactantius himself, Epitome chapter 29, from Gellius: "If you take one, you will have taken away both." Ambrose, On Duties book 1, chapter 32: "Take benevolence out of men's dealings, and it will be as if you had taken the sun from the world." Book 3 of On Duties, chapter 5: "He took only the spear ... and the little flask of water." Bünemann.

(printed under page 213)

(11) ‹anchor: Siquidem nihil fuerit, quod abstineatur, alienum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Siquidem nihil fuerit, quod abstineatur, alienum. Hanc lectionem retinent quamplurimi mss. et excusi: et optima est, quidquid dicat Thomasius; nam rectissime dicimus, rem aliquam abstineri, quasi procul teneri ac prohiberi. Lact. lib. vii, cap. 17: abstinebat imbres, etc. Livius: Romano bello, Fortuna Alexandrum magnum abstinuit. Mss. 16, rec. et editi octo legunt, siquidem nihil fuerit, quo abstineatur; Bon. siquidem nullus fuerit, qui abstineat alieno. Ex. Isaeo.

"Since there will be nothing belonging to another to be kept from." Very many manuscripts and printed editions keep this reading; and it is the best, whatever Thomasius may say. For we say quite correctly that a thing "is kept off", as if held far off and forbidden. Lactantius book 7, chapter 17: "he held back the rains," etc. Livy: "Fortune kept Alexander the Great from a Roman war." Sixteen recent manuscripts and eight printed editions read "siquidem nihil fuerit, quo abstineatur"; the Bologna, "siquidem nullus fuerit, qui abstineat alieno". From Isaeus.

(printed under page 213)

(12) ‹anchor: Ac nepotes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ac nepotes. Id est, consumptores. Horat. Epod. 1, ἄσωτοι, intemperantes, et patrimonii dissipatores. In mss. 1 Reg., 1 Colbert., Pal. et Brun. legitur, ac perditi, quod est interpretatio vocis nepotes. — Luxuriosi ac nepotes. Cicero pro Quintio cap. 12: « Quis tam perditus ac profusus nepos non adesa jam, sed abundanti etiam pecunia sic dissolutus fuisset, ut fuit S. Naevius. » Bun.

"And spendthrifts." That is, squanderers. Horace, Epode 1: "prodigals", the intemperate and dissipaters of a patrimony. In the manuscripts 1 Royal, 1 Colbert, Palatine and Brun. is read "ac perditi" ("and abandoned men"), which is an interpretation of the word "nepotes". — "Wanton men and spendthrifts." Cicero for Quinctius, chapter 12: "What spendthrift so abandoned and lavish, with his money not already eaten away but even abundant, would have been as dissolute as Sextus Naevius was?" Bünemann.

(printed under page 213)

(13) ‹anchor: Dicam› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Dicam. Ita mss. At editi, dico.

"I would say." So the manuscripts. But the printed editions have "dico" ("I say").

(printed under page 213)

Page

  • running head: 419 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A et mariti, et patres; B reclamante natura. Superest; C invenit concotdiam, quam quaerebat; D ex 19 mss. et edit. vet. Rom. (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: conco⟨r⟩diam: the r is printed damaged, looking like a t; stray mark between concipi and non ignored; caritas and charitatem both printed as set; the VARIORUM NOTAE heading is printed across both columns and is cut off at the image edge, it heads the notes at the page foot and is not set; editors' matter: none in the text block
PL 6:420
momenti habet, ne in corpore quidem: sed tota in hominis mente versatur. Qui ergo vult homines adaequare, non matrimonia, non opes subtrahere debet; sed arrogantiam, superbiam, tumorem, ut illi potentes et elati pares esse se etiam mendicissimis sciant. Detracta enim divitibus insolentia et iniquitate, nihil intererit utrumne alii divites, alii pauperes sint, cum animi pares fuerint; quod efficere nulla res alia praeter religionem Dei potest. Putavit igitur se invenisse justitiam, cum eam prorsus everterit; quia non rerum fragilium, sed mentium debet esset communitas. Nam si justitia virtutum omnium mater est, cum illae singulae tolluntur, ipsa subvertitur. Tulit autem Plato ante omnia frugalitatem: quae utique nulla est, ubi proprii nihil habeatur. Tulit abstinentiam: siquidem nihil fuerit, quod abstineatur, alienum. Tulit temperantiam, tulit castitatem; quae virtutes in utroque sexu maximae sunt. Tulit verecundiam, pudorem, modestiam, si honesta et legitima esse incipiunt, quae solent flagitiosa et turpia judicari. Sic virtutem dum vult omnibus dare, omnibus adimit. Nam rerum proprietas, et vitiorum, et virtutum materiam continet: communitas autem nihil aliud, quam vitiorum licentiam. Nam viri, qui multas mulieres habent, nihil aliud dici possunt, quam luxuriosi ac nepotes. Item mulieres, quae a multis habentur, non utique adulterae, quia certum matrimonium nullum est, sed prostitutae ac meretrices sint necesse est.
of importance, not even in the body: but it dwells wholly in the mind of man. He, therefore, who wishes to make men equal ought to take away not marriages, not riches, but arrogance, pride, conceit, so that those who are powerful and lofty may know that they are equal even to the most beggarly. For when insolence and iniquity have been taken away from the rich, it will make no difference whether some are rich and others poor, since they will be equal in spirit; and nothing else can bring this about except the religion of God. He thought, therefore, that he had found justice, when he had utterly overturned it; because the community ought to be not of fragile things but of minds. For if justice is the mother of all the virtues, when they are taken away one by one, it itself is overthrown. But Plato took away before all else frugality, which certainly does not exist where nothing of one's own is held. He took away abstinence, since there will be nothing belonging to another from which one may abstain. He took away temperance, he took away chastity, virtues which are the greatest in either sex. He took away modesty, shame, restraint, if those things begin to be honourable and lawful which are usually judged shameful and base. Thus, while he wishes to give virtue to all, he takes it away from all. For the ownership of things contains the material both of vices and of virtues: but community contains nothing other than licence for vices. For men who have many women can be called nothing other than lustful men and prodigals. Likewise women who are had by many must necessarily be, not indeed adulteresses, since there is no fixed marriage, but prostitutes and harlots.
Redegit ergo humanam vitam ad similitudinem, non dicam mutorum, sed pecudum ac belluarum. Nam volucres pene omnes faciunt matrimonia, et
He reduced human life, therefore, to the likeness, I will not say of dumb creatures, but of cattle and beasts. For almost all birds form marriages, and
Editors' notes and page, col. 420

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  • running head: [LA]CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 420 (first letters cut off at the left edge)
  • marginal letters: A momenti habet, ne in corpore quidem; B habeatur. Tulit abstinentiam; C non dicam mutorum; D Siquidem nihil fuerit (beside the editors' notes at the page foot)
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  • other: full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE." printed across the page below the text block, cut off at the left edge; not set. Variorum notes at the page foot not set (later pass). Column ends mid-sentence at "et". "belluarum" slightly blurred in print but read as such.
PL 6:421
paria junguntur, et nidos suos tamquam geniales toros concordi mente defendunt; et foetus suos, quia certi sunt, amant; et si alienos objeceris, abigunt. At homo sapiens contra morem hominum, contraque naturam, stultiora sibi, quae imitaretur, elegit. Et quoniam videbat in caeteris animalibus officia marium foeminarumque non esse divisa, existimavit oportere etiam mulieres militare, et consiliis publicis interesse, et magistratus gerere, et imperia suscipere. Itaque his arma et equos assignavit: consequens est, ut lanam et telam viris, et infantium gestationes. Nec vidit impossibilia esse, quae diceret; ex eo quod adhuc in orbe terrae, neque tam stulta, neque tam vana ulla gens extiterit, quae hoc modo viveret.
are joined in pairs, and with one accord they defend their nests as though they were marriage beds; and they love their young because they are certain of them; and if you put strange ones before them, they drive them away. But the wise man, against the custom of men and against nature, chose for himself more foolish things to imitate. And since he saw that among the other animals the duties of males and females are not divided, he judged that women too ought to serve as soldiers, take part in public councils, hold magistracies and assume commands. Accordingly he assigned them arms and horses: it follows that [he assigned] wool and the loom to men, and the carrying of infants. Nor did he see that the things he was saying were impossible, from the fact that up to now no nation on the face of the earth has existed so foolish or so empty as to live in this way.
CAPUT XXIII.
Chapter XXIII.
De erroribus quorumdam philosophorum, deque sole et luna.
On the errors of certain philosophers, and on the sun and the moon.
Cum igitur in tanta vanitate ipsi philosophorum principes deprehendantur, quid illos minores putabimus, qui numquam sibi tam sapientes videri solent,
Since, then, the very leaders of the philosophers are caught in such great emptiness, what shall we think of those lesser ones, who never usually seem to themselves so wise,
Editors' notes and page, col. 421

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Paria junguntur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Paria junguntur. Ita mss. 3 Reg., 2 Bonon., Cauc., Jun., Cant., Coth., 1 Colb., etc., edit. vet. Rom., Ald., Paris., Florent., et 7 alii, 1 Reg. et 2 Lips. habent conjunguntur; quamplures mss. jungunt; tres rec. et plures edd. conjungunt. Columbarum genus hoc maxime nomine celebratur ab Aristotele, lib. ix Histor. Animalium, cap. 7; et a Plinio, libro x, cap. 34.

"They are joined in pairs." So the manuscripts 3 Royal, 2 Bologna, Cauc., Junius, Cambridge, Gotha [Coth., as printed], 1 Colbert, etc., the old Rome edition, the Aldine, Paris, Florence and 7 others. One Royal and 2 Leipzig have "conjunguntur"; a great many manuscripts "jungunt"; three recent ones and several editions "conjungunt". The race of doves is especially praised on this account by Aristotle, History of Animals book 9, chapter 7, and by Pliny, book 10, chapter 34.

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(2) ‹anchor: Geniales toros› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Geniales toros. Optima lectio, quae est quamplurimorum mss. et edit. Is., Spark., Walch. In caeteris vulgatis et decem scriptis est, genitales. At lectus genialis est apud Horat. lib. i, epist. 1, Pers. Satyr. 2, v. 3.

"Marriage beds." The best reading, that of very many manuscripts and of the editions of Isaeus, Spark and Walch. In the other common editions and ten manuscripts it is "genitales". But "lectus genialis" is in Horace, Epistles book 1, letter 1, and Persius, Satire 2, line 3.

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(3) ‹anchor: Et quoniam videbat› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et quoniam videbat. Omnia omnium maris ac foeminae miscet officia Plato, lib. vii de Legibus, et in exemplum affert Amazonas, Laconicas virgines, atque mulieres Sarmatas et Ponticas. Quidni etiam lib. v de Republica docet, mulieres aeque ut viros ad munia subeunda idoneas, nisi quod sint aliquanto imbecilliores? Sed hoc institutum reprehendit Aristoteles, cap. 4, lib. ii de Republica. Taxantur haec eadem ab Eusebio, lib. iii de Praeparat. Evangelica, cap. 12. In christiana republica mulieribus Ecclesiae muneribus interdictum est. Betuleius.

"And since he saw." Plato mixes all the duties of male and female, Laws book 7, and brings as examples the Amazons, the Spartan maidens, and the Sarmatian and Pontic women. Why, in book 5 of the Republic he also teaches that women are as fit as men to take up public duties, except that they are somewhat weaker. But Aristotle censures this institution, Politics book 2, chapter 4. The same things are criticized by Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel book 3 [as printed], chapter 12. In the Christian commonwealth women are barred from the offices of the Church. Betuleius.

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(4) ‹anchor: Ut lanam et telam viris, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut lanam et telam viris, etc. S. Epiphanius, episcopus Constantiae Cypri, contra haereses varias scribens, in tertio libro variarum gentium mores recenset, taleque quiddam de Seris refert.

"As wool and the loom to men," etc. St Epiphanius, bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, writing against various heresies, reviews the customs of various peoples in the third book, and reports something of this kind about the Seres.

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(5) ‹anchor: Neque tam vana› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Neque tam vana. Sic reposui ex omnibus prope mss. et 10 vet. excusis. In 1 Colb. et in edit. Ald. legitur varia pro vana; in scriptis 3 Reg. et Marm. ac 7 impressis rec. neque tam sapiens.

"Nor so vain." So I have restored it from almost all the manuscripts and 10 old printed editions. In 1 Colbert and the Aldine edition "varia" is read for "vana"; in the manuscripts 3 Royal and Marm. and 7 recent printed editions, "neque tam sapiens" ("nor so wise").

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(6) ‹anchor: In tanta vanitate› · no call (lemma-keyed)

In tanta vanitate. Editi 5 cum 1 Reg., varietate.

"In so great vanity." Five printed editions with 1 Royal have "varietate" ("variety").

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(7) ‹anchor: Minores› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Minores. Id est, famae inferioris philosophos, de quibus mox sermo habebitur.

"The lesser." That is, philosophers of lower repute, of whom there will be discussion shortly.

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(8) ‹anchor: In tranquillo› · no call (lemma-keyed)

In tranquillo. Goth., Lips. tert. et Reimm: In tranquillum, sc. mare. Praefero receptam ex aliis mss. et vett. edd. omnibus. Tranquillum opponitur tempestati: in tranquillo, id est, cum tranquillum est. Seneca in Agamemn. iii, 682: Tranquillo male confisae credunt iterum pelago audaces. Livius l. xxvi: Non tranquillo navigamus: sed jam aliquot procellis submersi pene sumus. L. xxvi: Milites tranquillo in altum provecti. Bun.

"In calm weather." The Gotha, the third Leipzig and Reimmann's: "In tranquillum", understanding "mare" ("into the calm sea"). I prefer the received reading, from the other manuscripts and all the old editions. Calm is opposed to storm: "in tranquillo", that is, when it is calm. Seneca, Agamemnon 3, 682: "Ill-trusting the calm, they boldly trust the sea again." Livy book 26: "We are not sailing in calm weather; already we have almost been sunk by several squalls." Book 26: "The soldiers, carried out to the deep in calm weather." Bünemann.

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(9) ‹anchor: Unde possent› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Unde possent. Sic restitui ex omnibus mss. et edd. praeter 2 Reg. rec. et edd. 5, in quibus est, unde putant.

"Whence they could." So I have restored it from all the manuscripts and editions except 2 recent Royal and 5 editions, in which it is "unde putant" ("whence they think").

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(10) ‹anchor: Democritus› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Democritus. Aliter Valer. Max. lib. viii, cap. 7: At Democritus, inquit, cum divitiis censeri posset, quae tantae fuerunt, ut pater ejus Xerxis exercitui epulum dare facile potuerit, quo magis vacuo animo studiis litterarum esset operatus, parva admodum summa retenta, patrimonium suum patriae donavit. Laert. scribit, ipsum suam portionem inter fratres divisisse, sibique aliquantum pecuniae in viaticum peregrinationis reservasse. Seneca in libro de Providentia: Democritus, inquit, divitias projecit, onus illas bonae mentis existimans. Cic. de Finib. v ad Lactantium propius accedit: Cur haec eadem Democritus, qui (vere falsone quaereremus) dicitur oculis se privasse? Certe ut quam minime animus a cogitationibus abduceretur, patrimonium neglexit, agros deseruit incultos: quid quaerens aliud, nisi beatam vitam? Tert. cap. 46, Apol. aliter spontaneam excaecationem interpretatur. Betuleius. — Laudatur Democritus. Meretur legi de hac re Philo de Vita contemplat., fol. 891, ed. Lips. et Hieronymus ad Pammachium f. 164. sqq.; ad Lucinium f. 193; ep. ad Julianum f. 207 et l. ii, adv. Jovian. f. 76; Clem. Alex. de Salute Divitis ed. Ilt. cap. 11, pag. 24. Bun.

"Democritus." Valerius Maximus tells it otherwise, book 8, chapter 7: "But Democritus," he says, "though he could have been rated by his wealth, which was so great that his father could easily give a banquet to the army of Xerxes, yet, so as to apply himself to the study of letters with a freer mind, kept back a very small sum and gave his patrimony to his country." Laertius writes that he divided his share among his brothers and kept back for himself some money as provision for travel. Seneca, in the book On Providence: "Democritus," he says, "threw away his riches, thinking them a burden to a sound mind." Cicero, On Ends book 5, comes nearer to Lactantius: "Why did Democritus do the same — he who (whether truly or falsely, we would ask) is said to have deprived himself of his eyes? Certainly, so that his mind might be drawn away as little as possible from his thoughts, he neglected his patrimony and left his fields untilled: seeking what else but the happy life?" Tertullian, Apology chapter 46, interprets his self-blinding differently. Betuleius. — "Democritus is praised." On this matter Philo, On the Contemplative Life, fol. 891, Leipzig edition, deserves to be read, and Jerome to Pammachius, fol. 164 and following; to Lucinius, fol. 193; the letter to Julian, fol. 207; and Against Jovinian [Jovian., as printed] book 2, fol. 76; Clement of Alexandria, Who Is the Rich Man That Is Saved, Ilt. edition, chapter 11, page 24. Bünemann.

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(11) ‹anchor: Quid ille?› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quid ille? Crates nimirum Thebanus, philosophus Cynicus, Diogenis discipulus: ejus meminit Hieron. ad Paulinum de Institutione monach. et lib. ii adversus Jovinianum, refert ejus apophthegma: Abite, inquiebat, pessum, malae cupiditates; ego vos mergam, ne ipse mergar a vobis. Et hic quidem theologus hoc laudi adscribit, nihil aliud quam pecuniarum contemptum spectans. Sed Apollonius, ut Philost. refert, ipsum eodem reprehendit argumento, quo Lactantius, ut qui nec brutis, nec hominibus utilis fuerit. Verum hujus submersionis nec Laertius, nec Plutarchus meminerunt. Betul.

"What of him?" Crates of Thebes, namely, the Cynic philosopher, disciple of Diogenes. Jerome mentions him, to Paulinus on the training of a monk, and in book 2 Against Jovinian reports his saying: "Go to the bottom," he said, "evil desires; I will drown you, lest I myself be drowned by you." And this theologian counts it to his praise, looking at nothing but the contempt of money. But Apollonius, as Philostratus reports, censures him on the same ground as Lactantius, as one who was useful neither to dumb beasts nor to men. But neither Laertius nor Plutarch mentions this drowning. Betuleius.

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(12) ‹anchor: Quid ille, qui patrimonium in nummos redactum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quid ille, qui patrimonium in nummos redactum. Crates Thebanus est. Hieronymus epist. 13 ad Paulinum, de Institutione monachi: Crates ille Thebanus, homo quondam ditissimus, cum ad philosophandum Athenas pergeret, magnum auri pondus abjecit, nec putavit se simul posse et virtutes et divitias possidere. Buneman.

"What of him who, his patrimony turned into coin." It is Crates of Thebes. Jerome, letter 13 to Paulinus, on the training of a monk: "That Crates of Thebes, once a very rich man, when he was going to Athens to study philosophy, threw away a great weight of gold, and did not think he could possess virtues and riches at once." Bünemann.

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(13) ‹anchor: Effudit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Effudit. Proprie h. l. noster: Cicero translate l. ii, Off. cap. 15: « Multi patrimonia effuderunt inconsulte (continues)

"Poured out." Our author uses it literally in this place; Cicero figuratively, On Duties book 2, chapter 15: "Many have poured out their patrimonies thoughtlessly (continues)

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Page

  • running head: 421 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A paria junguntur, et nidos suos; B CAPUT XXIII.; C Histor. Animalium, cap. 7 (in the Variorum notae); D set, taleque quiddam de Seris (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "junguntur" prints with a worn t (looks like jungunlur), and "etiam" has damaged type; both are set as the intended words. The marks after "terrae" and "extiterit" are unclear (a comma or a semicolon, with a space before) and are set as commas. The column ends mid-sentence after "solent,". The VARIORUM NOTAE at the page foot (Paria junguntur ... Unde possent) are apparatus and are not set.
PL 6:422
quam cum pecuniae contemptu gloriantur? Fortis animus. Sed expecto quid faciant, et quo ille contemptus evadat. Tradita sibi a parentibus patrimonia tamquam malum fugiunt, ac deserunt. Et ne in tempestate naufragium faciant, in tranquillo se ultro praecipitant, non virtute, sed perverso metu fortes; sicut illi, qui, cum timent ne ab hoste jugulentur, ipsi se jugulant, ut mortem morte devitent. Sic isti, unde possent gloriam liberalitatis acquirere, sine honore, sine gratia perdunt. Laudatur Democritus, quod agros suos reliquerit, eosque pascua publica fieri passus sit. Probarem, si donasset. Nihil autem sapienter fit, quod si ab omnibus fiat, inutile est ac malum. Sed haec negligentia tolerabilis. Quid ille, qui patrimonium in nummos redactum effudit in mare? Ego dubito utrumne sanus, an demens fuerit. Abite, inquit, in profundum, malae cupiditates; ego vos mergam, ne ipse mergar a vobis. Si tantus pecuniae contemptus est, fac illam beneficium, fac humanitatem, largire pauperibus: potest hoc, quod perditurus es, multis succurrere, ne fame, aut siti, aut nuditate moriantur. Imitare insaniam saltem furoremque
than when they glory in their contempt of money? A brave spirit. But I wait to see what they do, and where that contempt of theirs ends up. The patrimonies handed down to them by their parents they flee as though an evil, and abandon them. And so as not to suffer shipwreck in a storm, they hurl themselves overboard of their own accord in calm weather, brave not through virtue but through a perverse fear; like those who, when they fear that their throats will be cut by the enemy, cut their own throats, so as to escape death by death. So these men lose, without honour and without gratitude, the very thing from which they could have gained the glory of liberality. Democritus is praised because he abandoned his fields and allowed them to become public pastures. I would approve, if he had given them away. But nothing is done wisely which, if it were done by all, is useless and evil. Yet this negligence is tolerable. What of that man who poured into the sea his patrimony converted into coin? I doubt whether he was sane or mad. 'Away,' he says, 'into the deep, evil desires; I will drown you, so that I may not myself be drowned by you.' If your contempt of money is so great, make it a kindness, make it an act of humanity, bestow it on the poor: this, which you are about to lose, can succour many, so that they may not die of hunger, or thirst, or nakedness. Imitate at least the madness and frenzy
Editors' notes and page, col. 422

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  • running head: ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 422 (left part of the running head cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹quam cum pecuniae contemptu›; B ‹bito utrumne sanus›; C ‹patrimonium suum patriae donavit› (in the notes); D ‹Cynicus, Diogenis discipulus› (in the notes)
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  • other: column begins and ends mid-sentence (ends "furoremque"); full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE." below the text block not set, cut off at the left edge; the Variorum notae (Betuleius, Bunemann, on Democritus, Crates, Effudit) at the page foot not set, left for the later pass; fragments of the left-hand column not set
PL 6:423
Tuditani; sparge populo diripienda. Potes et pecuniam effugere, et tamen bene collocare; quia salvum est quidquid pluribus profuit.
of Tuditanus; scatter them to the people to be plundered. You can both escape your money and yet place it well, for whatever has benefited many is safe.
Zenonis autem paria peccata quis probat? Sed omittamus id, quod est ab omnibus semper irrisum. Illud satis est ad coarguendum furiosi hominis errorem, quod inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit. Adimit nobis affectum, quo ratio humanae vitae pene omnis continetur. Cum enim natura hominis imbecillior sit quam caeterorum animalium, quae vel ad perferendam vim temporum, vel ad incursiones a suis corporibus arcendas, naturalibus munimentis providentia coelestis armavit: homini autem quia nihil istorum datum est, accepit pro istis omnibus miserationis
Moreover, who approves Zeno's equal sins? But let us pass over that, which has always been laughed at by everyone. This is enough to refute the error of a madman: that he places mercy among vices and diseases. He takes from us the affection by which nearly the whole conduct of human life is held together. For since the nature of man is weaker than that of the other animals, which heavenly providence has armed with natural defences, either for enduring the violence of the seasons or for warding off attacks from their bodies, but since none of these things has been given to man, he has received in place of all these things a compassionate
Editors' notes and page, col. 423

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Zenonis autem paria, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Zenonis autem paria, etc. Hieronymus notat hac labe Jovinianum. Nam Theologi recte statuunt peccatorum discrimina. Vide Cicer. in Paradoxis. Apud Stoicos vero Paradoxon est, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. Stoicorum dogmata compendioso fasciculo complectitur Cicero Oratione pro Muraena: Fuit enim, inquit, quidam summo ingenio vir Zeno, cujus inventorum aemuli Stoici nominantur. Hujus sententiae sunt etiam praecepta ejusmodi: Sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cujusquam delicto ignoscere. Neminem misericordem esse, nisi stultum et levem. Viri non esse, neque exorari, neque placari. Solos sapientes esse; si distortissimi sint, formosos; si mendicissimi, divites; si servitutem serviant, reges. Betul.

"But Zeno's [sins] equal," etc. Jerome brands Jovinian with this taint. For theologians rightly establish distinctions among sins. See Cicero in the Paradoxes. Among the Stoics it is a paradox "that sins are equal". Cicero gathers the Stoics' doctrines into a short bundle in the speech for Murena: "For there was," he says, "a man of the highest genius, Zeno, whose followers are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of this kind: that the wise man is never moved by favour, never pardons anyone's fault; that no one is merciful but the foolish and frivolous; that it is not manly to be entreated or appeased; that the wise alone are beautiful, even if most deformed; rich, even if most beggarly; kings, even if they are slaves." Betuleius.

(printed under page 215)

(2) ‹anchor: Ad coarguendum furiosi hominis errorem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ad coarguendum furiosi hominis errorem. Emman., Cant. et Reimm. cum Sublac., Rost., Ven. 1471, 97, usque ad Gymn. ad coercendum. Aptum visum verbum, quia sequitur furiosi, qui magis coercendi, quam coarguendi. Bun.

"To refute the error of a madman." The Emmanuel, Cambridge and Reimmann's, with the Subiaco, Rostock, and Venice 1471 and [14]97 editions, down to Gymnicus, have "ad coercendum" ("to restrain"). The word seemed apt, because "furiosi" follows, and madmen are to be restrained rather than refuted. Bünemann.

(printed under page 215)

(3) ‹anchor: Quod inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quod inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit. Dogma stoicum statuit, misericordiam esse aegritudinem, sive perturbationem contractionemque animi, a ratione alienam. Itaque Sapientes non esse misericordes. Laert. lib. vii, in Zenone; Cic. Orat. pro Muraen. et iv Tusculanar. quaest., cap. 18: cum Plato et Aristoteles contra docuerint, viri boni esse misereri. Quin et Euripides contra prorsus quam Stoici, in Antiopa apud Stob. tom. ii, tit. 3: / Non imperiti motus est miserescere, / Sed viri sapientis; noxaeque imminet, / Cum sapere sese qui putant, sapiunt nimis. / Verum Stoicorum dogma istud Seneca clarissime explicat de Clement. lib. ii, cap. 4, 5: Misericordiam plerique ut virtutem laudant, et bonum hominem vocant misericordem: haec autem vitium animi est. Est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis. Et mox: Misericordia aegritudo est ob alienarum miseriarum speciem: aegritudo autem in sapientem virum non cadit. Denique cap. 6: Misericordia vitium est animorum nimis miseriae faventium: quam si quis a sapiente exigit, prope est ut lamentationem exigat; et in alienis superbus gemitus. Porro ista quia durius asperiusque dicta videri poterant, mitigare conatur idem ibidem, ubi subjicit, cap. 5 et 6: Sapiens ergo non miseretur, quia et sine miseria animi non sit: caeterum omnia quae, qui miserentur, dolentes facerent, hic libens et alacri vultu faciet. Succurret alienis lacrymis, non accedet: dabit manum naufrago, exuli hospitium, egenti stipem: donabit lacrymis maternis filium, et catenas solvi jubebit, et ludo eximet, et cadaver etiam noxium sepeliet. Ac faciet ista tranquilla mente, vultu suo. Ergo non miserebitur sapiens: sed succurret, sed proderit, in commune auxilium natus ac publicum bonum, etc. Quin et Augustinus ipse de Moribus Eccles. Cathol. lib. i, cap. 27: Quare illa omnia, quibus hujuscemodi malis incommodisve resistitur, qui officiose atque humaniter praebent, misericordes vocantur, etiamsi sapientes usque adeo sint, ut jam nullo animi dolore turbentur. Nam quis ignoret, ex eo appellatam esse misericordiam, quod miserum cor faciat, condolentis alieno malo? Quamquam revera misericordia potius dicta, quod cordi sit aliena miseria. Verum pergit Aug.: Et quis non concedat, ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem, cum subvenit inopi, cum oppressum liberat, cum denique humanitatem suam usque ad sepulturam porrigit mortuorum? Etiamsi id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, misericors tamen vocandus est; huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria. Stoici, quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, inquit Cicero (Academ. lib. iv), nec ipsi solent dicere; quique sapientem, vel sapientis ideam potius, talem nobis delineant, qualem nemo mortalis est umquam consecutus.

"That he puts mercy among vices and diseases." The Stoic doctrine lays down that mercy is a sickness, or a disturbance and contraction of the mind, foreign to reason; and so the wise are not merciful. Laertius, book 7, in his Zeno; Cicero, speech for Murena, and Tusculan Disputations 4, chapter 18; whereas Plato and Aristotle taught the contrary, that it belongs to a good man to have pity. Indeed Euripides too, quite contrary to the Stoics, in the Antiope, in Stobaeus volume 2, title 3: "To feel pity is the impulse not of the unskilled but of the wise man; and harm hangs over those who, thinking themselves wise, are too wise." But Seneca explains this Stoic doctrine most clearly, On Clemency book 2, chapters 4–5: "Most people praise mercy as a virtue and call a good man merciful; but it is a vice of the mind. For it is the vice of a small mind, collapsing at the sight of others' ills." And soon after: "Mercy is a sickness caused by the sight of others' miseries; but sickness does not befall the wise man." Finally chapter 6: "Mercy is a vice of minds too partial to misery: if one demands it of the wise man, it is close to demanding lamentation, and groans at others' woes." Further, because these things could seem said too harshly and roughly, he tries to soften them in the same place, where he adds, chapters 5 and 6: "The wise man, then, does not pity, since that is not without misery of mind; but everything that those who pity would do in grief, he will do willingly and with a cheerful face. He will come to the aid of others' tears, not join in them; he will give his hand to the shipwrecked, hospitality to the exile, a coin to the needy; he will restore a son to a mother's tears, and order chains to be loosed, and release from the gladiatorial school, and bury even the corpse of a criminal. And he will do these things with a tranquil mind and his own countenance. So the wise man will not pity; but he will succour, he will help, born as he is for common aid and the public good," etc. Indeed Augustine himself too, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, book 1, chapter 27: "Wherefore all those things by which such evils or troubles are resisted, those who render them dutifully and humanely are called merciful, even if they are so wise as no longer to be troubled by any pain of mind. For who does not know that mercy (misericordia) is so called because it makes the heart (cor) wretched (miserum) as it grieves at another's ill?" Though in truth it is rather called misericordia because another's misery is at heart (cordi). But Augustine continues: "And who would not grant that the wise man ought to be free of all misery when he helps the needy, frees the oppressed, and finally extends his humanity even to the burial of the dead? Even if he does it with a tranquil mind, driven by no stings of pain but led by the duty of goodness, he must still be called merciful; for the name does him no harm, since misery is absent." "The Stoics themselves," says Cicero (Academics book 4), "are not wont to say who is or was wise"; and they sketch for us a wise man, or rather the idea of a wise man, such as no mortal has ever attained.

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(4) ‹anchor: Ad conspectum alterius hominis efferaretur› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ad conspectum alterius hominis efferaretur. Optime judicavit Isaeus, pro eo quod in 1 Reg. rec., Bon., Tax., auferretur, legendum esse efferaretur. Efferantur enim hominum animi miseratione sublata. Sic legunt triginta mss. ac plurimi editi. Ex Gallaeo. —Ad conspectum... efferaretur. Hinc. de Opific. c. 4: Homo quoque, si... haberet ad propulsanda pericula suppetens robur, nec ullius alterius auxilio indigeret; quae societas esset?... aut quid esset tetrius homine? Quid efferatius? Quid immanius? Bun.

"He would grow savage at the sight of another man." Isaeus judged very well that, instead of "auferretur" in 1 recent Royal, the Bologna and the Tax., "efferaretur" should be read. For men's minds grow savage when pity is taken away. So read thirty manuscripts and most printed editions. From Gallaeus. — "At the sight ... would grow savage." Hence On the Workmanship [of God], chapter 4: "Man too, if ... he had strength sufficient to ward off dangers, and needed no one else's help, what society would there be? ... or what would be more hideous than man? What more savage? What more monstrous?" Bünemann.

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(5) ‹anchor: Solivaga› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Solivaga. Quae solitarie amat vivere; iisque opponitur quae gregatim vivunt, ut apes, formicae aliaque multa. — Quarum natura solivaga. Tuscul. lib. v, cap. 13: Bestiae solivagae opponuntur congregatis... Et Offic. l. i, cap. penult.: Solivaga conditio communioni adversatur. Bun.

"Solitary-roaming." [An animal] that loves to live alone; opposed to those that live in herds, as bees, ants and many others. — "Whose nature is solitary-roaming." Tusculans book 5, chapter 13: solitary beasts are contrasted with gregarious ones ... And On Duties book 1, second-to-last chapter: "A solitary condition is opposed to community." Bünemann.

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(6) ‹anchor: Qui nigram dixit esse nivem› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Qui nigram dixit esse nivem. Anaxagoras, ut refert Galenus, lib. de Simplicibus medicamentis. Non minus contra communem sensum pugnavit ille, de quo in eodem opere Gal. lib. ix scribit, cap. 1, quod dixerit, nihil prohibere, quominus diceretur nix eamdem cum igne habere tum qualitatem, tum facultatem. Betuleius.

"Who said that snow is black." Anaxagoras, as Galen reports in the book On Simple Medicines. No less did that man fight against common sense of whom Galen writes in the same work, book 9, chapter 1, that he said nothing prevented snow from being said to have the same quality and the same power as fire. Betuleius.

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(7) ‹anchor: Ut coelum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Ut coelum. Vide supra cap. 9, et infra lib. xi, cap. 1.

"As the sky." See above, chapter 9, and below, book 11 [as printed], chapter 1.

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(8) ‹anchor: Xenophanes› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Xenophanes. Cic. in Acad. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna, eamque esse terram, in qua multarum urbium et montium portenta videntur. De hoc lege Lucianum in Icaro Menippo. Betuleius.

"Xenophanes." Cicero in the Academics: "Xenophanes says the moon is inhabited, and that it is an earth on which marvels of many cities and mountains are seen." On this read Lucian in the Icaromenippus. Betuleius.

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Editors' prose

largiendo. De Cratere plures tradunt, ipsum bona populo Thebano esse largitum. Vid. Menag. ad Laert. l. vi, f. 87; et Perizon. ad Aelian. Var. Hist. l. iii, cap. 6. BUN.

by giving largesse. Of Crates many relate that he gave away his goods to the people of Thebes. See Ménage on Laertius, book 6, f. 87; and Perizonius on Aelian, Varia Historia, book 3, chapter 6. BÜNEMANN.

Tuditani. De eo Val. Max. lib. vii, cap. 8. Cicero quoque Philip. iii, 6: Tuditanus nempe ille, ille qui cum palla et cothurnis nummos populo de rostris spargere solebat.

Of Tuditanus. On him see Valerius Maximus, book 7, chapter 8. Cicero too, Philippics 3.6: "That Tuditanus, to be sure, he who in a mantle and buskins used to scatter coins to the people from the rostra."

Zenonis autem paria, etc. Hieronymus notat hac labe Jovinianum. Nam Theologi recte statuunt peccatorum discrimina. Vide Cicer. in Paradoxis. Apud Stoicos vero Paradoxon est, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα. Stoicorum dogmata compendioso fasciculo complectitur Cicero Oratione pro Muraena: Fuit enim, inquit, quidam summo ingenio vir Zeno, cujus inventorum aemuli Stoici nominantur. Hujus sententiae sunt etiam praecepta ejusmodi: Sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cujusquam delicto ignoscere. Neminem misericordem esse, nisi stultum et levem. Viri non esse, neque exorari, neque placari. Solos sapientes esse; si distortissimi sint, formosos; si mendicissimi, divites; si servitutem serviant, reges. BETUL.

But Zeno's equal [sins], etc. Jerome brands Jovinian with this blemish. For theologians rightly lay down distinctions among sins. See Cicero in the Paradoxes. Among the Stoics, indeed, it is a paradox "that sins are equal". Cicero gathers the Stoics' tenets into a compact bundle in the speech For Murena: "There was," he says, "a certain man of the highest ability, Zeno, the emulators of whose discoveries are called Stoics. His opinions and precepts are of this kind: that the wise man is never moved by favour, never pardons anyone's offence; that no one is merciful but the foolish and fickle; that it is not a man's part to be entreated or appeased; that the wise alone, though they be most misshapen, are beautiful; though most beggarly, rich; though they serve in slavery, kings." BETULEIUS.

Ad coarguendum furiosi hominis errorem. Emman., Cant. et Reimm. cum Sublac., Rost., Ven. 1471, 97, usque ad Gymn. ad coercendum. Aptum visum verbum, quia sequitur furiosi, qui magis coercendi, quam coarguendi. BUN.

To refute the error of a madman. The Emmanuel, Canterbury and Reimmann [manuscripts], with the Subiaco, Rostock and Venice editions of 1471 and [14]97, down to Gymnicus, read "to restrain". The word seemed apt because "madman" follows, who is rather to be restrained than refuted. BÜNEMANN.

Quod inter vitia et morbos misericordiam ponit. Dogma stoicum statuit, misericordiam esse aegritudinem, sive perturbationem contractionemque animi, a ratione alienam. Itaque Sapientes non esse misericordes. Laert. lib. vii, in Zenone; Cic. Orat. pro Muraen. et iv Tusculanar. quaest., cap. 18: cum Plato et Aristoteles contra docuerint, viri boni esse misereri. Quin et Euripides contra prorsus quam Stoici, in Antiopa apud Stob. tom. ii, tit. 3:

That he places mercy among vices and diseases. The Stoic tenet lays down that mercy is a sickness, or a disturbance and contraction of the mind, foreign to reason; and therefore that the wise are not merciful. Laertius, book 7, in the Zeno; Cicero, speech For Murena, and Tusculan Disputations 4, chapter 18; whereas Plato and Aristotle taught the contrary, that it is the part of a good man to feel pity. Nay, Euripides too, quite against the Stoics, in the Antiope, quoted by Stobaeus, volume 2, title 3:

Non imperiti motus est miserescere, Sed viri sapientis; noxaeque imminet, Cum sapere sese qui putant, sapiunt nimis.

To feel pity is no stirring of the untaught, / But of the wise man; and harm hangs over us / When those who think themselves wise are wise overmuch.

Verum Stoicorum dogma istud Seneca clarissime explicat de Clement. lib. ii, cap. 4, 5: Misericordiam plerique ut virtutem laudant, et bonum hominem vocant misericordem: haec autem vitium animi est. Est enim vitium pusilli animi, ad speciem alienorum malorum succidentis. Et mox: Misericordia aegritudo est ob alienarum miseriarum speciem: aegritudo autem in sapientem virum non cadit. Denique cap. 6: Misericordia vitium est animorum nimis miseriae faventium: quam si quis a sapiente exigit, prope est ut lamentationem exigat; et in alienis superbus gemitus. Porro ista quia durius asperiusque dicta videri poterant, mitigare conatur idem ibidem, ubi subjicit, cap. 5 et 6: Sapiens ergo non miseretur, quia et sine miseria animi non sit: caeterum omnia quae, qui miserentur, dolentes facerent, hic libens et alacri vultu faciet. Succurret alienis lacrymis, non accedet: dabit manum naufrago, exuli hospitium, egenti stipem: donabit lacrymis maternis filium, et catenas solvi jubebit, et ludo eximet, et cadaver etiam noxium sepeliet. Ac faciet ista tranquilla mente, vultu suo. Ergo non miserebitur sapiens: sed succurret, sed proderit, in commune auxilium natus ac publicum bonum, etc. Quin et Augustinus ipse de Moribus Eccles. Cathol. lib. i, cap. 27: Quare illa omnia, quibus hujuscemodi malis incommodisve resistitur, qui officiose atque humaniter praebent, misericordes vocantur, etiamsi sapientes usque adeo sint, ut jam nullo animi dolore turbentur. Nam quis ignoret, ex eo appellatam esse misericordiam, quod miserum cor faciat, condolentis alieno malo? Quamquam revera misericordia potius dicta, quod cordi sit aliena miseria. Verum pergit Aug.: Et quis non concedat, ab omni miseria liberum esse debere sapientem, cum subvenit inopi, cum oppressum liberat, cum denique humanitatem suam usque ad sepulturam porrigit mortuorum? Etiamsi id faciat mente tranquilla, nullis aculeis doloris instinctus, sed adductus officio bonitatis, misericors tamen vocandus est; huic enim nihil obest nomen, cum absit miseria. Stoici, quis sapiens sit, aut fuerit, inquit Cicero (Academ. lib. iv), nec ipsi solent dicere; quique sapientem, vel sapientis ideam potius, talem nobis delineant, qualem nemo mortalis est umquam consecutus.

But Seneca explains this Stoic tenet most clearly, On Clemency, book 2, chapters 4–5: "Most people praise mercy as a virtue and call a good man merciful; but it is a vice of the mind. For it is the vice of a petty mind, sinking at the sight of others' ills." And soon after: "Mercy is a sickness arising from the sight of others' miseries; but sickness does not befall the wise man." Finally, chapter 6: "Mercy is a vice of minds that favour misery overmuch; and if anyone demands it of the wise man, he is near to demanding lamentation of him, and groaning at others' troubles." Further, because these things could seem to have been said rather harshly and roughly, the same author tries to soften them in the same place, where he adds, chapters 5 and 6: "The wise man, then, does not pity, because that is not without misery of mind; but all the things that those who pity would do in grief, he will do willingly and with a cheerful face. He will come to the aid of others' tears, not join in them; he will give his hand to the shipwrecked, hospitality to the exile, a coin to the needy; he will restore a son to a mother's tears, and order chains to be loosed, and release from the gladiatorial school, and bury even the corpse of a criminal. And he will do these things with a tranquil mind and his own countenance. So the wise man will not pity; but he will succour, he will help, born as he is for common aid and the public good," etc. Nay, Augustine himself too, On the Morals of the Catholic Church, book 1, chapter 27: "Wherefore those who dutifully and humanely render all those things by which such evils or hardships are resisted are called merciful, even if they are so far wise that they are no longer troubled by any pain of mind. For who does not know that mercy (misericordia) was so named because it makes the heart wretched (miserum cor), as it grieves with another's ill?" Though in truth it is rather called misericordia because another's misery is at heart (cordi). But Augustine goes on: "And who would not grant that the wise man ought to be free from all misery, when he relieves the needy, when he frees the oppressed, when in short he extends his humanity even to the burial of the dead? Even if he does it with a tranquil mind, spurred by no stings of grief but led by the duty of goodness, he must still be called merciful; for the name does him no harm, since misery is absent." "Who is wise, or has been," says Cicero (Academica, book 4), "the Stoics themselves are not wont to say"; and they draw for us such a wise man, or rather the idea of a wise man, as no mortal has ever attained.

Ad conspectum alterius hominis efferaretur. Optime judicavit Isaeus, pro eo quod in 1 Reg. rec., Bon., Tax., auferretur, legendum esse efferaretur. Efferantur enim hominum animi miseratione sublata. Sic legunt triginta mss. ac plurimi editi. EX GALLAEO. —Ad conspectum... efferaretur. Hinc. de Opific. c. 4: Homo quoque, si... haberet ad propulsanda pericula suppetens robur, nec ullius alterius auxilio indigeret; quae societas esset?... aut quid esset tetrius homine? Quid efferatius? Quid immanius? BUN.

Should grow savage at the sight of another man. Isaeus judged excellently that, in place of "should be taken away", which stands in the first Regius, the recent [manuscript], Bononiensis and Taxaquetianus, "should grow savage" must be read. For men's minds grow savage when pity is removed. So read thirty manuscripts and very many editions. FROM GALLAEUS. — At the sight … should grow savage. Hence On the Workmanship [of God], chapter 4: "Man too, if … he had strength sufficient to ward off dangers, and needed the help of no other, what fellowship would there be? … or what would be more hideous than man? What more savage? What more monstrous?" BÜNEMANN.

Solivaga. Quae solitarie amat vivere; iisque opponitur quae gregatim vivunt, ut apes, formicae aliaque multa. — Quarum natura solivaga. Tuscul. lib. v, cap. 13: Bestiae solivagae opponuntur congregatis... Et Offic. l. i, cap. penult.: Solivaga conditio communioni adversatur. BUN.

Solitary-roaming. That which loves to live alone; and it is opposed to those that live in herds, such as bees, ants and many others. — Whose nature is solitary-roaming. Tusculans, book 5, chapter 13: solitary-roaming beasts are opposed to gregarious ones … And On Duties, book 1, second-last chapter: a solitary-roaming condition is contrary to fellowship. BÜNEMANN.

Qui nigram dixit esse nivem. Anaxagoras, ut refert Galenus, lib. de Simplicibus medicamentis. Non minus contra communem sensum pugnavit ille, de quo in eodem opere Gal. lib. ix scribit, cap. 1, quod dixerit, nihil prohibere, quominus diceretur nix eamdem cum igne habere tum qualitatem, tum facultatem. BETULEIUS.

Who said that snow was black. Anaxagoras, as Galen relates in his book On Simple Medicines. No less against common sense did that man fight of whom Galen writes in the same work, book 9, chapter 1, that he said nothing prevented its being said that snow has the same quality, and the same power too, as fire. BETULEIUS.

Ut coelum. Vide supra cap. 9, et infra lib. xi, cap. 1.

That [he might see] the heaven. See above, chapter 9, and below, book 11, chapter 1.

Xenophanes. Cic. in Acad. Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna, eamque esse terram, in qua multarum urbium et montium portenta videntur. De hoc lege Lucianum in Icaro Menippo. BETULEIUS.

Xenophanes. Cicero in the Academica: Xenophanes says that the moon is inhabited, and that it is an earth on which marvels of many cities and mountains are seen. On this read Lucian in the Icaromenippus. BETULEIUS.

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  • running head: 423 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVI[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A Tuditani; sparge populo diripienda; B hil istorum datum est; C praecepta ejusmodi: Sapientem gratia (in the Variorum Notae); D Antiopa apud Stob. (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the column ends with "mi-" (miserationis), which is split at the column break. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" is not set: it stands below the text block and is cut off at the right edge. The Variorum Notae beneath it (Bun., Betul. on Tuditanus, Zeno, coarguendum/coercendum, misericordia) are page-foot commentary and are left for the later pass.
PL 6:424
affectum, qui plane vocatur humanitas, qua nosmet invicem tueremur. Nam si homo ad conspectum alterius hominis efferaretur, quod facere videmus animantes quarum natura solivaga est, nulla esset hominum societas, nulla urbium condendarum vel cura, vel ratio. Sic neque vita quidem satis tuta, cum et caeteris animalibus exposita esset imbecillitas hominum, et ipsi inter semetipsos belluarum more saevirent. Non minor in aliis dementia.
affection, which is plainly called humanity, by which we might protect one another. For if a man were made savage at the sight of another man, as we see those living creatures do whose nature is solitary and wandering, there would be no society of men, no care or method of founding cities. Thus not even life would be quite safe, since both the weakness of men would be exposed to the other animals, and men themselves would rage among themselves after the manner of beasts. No less madness in others.
Quid enim dici potest de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem? quam consequens erat, ut etiam picem albam esse diceret! Hic est ille, qui se idcirco natum esse dicebat, ut coelum ac solem videret, qui in terra nihil videbat sole lucente. Xenophanes dicentibus Mathematicis
For what can be said of him who said that snow was black? How consistent it would have been for him to say that pitch too was white! This is the man who used to say that he had been born for this reason, that he might see the sky and the sun, he who saw nothing on earth while the sun was shining. Xenophanes, when the mathematicians said
Editors' notes and page, col. 424

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  • running head: [L]ACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 424
  • marginal letters: A serationis affectum; B hil videbat sole lucente; C debere sapientem (in the notes); D Quid efferatius? (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "serationis" (mi-serationis broken from col. 423); column ends with "Ma-" split at the column break; the full-width heading "[V]ARIORUM NOTAE" stands between the text and the notes, cut off at its left edge, not set; Variorum notes at the page foot not set (later pass); column number in head printed faintly, read as 424
PL 6:425
orbem lunae duodeviginti partibus majorem esse, quam terram, stultissime credidit; et quod huic levitati fuit consentaneum, dixit, intra concavum lunae sinum esse aliam terram, et ibi aliud genus hominum simili modo vivere, quo nos in hac terra vivimus. Habent igitur illi lunatici homines alteram lunam, quae illis nocturnum lumen exhibeat, sicut haec exhibet nobis. Et fortasse noster hic orbis alterius inferioris terrae luna sit. Fuisse Seneca inter Stoicos ait, qui deliberaret utrumne Soli quoque suos populos daret: inepte scilicet, qui dubitaverit. Quid enim perderet, si dedisset? Sed, credo, calor deterrebat, ne tantam multitudinem periculo committeret; ne si aestu nimio periissent, ipsius culpa evenisse tanta calamitas diceretur.
that the orb of the moon is eighteen parts greater than the earth, most foolishly believed [it]; and, what was consistent with this levity, he said that within the concave hollow of the moon there is another earth, and that there another race of men lives in the same manner in which we live on this earth. Those lunar men therefore have another moon, which provides them with light by night, as this one provides it to us. And perhaps this orb of ours is the moon of another, lower earth. Seneca says that there was one among the Stoics who deliberated whether he should give the sun too its own peoples: foolishly, to be sure, since he was in doubt. For what would he have lost, if he had given them? But, I suppose, the heat deterred him from committing so great a multitude to danger, lest, if they had perished from excessive heat, so great a calamity should be said to have happened by his fault.
CAPUT XXIV.
Chapter XXIV.
De antipodibus, de coelo ac sideribus.
On the antipodes, on the heaven and the stars.
Quid illi, qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodas putant, num aliquid loquuntur? aut est quisquam tam ineptus, qui credat esse homines, quorum vestigia sint superiora, quam capita? aut ibi, quae apud nos jacent, inversa pendere? fruges et arbores deorsum versus crescere? pluvias, et nives, et grandinem sursum versus cadere in terram? Et miratur
What of those who think that there are Antipodes, with footsteps opposite to ours: do they say anything? Or is anyone so foolish as to believe that there are men whose footsteps are higher than their heads? or that the things which lie flat among us hang upside down there? that crops and trees grow downwards? that rains and snows and hail fall upwards onto the earth? And marvels
Editors' notes and page, col. 425

Footnotes

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(1) ‹anchor: Dicentibus Mathematicis, etc.› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Dicentibus Mathematicis, etc. Nescio an Anaximandrum intelligat, cujus auditor fuisse creditur. Dixit autem Anaximander, circulum lunae decem et novem partibus terra majorem esse, ut Plut. in Placitis refert; vel ut Galenus, sex decuplum terrae circulum esse lunae. Sed apud Plut. Xenophanis sententia est, σελήνην εἶναι νέφος πεπιλημένον, id est, nubem constipatam vel conglobatam: apud Galen. vero, νέφος πεπυρωμένον, id est, inflammatam nubem. Sed haec nihil aliud sunt, quam somnia.

"As the mathematicians say," etc. I do not know whether he means Anaximander, whose hearer [Xenophanes] is believed to have been. Anaximander said that the circle of the moon is nineteen times greater than the earth, as Plutarch reports in the Placita; or, as Galen has it, that the circle of the moon is sixty times that of the earth. But in Plutarch the opinion of Xenophanes is that "the moon is a compressed cloud", that is, a cloud packed or rolled together; in Galen, "a fiery cloud", that is, a cloud set on fire. But these are nothing but dreams.

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(2) ‹anchor: Duodeviginti› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Duodeviginti. Elegantiae servantissimus est: sequitur paucis mutatis Ciceronem lib. iv Acad. cap. 26, et cap. 41.

"Eighteen." He is most observant of elegance: with a few changes he follows Cicero, Academics book 4, chapter 26 and chapter 41.

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(3) ‹anchor: Intra concavum lunae sinum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Intra concavum lunae sinum. Cicero lib. iv Acad. Quaest. cap. 39: Habitari ait Xenophanes in luna, eamque esse terram multarum urbium et montium. Cell.

"Within the hollow bosom of the moon." Cicero, Academic Questions book 4, chapter 39: "Xenophanes says the moon is inhabited, and that it is an earth of many cities and mountains." Cellarius.

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(4) ‹anchor: Seneca ait› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Seneca ait. Nil de hoc hodie apud Senecam.

"Seneca says." Nothing on this survives today in Seneca.

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(5) ‹anchor: Quid illi, qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodas putant?› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quid illi, qui esse contrarios vestigiis nostris Antipodas putant? De quibus Cicero in Lucull. Lactantius quidem multa hoc capite asserit paradoxa, quo nomine a nonnullis exsibilatur. Ego licet illum a vero deflexisse fatear, cum tamen gravissimos homines ac sapientissimos habuerit, ut nunc ostendam, suarum opinionum vel auctores, vel sectatores, nae illos magis exsibilandos putem, qui virum insignem tam temere exsibilandum putarent. Principio nullos esse censet Antipodas, id quod asseruere etiam Eratosthenes, Polyb., Strabo, Tzetzes in Chiliad., Lucret. libro primo, ad fin. Asseritur et haec positio apud Plutarch. in Dial. de fac. in or. Lun. Ex nostratibus idem putaverunt S. Augustinus lib. xvi de Civit. Dei, cap. 9, sed aliis adductus rationibus; verebatur enim si Antipodas dari concederet, ne alius nobis esset humani generis auctor praeter Adamum. Negat etiam Antipodas Nicolaus de Lira super Genes. in principio; et deinde quicumque sphaericam terram esse pernegarunt. Veram tamen sententiam de Antipodibus huic adversam probant Macrob. lib. i, in somn. Scip. ubi Lactantii rationes evertit cap. 5; Plin. ii Hist. c. 65; Cleomed. in i Meteor. cap. 2; S. Aug. sibi contrarius ii in Genes. ad litt. cap. 9, etc. Nec amplius ulla hisce quidem temporibus ea de re haberi dubitatio potest, quibus praeclarissimi illius Herois Liguris Christophori Columbi ingenio ac virtute alterius hemisphaerii quondam incognitae gentes compertae jam sunt, ac penitus exploratae. Isaeus.

"What of those who think there are Antipodes, with their footprints opposite to ours?" On them Cicero in the Lucullus. Lactantius does indeed assert many paradoxes in this chapter, for which he is hissed off by some. Though I admit that he strayed from the truth, yet since he had, as I shall now show, men of great weight and wisdom as authors or followers of his opinions, I would think those more deserving to be hissed who thought so distinguished a man deserved to be hissed so rashly. First, he holds that there are no Antipodes, which Eratosthenes, Polybius, Strabo, Tzetzes in the Chiliades, and Lucretius at the end of book 1 also asserted. This position is asserted too in Plutarch, in the dialogue On the Face in the Orb of the Moon. Among our own, St Augustine thought the same, City of God book 16, chapter 9, though led by other reasons: he feared that if he granted the existence of Antipodes, there would be another author of the human race for us besides Adam. Nicholas of Lyra too denies the Antipodes, on the beginning of Genesis; and so, after him, did all who flatly denied that the earth is a sphere. Yet the true opinion about the Antipodes, contrary to this, is upheld by Macrobius on the Dream of Scipio book 1, chapter 5, where he overturns Lactantius's reasons; Pliny, Natural History 2, chapter 65; Cleomedes, Meteora 1, chapter 2; St Augustine, contradicting himself, On Genesis According to the Letter 2, chapter 9, etc. Nor can there be any further doubt on the matter in these times, in which, by the genius and courage of that most illustrious hero of Liguria, Christopher Columbus, the once unknown peoples of the other hemisphere have now been discovered and thoroughly explored. Isaeus.

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(6) ‹anchor: Hortos pensiles› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Hortos pensiles. Intelligit hortos pensiles Semiramidis, de quibus Diodor. lib. ii, cap. 10; Strab. 16, pag. 508, et Plinius lib. xxxvi, cap. 14.

"Hanging gardens." He means the hanging gardens of Semiramis, on which see Diodorus book 2, chapter 10; Strabo 16, page 508; and Pliny book 36, chapter 14.

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(7) ‹anchor: Quae igitur illos ad Antipodas ratio perduxit?› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Quae igitur illos ad Antipodas ratio perduxit? Addidi praepositionem ad ex 20 mss. et 10 editis, utpote necessariam. In 2 Colb. est Antipedas.

"What reasoning, then, led them to the Antipodes?" I have added the preposition "ad" from 20 manuscripts and 10 printed editions, as being necessary. In 2 Colbert it is "Antipedas".

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(8) ‹anchor: Rotundum esse mundum› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Rotundum esse mundum. Ratio desumitur ex ejus diurno motu; is enim manifestat mundum, ac praecipue coelum, moveri sphaerice, seu ad modum sphaerae, circa proprium axem ac polos. Planetae enim ac sidera omnia, imo ei elementa ipsa, in gyrum ab ortu in occasum, non secus ac in sphaera contingit, revolvuntur: quae omnia argumento sunt, supremam coeli partem esse sphaericam, seu globosam, ac proinde mundum figura sphaerica esse praeditum.

"That the world is round." The reasoning is taken from its daily motion; for this shows that the world, and especially the sky, moves spherically, that is, in the manner of a sphere, about its own axis and poles. For the planets and all the stars, indeed [ei, as printed] the elements themselves, revolve in a circle from rising to setting, just as happens in a sphere: all of which is proof that the highest part of the sky is spherical, or globe-shaped, and hence that the world has a spherical figure.

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(9) ‹anchor: Et ex motu siderum opinati sunt coelum volvi› · no call (lemma-keyed)

Et ex motu siderum opinati sunt coelum volvi. Coelum volvi negat non modo Lactantius, sed et cum eo philosophi plures, ac sanctorum Patrum et doctorum plurimi. Justinus Martyr respondens ad quaest. 93 Orthodox.; Joan. Chrysost., Homil. 6 et 13, in Genes. et 12 ad pop. Antioch.; Caesarius, in fine i Dialog.; Elias Cretensis, ad Orationem vii Greg. Nazianz.; Isidor., Etymolog. lib. iii, cap. 49; Severianus item, et Acacius qui mundum semisphaericum, coelumque immotum extensum sicut tabernaculum, et fornicem seu cameram putaverunt; Junilius in Hexaemeron, Richardus secundo Exception.; Diodor. et Procop. in Commentar. ad Genes. Philastrius hanc opinionem sacris Scripturis consonam, contrariam autem absonam, et paganae potius vanitati, quam christianae veritati consentientem scribit in libro de Haeresibus; et S. Augustinus secundo de Genesi ad litt. cap. 10, defendi eam posse putat. Reprobata tamen est a plerisque tum philosophis, tum mathematicis, praesertim apud Aristotelem secundo, Coel. tex. 43 et seqq. Isaeus.

"And from the motion of the stars they supposed that the sky revolves." Not only Lactantius denies that the sky revolves, but with him many philosophers and very many of the holy Fathers and doctors: Justin Martyr, answering question 93 of the Questions to the Orthodox; John Chrysostom, Homilies 6 and 13 on Genesis, and 12 to the people of Antioch; Caesarius, at the end of Dialogue 1; Elias of Crete, on Oration 7 of Gregory Nazianzen; Isidore, Etymologies book 3, chapter 49; Severian likewise, and Acacius, who thought the world a hemisphere and the sky motionless, stretched out like a tent, a vault or chamber; Junilius on the Hexaemeron; Richard, in the second book of the Exceptiones; Diodorus and Procopius in their commentaries on Genesis. Philastrius writes in his book On Heresies that this opinion agrees with the sacred Scriptures, while the contrary is discordant and accords rather with pagan vanity than with Christian truth; and St Augustine, On Genesis According to the Letter 2, chapter 10, thinks it can be defended. Yet it has been rejected by most philosophers and mathematicians alike, especially in Aristotle, On the Heavens book 2, text 43 and following. Isaeus.

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Page

  • running head: 425 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIEN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹thematicis orbem lunae›; B ‹CAPUT XXIV.›; C ‹autem Anaximander, circulum› (in the Variorum notae); D ‹deflexisse fatear› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "thematicis" (the rest of "Mathematicis" from col. 424); "de" in the chapter summary is printed with a flawed e (looks like "dę"), set as "de"; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off at the edge) stands below the text block and is not set; the Variorum notae at the page foot are left for the later pass; printer's signature "Patrol. VI." omitted
PL 6:426
aliquis, hortos pensiles inter septem mira narrari, cum philosophi et agros, et maria, et urbes, et montes pensiles faciant? Hujus quoque erroris aperienda nobis o⟨r⟩igo est. Nam semper eodem modo falluntur. Cum enim falsum aliquid in principio sumpserint, veri similitudine inducti, necesse est eos in ea, quae consequuntur, incurrere. Sic incidunt in multa ridicula; quia necesse est falsa esse, quae rebus falsis congruunt. Cum autem primis habuerint fidem, qualia sint ea, quae sequuntur, non circumspiciunt, sed defendunt omni modo; cum debeant prima illa, utrumne vera sint, an falsa, ex consequentibus judicare.
anyone, that hanging gardens are recounted among the seven wonders, when the philosophers make fields, and seas, and cities, and mountains hanging? The origin of this error too must be laid open by us. For they are always deceived in the same way. For when they have assumed something false at the beginning, led on by its likeness to truth, they necessarily run into the things that follow from it. So they fall into many absurdities, because things that agree with false things must necessarily be false. But once they have put their faith in the first things, they do not look round to see of what kind the things are that follow, but defend them in every way, although they ought to judge from the consequences whether those first things are true or false.
Quae igitur illos ad Antipodas ratio perduxit? Videbant siderum cursus in occasum meantium; solem atque lunam in eamdem partem semper occidere, atque oriri semper ab eadem. Cum autem non perspicerent, quae machinatio cursus eorum temperaret, nec quomodo ab occasu ad orientem remearent, coelum autem ipsum in omnes partes putarent esse devexum, quod sic videri, propter immensam latitudinem necesse est: existimaverunt, rotundum esse mundum sicut pilam, et ex motu siderum opinati sunt coelum volvi, sic astra solemque, cum occiderint, volubilitate ipsa mundi ad ortum referri. Itaque et aereos orbes
What reasoning, then, led them to the Antipodes? They saw the courses of the stars travelling towards the west; that the sun and the moon always set in the same quarter, and always rise from the same. But since they did not perceive what contrivance regulated their courses, nor how they returned from the west to the east, and supposed that the heaven itself slopes downward in all directions, which it must necessarily appear to do because of its immense breadth, they thought that the world is round like a ball, and from the motion of the stars they supposed that the heaven revolves, and that thus the stars and the sun, when they have set, are carried back to their rising by the very rotation of the world. And so also bronze spheres
Editors' notes and page, col. 426

Page

  • running head: FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 426 (left part of the running head cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A aliquis, hortos pensiles; B atque lunam in eamdem; C praeclarissimi illius Herois (in the Variorum Notae, not set); D lum volvi negat (in the Variorum Notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "o⟨r⟩igo": the r looks damaged and reads like "oiigo". The last word "or-" is split at the column break (orbes). The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" stands between the text and the notes, is cut off at the left edge, and is not set. The Variorum Notae (Isaeus, Columbus, Hortos pensiles, Antipodas, Rotundum esse mundum, Et ex motu siderum) are left for the later pass. The signature "14." and the Google/ABK/FR digitization marks are not set.
PL 6:427
fabricati sunt, quasi ad figuram mundi, eosque caelarunt portentosis quibusdam simulacris, quae astra esse dicerent. Hanc igitur coeli rotunditatem illud sequebatur, ut terra in medio sinu ejus esset inclusa. Quod si ita esset, etiam ipsam terram globo similem; neque enim fieri posset, ut non esset rotundum, quod rotundo conclusum teneretur. Si autem rotunda etiam terra esset, necesse esse, ut in omnes coeli partes eamdem faciem gerat, id est montes erigat, campos tendat, maria consternat. Quod si esset, etiam sequebatur illud extremum, ut nulla sit pars terrae, quae non ab hominibus caeterisque animalibus incolatur. Sic pendulos istos Antipodas coeli rotunditas adinvenit.
were fashioned, as if after the figure of the world, and they engraved them with certain monstrous images, which they said were the stars. This roundness of the heaven, then, brought with it the consequence that the earth was enclosed in the middle of its bosom. And if that were so, the earth itself too was like a globe; for it could not be that what was held enclosed in a round thing was not round. But if the earth too were round, it would necessarily present the same face to all parts of the heaven, that is, raise up mountains, stretch out plains, spread out seas. And if that were so, there followed also that last consequence, that there is no part of the earth which is not inhabited by men and the other animals. Thus the roundness of the heaven invented those hanging Antipodes.
Quod si quaeras ab iis, qui haec portenta defendunt, quomodo non cadunt omnia in inferiorem illam coeli partem; respondent, hanc rerum esse naturam, ut pondera in medium ferantur, et ad medium connexa sint omnia, sicut radios videmus in rota; quae autem levia sunt, ut neb⟨u⟩la, fumus, ignis, a medio deferantur, ut coelum petant. Quid dicam de iis nescio, qui, cum semel aberraverint, constanter in stultitia perseverant, et vanis vana defendunt; nisi quod eos interdum puto, aut joci causa philosophari,
But if you ask those who defend these monstrous notions how it is that all things do not fall into that lower part of the heaven, they answer that this is the nature of things, that weights are borne towards the middle, and that all things are joined to the middle, as we see the spokes in a wheel; but that things which are light, such as mist, smoke, fire, are carried away from the middle, so as to make for the heaven. I do not know what to say of those who, once they have gone astray, steadily persevere in their folly and defend vain things with vain things; except that I sometimes think that they either philosophize for the sake of a jest,
Editors' notes and page, col. 427

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 217)

(1) ‹lemma: Hanc igitur coeli rotunditatem› · no call mark

Hanc igitur coeli rotunditatem. Coelum rotundum esse negavit non solum Lactantius, sed etiam Justinus Martyr respondens ad quaestionem 59 et 130 Orthodox; Basil. Homil. 1 in Genes.; Chrysost., Homil. 14 et 27 in Ep. Pauli ad Hebr., et Homil. 2 de incomprehensib. Dei natura; Ambros., lib. I in Hexaemer.; Theophylact. et Theodoret., in cap. VIII Epist. ad Hebr.; Caesarius et Procop. ubi supra; Haimo, Severianus et Acacius; item Primasius in Epist. ad Hebr. Eutymius in Psalm. 103; Elias Cretensis ubi supra. Contraria tamen opinio vera est, ab omnibus philosophis atque astronomis probata, coelum videlicet esse rotundum; idque demonstrat Ptolemaeus novem rationibus 3 cap. lib. I edit. magnae; Aristot. II, Coel. tex. 22 et seqq. Sancti Patres idem asseruere: Nazianz., Orat. 4, adversus Julian., in Orat. 2, de Theolog., in Orat. in sanctum Baptisma; Chrysost. Homil. in Psal. CIII; Ambros. Serm. 12 in Psal. CXVIII; S. Augustinus in Genes. ad litter. lib. I, cap. 10 et lib. II, cap. 9; Beda, de sex dier., Orat. et quaest. in Genes. Magis quoque consonum sacris Litteris videtur. Initio Ecclesiast. Oritur sol, etc., quo de loco videndus est S. Hieronymus; item XXIV Eccli. Gyrum coeli, etc. Job. IX, sub quo curvantur qui portant orbem; Proverb. VIII. Ad Psal. CIII, et Isai. XL, ubi dicitur coelum a Deo, sicut tabernaculum, vel cameram, vel pellem extensum, respondet S. Augustinus cap. 9, lib. II, in Genes. ad litter. ISAEUS.

"This roundness of the heaven, then." That the heaven is round was denied not only by Lactantius but also by Justin Martyr, answering questions 59 and 130 of the Orthodox; Basil, Homily 1 on Genesis; Chrysostom, Homilies 14 and 27 on Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, and Homily 2 on the incomprehensible nature of God; Ambrose, Hexaemeron book I; Theophylact and Theodoret on chapter VIII of the Epistle to the Hebrews; Caesarius and Procopius in the places cited above; Haimo, Severian and Acacius; likewise Primasius on the Epistle to the Hebrews; Euthymius on Psalm 103; Elias of Crete in the place cited above. The contrary opinion, however, is the true one, approved by all philosophers and astronomers: namely that the heaven is round; and Ptolemy proves it by nine arguments in chapter 3 of book I of the Great [Syntaxis]; Aristotle, On the Heavens II, text 22 and following. The holy Fathers have asserted the same: Nazianzen, Oration 4 against Julian, Oration 2 on Theology, and the Oration on holy Baptism; Chrysostom, Homily on Psalm 103; Ambrose, Sermon 12 on Psalm 118; St Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter, book I chapter 10 and book II chapter 9; Bede, On the Six Days, Orations and Questions on Genesis. It also seems more consonant with Holy Scripture: the opening of Ecclesiastes, "The sun rises," etc., on which passage St Jerome should be consulted; likewise Ecclesiasticus 24, "the circuit of heaven," etc.; Job 9, "under whom they stoop that bear up the world"; Proverbs 8. To Psalm 103 and Isaiah 40, where heaven is said to be stretched out by God like a tent, or a vault, or a skin, St Augustine replies in On Genesis according to the Letter, book II chapter 9. ISAEUS.

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(2) ‹lemma: Inclusa› · no call mark

Inclusa. Mss. 2 Reg. et editi 7 conclusa.

"Enclosed." Two Regius manuscripts and seven editions read conclusa ("shut in").

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(3) ‹lemma: Ipsam terram globo similem› · no call mark

Ipsam terram globo similem. Est terra rotunda ac sphaerica, non quidem geometrice, sed rudi quodam modo, cum ejus superficiem valles ac montes asperam reddant. Cujus primum sit argumentum, quod sol, stellae, eclypses circa terram omnibus habitatoribus ita successive apparent, perinde ac si circa sphaeram rotundissimam moverentur, hoc est, regulariter et uniformiter, ita ut locis, v. g. per 15 gradus magis orientalibus una hora prius appareant; atque hoc accidit ubique terrarum secundum terrae gyrum ab oriente in occasum productum, quod patet ex eclypsium praedictione infallibili, secundum quam non omnibus eadem hora, sed diversis appariturae praenuntiantur: quae certa praedictio supponit terram esse rotundam. Accedit etiam experientia nautarum, qui dum totum terrae ambitum circumnavigant, eamdem stellarum uniformem ac regularem apparitionem ubique observant. Jos. BLANCANUS.

"The earth itself like a globe." The earth is round and spherical, not indeed geometrically, but in a rough sort of way, since valleys and mountains make its surface uneven. Let the first proof of this be that the sun, the stars and eclipses appear successively to all the inhabitants around the earth, just as if they moved about a perfectly round sphere, that is, regularly and uniformly, so that in places lying, for example, 15 degrees further east they appear an hour earlier; and this happens everywhere on earth along the earth's circuit drawn from east to west, as is clear from the infallible prediction of eclipses, by which they are foretold to appear not at the same hour for all but at different hours: and this sure prediction presupposes that the earth is round. Add also the experience of sailors, who, while sailing around the whole circuit of the earth, observe everywhere the same uniform and regular appearance of the stars. Jos. BLANCANUS [Giuseppe Biancani].

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(4) ‹lemma: Quomodo non cadunt omnia› · no call mark

Quomodo non cadunt omnia. Ms. 1 Regio-Put., cadant. Mss. 10, et vet. 2 edit., Quomodo ergo. 1 Colb., igitur.

"How do all things not fall?" One Regio-Puteanus manuscript has cadant (subjunctive). Ten manuscripts and two old editions read Quomodo ergo ("How then"); one Colbertinus, igitur.

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(5) ‹lemma: A medio deferantur› · no call mark

A medio deferantur. Ita restitui ex decem editis et omnibus mss. praeter 3 Reg. quibus est differantur, ut et 3 vulgatis rec.

"Are carried down from the middle." So I have restored from ten editions and all the manuscripts except three Regii, which have differantur, as do three recent printed editions.

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(6) ‹lemma: Ostendant› · no call mark

Ostendant. Reposui ex mss. et vet. editis 2 Rom. In caeteris vulgatis legitur, ostentent.

"Let them show." I have restored this from the manuscripts and two old Roman editions. In the other printed editions one reads ostentent ("let them display").

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(7) ‹lemma: Multis argumentis› · no call mark

Multis argumentis. Imo nullis.

"By many arguments." Rather, by none.

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(8) ‹lemma: Possit› · no call mark

Possit. Mss. 7 et totidem editi, possint.

"Can" (singular). Seven manuscripts and as many editions read possint (plural).

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(9) ‹lemma: Nunc pauca nobis de philosophia› · no call mark

Nunc pauca nobis de philosophia. Caute lege hoc caput; nam si Lactantius omnem antiquorum Gentilium philosophiam reprehendit, non satis consulte facit, cum multa et vera, et recta contineret illa philosophia, quae usui et utilitati humanae vitae essent. Si vero philosophiam in universum damnat, nullo pacto ferendus est, et repugnat communi Patrum et Ecclesiae sensui. Vide Alphonsum Castrum lib. XIII adversus Haereses, verbo Scientia BRASICHELLI.

"Now a few words from us on philosophy." Read this chapter with caution; for if Lactantius censures all the philosophy of the ancient Gentiles, he does not act wisely enough, since that philosophy contained many things both true and right, which were of use and benefit to human life. But if he condemns philosophy altogether, he is in no way to be tolerated, and he goes against the common mind of the Fathers and of the Church. See Alfonso de Castro, Against Heresies book XIII, under the word Scientia. BRASICHELLI.

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(10) ‹lemma: In commune› · no call mark

In commune. Omnium mss. est, praeter 4 recentiores, quibus est, ut impressis, in communi. — In commune. Restituo ex Bon., Tax., Cauc., Ultr., Goth. Illustravi uberius ad l. III, cap. 21. Hic addo ex Tertull. de Patient.: Patientiae in commune memores. BUNEMAN.

"In common" (in commune). This is the reading of all the manuscripts except four more recent ones, which have, as the printed editions do, in communi. — "In common." I restore it from the Bononiensis, Taxaquetianus, Cauchianus, Ultrajectinus and Gothanus. I have illustrated it more fully at book III, chapter 21. Here I add from Tertullian, On Patience: "mindful of patience in common." BUNEMAN.

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(11) ‹lemma: Summus ille noster› · no call mark

Summus ille noster. Διαβολὴ, per ironiam. Locus est in Praefatione secundae Tusc. Quaest. Ms. 1 Bonon. antiq. habet, Cicero summus ille noster. Ita enim se habet ille locus: Plato quidem in politicis delectum facit, νόθους (id est spurios) excludens a sapientiae studio, γνησίους (id est legitimos) admittens. Sed Plato in Euthydemo haec ait, cum sit finis hominibus in universum omnibus propositus felicitas, felicitas autem in sapientia consistat, relinqui ut omnes sapientiae studio se dedant.

"That great one of ours." A gibe (diabolē), by irony. The passage is in the preface to the second book of the Tusculan Disputations. One old Bologna manuscript has "Cicero, that great one of ours." For the passage runs thus: "Plato indeed makes a selection in his Republic, excluding the nothoi (that is, the bastards) from the study of wisdom and admitting the gnēsioi (that is, the legitimate)." But Plato in the Euthydemus says this: since the end set before all men universally is happiness, and happiness consists in wisdom, it remains that all should devote themselves to the study of wisdom.

(printed under page 217)

(12) ‹lemma: Possint› · no call mark

Possint. Ita multi optimi et veterrimi mss. In rec. 2 est possunt; in 3 rec. et in excusis, possent.

"Could" (possint). So many of the best and oldest manuscripts. In two recent ones it is possunt; in three recent ones and in the printed editions, possent.

(printed under page 217)

(13) ‹lemma: Quoniam si sapientia› · no call mark

Quoniam si sapientia. Lips. tert. et Reimm. hoc ordine, quoniam sapientia si. Satis bene; et sic Su- (continues)

"Since if wisdom." The third Leipzig manuscript and Reimmann's have it in this order: quoniam sapientia si. Well enough; and so Su- (continues)

(printed under page 217)

Page

  • running head: 427 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at right edge)
  • marginal letters: A bes fabricati sunt; B quomodo non cadunt omnia; C mil. 14 et 27 in Ep. Pauli (in the notes); D tant orbem; Proverb. VIII (in the notes; position between this line and the next, unsure)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: first word "bes" is the end of a word (presumably orbes) broken from col. 426; "neb⟨u⟩la": the u is damaged/faint in the type; full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" stands below "philosophari," and is not set; the Variorum notae below it (Hanc igitur coeli rotunditatem ... Inclusa ... Ipsam terram globo similem ...) are page-foot commentary, left for the later pass
PL 6:428
aut prudentes et scios mendacia defendenda suscipere, quasi ut ingenia sua in malis rebus exerceant, vel ostendant. At ego multis argumentis probare possem, nullo modo fieri posse, ut coelum terra sit inferius, nisi et liber jam concludendus esset, et adhuc aliqua restarent, quae magis sunt praesenti operi necessaria. Et quoniam singulorum errores percurrere non est unius libri opus, satis sit pauca enumerasse, ex quibus possit qualia sint caetera intelligi.
or, being wise and knowing, undertake to defend lies, as though to exercise or display their talents in bad matters. But I could prove by many arguments that it can in no way come about that the sky is lower than the earth, were it not that the book must now be brought to a close, and that some things still remain which are more necessary to the present work. And since running through the errors of each one is not the work of a single book, let it suffice to have enumerated a few, from which it may be understood what the rest are like.
CAPUT XXV.
Chapter XXV.
De addiscenda philosophia; et quanta ad ejus studium sint necessaria.
On learning philosophy; and how much is necessary for its study.
Nunc pauca nobis de philosophia in commune dicenda sunt, ut confirmata causa peroremus. Summus ille noster Platonis imitator existimavit philosophiam non esse vulgarem, quod eam non nisi docti homines assequi possint. « Est, inquit Cicero (lib. II Tusc., n° 1), philosophia paucis contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens. » Non est ergo sapientia, si ab hominum coetu abhorret: quoniam si sapientia homini data est, sine ullo discrimine omnibus data est, ut nemo sit prorsus,
Now a few things must be said by us about philosophy in general, so that, our case having been established, we may conclude. That supreme imitator of Plato among us thought that philosophy is not for the common people, because none but learned men can attain it. "Philosophy," says Cicero (Tusc. 2, no. 1), "is content with few judges, of set purpose itself fleeing the multitude." It is therefore not wisdom, if it shrinks from the company of men: since if wisdom has been given to man, it has been given to all without any distinction, so that there is absolutely no one
Editors' notes and page, col. 428

Page

  • running head: TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 428 (start of the running head cut off at the left edge of the image)
  • marginal letters: A ‹aut prudentes et scios›; B ‹dicenda sunt, ut confirmata›; C ‹dant. Mss. 10, et vet. 2 edit.› (in the notes); D ‹tiores, quibus est, ut impressis› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column ends mid-sentence at "prorsus,"; full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE" below the text block, cut off at the left edge, not set; the editors' notes at the page foot (Blancanus, Brasichelli, Buneman, etc.) not set, left for the later pass; "n° 1" set as printed
PL 6:429
qui eam capere non possit. At illi virtutem humano generi datam sic amplexantur, ut soli omnium publico bono frui velle videantur, tam invidi, quam si velint deligare oculos aut effodere caeteris, ne solem videant. Nam quid est aliud hominibus negare sapientiam, quam mentibus eorum verum ac divinum lumen auferre? Quod si natura hominis sapientiae capax est, oportuit et opifices, et rusticos, et mulieres, et omnes denique, qui humanam formam gerunt, doceri, ut sapiant; populumque ex omni lingua, et conditione, et sexu, et aetate conflari. Maximum itaque argumentum est, philosophiam neque ad sapientiam tendere, neque ipsam esse sapientiam, quod mysterium ejus barba tantum celebratur et pallio. Senserunt hoc adeo Stoici, qui et servis, et mulieribus philosophandum esse dixerunt; Epicurus quoque, qui rudes omnium litterarum ad philosophiam invitat; item Plato, qui civitatem de sapientibus voluit componere.
who cannot grasp it. But those men so embrace the virtue given to the human race that they seem to wish to be the only ones of all to enjoy a public good, as envious as if they wished to bind or dig out the eyes of everyone else, so that they might not see the sun. For what else is it to deny wisdom to men than to take away the true and divine light from their minds? But if the nature of man is capable of wisdom, then craftsmen, and country folk, and women, and in short all who bear the human form, ought to have been taught so that they might be wise, and a people ought to have been gathered together from every tongue, and condition, and sex, and age. It is therefore the greatest proof that philosophy neither tends towards wisdom nor is itself wisdom, that its mystery is celebrated only with a beard and a cloak. The Stoics perceived this so far that they said that both slaves and women ought to study philosophy; Epicurus too, who invites to philosophy those unskilled in all letters; likewise Plato, who wished to compose a city out of wise men.
Conati quidem illi sunt facere, quod veritas exigebat: sed non potuit ultra verba procedi. Primum, quia multis artibus opus est, ut ad philosophiam possit accedi. Discendae istae communes litterae propter usum legendi, quia in tanta rerum varietate, nec disci audiendo possunt omnia, nec memoria contineri. Grammaticis quoque non parum operae
Those men did indeed try to do what truth demanded, but it was not possible to proceed beyond words. First, because many arts are needed so that one may approach philosophy. These common letters must be learned for the practice of reading, because in so great a variety of things neither can all things be learned by hearing nor be retained in memory. To the grammarians also not a little effort
Editors' notes and page, col. 429

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 218)

(1) ‹lemma: Quoniam si sapientia (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) blac., Rost., Ven. 1471, utraque 78; quoniam sapientia si.

(printed under page 218)

(2) ‹lemma: Tam invidi, quam si velint deligare oculos› · no call mark

Tam invidi, quam si velint deligare oculos. Quintil. lib. II Inst. cap. 17: deligare vulnus, pro aliorum obligare, adligare; sic et deligare oculos rectum. Conf. not. ad Lact. l. V, cap. 1. BUN.

"As grudging as if they wished to bind up the eyes." Quintilian, Institutes book II chapter 17: deligare vulnus, "to bind up a wound," where others say obligare, adligare; so deligare oculos is also correct. Compare the note on Lactantius book V chapter 1. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 218)

(3) ‹lemma: Lumen› · no call mark

Lumen. Quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.

"Light." That which enlightens every man coming into this world.

(printed under page 218)

(4) ‹lemma: Oportuit et opifices› · no call mark

Oportuit et opifices. Ex mss. addidi et quam voculam sequentia postulare videntur.

"Craftsmen too ought." From the manuscripts I have added et ("too"), a little word which what follows seems to require.

(printed under page 218)

(5) ‹lemma: Populum... conflari› · no call mark

Populum... conflari. Verbo Ciceronis eleganti, quo jam usus, l. II, c. 6.

"A people ... be brought together." With an elegant word of Cicero's, which he has used already, book II, chapter 6.

(printed under page 218)

(6) ‹lemma: Mysterium ejus barba tantum› · no call mark

Mysterium ejus barba tantum, etc. Philosophi enim promissam barbam habebant, ac pallio amiciebantur: de quo supra. Is Vide etiam infra lib. V, cap. 2. Recte itaque Herodes Atticus apud Gell., lib. IX, cap. 2, mendico, qui habitu philosophiam profitebatur, respondit: Barbam et pallium video, philosophum non video. Vide proverbium, Tragica Simia: item aliud, Barba tenus Sapientes. — Barba tantum celebratur et pallio. Habitu philosophorum, praesertim Graecorum. Infra, l. V, cap. 2, de falso philosopho: Vitia sua capillis et pallio praetegebat. Et Gellius lib. XIII, cap. 8, de ejusdem generis hominibus: Operti barba et pallio, mores et emolumenta philosophiae in linguam verborumque artes convertunt. CELL.

"Its mystery [is celebrated] only by the beard," etc. For the philosophers wore long beards and were wrapped in the cloak: on which see above. See also below, book V, chapter 2. So Herodes Atticus, in Gellius book IX chapter 2, rightly answered a beggar who professed philosophy by his dress: "I see a beard and a cloak; I do not see a philosopher." See the proverb "a tragic ape," and another, "wise as far as the beard." — "It is celebrated only by the beard and the cloak": by the dress of philosophers, especially the Greeks. Below, book V chapter 2, of a false philosopher: "He covered his vices with his hair and his cloak." And Gellius book XIII chapter 8, of men of the same kind: "Covered with beard and cloak, they turn the morals and profits of philosophy into tongue and the arts of words." CELL[ARIUS].

(printed under page 218)

(7) ‹lemma: Stoici› · no call mark

Stoici. De hoc vide Senecam, Epistol. ad Martiam.

"The Stoics." On this see Seneca, letter to Marcia.

(printed under page 218)

(8) ‹lemma: Item Plato› · no call mark

Item Plato. Ms. 1 Reg. vetustissimus, idem; Cotton., Ita non Plato.

"Plato likewise." One very old Regius manuscript has idem; the Cottonianus, Ita non Plato ("Not so Plato").

(printed under page 218)

(9) ‹lemma: Discendae istae communes litterae› · no call mark

Discendae istae communes litterae. Mss. Clarom. et Brun., Discendae sunt communes litterae. — Communes litterae. Cic. lib. II de Orat. cap. 17: Communium litterarum et politioris humanitatis. Sic dixit Lactantius, l. III, cap. 6: communem scientiam. BUN.

"These common letters must be learned." The Claromontanus and Brunswick manuscripts: "the common letters must be learned." — "Common letters." Cicero, On the Orator book II chapter 17: "of common letters and of a more refined culture." So Lactantius said, book III chapter 6: "common knowledge." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 218)

(10) ‹lemma: Tullius› · no call mark

Tullius. Vide Ciceron. ubi supra not. ad fin. 2.

"Tullius." See Cicero in the place cited above, note towards the end, 2.

(printed under page 218)

(11) ‹lemma: Themisten› · no call mark

Themisten. Putat fortasse Leontii conjugem, ad quam Epicurus scripsisse legitur. Quid dicemus de Themistoclea, Pythagorae sorore? quid de aliis pluribus, quarum bene longum catalogum Textor recenset? BETULEIUS. — Vide Histor. ad mulierum philosopharum Aegidii Menagii, Lugduni, 1682, in 12. Hi tamen auctores non omnes enumerant. — Unam ex omni memoria Themisten. Nulli forsan saeculo, nec antiquitati, doctae feminae defuerunt. Laudatur Themistoclea, soror Pythagorae; laudantur aliae. BUN.

"Themista." He means perhaps the wife of Leontius, to whom Epicurus is read to have written. What shall we say of Themistoclea, the sister of Pythagoras? What of many others, of whom Textor gives a fairly long catalogue? BETULEIUS. — See Gilles Ménage's History of women philosophers, Lyon, 1682, in duodecimo. Yet these authors do not list them all. — "Themista alone in all memory." Perhaps no age, and not antiquity, was without learned women. Themistoclea, sister of Pythagoras, is praised; others are praised. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 218)

(12) ‹lemma: Phaedonem› · no call mark

Phaedonem. Mss. 28 corrupte, Pythagoram. Apud Laert. dubium est, Critone an Alcibiades eum ex Socratis admonitione redemerit. Gellius tamen cum Lactantio facit, qui lib. II, cap. 18, de Phaedone sic scribit: Phaedon Elidensis ex cohorte illa Socratica fuit Socratique, et Platoni perquam fuit familiaris. Ejus nomini Plato illum librum divinum de Immortalitate animae dedit. Is Phaedo servus fuit, forma atque ingenio liberali, et ut quidam scripserunt, a lenone domino puer ad merendum coactus. Eum Cebes Socraticus, hortante Socrate, emisse dicitur, habuisseque in philosophiae disciplinis; atque is postea philosophus illustris fuit, sermonesque ejus de Socrate admodum elegantes leguntur. Lege post hunc Macrob. lib. I, Sat. 2. BETUL. — Pro Phaedonem, in mss. 28, et 2 vet. edit. Rom., videtur fuisse intrusum Pythagorae nomen: sed male; nusquam enim legimus Pythagoram servum fuisse, et a Cebete emptum ac philosophicis imbutum.

"Phaedo." Twenty-eight manuscripts corruptly read Pythagoras. In Laertius it is uncertain whether Crito or Alcibiades ransomed him at Socrates' urging. Gellius, however, agrees with Lactantius; in book II chapter 18 he writes thus of Phaedo: "Phaedo of Elis was of that Socratic band, and was very intimate with Socrates and Plato. To his name Plato gave that divine book on the Immortality of the Soul. This Phaedo was a slave, of a gentleman's looks and mind, and, as some have written, was forced as a boy by his master, a pander, to earn by prostitution. Cebes the Socratic is said to have bought him at Socrates' urging and to have kept him in the studies of philosophy; and he afterwards became a famous philosopher, and his discourses on Socrates, which are very elegant, are read." After him read Macrobius, Saturnalia book I chapter 2. BETUL[EIUS]. — In place of Phaedo, the name of Pythagoras seems to have been thrust into twenty-eight manuscripts and two old Roman editions: but wrongly; for nowhere do we read that Pythagoras was a slave, and bought by Cebes and trained in philosophy.

(printed under page 218)

(13) ‹lemma: Cebetem tradunt› · no call mark

Cebetem tradunt. Abest Cebetem a mss. et 2 vet. edit. Rom. In mss. 14 est, traduntur.

"They report that Cebes." Cebetem is missing from the manuscripts and two old Roman editions. In fourteen manuscripts it is traduntur ("are reported").

(printed under page 218)

(14) ‹lemma: Platonem› · no call mark

Platonem. De Platonis servitute a Dionysio Juniori tyranno, vide Laertium.

"Plato." On Plato's enslavement by the tyrant Dionysius the Younger, see Laertius.

(printed under page 218)

(15) ‹lemma: Ac Diogenem› · no call mark

Ac Diogenem. Gellius et Macrob. iisdem locis: Diogenes etiam Cynicus servitutem servivit: sed is ex libertate in servitutem venum ierat. Quem cum emere vellet Xeniades Corinthius, et quid artificii novisset, percunctatus foret: « Novi, inquit Diogenes, hominibus liberis imperare. » Tum Xeniades responsum ejus miratus emit, et manumisit; filiosque suos ei tradens: « Accipe, inquit, liberos meos, quibus imperes. » Confer cum his etiam Laert. BETUL.

"And Diogenes." Gellius and Macrobius in the same places: "Diogenes the Cynic also served as a slave: but he had been sold from freedom into slavery. When Xeniades of Corinth wished to buy him, and had asked what craft he knew, 'I know,' said Diogenes, 'how to rule free men.' Then Xeniades, admiring his answer, bought him and freed him; and handing his sons over to him, 'Take my children,' he said, 'to rule.'" Compare Laertius too with these. BETUL[EIUS].

(printed under page 218)

Page

  • running head: 429 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT[IA] (cut off at right edge; column number blurred in print)
  • marginal letters: A ‹qui eam capere non possit›; B ‹et servis, et mulieribus philosophandum›; C ‹contineri. Grammaticis quoque›; D ‹praesertim Graecorum› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "capere" in line 1 is printed heavily inked and looks like "eapere", set as capere; full-width line "VARIORUM NOTAE" after "operae" not set; column ends mid-sentence at "operae"; Variorum notae at page foot (blac., Rost., Ven. 1471 ... Themistoclea, Pythagorae sorore) left for later pass
PL 6:430
dandum est, ut rectam loquendi rationem scias. Id multos annos auferat necesse est. Nec oratoria quidem ignoranda est; ut ea, quae didiceris, proferre atque eloqui possis. Geometria quoque, ac musica, et astrologia necessaria est, quod hae artes cum philosophia habent aliquam societatem: quae universa perdisce⟨r⟩e neque foeminae possunt, quibus intra puberes annos officia mox usibus domesticis profutura discenda sunt neque servi, quibus per eos annos vel maxime serviendum est, quibus possunt discere; neque pauperes, aut opifices, aut rustici, quibus in diem victus labore est quaerendus. Ob eam causam Tullius ait abhorrere a multitudine philosophiam. At enim rudes Epicurus accipiet. Quomodo ergo illa, quae de principiis rerum dicuntur, intelligunt, quae perplexa et involuta vix etiam politi homines assequuntur?
must be given, so that you may know the correct method of speaking. That must necessarily take away many years. Nor indeed is oratory to be left unknown, so that you may be able to bring forth and express the things you have learned. Geometry also, and music, and astrology are necessary, because these arts have some fellowship with philosophy: all of which neither women can learn thoroughly, who within the years of puberty must learn the duties that will soon be of use for domestic needs, nor slaves, who during those years, in which they could learn, must above all serve; nor the poor, or craftsmen, or rustics, who must seek their daily living by labour. For that reason Tullius says that philosophy shrinks from the multitude. But Epicurus, it is said, will receive the unlearned. How then do they understand those things which are said about the first principles of things, which are intricate and involved, and which even cultivated men scarcely attain?
In rebus igitur obscuritate implicitis, et ingeniorum varietate confusis, et eloquentium virorum exquisito sermone fucatis, quis imperito ac rudi locus est? Denique nullas unquam mulieres philosophari docuerunt, praeter unam ex omni memoria Themisten; neque servos, praeter unum Phaedonem, quem male servientem redemisse ac docuisse Cebetem tradunt. Enumerant etiam Platonem, ac Diogenem; qui tamen servi non fuerunt: sed his servitus evenerat;
In matters, therefore, entangled in obscurity, and confused by the variety of minds, and coloured by the refined speech of eloquent men, what place is there for the untrained and unlearned? Finally, they never taught any women to philosophize, except one in all memory, Themiste; nor slaves, except Phaedo alone, whom, while he was serving in a base servitude, they report that Cebes ransomed and taught. They also enumerate Plato, and Diogenes; who, however, were not slaves: but slavery had befallen them;
Editors' notes and page, col. 430

Page

  • running head: [cut off at left] FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 430
  • marginal letters: A ‹dandum est, ut rectam›; B ‹ligunt, quae perplexa›; C ‹qui tamen servi non fuerunt›; D ‹elegantes leguntur (in the notes below the text)›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "perdisce⟨r⟩e": the printed form looks like "perdisce: e", which seems to be a broken or missing r, so it is set as damaged type. The column ends mid-word with "eve-" (evenit/evenerat), and the English breaks off at the same point. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off at the left edge as "RIORUM NOTÆ.") stands between the text and the notes and is not set. The Variorum notes at the page foot (Betuleius, Bun., on Themiste, Phaedo, Plato and Diogenes) are left for the later pass.
PL 6:431
sunt enim capti. Platonem quidem redemisse Anniceris quidam traditur sestertiis octo. Itaque insectatus est conviciis hunc ipsum redemptorem Seneca, quod parvo Platonem aestimaverit. Furiosus, ut mihi videtur, qui homini fuerit iratus, quod non multam pecuniam perdidit: scilicet aurum appendere debuit, tamquam pro mortuo Hectore, aut tantum ingerere nummorum, quantum venditor non poposcit. Ex Barbaris vero nullum, praeter unum Anacharsim Scytham, qui philosophiam ne somniasset quidem, nisi et linguam, et litteras ante didicisset.
for they were captives. Plato, indeed, is reported to have been ransomed by a certain Anniceris for eight sestertia. And so Seneca assailed this very ransomer with reproaches, because he had valued Plato cheaply. A madman, as it seems to me, who was angry with the man because he did not lose much money: no doubt he ought to have weighed out gold, as for the dead Hector, or heaped up as much coin as the seller did not demand. Of the barbarians, however, none, except only Anacharsis the Scythian, who would not even have dreamed of philosophy unless he had first learned both the language and the letters.
CAPUT XXVI.
Chapter XXVI.
Sapientiam sola doctrina coelestis largitur; et quam sit efficax lex Dei.
That the heavenly teaching alone bestows wisdom; and how effective the law of God is.
Quod ergo illi poscente natura faciendum esse senserunt, sed tamen neque ipsi facere potuerunt, neque a philosophis fieri posse viderunt, sola haec efficit doctrina coelestis; quia sola sapientia est. Illi scilicet persuadere cuiquam poterunt, qui nihil persuadent etiam sibi? aut cujusquam cupiditates oppriment,
What, therefore, they perceived ought to be done at nature's demand, but yet were neither able to do themselves, nor saw could be done by philosophers, this the heavenly teaching alone accomplishes; because it alone is wisdom. Will they, forsooth, be able to persuade anyone, who persuade not even themselves of anything? or will they suppress the desires of anyone,
Editors' notes and page, col. 431

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 219)

(1) ‹lemma: Platonem... redemisse Aniceris quidam› · no call mark

Platonem... redemisse Aniceris quidam. Plato, cum Dionysio, Siciliae tyranno, acerbius de tyrannide respondisset, ab eo abducendus vendendusque traditus est Polidi, Lacedaemoniorum legato, qui Aeginae venalem exposuit. Redemptus vero 20 minis ab Anniceri Cyrenaico, et Athenas remissus ad amicos. CELL.

"That one Anniceris ransomed Plato." Plato, having answered Dionysius, tyrant of Sicily, too sharply about tyranny, was handed over by him to be led away and sold to Pollis, envoy of the Lacedaemonians, who put him up for sale at Aegina. He was ransomed for 20 minas by Anniceris of Cyrene and sent back to his friends at Athens. CELL[ARIUS].

(printed under page 219)

(2) ‹lemma: Sestertiis octo› · no call mark

Sestertiis octo. Haec summam faciunt ducentorum aureorum coronatorum.

"For eight sestertia." These make a sum of two hundred gold crowns.

(printed under page 219)

(3) ‹lemma: Furiosus› · no call mark

Furiosus. Heumannus credit, Lactantium scripsisse, furiosius. Ego vix crediderim. Habent omnes libri, in his Reimm., Furiosus, et recte; et ex indole Lactantii, l. VI, cap. 15: Stoici ergo furiosi, qui. BUN.

"Mad." Heumann believes Lactantius wrote furiosius ("more madly"). I should hardly believe it. All the books, among them Reimmann's, have furiosus, and rightly; and it suits Lactantius's manner, book VI chapter 15: "Mad, then, the Stoics, who ..." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 219)

(4) ‹lemma: Ut mihi videtur› · no call mark

Ut mihi videtur. Delevi quidem, quod ab omnibus mss. et nonnullis editis abest.

"As it seems to me." I have deleted quidem, which is missing from all the manuscripts and some editions.

(printed under page 219)

(5) ‹lemma: Multam pecuniam› · no call mark

Multam pecuniam. Sic reposui ex omnibus mss. ac veteribus editis 2 Rom. Tornes. et Soubron. In 12 vulgatis est, multum pecuniae.

"Much money." So I have restored from all the manuscripts and the old editions, two Roman, the Tornaesius and the Soubron. In twelve printed editions it is multum pecuniae.

(printed under page 219)

(6) ‹lemma: Mortuo Hectore› · no call mark

Mortuo Hectore. Historia est apud Homer. Iliad.; Dictyn. Cretensem, lib. III; et Virgil., lib. I Aeneid. Cicero, actione VII, Verri hoc crimen objicit, quod cum multos in Sicilia occidisset, cadavera non nisi accepto pretio patribus et cognatis ad sepulturam redderet.

"When Hector was dead." The story is in Homer's Iliad; in Dictys of Crete, book III; and in Virgil, Aeneid book I. Cicero, in the seventh speech [against Verres], charges Verres with this crime: that, having killed many in Sicily, he gave the bodies back for burial to fathers and kinsmen only when he had been paid.

(printed under page 219)

(7) ‹lemma: Anacharsim Scytham› · no call mark

Anacharsim Scytham. Is fuit Scytharum regis frater, matre Graeca: ex patria Athenas profectus. Vita ejus est libro primo apud Laert. Insignis Luciani Dialogus hujus nomine inscriptus est, in quo de juventutis exercitiis cum Solone disputat. De Anacharsi vide Plutarchum in Vita Solonis. BETUL.

"Anacharsis the Scythian." He was the brother of the king of the Scythians, by a Greek mother; he set out from his homeland to Athens. His life is in the first book of Laertius. A notable dialogue of Lucian bears his name, in which he debates with Solon on the exercises of the young. On Anacharsis see Plutarch's Life of Solon. BETUL[EIUS].

(printed under page 219)

(8) ‹lemma: Et litteras› · no call mark

Et litteras. Expunxi Graecas, quod a cunctis mss. ac veteribus editis 2 Rom. et Betul. abest. Buneman. habet: — Et (Graecas) litteras. Parenthesi inclusi (Graecas), quam vocem non habent Bon., Tax., Pen., Cauc., Pal., Ultr., Jun., Goth., Lips. 1, 3, Reimm., Emman., Cant., nec ullae edd. vett. Sublac., Rost., Ven. 1471-97, Paris. 1513. At receperunt Aldus et seqq. BUNEM.

"And letters." I have struck out Graecas ("Greek"), because it is missing from all the manuscripts and the old editions, two Roman and Betuleius's. Bünemann has: — "And (Greek) letters. I have put (Graecas) in parentheses; the word is not in the Bononiensis, Taxaquetianus, Pen., Cauchianus, Palatinus, Ultrajectinus, Junius, Gothanus, Leipzig 1 and 3, Reimmann's, Emmanuel, Cantabrigiensis, nor in any of the old editions, Subiaco, Rostock, Venice 1471–97, Paris 1513. But Aldus and those after him took it in." BUNEM[ANN].

(printed under page 219)

(9) ‹lemma: Poscente natura› · no call mark

Poscente natura. Dictante lege naturae, non corrupta illa, sed primogenita. Nam sub finem hujus capitis, naturae vocabulum usurpat pro vitiata illa, adeoque pro ingenio sive, ut cum Apostolo loquar, lege carnis. BETUL.

"As nature demands." As the law of nature dictates: not that corrupted nature, but the first-made. For towards the end of this chapter he uses the word "nature" for nature as vitiated, and so for natural disposition, or, to speak with the Apostle, the law of the flesh. BETUL[EIUS].

(printed under page 219)

(10) ‹lemma: Dei autem praecepta› · no call mark

Dei autem praecepta, etc. Non per se, sed per comitantem S. Spiritus efficaciam.

"But the precepts of God," etc. Not of themselves, but through the accompanying efficacy of the Holy Spirit.

(printed under page 219)

(11) ‹lemma: Tam placidum› · no call mark

Tam placidum. Id ex Terentii Adelphis act. IV, scen. 1, ac docet Lactantius quod christianum nil magis deceat, quam simplicitas.

"So gentle." This is from Terence's Adelphoe, act IV, scene 1; and Lactantius teaches that nothing better becomes a Christian than simplicity.

(printed under page 219)

(12) ‹lemma: Plenis manibus largientem› · no call mark

Plenis manibus largientem. Optima lectio vetustiorum mss. et plurium editorum. Scripti 13 et vulgati sex, propriis.

"Giving with full hands." The best reading, that of the older manuscripts and of most editions. Thirteen manuscripts and six printed editions read propriis ("with his own").

(printed under page 219)

(13) ‹lemma: Plenis manibus› · no call mark

Plenis manibus. Hoc est ampliter, copiose, prolixe, minimeque maligne. Haec Eras. in Chil. Jacobus in sua Epistola cap. III, confert mundanam sapientiam cum coelesti, vers. 13, et seqq. — Plenis manibus. Cic. l. II Att., Ep. XXV: Hortatus quam plena manu, etc. Ubi Corradus notat, plena manu esse proverbium ut pleno modio. Saepe utitur Seneca ad Polyb. cap. 28: Munera plena manu congerentem reliquit. Sen. Ep. XXXIII: Si tamen exegeris, non tam mendice tecum agam: sed plena manu fiet; et Epist. CXX: Vidimus, ubi tribuendum esset, plena manu dantem. BUN.

"With full hands." That is, amply, abundantly, generously, and not at all grudgingly. So Erasmus in the Chiliades [Adagia]. James in his Epistle, chapter 3, verse 13 and following, compares worldly wisdom with heavenly. — "With full hands." Cicero, To Atticus book II, letter 25: "with how full a hand he urged," etc.; where Corradus notes that "with full hand" is a proverb, like "with full measure." Seneca uses it often: To Polybius chapter 28, "he left him heaping up gifts with a full hand"; Seneca, Letter 33: "If, however, you demand it, I shall not deal with you so beggarly: it shall be done with a full hand"; and Letter 120: "We have seen him, where something was to be bestowed, giving with a full hand." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 219)

(14) ‹lemma: Cruces› · no call mark

Cruces. Vers. Gall. perperam hic vertit, afflictions; significat. h. l. patibula. BUN.

"Crosses." The French version wrongly renders it here as afflictions; in this place it means gibbets. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 219)

(15) ‹lemma: Cruces, et ignes, et taurum contemnet› · no call mark

Cruces, et ignes, et taurum contemnet. Haec eruditis viris et nobis verior visa est lectio, quam intrusum et pericula 23 manuscriptorum et 7 editorum, pro quo est et Perilli, in 1 Cauc. et Phalaridis, in 3 scriptis et 4 impressis: quae omnia nobis videntur esse glossemata. — Cruces, et ignes, et Phalaridis taurum contemnet. Bon., cruces, et ignes, periculum omne et taurum. Singularis ms. Cauci, cruces et ignes et Perilli taurum contemnet. Perillus enim erat inventor illius aenei tauri, de quo docte et pluribus Salvagninus ad Ovid. Ibid., 439: Aere Perillaeo veros imitere juvencos; et lib. V Trist. 1: Ipse Perillaeo Phalaris permisit in aere / Edere mugitus, et bovis ore queri. BUN.

"He will despise crosses, and fires, and the bull." This seemed to learned men and to us the truer reading, rather than the intruded "and dangers" of twenty-three manuscripts and seven editions; in its place one Cauchianus has "and of Perillus," and three manuscripts and four printed editions "and of Phalaris": all of which seem to us to be glosses. — "He will despise crosses, and fires, and the bull of Phalaris." The Bononiensis: "crosses, and fires, every danger, and the bull." Cauchi's single manuscript: "he will despise crosses and fires and the bull of Perillus." For Perillus was the inventor of that bronze bull, on which Salvagninus writes learnedly and at length on Ovid's Ibis, 439: "May you imitate real bullocks in Perillus's bronze"; and Tristia book V, 1: "Phalaris himself let men bellow in Perillus's bronze and lament through the mouth of an ox." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 219)

(16) ‹lemma: Ganeonem› · no call mark

Ganeonem. Tabernis et conviviis turpioribus dantem operam. Vide Cortium ad Sall. Catil. c. 13, p. 90 et c. 14, p. 94. BUN.

"A glutton." One who gives himself to taverns and to rather shameful banquets. See Cortius on Sallust's Catiline, chapter 13, page 90, and chapter 14, page 94. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 219)

(17) ‹lemma: Uno enim lavacro› · no call mark

Uno enim lavacro, etc. Baptismatis scilicet sacro fonte.

"For by one washing," etc. Namely, by the sacred font of baptism.

(printed under page 219)

(18) ‹lemma: Stultitiam uno semel impetu expellat› · no call mark

Stultitiam uno semel impetu expellat. Hoc est, hominis malitiam universaque peccata depellit baptismus.

"Drives out folly at a single stroke, once for all." That is, baptism drives out a man's wickedness and all his sins.

(printed under page 219)

Page

  • running head: 431 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A nerat; sunt enim capti; B efficax lex Dei. / Quod ergo illi (letter stands between these lines); C cos. CELL. (in the notes); D frater, matre Graeca (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the word fragment "nerat", broken from the previous column; column ends mid-word with "op-". Editors' matter set: the chapter summary "Sapientiam sola doctrina coelestis largitur...". The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOT[AE]" stands above the page-foot commentary; it is cut off at the edge and is not set. The commentary below it, from "Platonem... redemisse Aniceris quidam" to "Dei autem praecepta, etc.", is left for the later pass. The B position is approximate.
PL 6:432
iram temperabunt, libidinem coercebunt, cum ipsi et cedant vitiis, et fateantur, plus valere naturam? Dei autem praecepta, quia et simplicia, et vera sunt, quantum valeant in animis hominum, quotidiana experimenta demonstrant. Da mihi virum, qui sit iracundus, maledicus, effraenatus: paucissimis Dei verbis:
will temper anger, will curb lust, when they themselves both yield to vices and confess that nature is stronger? But how much the precepts of God avail in the minds of men, because they are both simple and true, daily experience shows. Give me a man who is irascible, abusive, unbridled: with a very few words of God
Tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam.
I shall render him as gentle as a sheep.
Da cupidum, avarum, tenacem: jam tibi eum liberalem dabo, et pecuniam suam plenis manibus largientem. Da timidum doloris ac mortis: jam cruces, et ignes, et taurum contemnet. Da libidinosum, adulterum, ganeonem: jam sobrium, castum, continentem videbis. Da crudelem et sanguinis appetentem: jam in veram clementiam furor ille mutabitur. Da injustum, insipientem, peccatorem: continuo et aequus, et prudens, et innocens erit. Uno enim lavacro malitia omnis abolebitur. Tanta divinae sapientiae vis est, ut in hominis pectus infusa, matrem delictorum stultitiam uno semel impetu expellat: ad quod efficiendum, non mercede, non libris, non lucubrationibus opus est. Gratis ista fiunt, facile, cito;
Give me one who is greedy, avaricious, tight-fisted: I shall at once give him back to you generous, and lavishing his money with full hands. Give me one who is fearful of pain and death: at once he will despise crosses, and fires, and the bull. Give me one who is lustful, an adulterer, a glutton: at once you will see him sober, chaste, continent. Give me one who is cruel and thirsting for blood: at once that fury will be changed into true clemency. Give me one who is unjust, foolish, a sinner: forthwith he will be both fair, and prudent, and innocent. For by a single washing all wickedness will be abolished. So great is the power of divine wisdom that, poured into the breast of a man, it drives out folly, the mother of offences, with one single onset: and to accomplish this there is no need of payment, nor of books, nor of night-long studies. These things are done freely, easily, quickly;
Editors' notes and page, col. 432

Page

  • running head: ...CTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 432 (left edge of head cut off by the image; presumably LACTANTII)
  • marginal letters: A priment, iram temperabunt; B injustum, insipientem, peccatorem; C sex, propriis (in the Variorum notae); D rum contemnet. Bon. (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the word fragment "priment", broken from column 431 (e.g. com-/re-priment), set as printed; the verse line "Tam placidum, quam ovem, reddam." is printed on a line of its own and set as such; the VARIORUM NOTAE at the page foot (from "comitantem S. Spiritus efficaciam" to "depellit baptismus") are not set, left for the later pass; the cut-off text at the left edge belongs to column 431 and is not set; the "Digitized by Google" stamp is not set
PL 6:433
modo pateant aures, et pectus sapientiam sitiat. Nemo vereatur: nos aquam non vendimus, nec solem mercede pr⟨ae⟩stamus. Dei fons uberrimus atque plenissimus patet cunctis: et hoc coeleste lumen universis oritur (Vid. Joan. cap. I et VI), quicumque oculos habent. Num quis haec philosopborum aut unquam praestitit, aut praestare, si velit, potest? Qui cum aetates suas in studio philosophiae conterant, neque alium quemquam, neque seipsos (si natura paululum obstitit) possunt facere meliores. Itaque sapientia eorum, ut plurimum efficiat, non excidit vitia, sed abscondit. Pauca vero Dei praecepta sic totum hominem immutant, et exposito vetere novum reddunt, ut non cognoscas eumdem esse.
only let the ears be open, and let the breast thirst for wisdom. Let no one be afraid: we do not sell water, nor do we supply the sun for a fee. The most abundant and fullest fountain of God lies open to all, and this heavenly light rises for all (see John 1 and 6), whoever have eyes. Has any of the philosophers ever supplied these things, or can he supply them, if he wished? Though they wear out their lifetimes in the study of philosophy, they can make neither anyone else nor themselves better (if nature has resisted even a little). And so their wisdom, at the most it can achieve, does not cut out vices but hides them. But a few precepts of God so change the whole man, and, the old one having been put off, render him new, that you would not recognize him to be the same.
CAPUT XXVII.
Chapter XXVII.
Quam parum philosophorum praecepta conferant ad veram sapientiam, quam in sola religione invenies.
How little the precepts of the philosophers contribute to true wisdom, which you will find in religion alone.
Quid ergo? nihilne illi simile praecipiunt? Imo permulta; et ad verum frequenter accedunt. Sed nihil ponderis habent illa praecepta, quia sunt humana, et auctoritate majori, id est divina illa, carent. Nemo igitur credit; quia tam se hominem putat esse, qui audit, quam est ille, qui praecipit. Praeterea
What then? Do they enjoin nothing similar? On the contrary, a great many things; and they frequently come near to the truth. But those precepts have no weight, because they are human and lack a greater authority, that is, that divine one. Therefore no one believes, because the one who hears thinks himself as much a man as is the one who enjoins. Moreover
Editors' notes and page, col. 433

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 220)

(1) ‹lemma: Pectus... sitiat› · no call mark

Pectus... sitiat. Rost. pectus... sciat, prave. Imitatur Cyprianum, l. II, ep. 2, ed. Erasmi: Nostrum tantum sitiat pectus et pateat. BUN.

"Let the heart ... thirst." The Rostock edition has pectus ... sciat ("let the heart know"), wrongly. He is imitating Cyprian, book II, letter 2, in Erasmus's edition: "Let our heart only thirst and lie open." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 220)

(2) ‹lemma: Nemo vereatur: nos aquam non vendimus› · no call mark

Nemo vereatur: nos aquam non vendimus. Tali interpunctione haec distinguunt mss. 9 Reg., 3 Colbert. sexque alii, et edit. Rom. 1470. In 3 Colbert. nulla distinctio; in 2 scriptis rec. et 17, excusis legitur: Nemo vereatur nos, aquam non vendimus. — Aquam non vendimus. Materiam Baptismatis, ut vides. Id est, gratis illud sacramentum omnibus conferimus. Et quidem secutis temporibus a variis diversorum regnorum conciliis prohibitum est, ne quid pro baptismi collatione exigeretur. Inter haec sunt Concilia Eliberit. can. 48, Brachar. can. 7, Emerit. an 666, Tribur. an 895, Lemovic. an 1031, Bituric. 1438, Mediolanense sub S. Carolo Borromaeo, Gelasius papa epist. ad universos Lucaniae episcopos cap. 7, Constitutiones Gallonis S. R. E. cardinalis circa annum 1208, cap. 2, Ritualia omnia. — Nemo vereatur: nos aquam. Integer hic locus egregie illustratur ex Cypriani lib. II, ep. 2, ed. Basil. et Gryph. in ep. ad Donatum: Nec ad hoc pretiis aut ambitu, aut manu opus est... sed gratuitum de Deo munus religiosa mente concipitur, et facile est; et ut sponte sol radiat, dies illuminat, fons rigat, imber irrorat: ita se spiritus coelestis infundit. Ipse Lact. l. VII, cap. 27: Et quis est, qui hoc bona parare ac acquirere velit?... Veniant, qui sitiunt ut aquam salutarem de perenni coelestique fonte plenissimis faucibus trahant; et l. I, cap. 1. BUN.

"Let no one fear: we do not sell water." With this punctuation the passage is divided by nine Regius manuscripts, three Colbertini and six others, and the Rome edition of 1470. In three Colbertini there is no division; in two recent manuscripts and seventeen printed editions one reads: "Let no one fear us; we do not sell water." — "We do not sell water": the matter of Baptism, as you see. That is, we confer that sacrament on all freely. And indeed in later times it was forbidden by various councils of different kingdoms that anything be exacted for conferring baptism. Among these are the Councils of Elvira, canon 48; Braga, canon 7; Mérida, in the year 666; Tribur, 895; Limoges, 1031; Bourges, 1438; the Milanese council under St Charles Borromeo; Pope Gelasius, letter to all the bishops of Lucania, chapter 7; the Constitutions of Gallo, cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, about the year 1208, chapter 2; all the Rituals. — "Let no one fear: we [do not sell] water." The whole of this passage is excellently illustrated from Cyprian book II, letter 2 (Basel and Gryphius editions), the letter to Donatus: "Nor is there need for this of price, or canvassing, or handiwork ... but the free gift from God is conceived by a religious mind, and it is easy; and as the sun shines of itself, the day gives light, the spring waters, the shower bedews: so the heavenly Spirit pours itself in." Lactantius himself, book VII chapter 27: "And who is there who would not wish to procure and acquire this good? ... Let those who thirst come, to draw saving water from the everlasting and heavenly fountain with fullest throats"; and book I chapter 1. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 220)

(3) ‹lemma: Excidit vitia› · no call mark

Excidit vitia. Sic omnes fere mss. In 3 Reg. ex Marm. et editis 6, exscindit; in 10 impressis excindit.

"Cuts away vices." So almost all the manuscripts. In three Regii, from the Marmoutier [manuscript], and in six editions, exscindit; in ten printed editions, excindit.

(printed under page 220)

(4) ‹lemma: Vetere› · no call mark

Vetere. Vide Paulum ad Ephes. IV, et Colossenses III, Exposito vetere, scilicet homine, id est ejecto. Canterus atque alii, loco vocis exposito, legendum putant expuncto, quae conjectura non est contemnenda; utinam manuscriptis esset roborata! — Exposito vetere. Hic est stylus Lactantii et scriptorum veterum S. et ecclesiasticorum. Iterum Lact. l. VII, cap. 5: Homo coelesti lavacro purificatus exponit infantiam cum omni labe vitae prioris; ubi frustra Heumannus tentat, deponit. Saepe ita Cyprianus; e. g. contra Demetrianum ed. Basil. fol. 103, Oxon. fol. 193: Exposita nativitate terrena, spiritu recreati et renati sumus. Idem, epist. XI ed Oxon., fol. 26: Conversationem veteris hominis exponunt. Lib. II, ep. III, in Oxon. ed., ep. LXIII, fol. 153: Tristitia omnis exponitur... exponatur memoria veteris hominis. Idem de Habitu Virginis prope finem: Hominem veterem illic gratia lavacri spiritualis exponunt. Idem certius probat versus Paulini Nolani Poem. XXIII, 609, 610: Ne maneam terrenus Adam, sed virgine terra / Nascar, et, exposito veteri, nova former imago. BUN.

"The old." See Paul to the Ephesians 4 and to the Colossians 3. "The old being put off," that is, the [old] man, that is, cast out. Canterus and others think that in place of the word exposito one should read expuncto ("struck out"), a conjecture not to be despised; would that it were supported by the manuscripts! — "The old being put off." This is the style of Lactantius and of the old sacred and ecclesiastical writers. Again Lactantius, book VII chapter 5: "Man, purified by the heavenly washing, puts off infancy with every stain of his former life"; where Heumann tries, in vain, deponit ("lays down"). Cyprian often says it so; for example, Against Demetrianus, Basel edition fol. 103, Oxford fol. 193: "Our earthly birth put off, we have been re-created and reborn by the Spirit." The same, letter 11 in the Oxford edition, fol. 26: "They put off the conduct of the old man." Book II, letter 3, in the Oxford edition letter 63, fol. 153: "All sadness is put off ... let the memory of the old man be put off." The same, On the Dress of Virgins, near the end: "There, by the grace of the spiritual washing, they put off the old man." The verses of Paulinus of Nola, Poem 23, 609–610, prove the same more surely: "That I may not remain an earthly Adam, but be born of virgin earth, and, the old put off, be formed a new image." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 220)

(5) ‹lemma: Quod a scientia veniat› · no call mark

Quod a scientia veniat. Ita mss. 2 veterrimi Reg. aliique plures, cum cunctis ferme editis. In 1 Bonon. et 10, scriptis rec. est, quod ad scientiam veniat.

"That it comes from knowledge." So two very old Regius manuscripts and many others, with nearly all the editions. In one Bologna manuscript and ten recent manuscripts it is "that it comes to knowledge."

(printed under page 220)

(6) ‹lemma: Virtutem esse Stoici aiunt› · no call mark

Virtutem esse Stoici aiunt. Laertius Zenonem et Chrysippum hujus assertionis auctores citat. Disputant super hac quaestione Cicero in V Tusc. quaest., Seneca epist. 92. Lactantius probat gentilium sententiam, quam tamen aliter atque ipsi, intelligit: ita nimirum, quod virtus, quae ex fide christiana nascitur, ad aeternam felicitatem consequendam sufficiat: quum Gentilium sensus sit, virtutem sibi sufficere, neque indigere cujusquam laude, vel gloria, neque praesidio fortunae parere, perficereque beatitudinem. Hinc definivit etiam Cic. in I de Legibus virtutem, perfectam in se ad summum perductam naturam. BETULEIUS.

"The Stoics say that virtue is ..." Laertius cites Zeno and Chrysippus as the authors of this assertion. Cicero debates this question in Tusculan Disputations V, and Seneca in letter 92. Lactantius approves the opinion of the Gentiles, though he understands it otherwise than they: namely, that the virtue born of Christian faith suffices to obtain eternal happiness; whereas the Gentiles' sense is that virtue suffices for itself, needs no one's praise or glory, does not depend on the protection of fortune, and achieves blessedness. Hence Cicero too, in On the Laws I, defined virtue as nature perfected in itself and brought to its highest. BETULEIUS.

(printed under page 220)

(7) ‹lemma: Sapiens, inquit, semper beatus est› · no call mark

Sapiens, inquit, semper beatus est. Apud Ciceronem in II, Tusc. quaest. sub initium de hac Epicuri constantia sic legimus: Epicurus affirmat, si uratur sapiens, si crucietur, expectas fortasse dum dicat, patietur, perferet, non succumbet. Magna mehercule laus, et eo ipso per quem juravi, Hercule digna. Sed Epicuro, homini aspero et duro, non est hoc satis. In Phalaridis tauro si erit, dicet: « Quam suave est hoc, quam hoc non curo. » Suave etiam? an parum est, si non est amarum? etc. De Perillo notior est historia, quam quae referri debeat. Vide, si voles, Plin. lib. XXXIV, cap. 8. Prov. apud Erasm. Phalaridis imperium. BUTELEIUS.

"The wise man, he says, is always happy." In Cicero, Tusculan Disputations II, near the beginning, we read thus of this firmness of Epicurus: "Epicurus affirms — if the wise man is burned, if he is tortured — you perhaps expect him to say, he will endure, bear it out, not give in. Great praise, by Hercules, and worthy of that very Hercules by whom I swore. But for Epicurus, a harsh and hard man, this is not enough. If he is in the bull of Phalaris, he will say, 'How pleasant this is; how little I care for it.' Pleasant even? Is it too little if it is not bitter?" etc. The story of Perillus is too well known to need telling. See, if you wish, Pliny book XXXIV chapter 8; the proverb in Erasmus, "the rule of Phalaris." BUTELEIUS [as printed, for Betuleius].

(printed under page 220)

(8) ‹lemma: Si propter gloriam patientiae; non fruetur› · no call mark

Si propter gloriam patientiae; non fruetur. Sic legunt 6 Reg., 1 Colbert., Bon., 2 Brun., Em., Cauc., Ultr., atque ita legendum esse contendo; ut enim recte affirmat Thomasius, si, ut est in aliis 4, mss. et editis legatur patientia fruetur, nullum habebimus sensum: hoc autem intendit Lactantius, ho- (continues)

"If for the glory of patience; he will not enjoy it." So read six Regii, one Colbertinus, the Bononiensis, two Brunswick manuscripts, the Emmanuel, the Cauchianus and the Ultrajectinus, and so I maintain it must be read; for, as Thomasius rightly asserts, if, as in four other manuscripts and in the editions, one reads "he will enjoy patience," we shall have no sense: but what Lactantius means is this, ... (continues)

(printed under page 220)

Page

  • running head: 433 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENTI (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹modo pateant aures›; B ‹Quam parum philosophorum praecepta› (caption line); C ‹terpunctione haec distinguunt mss.› (in the Variorum Notae); D ‹sol radiat, dies illuminat› (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "pr⟨ae⟩stamus" (line 3): the ae ligature is damaged/blurred in the type. "philosopborum" is read as printed with b for h, but this is UNSURE at this resolution. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off at the right edge) stands above the page-foot notes and is not set. The Variorum Notae (Pectus... sitiat ... Exposita nativitate terrena) are left for the later pass. The right-hand column (434) is cut off and not set. The column ends with the complete word "Praeterea".
PL 6:434
nihil apud eos certi est, nihil quod a scientia veniat. Sed cum omnia conjecturis agantur, multa etiam diversa et varia proferantur, stultissimi est hominis, praeceptis eorum velle parere, quae utrum vera sint, an falsa, dubitatur; et ideo nemo paret, quia nemo vult ad incertum laborare. Virtutem esse Stoici aiunt, quae sola efficiat vitam beatam. Nihil potest verius dici. Sed quid, si cruciabitur aut dolore afficietur? Poteritne quisquam inter carnifices beatus esse? Imo vero illatus corpori dolor materia virtutis est: itaque ne in tormentis quidem miser est. Epicurus multo fortius. Sapiens, inquit, semper beatus est; et vel inclusus in Phalaridis tauro hanc vocem emittet: « Suave est, et nihil curo. » Quis eum non irriserit? Maxime, quod homo voluptarius personam sibi viri fortis imposuit, et quidem supra modum, non enim fieri pote⟨s⟩t, ut quisquam cruciatus corporis pro voluptatibus ducat, cum satis sit, ad officium virtutis implendum, perferre ac sustinere. Quid dicitis Stoici? Quid tu Epicure? Beatus est sapiens, etiam cum torquetur. Si propter gloriam patientiae; non fruetur; in tormentis enim fortasse morietur. Si propter memoriam; aut non sentiet, si occidunt animae, aut si sentiet, nihil ex ea consequetur.
nothing among them is certain, nothing that comes from knowledge. But since everything is carried on by conjectures, and many diverse and varied things are also put forward, it is the mark of a most foolish man to wish to obey their precepts, of which it is doubted whether they are true or false; and therefore no one obeys, because no one wishes to labour for an uncertain end. The Stoics say that it is virtue which alone makes life happy. Nothing can be said more truly. But what if he is tortured or afflicted with pain? Will anyone be able to be happy among executioners? Nay rather, pain inflicted on the body is the material of virtue: and so not even in torments is he wretched. Epicurus [says it] much more boldly. The wise man, he says, is always happy; and even shut up in the bull of Phalaris he will utter this cry: 'It is pleasant, and I care nothing.' Who would not laugh at him? Above all, because a man given to pleasure has put on himself the mask of a brave man, and indeed beyond measure; for it cannot be that anyone should count tortures of the body as pleasures, since it is enough, for fulfilling the duty of virtue, to bear and endure them. What do you say, Stoics? What [say] you, Epicurus? The wise man is happy even when he is being tortured. If on account of the glory of endurance, he will not enjoy it; for perhaps he will die in his torments. If on account of remembrance, either he will not perceive it, if souls perish, or if he perceives it, he will gain nothing from it.
Editors' notes and page, col. 434

Page

  • running head: LSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 434 (cut off at the left edge; presumably ...DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.)
  • marginal letters: A nihil apud eos certi est; B sibi viri fortis imposuit; C de Habitu Virginis (in the Variorum notae, not set); D tem, perfectam (in the Variorum notae, not set)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with "nihil", and "sitiat." on the first line belongs to col. 433; "pote⟨s⟩t" has a damaged s; the heading "[V]ARIORUM NOTAE" is printed across both columns and cut off at the left edge, so it is not set; the Variorum notae below it are left for the later pass; the last text line of the column ends a sentence, "consequetur."
PL 6:435
Quis ergo alius fructus est in virtute? quae beatitudo vitae? ut aequo animo moriatur? Bonum mihi affertis unius horae, aut fortasse momenti, propter quod non expediat in tota vita miseriis et laboribus confici. Quantum autem temporis mors occupat? quae cum veniat utrum aequo an iniquo animo eam subieris, jam nihil refert. Ita fit, ut nihil aliud ex virtute capietur, nisi gloria. Sed haec aut supervacua et brevis est, aut pravis hominum judiciis non sequetur. Nullus igitur ex virtute fructus est, ubi virtus mortalis est et caduca. Ita qui haec locuti sunt, umbram quamdam virtutis videbant, ipsam virtutem non videbant. Defixi enim fuerunt in terram, nec vultus suos in altum erigebant, ut eam possent intueri,
What other fruit, then, is there in virtue? What happiness of life? That one should die with an even mind? You offer me the good of a single hour, or perhaps of a moment, for the sake of which it would not be worth being worn down by miseries and labours throughout the whole of life. And how much time does death take up? When it comes, whether you undergo it with an even or an uneven mind no longer matters at all. So it comes about that nothing else will be gained from virtue except glory. But this is either superfluous and brief, or, through the perverse judgements of men, will not follow. There is therefore no fruit from virtue where virtue is mortal and perishable. So those who said these things saw a certain shadow of virtue, but did not see virtue itself. For they were fixed upon the earth, and did not raise their faces on high so that they might behold it,
Quae sese a coeli regionibus ostentabat.
which showed itself from the regions of heaven.
Haec causa est, cur praeceptis eorum nullus obtemperet: quoniam aut ad vitia erudiunt, si voluptatem defendunt; aut si virtutem asserunt, neque peccato poenam minantur, nisi solius turpitudinis, neque virtuti ullum praemium pollicentur, nisi solius honestatis et laudis, cum dicant, non propter seipsam expetendam esse virtutem.
This is the reason why no one obeys their precepts: because either they train men to vices, if they defend pleasure; or, if they maintain virtue, they neither threaten sin with any punishment except that of disgrace alone, nor promise virtue any reward except that of honour and praise alone, since they say that virtue is not to be sought for its own sake.
Beatus est igitur sapiens in tormentis: sed cum torquetur pro fide, pro justitia, pro Deo, illa patientia doloris beatissimum faciet. Est enim Deus, qui solus potest honorare virtutem; cujus merces immortalitas sola est: quam qui non appetunt, nec religionem tenent, cui aeterna subjacet vita, profecto neque virtutis vim sciunt, cujus praemium ignorant; neque in coelum spectant, quod ipsi se facere putant,
The wise man, then, is happy in torments: but when he is tortured for faith, for justice, for God, that endurance of pain will make him most happy. For it is God Who alone can honour virtue; whose reward is immortality alone: and those who do not seek it, nor hold to the religion on which eternal life depends, assuredly neither know the force of virtue, whose reward they do not know, nor look towards heaven, which they themselves think they do,
Editors' notes and page, col. 435

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 221)

(1) ‹lemma: Si propter gloriam patientiae; non fruetur (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) mines non ita felices futuros inter calamitates, ut clamat Epicurus. Si enim propter gloriam patientiae patiatur, non poterit frui illa gloria statim moriturus. Mss. 1 Reg., Pal., et ed. Rom. 1468, pro fruetur, habent fruatur.

(printed under page 221)

(2) ‹lemma: Veniat› · no call mark

Veniat. Recte. At aliis venit.

"Should come" (veniat). Correctly. But others have venit ("comes").

(printed under page 221)

(3) ‹lemma: Utrum aequo an iniquo animo eam subieris› · no call mark

Utrum aequo an iniquo animo eam subieris. Omissas in antiquo Bononiensi et in 5 excusis duas voces, an iniquo, restitui ex caeteris editis et 27 mss. nisi quod in 2 Colb. et 1 Clarom. est aut iniquo.

"Whether you underwent it with an even or an uneven mind." The two words an iniquo ("or an uneven"), omitted in the old Bologna manuscript and in five printed editions, I have restored from the other editions and twenty-seven manuscripts, except that two Colbertini and one Claromontanus have aut iniquo.

(printed under page 221)

(4) ‹lemma: Non sequetur› · no call mark

Non sequetur. Scilicet gloria. 1 Bon. rec. et ed. Is. non sequitur. Ms. Jun. et 9 editi ferunt non sequenda, quod non cohaeret. Hanc lectionem nostram ita Thomasius interpretatur, ut dicat Lactantius, prava hominum judicia effectura esse, ut nulla inde, id est ex virtute, gloria oriatur, ubi fuerit vera et solida gloria, vel vita digna hac gloria.

"Will not follow." Namely, glory. One recent Bologna manuscript and the edition of Isaeus: non sequitur ("does not follow"). The Junius manuscript and nine editions give non sequenda, which does not hang together. Thomasius interprets this reading of ours as meaning that Lactantius says men's perverse judgements will bring it about that no glory arises from it, that is, from virtue, where there has been true and solid glory, or a life worthy of this glory.

(printed under page 221)

(5) ‹lemma: Ita qui haec locuti sunt› · no call mark

Ita qui haec locuti sunt. Sic veterrimi et optimi mss. Bonon. et Reg. aliique cum editis quinque. In scriptis 15 rec. et 11 impressis, Itaque qui haec locuti sunt; in rect. 1 Reg. et 1 Colb., Itaque qui hoc.

"So those who said these things." So the very old and best manuscripts, the Bologna and the Regius, and others, with five editions. In fifteen recent manuscripts and eleven printed editions, "And so those who said these things"; in one recent Regius and one Colbertinus, "And so those who [said] this."

(printed under page 221)

(6) ‹lemma: Videbant› · no call mark

Videbant. Utrobique ex mss. repositum. Editi habent bis, viderunt.

"They saw" (videbant). Restored in both places from the manuscripts. The editions have viderunt twice.

(printed under page 221)

(7) ‹lemma: Defixi› · no call mark

Defixi. Mss. 8 rec et edd. 5, Deflexi. Caeteri ut in textu.

"Fixed." Eight recent manuscripts and five editions, deflexi ("bent aside"). The rest as in the text.

(printed under page 221)

(8) ‹lemma: Ostentabat› · no call mark

Ostentabat. Manuscriptorum est; ostendebat editorum, et Lucretii vulgati. Versus ille Lucretii est libro I, initio.

"Displayed." This is the reading of the manuscripts; ostendebat ("showed") that of the editions and of the common text of Lucretius. That verse of Lucretius is at the beginning of book I.

(printed under page 221)

(9) ‹lemma: Virtuti› · no call mark

Virtuti. Emendavi ex mss. et melioribus editis. Sex impressi habent virtute.

"To virtue." I have corrected it from the manuscripts and the better editions. Six printed editions have virtute ("by virtue").

(printed under page 221)

(10) ‹lemma: Cum res non vestigabiles quaerunt› · no call mark

Cum res non vestigabiles quaerunt. Ita vetusti codices mss. Vitiose recentiores et impressi, cum res non investigabiles. Quasi dicat Lactantius eos, qui nullam religionem habent, et animam putant esse mortalem nihil causae habere, cur in coelum spectent, quia si ibi mortalitatem animarum et impietatem quaerunt, res quaerunt non vestigabiles, hoc est quae inveniri non possunt. Si vero legas non investigabiles, contrarius erit sensus, et plane nullus. Haec ex Thomasio. Attamen Cellarius et Heumannus auctoritate antiquarum editionum freti, putant legendum esse non investigabiles. Videant igitur eruditi quam lectionem sibi amplectendam esse existiment.

"When they seek things not to be tracked." So the old manuscript codices. The more recent ones and the printed editions faultily read "when [they seek] things not untraceable." As if Lactantius were saying that those who have no religion, and think the soul mortal, have no reason to look to heaven, because if they seek there the mortality of souls and impiety, they are seeking things not to be tracked, that is, things that cannot be found. But if you read non investigabiles, the sense will be the opposite, and plainly none at all. This from Thomasius. Yet Cellarius and Heumann, relying on the authority of the old editions, think one should read non investigabiles. Let the learned, then, see which reading they judge they should embrace.

(printed under page 221)

(11) ‹lemma: Aut religionem suscipere› · no call mark

Aut religionem suscipere. Doctiss. Rivetus in Notis suis mss. legit suspicere: sed in nullo, quod sciam, ms. sic legitur. GALLAEUS. — Infra, religionem non suscipiunt.

"Or to take up religion." The most learned Rivet, in his manuscript notes, reads suspicere ("to look up to"): but in no manuscript, so far as I know, is it read so. GALLAEUS. — Below: "they do not take up religion."

(printed under page 221)

(12) ‹lemma: In coelo est› · no call mark

In coelo est. Nam cogitatio nostra in coelis esse debet, ait Paulus.

"Is in heaven." For our thought ought to be in the heavens, says Paul.

(printed under page 221)

(13) ‹lemma: Specie falsae virtutis› · no call mark

Specie falsae virtutis. Mss. 1 Colbert. et Brun., falsa.

"By the appearance of false virtue." One Colbertinus and the Brunswick manuscript: falsa (agreeing with "appearance": "by a false appearance of virtue").

(printed under page 221)

(14) ‹lemma: Naturae nomen invenit› · no call mark

Naturae nomen invenit. De natura, testante Galeno, scripserunt Plato, Hippocrates, Empedocles, Parmenides, Melissus, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Epicurus. Vocabulum naturae varie usurpatur a Latinis. Nam quandoque pro indole, ingenio, habitu accipitur, quandoque pro mente, saepius pro substantia, praesertim apud Ciceronem: communior tamen hujus usus est, ut pro nascendi conditione rationeque accipiatur. Lactantius autem, dum significationes istas confundit, sese magis involvit, quam explicat: alioqui non immerito damnans eos, qui Deum rerum conditorem sua gloria fraudantes, Naturam quamdam creatricem, et administratricem rerum constituunt; cum Natura (φύσις) nihil aliud sit, quam lex et voluntas aeterna Dei creantis et administrantis per ipsam omnia. Nam verbalia Graecorum ις, saepissime actionem agendique facultatem significant. Mirari quis posset, cur Naturae vocem suspectam reddere nitatur, (continues)

"Found the name of nature." On nature, as Galen testifies, Plato, Hippocrates, Empedocles, Parmenides, Melissus, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus and Epicurus wrote. The word "nature" is used variously by the Latins. For sometimes it is taken for disposition, temperament, habit; sometimes for mind; more often for substance, especially in Cicero: its more common use, however, is for the condition and manner of being born. Lactantius, though, in confusing these meanings, entangles himself more than he explains: otherwise rightly condemning those who, robbing God the founder of things of his glory, set up a certain Nature as creatress and administratrix of things; whereas Nature (physis) is nothing other than the law and eternal will of God, who creates and administers all things through it. For the Greek verbal nouns in -is very often signify action and the faculty of acting. One might wonder why he strives to make the word "Nature" suspect, (continues)

(printed under page 221)

Page

  • running head: 435 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVI[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹Quis ergo alius fructus est›; B ‹Haec causa est, cur praeceptis› (printed just above it, beside the gap after the verse line); C ‹neque in coelum spectant›; D ‹hominum judicia effectura esse› (in the Variorum Notae at the page foot)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "capietur" is UNSURE; the bold type reads like "capletur", so capiatur is possible. "immortalitas" is printed "Im-mortalitas" with what may be a capital I. "alius" looks like "allus" in the bold type. "Quae sese a coeli regionibus ostentabat" is a verse of Lucretius printed centred on its own line, so it is set as its own line. The column ends with "pu-" broken at the column break. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" is cut off at the right edge and is not set; it stands above the notes, below the line "neque in coelum spectant". The Variorum Notae at the page foot, from "mines non ita felices" to "putant esse mortalem", are not set here and are left for the later pass.
PL 6:436
cum res non vestigabiles quaerunt, quia ratio in coelum spectandi nulla alia est, nisi aut religionem suscipere, aut animam suam immortalem esse credere. Quisquis enim aut Deum colendum esse intelligit, aut immortalitatis spem sibi propositam habet, mens ejus in coelo est; et licet id non aspiciat oculis, animae tamen lumine aspicit. Qui autem religionem non suscipiunt, terreni sunt; qui religio de coelo est, et qui animam putant cum corpore interire, aeque in terram spectant, quia ultra corpus quod est terra, nihil amplius vident, quod sit immortale. Nihil igitur prodest hominem ita esse fictum, ut recto corpore spectet in coelum; nisi erecta mente Deum cernat, et cogitatio ejus in spe vitae perpetuae tota versetur.
when they seek things that cannot be tracked down, since there is no other reason for looking towards heaven than either to take up religion or to believe that one's soul is immortal. For whoever either understands that God is to be worshipped, or has the hope of immortality set before him, his mind is in heaven; and although he does not see it with his eyes, yet he sees it with the light of the soul. But those who do not take up religion are earthly, since religion is from heaven; and those who think that the soul perishes with the body likewise look towards the earth, since beyond the body, which is earth, they see nothing further that would be immortal. It is therefore of no profit that man has been so fashioned as to look towards heaven with an upright body, unless with an upright mind he discerns God, and his thought is wholly occupied in the hope of everlasting life.
CAPUT XXVIII.
Chapter XXVIII.
De vera religione, deque natura; fortuna num sit dea; et de philosophia.
On true religion, and on nature; whether Fortune is a goddess; and on philosophy.
Quapropter nihil aliud est in vita, quo ratio, quo conditio nostra nitatur, nisi Dei, qui nos genuit, agnitio et religiosus ac pius cultus: unde quoniam philosophi aberraverunt, sapientes utique non fuerunt. Quaesierunt illi quidem sapientiam: sed quia non rite quaerebant, prolapsi sunt longius; et in tantos errores inciderunt, ut etiam communem sapientiam non tenerent. Non enim tantum religionem asserere noluerunt: verum etiam sustulerunt; dum specie falsae virtutis inducti, conantur animos omni metu liberare: quae religionis eversio naturae nomen invenit. Illi
Wherefore there is nothing else in life on which reason, on which our condition, may rest, except the knowledge of God, Who begot us, and religious and pious worship of Him: hence, since the philosophers went astray, they were certainly not wise. They did indeed seek wisdom, but because they did not seek it rightly, they slid further away; and they fell into such great errors that they did not hold even common wisdom. For not only were they unwilling to assert religion, but they even took it away, while, led on by the appearance of a false virtue, they try to free minds from all fear: and this overthrow of religion has found the name of nature. They
Editors' notes and page, col. 436

Page

  • running head: LACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 436 (column number printed with damaged final figure, reads like 439/436)
  • marginal letters: A ‹tant, cum res non vestigabiles›; B ‹CAPUT XXVIII.› (printed just above the chapter heading); C ‹quae religionis eversio naturae›; D ‹bet, ait Paulus› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "tant", the end of a word broken from the previous column; the English omits it since the verb cannot be rendered from the fragment alone. "qui religio de coelo est" is printed qui for quia; it is set as printed and translated as intended. The full-width notes heading "...RIORUM NOTÆ." (Variorum notae) stands below "Illi", cut off at the left edge; it is not set. The Variorum notae below it (from "nihil causae habere" to "reddere nitatur") are left for the later pass. The ligatures are read as printed: coelum/coelo with œ, quaerunt/animae/aeque/vitae/perpetuae/quae with æ.
PL 6:437
enim, cum aut ignorarent, a quo esset effectus mundus, aut persuadere vellent, nihil esse divina mente perfectum, naturam esse dixerunt rerum omnium matrem, quasi dicerent, omnia sua sponte esse nata: quo verbo plane imprudentiam suam confitentur. Natura enim, remota providentia et potestate divina, prorsus nihil est. Quod si Deum naturam vocent, quae perversitas est, naturam potius quam Deum nominare? Si autem natura ratio est, vel necessitas, vel conditio nascendi, non est per seipsam sensibilis: sed necesse est mentem esse divinam, quae sua providentia nascendi principium rebus omnibus praebeat. Aut si natura est coelum atque terra, et omne, quod natum est, non est Deus natura, sed Dei opus.
for, since they either did not know by whom the world had been made, or wished to persuade [people] that nothing had been made by the divine mind, said that nature was the mother of all things, as if they were saying that all things had been born of their own accord: by which word they plainly confess their own imprudence. For nature, with the providence and power of God removed, is absolutely nothing. But if they call God nature, what perversity is it to name nature rather than God? If, however, nature is reason, or necessity, or the condition of being born, it is not capable of sensation through itself: rather, there must be a divine mind, which by its providence supplies to all things the beginning of their birth. Or if nature is the heaven and the earth, and everything that has been born, then nature is not God, but the work of God.
Non dissimili errore credunt esse fortunam, quasi deam quamdam res humanas variis casibus illudentem; quia nesciunt, unde sibi bona, et mala eveniant. Cum hac se compositos ad praeliandum putant; nec ullam tamen rationem reddunt, a quo et quam ob causam: sed tantum cum fortuna se digladiari momentis omnibus gloriantur. Jam quicumque aliquos consolati sunt ob interitum amissionemque charorum, fortunae nomen acerrimis accusationibus prosciderunt;
By a not dissimilar error they believe that there is fortune, as if she were some goddess mocking human affairs with various chances; because they do not know whence good and evil things befall them. With her they think themselves matched for fighting; and yet they give no account of by whom, or for what cause: they only boast that they are contending with fortune at every moment. Moreover, all who have consoled others on account of the death and loss of their dear ones have torn at the name of fortune with the bitterest accusations;
Editors' notes and page, col. 437

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 222)

(1) ‹lemma: Naturae nomen invenit (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) cum ea non modo in utriusque Testamenti voluminibus crebro occurrat legentibus, sed etiam apud scriptores ecclesiasticos antiquissimos. Neque enim ex sese vel est quidquam, vel movetur, quae nihil aliud quam Dei nutus est, et ut dixi, voluntas aeterna. Deus autem Natura quidem esse potest, si non φύσιν, sed οὐσίαν intelligas. Nam sic non Cicero modo, sed etiam ipse Augustinus, creaturam οὐσίαν transtulerunt, non de Deo modo, sed etiam de aliis substantiis. Nam in II de Moribus Manichaeorum libro, cap. 1, dicit, verbo substantivo (nihil refert sive εἰμὶ, unde οὐσία deducitur; sive sum, unde Essentia, intelligas) subesse manentis in se, atque incommutabiliter sese habentis naturae significationem. Hanc nihil aliud quam Deum possumus dicere. Idem Augustinus l. II de Anima. Quare Lactantius hoc quoque, quod sano cum intellectu et legi et intelligi poterat, praeter meritum videtur acerbius reprehendere. Quam quidem quaestionem cap. 10, de Ira Dei refricat. BETULEIUS.

(printed under page 222)

(2) ‹lemma: Si Deum naturam vocent› · no call mark

Si Deum naturam vocent. Quae Senecae sententia fuit. Vide supra lib. I, cap. 9.

"If they call God nature." Which was Seneca's opinion. See above, book I, chapter 9.

(printed under page 222)

(3) ‹lemma: Sed› · no call mark

Sed. Ex mss. reposui; in editis est quia.

"But." I have restored it from the manuscripts; in the editions it is quia ("because").

(printed under page 222)

(4) ‹lemma: Non dissimili errore› · no call mark

Non dissimili errore. In hunc Gentilium errorem invehitur S. Augustinus lib. IV de Civit. Dei, cap. 18 et 19.

"By no unlike error." St Augustine inveighs against this error of the Gentiles in The City of God book IV, chapters 18 and 19.

(printed under page 222)

(5) ‹lemma: Cum hac se compositos› · no call mark

Cum hac se compositos. Verbum gladiatorum, ubi paria componebantur, quod et committere, comparare dicebant. Hic Firmianus respexit ad Senec. de Provid. cap. 2: Ecce par Deo dignum, vir fortis cum mala fortuna compositus. BUNEMAN.

"Matched with her." A gladiators' word, used when pairs were matched, which they also called committere, comparare. Here Firmianus had in view Seneca, On Providence chapter 2: "Behold a pair worthy of God: a brave man matched with ill fortune." BUNEMAN.

(printed under page 222)

(6) ‹lemma: Amissionemque carorum› · no call mark

Amissionemque carorum. Conf. infra, amiserit carissimam. Interitus et amissio non raro pro obitu ponuntur. Sic sacri et profani scriptores. Tertull. de Patient. cap. 14: amissio carissimorum. Conf. cap. 9, pr. Cyprianus de Bono Patient. n. 9: Multiplex tentationum qualitas irrogatur, de jacturis facultatum... de cruciatibus vulnerum, de amissione carorum. Arnobius lib. II, n. 98: Amissio pignorum. Seneca ad Marciam cap. 7: Ex discessu, non solum amissione carissimorum necessarius morsus est. Ipse Cicero lib. III Off. cap. 5: Amissio liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum; et lib. III, Tusc. c. 30, pr. In Lips. altero legitur, ab interitu amissioneque carorum. BUNEMAN.

"And the loss of dear ones." Compare below, "has lost a most dear one." Interitus and amissio are not seldom used for death. So the sacred and profane writers. Tertullian, On Patience chapter 14: "the loss of the dearest." Compare chapter 9, beginning. Cyprian, On the Good of Patience no. 9: "Manifold kinds of trial are inflicted: losses of property ... tortures of wounds, the loss of dear ones." Arnobius book II, no. 98: "the loss of pledges [children]." Seneca to Marcia chapter 7: "From the departure, not only the loss, of the dearest a pang is inevitable." Cicero himself, On Duties book III chapter 5: "the loss of children, kin, friends"; and Tusculans book III chapter 30, beginning. In the second Leipzig manuscript one reads "from the death and loss of dear ones." BUNEMAN.

(printed under page 222)

(7) ‹lemma: Vexetur› · no call mark

Vexetur. Omnium pene mss. et editorum est; scripti 1 Bon. antiq., 1 Colb. et 3 editi legunt, versetur; 1 Reg. rec., veretur.

"Is harassed." The reading of almost all the manuscripts and editions; the old Bologna manuscript, one Colbertinus and three editions read versetur ("is engaged"); one recent Regius, veretur ("fears").

(printed under page 222)

(8) ‹lemma: Eamque a se esse superatam› · no call mark

Eamque a se esse superatam. Mss. 3 Reg., Lips., Goth. et edit. Cellar. post a se addunt semper, quod caeteri mss. editi respuunt, neque necessarium videtur, cum mox praecesserit. Vide et Tusculan. quaestiones Ciceron. lib. V: Occupavi te, inquit, fortuna, atque cepi, omnesque aditus tuos exclusi, ut ad me aspirare non posses. — Eamque a se semper esse superatam. Lips. et Goth. semper interserunt, quam alii negligunt, forsan quod repetitam ex superioribus crediderunt. Nec vero ingrata repetitio, aut a genio auctoris aliena. BUNEMAN.

"And that she had been overcome by him." Three Regius manuscripts, the Leipzig, the Gotha, and Cellarius's edition add semper ("always") after a se, which the other manuscripts and editions reject, nor does it seem necessary, since it came just before. See also Cicero's Tusculan Disputations book V: "I have forestalled you, Fortune, he says, and taken you, and shut off all your approaches, so that you could not reach me." — "And that she had always been overcome by him." The Leipzig and Gotha insert semper, which others pass over, perhaps because they thought it repeated from what went before. But the repetition is not unpleasing, nor foreign to the author's manner. BUNEMAN.

(printed under page 222)

(9) ‹lemma: Inquit› · no call mark

Inquit. Idem Cicero in fragmentis de Consolatione.

"He says." The same Cicero, in the fragments of the Consolation.

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(10) ‹lemma: Et manum tollo› · no call mark

Et manum tollo. Ita legendum est ex mss. et ex ipso Cicerone. Theod. Canterus ita correxit. Ita habent edit. antiquiss. Rom. 1470, et Veneta 1490, editi legunt, en manum tollo. Qui superabantur ac victos se agnoscebant, manum dabant: hinc Virgil. lib. XII Aeneid. tendere palmas dixit. Cicero in Laelio, ad extremum det manus, vincique se patiatur. Item Theocrit. Eidyllio 23.

"And I raise my hand." So it should be read from the manuscripts and from Cicero himself. Theodor Canter corrected it so. So have the very old editions, Rome 1470 and Venice 1490; the [other] editions read "lo, I raise my hand." Those who were being overcome and acknowledged themselves beaten gave their hands: hence Virgil, Aeneid book XII, said "stretch out the palms." Cicero in the Laelius: "let him at last give his hands and suffer himself to be beaten." Likewise Theocritus, Idyll 23.

(printed under page 222)

(11) ‹lemma: Qui sic jaceat?› · no call mark

Qui sic jaceat? Id est, sic abjectus, afflictus, fractus sit. Unde Ciceroni saepe afflictus et jacens, abjectus et jacens, junguntur. Conf. Lact. de Mort. Pers. cap. 1. BUNEMAN.

"Who lies so low?" That is, is so cast down, stricken, broken. Hence in Cicero "stricken and lying low," "cast down and lying low" are often joined. Compare Lactantius, On the Deaths of the Persecutors chapter 1. BUNEMAN.

(printed under page 222)

(12) ‹lemma: Inquit› · no call mark

Inquit. Sic omnes mss. et veteres edd. Rom. et Paris. vulgati 12 inquis.

"He says." So all the manuscripts and the old editions of Rome and Paris; twelve printed editions inquis ("you say").

(printed under page 222)

(13) ‹lemma: Datis› · no call mark

Datis. Secutus sum librorum mss. pene omnium et optimorum auctoritatem. Quinque recentissimi habent dat; 1 Lips. data sunt; 2 Reg. recent. et 1 Colb. cum editis dantur. Non male.

"Given" (datis). I have followed the authority of almost all and the best of the manuscript books. Five very recent ones have dat; one Leipzig data sunt; two recent Regii and one Colbertinus, with the editions, dantur. Not badly.

(printed under page 222)

(14) ‹lemma: Qui sapiat› · no call mark

Qui sapiat. Reposui ex omnibus mss. et plerisque editis. Caeteris vulgatis est, sapit.

"Who is wise" (sapiat). I have restored it from all the manuscripts and most editions. In the other printed editions it is sapit.

(printed under page 222)

(15) ‹lemma: Facit› · no call mark

Facit. In quibusdam editionibus, faciat.

"Makes." In some editions, faciat.

(printed under page 222)

(16) ‹lemma: Affingere› · no call mark

Affingere. Omnium fere mss. est et edition. Vulgat. accedentibus 3 Colb. in quibus est affigere; ms. Tornes. attingere. Vulgati legunt effingere.

"To attach falsely" (affingere). The reading of almost all the manuscripts and editions. The common editions, with three Colbertini joining them, have affigere ("to fasten on"); the Tornaesius manuscript attingere ("to touch"). The printed editions read effingere ("to portray").

(printed under page 222)

(17) ‹lemma: Anaxagoras› · no call mark

Anaxagoras, etc. Haec videntur ex primo Academicorum Ciceronis desumpta esse, ubi de Academicorum ἀκαταληψία scribit. Verba Ciceronis sunt: Tum ego, cum Zenone, inquam, ut accepimus, Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur) sed earum rerum obscu- (continues)

"Anaxagoras," etc. This seems to be taken from the first book of Cicero's Academics, where he writes of the Academics' akatalēpsia [the doctrine that nothing can be grasped]. Cicero's words are: "Then I said: Arcesilas, as we have been told, set up his whole contest with Zeno, not from obstinacy or desire to win (as it seems to me, at least), but [because of] the obscu[rity] of those things ... (continues)

(printed under page 222)

Page

  • running head: 437 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIEN[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹enim, cum aut ignorarent› (between the columns); B ‹deam quamdam res humanas›; C ‹aliud quam Dei nutus est› (in the Variorum Notae at the page foot); D ‹18 et 19.› (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column ends mid-word at proscide- (proscide-runt, continued in the next column); praeliandum is read from a partly blurred ae ligature; the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE and the editors' notes beneath it (cum ea non modo in utriusque Testamenti...; Si Deum naturam vocent...; Sed. Ex mss. reposui...; Non dissimili errore...; Cum hac se compositos...; Amissionemque carorum...; Vexetur...) are the page-foot commentary and are not set here; the running head is cut off at the image edge
PL 6:438
nec omnino ulla eorum disputatio de virtute est, in qua non fortuna vexetur. M. Tullius in sua Consolatione pugnasse se semper contra fortunam loquitur, eamque a se esse superatam, cum fortiter inimicorum impetus retudisset; ne tum quidem se ab ea fractum, cum domo pulsus patria caruit: tum autem, cum amiserit charissimam filiam, victum se a fortuna turpiter confitetur. Cedo, inquit, et manum tollo. Quid hoc homine miserius, qui sic jaceat? Insipienter, inquit: sed qui profitetur se esse sapientem. Quid ergo sibi vult assumptio nominis? Quid contemptus ille rerum, qui magnificis verbis praetenditur? Quid dispar caeteris habitus? Aut cur omnino praecepta sapientiae datis, si nemo, qui sapiat, adhuc inventus est? Et quisquam nobis invidiam facit, quia philosophos negamus esse sapientes? cum ipsi nec scire se quidquam, nec sapere fateantur. Nam si quando ita defecerint, ut ne affingere quidem quidquam possint, quod faciunt in rebus caeteris: tum vero ignorantiae admonentur, et quasi furibundi exiliunt, et exclamant se caecos esse et excordes. Anaxagoras pronuntiat circumfusa esse tenebris omnia. Empedocles angustas esse sensuum semitas queritur,
and there is no discussion at all of theirs concerning virtue in which fortune is not harassed. Marcus Tullius in his Consolation says that he always fought against fortune, and that she was overcome by him when he had bravely beaten back the onslaughts of his enemies; that not even then was he broken by her, when, driven from his home, he was deprived of his country: but then, when he had lost his dearest daughter, he confesses that he was shamefully vanquished by fortune. I yield, he says, and I raise my hand. What is more wretched than this man, who lies prostrate thus? Foolishly, he says: but he is one who professes himself to be wise. What then is the meaning of the assumption of the name? What is that contempt of things, which is held out in magnificent words? What is the dress unlike that of everyone else? Or why do you give precepts of wisdom at all, if no one who is wise has yet been found? And does anyone bring odium upon us because we deny that philosophers are wise, when they themselves confess that they neither know anything nor are wise? For if ever they have so failed that they cannot even invent anything, as they do in all other matters, then indeed they are reminded of their ignorance, and as if frenzied they leap out and cry aloud that they are blind and senseless. Anaxagoras declares that all things are surrounded with darkness. Empedocles complains that the paths of the senses are narrow,
Editors' notes and page, col. 438

Page

  • running head: ...ALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH. 438 (beginning cut off at the image edge; probably DE FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.)
  • marginal letters: A ‹runt; nec omnino ulla›; B ‹philosophos negamus esse›; C ‹caeteri mss. editi respuunt› (in the notes); D ‹et jacens, junguntur› (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins with the fragment "runt" of a word broken from col. 437; "exiliunt" is printed exi-liunt across a line end, clearly without s; the full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE" and the notes below it (Buneman and others) are page-foot commentary and are not set
PL 6:439
tamquam illi ad cogitandum rheda et quadrigis opus esset. Democritus quasi in puteo (Vid. Cic. Acad. cap. 12) quodam sic alto, ut fundus sit nullus, veritatem jacere demersam; nimirum stulte, ut caetera. Non enim tamquam in puteo demersa veritas est, quo vel descendere, vel etiam cadere illi licebat, sed tamquam in summo montis excelsi vertice, vel potius in coelo, quod est verissimum. Quid enim est, cur eam potius in imum depressam diceret, quam in summum levatam? nisi forte mentem quoque in pedibus, aut in imis calcibus constituere malebat potius, quam in pectore, aut in capite.
as though he needed a carriage and a four-horse chariot in order to think. Democritus [said] that truth lies sunk as if in a certain well, so deep that it has no bottom; foolishly, no doubt, like the rest. For truth is not sunk as if in a well, into which he was free to descend or even to fall, but as if on the highest summit of a lofty mountain, or rather in heaven, which is most true. For what reason is there why he should say that it was pressed down to the bottom rather than raised up to the top? Unless perhaps he preferred to place the mind also in the feet, or in the lowest heels, rather than in the breast or in the head.
Adeo remotissimi fuerunt ab ipsa veritate, ut eos ne status quidem sui corporis admoneret, veritatem in summo illis esse quaerendam. Ex hac desperatione confessio illa Socratis nata est, qua se nihil scire dixit, nisi hoc unum, quod nihil sciat. Hinc Academiae disciplina manavit; si tamen disciplina dici potest, in qua ignoratio et discitur et docetur. Sed ne illi quidem, qui scientiam sibi assumpserunt, id ipsum, quod se scire putabant, constanter defendere potuerunt. Qui, quoniam ratio illis non quadrabat, per ignorantiam rerum divinarum tam varii, tam incerti fuerunt, sibique saepe contraria disserentes, ut quid sentirent, quid vellent, statuere ac dijudicare non possis. Quid igitur pugnes adversus
So very far were they from truth itself that not even the posture of their own body reminded them that truth was to be sought by them on high. From this despair arose that confession of Socrates, in which he said that he knew nothing except this one thing, that he knew nothing. From this the teaching of the Academy flowed, if indeed it can be called teaching in which ignorance is both learned and taught. But not even those who claimed knowledge for themselves were able to defend steadfastly the very thing they thought they knew. These, since their reasoning did not fit together, were through ignorance of divine things so changeable, so uncertain, and often arguing things contrary to themselves, that you could not determine and decide what they thought or what they meant. Why then would you fight against
Editors' notes and page, col. 439

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 223)

(1) ‹lemma: Anaxagoras (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) ritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerunt Socratem, et veluti amantes Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres, qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbecillos animos, brevia circula vitae, et (ut Democritus) in profundo veritatem esse demersam. Hoc posterius legitur etiam in altero, quod extat, Academicarum Quaest. fragmento: Naturam accusa, quae in profundo veritatem, ut ait Democritus, penitus abstruserit. BETUL.

(printed under page 223)

(2) ‹lemma: In puteo demersa veritas› · no call mark

In puteo demersa veritas. Ita cum vet. 8 excusis ferunt cuncti mss. praeter duos Reg. rec. qui habent in puteum. Sed et apud Ciceronem I Academic. Quaest., cap. 12, effertur sexto casu: Democritus dixit, in profundo veritatem esse demersam.

"Truth sunk in a well." So, with eight old printed editions, all the manuscripts have it, except two recent Regii, which have in puteum ("into a well"). And in Cicero too, Academic Questions I, chapter 12, it is expressed in the ablative case: "Democritus said that truth is sunk in the deep."

(printed under page 223)

(3) ‹lemma: In summo illis› · no call mark

In summo illis. Veteres editiones legunt illis in summo.

"To them at the top." The old editions read illis in summo (the same words in another order).

(printed under page 223)

(4) ‹lemma: Nisi hoc unum› · no call mark

Nisi hoc unum. Istud vide apud Plat. in Apolog. Phaedon. Criton. et apud Cicer. I Acad. quaest. sub. init.

"Except this one thing." See this in Plato's Apology, Phaedo and Crito, and in Cicero, Academic Questions I, near the beginning.

(printed under page 223)

(5) ‹lemma: Saepe› · no call mark

Saepe. Mss. 6 rec. semper.

"Often." Six recent manuscripts: semper ("always").

(printed under page 223)

(6) ‹lemma: Quid sentirent, quid vellent› · no call mark

Quid sentirent, quid vellent. Mss. 10 rec. cum edit. Betul., quid sentiant, quid velint. Mss. Cotton., quid sentire vellent.

"What they thought, what they meant." Ten recent manuscripts, with Betuleius's edition: quid sentiant, quid velint (present tense). The Cotton manuscript: "what they wished to think."

(printed under page 223)

(7) ‹lemma: Statuere› · no call mark

Statuere. Sic antiquissimi codices Bonon., 3 Reg., Cauc., 3 Oxon. cum editis octo. Recentiores scripti 23 cum vet. impressis 8 ferunt satis statuere.

"To determine." So the most ancient codices, the Bononiensis, three Regii, the Cauchianus, three Oxford manuscripts, with eight editions. Twenty-three more recent manuscripts, with eight old printed editions, have satis statuere ("to determine sufficiently").

(printed under page 223)

(8) ‹lemma: Suo sibi gladio pereunt› · no call mark

Suo sibi gladio pereunt. Ms. 1 Clarom. a secunda manu, suo sese gladio peremerunt. Proverbium est: vide Terent. in Adelphis.

"They perish by their own sword." One Claromontanus manuscript, in a second hand: "they slew themselves with their own sword." It is a proverb: see Terence in the Adelphoe.

(printed under page 223)

(9) ‹lemma: Quos sua ipsos destruit› · no call mark

Quos sua ipsos destruit. Ita cuncti fere mss. cum omnibus pene editis. In tribus editis est ipsa suos; in scriptis rec. 1 Colb. et Brun. ipsa sua; in 1 Reg. rec., sua ipsa.

"Whom their own [doctrine] destroys." So almost all the manuscripts with nearly all the editions. In three editions it is ipsa suos; in recent manuscripts, one Colbertinus and the Brunswick, ipsa sua; in one recent Regius, sua ipsa.

(printed under page 223)

(10) ‹lemma: Afficit› · no call mark

Afficit. Sic restitui ex optimo et veterrimo ms. Regio-Put., 5 al. Reg., 6 Colb. septemque aliis, necnon ex vet. edit. Rom. 1470. Scripti tres et editi 14 ferunt affligit; 1 Reg. rec. infligit: sed et afficere simpliciter Ciceroni et Columellae idem est, ac vexare, affligere: quam vocem substituerunt ignari amanuenses.

"Afflicts" (afficit). So I have restored it from the best and oldest manuscript, the Regio-Puteanus, five other Regii, six Colbertini and seven others, and also from the old Rome edition of 1470. Three manuscripts and fourteen editions have affligit; one recent Regius infligit: but afficere used absolutely is, for Cicero and Columella, the same as vexare, affligere — a word which ignorant copyists substituted.

(printed under page 223)

(11) ‹lemma: Aut stultissimos, aut gloriosissimos fuisse› · no call mark

Aut stultissimos, aut gloriosissimos fuisse. Haec lectio sit omnium ferme et optimorum mss. codicum in 7 rec. et 5 vulgatis est aut gloriosos.

"Were either the most foolish or the most vainglorious." Let this be the reading of almost all and of the best manuscript codices; in seven recent ones and five printed editions it is aut gloriosos ("or vainglorious").

(printed under page 223)

(12) ‹lemma: Tempus? quo more? quando est› · no call mark

Tempus? quo more? quando est. Usus rarior probari potest ex Cic. lib. I Invent., c. 25, pr.: In victu considerare oportet, apud quos et quo more, et cujus arbitratu sit educatus.

"Time? In what manner? When is it?" The rarer usage can be proved from Cicero, On Invention book I, chapter 25, beginning: "In the manner of life one must consider among whom, and in what manner, and at whose direction he was brought up."

(printed under page 223)

(13) ‹lemma: Tamquam sit in aliquo sensu› · no call mark

Tamquam sit in aliquo sensu. Lege, tamquam sit illis aliquis sensus. HEUMAN. — Tamquam sit in aliquo sensu. Sine praepositione Cicero l. II de Nat. deor., cap. 15: Id animal et sensu acerrimo, et mobilitate celerrima esse. Sed notum est, veteres saepe in addere. BUN.

"As though it were in some sense." Read "as though they had some sense." HEUMAN[N]. — "As though it were in some sense." Without the preposition, Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods book II, chapter 15: "that this animal is of the keenest sense and the swiftest motion." But it is well known that the ancients often add in. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 223)

(14) ‹lemma: Sed deum esse dicunt› · no call mark

Sed deum esse dicunt. Quod philosophi hoc fecerint, nondum legi. Nisi fortassis Plutum intelligas, qui apud Aristoph. et ipse caecus inducitur. Sed Romani Fortunam masculam, et Fortunam muliebrem coluerunt, ut a Plutarcho scriptum est in lib. de Fortuna Romanorum. Augustinus utrinsque meminit loco supra citato. Masculae Fortunae templum ab Anco Martio, quarto Romanorum rege, extructum, quod plusculam sibi fortunam ad indipiscendam victoriam affuisse, quam fortitudinem crediderat. Fuit etiam alia masculae Fortunae aedicula ad Veneris fanum, auctore eodem Plutarcho, qui variarum Fortunarum et nomina et delubra recenset. Sed hic locus majorem acquireret lucem, si Ciceronis verba quae hic citantur, ex Academicarum Quaest. primo adscripsero integra; ibi enim perfectio illa rerum multis nominatur et variis nominibus. Verba Ciceronis, ubi de naturali philosophia loquitur, sic habent: Partes autem esse mundi, omnia quae insint in eo, quae Natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit, quae sit eadem sempiterna. Nihil enim valentius, a quo intereat. Quam vim Animum dicunt esse mundi, eamdemque esse mentem sapientiamque perfectam, quam Deum appellant, omniumque rerum, quae sunt ei subjectae, quasi prudentiam quamdam procurantem, coelestia maxime. Deinde in terris ea quae pertinent ad homines, quam interdum eamdem necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter possit, atque ab ea constitutum sit inter quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni. Nonnunquam quidem eamdem Fortunam, quod (continues)

"But they say it is a god" (masculine). That philosophers did this I have not yet read. Unless perhaps you understand Plutus, who in Aristophanes is himself brought on blind. But the Romans worshipped a male Fortune and a female Fortune, as Plutarch writes in his book On the Fortune of the Romans. Augustine mentions both in the place cited above. A temple of male Fortune was built by Ancus Marcius, fourth king of the Romans, because he believed that rather more fortune than courage had stood by him in gaining victory. There was also another little shrine of male Fortune near the temple of Venus, on the authority of the same Plutarch, who lists both the names and the shrines of the various Fortunes. But this passage would gain more light if I wrote out in full the words of Cicero cited here, from the first book of the Academic Questions; for there that perfection of things is named by many and various names. Cicero's words, where he speaks of natural philosophy, run thus: "And that all things in the world are parts of it, held together by a sentient Nature, in which perfect reason dwells, and which is likewise everlasting. For there is nothing stronger by which it could perish. This force they call the Soul of the world, and say it is likewise perfect mind and wisdom, which they call God, and a kind of providence caring for all things that are subject to it, above all the heavenly ones. Then on earth, for the things that concern men; which they sometimes call also necessity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it has been ordained by it, in a kind of fated and unchangeable sequence of everlasting order. Sometimes, indeed, they call the same thing Fortune, because ... (continues)

(printed under page 223)

Page

  • running head: 439 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN. (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A tamquam illi ad cogitandum; B ratione confessio illa Socratis; C ritate, quae ad confessionem (in the notes); D Betul., quid sentiant, quid velint (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the full-width heading VARIORUM NOTAE above the page-foot notes was not set; the notes beneath it (beginning "ritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis", then lemmata from "In puteo demersa veritas" to "Aut stultissimos, aut gloriosissimos fuisse") are left for the later pass; "[said]" is supplied in the English because the Democritus sentence depends on a verb in the preceding column
PL 6:440
eos homines, qui suo sibi gladio pereunt? Quid labores, ut eos destruas, quos sua ipsos destruit atque afficit oratio? Aristoteles, inquit Cicero (III Tusc.), veteres philosophos accusans, ait eos aut stultissimos, aut gloriosissimos fuisse, qui existimassent philosophiam suis ingeniis perfectam: sed se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Quod igitur fuit illud tempus? quo more? quando est aut a quibus absoluta? Nam quod ait stultissimos fuisse, qui putassent ingeniis suis perfectam esse sapientiam, verum est: sed ne ipse quidem satis prudenter, qui aut a veteribus coeptam, aut a novis auctam, aut mox a posterioribus perfectum iri putavit. Nunquam enim potest investigari, quod non per viam suam quaeritur.
those men who perish by their own sword? Why should you labour to destroy those whom their own speech destroys and afflicts? Aristotle, says Cicero (Tusc. 3), accusing the ancient philosophers, says that they were either most foolish or most vainglorious who had thought that philosophy had been perfected by their own talents; but that he himself saw, since in a few years a great advance had been made, that in a short time philosophy would be entirely completed. What, then, was that time? In what manner? When, or by whom, was it completed? For as to his saying that those were most foolish who had thought that wisdom had been perfected by their own talents, it is true; but not even he himself was sufficiently prudent, who thought that it had been begun by the ancients, or increased by the moderns, or would soon be perfected by those coming after. For that can never be discovered which is not sought by its own way.
CAPUT XXIX.
Chapter XXIX.
De fortuna iterum et virtute.
Of fortune again, and of virtue.
Sed repetamus id quod omisimus. Fortuna ergo per se nihil est; nec sic habendum est, tamquam sit in aliquo sensu. Siquidem fortuna est accidentium rerum subitus atque inopinatus eventus. Verum philosophi, ne aliquando non errent, in re stulta volunt esse sapientes; qui fortunae sexum mutant, eamque non deam, sicut vulgus, sed deum esse dicunt.
But let us return to that which we passed over. Fortune, then, is nothing in itself; nor is it to be regarded as though it were endowed with some sense. For fortune is the sudden and unexpected outcome of things that happen. But the philosophers, lest they should at any time not err, wish to be wise in a foolish matter; for they change the sex of fortune, and say that it is not a goddess, as the common people do, but a god.
Editors' notes and page, col. 440

Page

  • running head: …TANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 440 (left part cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A eos homines, qui suo sibi gladio; B viam suam quaeritur; C tio sit omnium ferme (in the notes); D masculae Fortunae aedicula (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence (eos homines); "pereunt" and "ut" read through blurred type that looks like "percunt"/"nt"; full-width heading "[VA]RIORUM NOTAE" stands below "deum esse dicunt", cut off at the left edge, not set; the Variorum Notae below it (Tempus? quo more?…; Tamquam sit in aliquo sensu…; Sed deum esse dicunt…) are left for the later pass; Google/ABK FR digitization stamp at foot not set
PL 6:441
Eumdem tamen interdum naturam, interdum fortunam vocant; « quod multa, inquit idem Cicero, efficiat inopinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum. » Cum igitur causas ignorent, propter quas fiat aliquid, et ipsum qui faciat ignorent, necesse est. Idem in opere valde serio, in quo praecepta vitae deprompta ex philosophia filio dabat: « Magnam, inquit, esse fortunae vim in utramque partem, quis nesciat? Nam et, cum prospero flatu ejus utimur, ad exitus pervenimus optatos; et, cum reflaverit, affligimur. » Primum, qui negat sciri posse quidquam, sic hoc dixit, tamquam et ipse, et omnes sciant. Deinde, qui, etiam quae clara sunt, dubia conatur efficere, hoc putavit esse clarum, quod illi esse debuit vel maxime dubium; nam sapienti omnino falsum est. Quis, inquit, nescit? Ego vero nescio. Doceat me, si potest, quae sit illa vis, qui flatus iste, et qui reflatus.
Yet the same god they sometimes call nature, sometimes fortune; "because," says the same Cicero, "it brings about many unexpected things for us, on account of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance of them." Since, therefore, they do not know the causes on account of which something comes about, it follows of necessity that they also do not know Him who brings it about. The same man, in a very serious work, in which he was giving his son precepts for life drawn from philosophy, says: "Who does not know that the power of fortune is great in either direction? For both when we enjoy its favourable breeze we arrive at the outcomes we desired, and when it has blown against us we are struck down." First, he who denies that anything can be known said this as though both he himself and everyone knew it. Next, he who tries to make even the things that are clear doubtful thought this to be clear, which ought to have been for him doubtful above all; for to the wise man it is altogether false. "Who," he says, "does not know?" I for my part do not know. Let him teach me, if he can, what that power is, what that breeze is, and what the contrary blast.
Turpe igitur est, hominem ingeniosum dicere id, quod, si neges, probare non possit. Postremo, quod is, qui dicit assensus esse retinendos, quod stulti sit hominis, rebus incognitis temere assentiri, is plane
It is therefore shameful for a man of talent to say that which, if you deny it, he cannot prove. Finally, that he who says that assent must be withheld, because it is the mark of a foolish man to assent rashly to things unknown, he plainly
Editors' notes and page, col. 441

Footnotes

[Header: VARIORUM NOTAE (not visible on this page's foot images). The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 224)

(1) ‹lemma: Sed deum esse dicunt (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) efficiat multa improvisa haec, nec opinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque caussarum. Sed apud Cicer. in II de Divinatione; disputatur, utrum divinatio rerum fortuitarum esse possit. Et contradicitur: si fortuna sit, fatum tolli; sin autem omnia ex aeternitate fataliterque fiant, tolli fortunam. Addidit Lact. eumdem Deum interdum naturam, interdum fortunam esse. Plut. vero in Problem. hanc ponit differentiam, quod fortuna sit rerum omnium principium, natura vero casu consistat. Sed de his lege Joan. Damascenum lib. II Orthodoxae fidei, cap. 15.

(printed under page 224)

(2) ‹lemma: Interdum naturam› · no call mark

Interdum naturam. Hae duae voces absunt a 12 mss. et ab edit. Thomas.

"Sometimes nature." These two words are missing from twelve manuscripts and from Thomasius's edition.

(printed under page 224)

(3) ‹lemma: Efficiat inopinata nobis› · no call mark

Efficiat inopinata nobis. Ita editi et mss. omnes, praeter 2 recentissimos Em. et Cant. in quibus est, Efficiat improvisa nec opinata nobis. Vide Ciceronem in I Academicar. quaestionum circa finem.

"Brings about things unexpected by us." So the editions and all the manuscripts, except two very recent ones, the Emmanuel and the Cantabrigiensis, in which it is "brings about things unforeseen and unexpected by us." See Cicero, Academic Questions I, near the end.

(printed under page 224)

(4) ‹lemma: Valde serio› · no call mark

Valde serio. Hac voce indicatur liber. II de Offic. cap. 2 ad finem, quibusdam tamen immutatis.

"Very seriously." By this phrase is indicated On Duties book II, chapter 2, near the end, though with some things changed.

(printed under page 224)

(5) ‹lemma: Pervenimus› · no call mark

Pervenimus. Legitur pervehimur apud Buneman, qui hujus mutationis sic rationem reddit. — Hanc lectionem cum Cicerone convenientem recepi ex Reimm., mss. et Tornes. 1587, ubi ante editum, pervenimus. BUN.

"We arrive." One reads pervehimur ("we are carried through") in Bünemann, who gives his reason for this change thus: — "This reading, agreeing with Cicero, I have taken in from Reimmann's, the manuscripts and the Tornaesius of 1587, where formerly pervenimus was printed." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 224)

(6) ‹lemma: Cum reflaverit› · no call mark

Cum reflaverit. Sic legitur in excusis et mss. codicibus, praeter octo qui ferunt cum respiraverit; et 1 Reg. cum respiravit. At reflaverit, quod est ex Ciceronis loco, optime respondet τῷ prospero flatu, quod mox praecessit. Sic et infra, qui flatus iste: et qui reflatus. — Reflaverit. Emman. et Goth. respiraverit. Receptam Ciceronis codices habent, et ipse Lact. infra, qui flatus... et qui reflatus. BUNEMAN.

"When it has blown against us." So it is read in the printed editions and manuscript codices, except eight which give cum respiraverit ("when it has breathed again"), and one Regius cum respiravit. But reflaverit, which comes from Cicero's passage, answers excellently to the phrase "with a favourable wind," which came just before. So too below: "what is that wind ... and what that contrary wind." — Reflaverit: the Emmanuel and Gotha have respiraverit. The codices of Cicero have the received reading, and so does Lactantius himself below: "what wind ... and what contrary wind." BUNEMAN.

(printed under page 224)

(7) ‹lemma: Assensus esse retinendos› · no call mark

Assensus esse retinendos. Sed vide potius Ciceronem ipsum in librorum de Officiis praefatione, ubi huic objectioni occurrit: occurritur autem nobis, etc. quam responsionem videas.

"That assent must be withheld." But see rather Cicero himself in the preface to the books On Duties, where he meets this objection: "but we are met with," etc.; look at that reply.

(printed under page 224)

(8) ‹lemma: Nam simulacrum ejus› · no call mark

Nam simulacrum ejus, etc. Cum copiae cornu Bupalus (ut ex Pausania Volaterr. citat) apud Smyrnaeos statuam fortunae fecit, cum polo supra caput, et altera manu cornu copiae. Sed Galeni quoque Fortuna gubernaculum in manibus habet. Caeterum quod caeca, et globo volubili insistens pingatur, praeter Galenum, vide Cebetis tabulam, et Pacuvii versus in Rhetorica ad Heren., lib. II, cap. de Vitiosa argumentatione. HEUM.

"For her image," etc. With the horn of plenty: Bupalus (as Volaterranus cites from Pausanias) made for the people of Smyrna a statue of Fortune with the pole [of heaven] above her head and in her other hand the horn of plenty. But Galen's Fortune too holds a rudder in her hands. As for her being painted blind and standing on a rolling globe, besides Galen see the Tablet of Cebes, and the verses of Pacuvius in the Rhetoric to Herennius, book II, the chapter on faulty argumentation. HEUM[ANN].

(printed under page 224)

(9) ‹lemma: Et humanarum› · no call mark

Et humanarum, etc. Plin., lib. II: Toto quippe mundo et locis omnibus, omnibusque horis, omnium vocibus fortuna sola laudatur, sola arguitur, et cum conviciis colitur; volubilis, a plerisque vero et caeca etiam existimata, et in tota ratione mortalium sola utramque paginam facit. Sic et Minucius Felix: Soluta legibus fortuna dominatur.

"And of human [affairs]," etc. Pliny, book II: "For throughout the whole world, in all places and at all hours, by the voices of all, Fortune alone is praised, alone accused, and worshipped with reproaches; held fickle, and by most even blind, and in the whole account of mortals she alone fills both pages." So too Minucius Felix: "Fortune, freed from laws, holds sway."

(printed under page 224)

(10) ‹lemma: Virgilius› · no call mark

Virgilius. Cujus haec verba sunt lib. VIII Aeneid., vers. 334. Aeneas loquitur: Me pulsum patria, pelagique extrema sequentem, / Fortuna omnipotens et ineluctabile fatum / His posuere locis, etc. Atque ibi Servius ait poetam secundum Stoicos locutum esse, qui nasci et mori fatis dant, media omnia fortunae, eo quod vitae humanae incerta sunt omnia.

"Virgil." His are these words, Aeneid book VIII, verse 334. Aeneas speaks [as printed; the speaker there is Evander]: "Me, driven from my country and following the furthest bounds of the sea, all-powerful Fortune and inescapable fate have set in these places," etc. And there Servius says that the poet spoke after the Stoics, who assign birth and death to the fates and everything between to fortune, because all things in human life are uncertain.

(printed under page 224)

(11) ‹lemma: Et historicus› · no call mark

Et historicus, etc. Sallustius: locutus est in prologo Catilinariae historiae. Possunt plurima in hanc sententiam testimonia ex Graecis Latinisque scriptoribus colligi. Sed hoc instituti nostri non est. Ita et Plato in IV de Legibus.

"And the historian," etc. Sallust: he spoke so in the prologue to the history of Catiline. Very many testimonies to this effect could be gathered from Greek and Latin writers. But that is not our purpose. So too Plato, Laws IV.

(printed under page 224)

(12) ‹lemma: Vel, si tantum› · no call mark

Vel, si tantum. Alii duas fortunas faciunt, bonam, malamque. At diversas fortunas esse posse, validis argumentis refellit Augustinus, lib. IV Civit. Dei, c. 18.

"Or, if only." Others make two Fortunes, a good and a bad. But that there can be different Fortunes Augustine refutes with strong arguments, City of God book IV, chapter 18.

(printed under page 224)

(13) ‹lemma: Illam generi hominum vexatricem constituerit› · no call mark

Illam generi hominum vexatricem constituerit. Sic reposui ex optimis et omnibus fere mss. In scriptis Em. et 1 Clarom. est, generi humano; in 1 Reg. rec. et cunctis editis, generis hominum. At infra idem Lactantius simili utitur locutione, c. 30: Una spes homini.... posita est; et mox, hominibus tam inimica. — Generis hominum vexatricem. Goth., Reimm.: Generi hominum, respectu verbi, constituerit; genitivus pendet a vexatricem. Ut lib. II, c. 15, fin.: vexatores hominum. BUN.

"Has set her up as tormentress to the race of men." So I have restored it from the best and almost all the manuscripts. In the Emmanuel and one Claromontanus manuscript it is generi humano ("to the human race"); in one recent Regius and all the editions, generis hominum ("of the race of men"). But below, chapter 30, the same Lactantius uses a like expression: "the one hope for man ... is placed"; and soon after, "so hostile to men." — "Tormentress of the race of men." The Gotha and Reimmann's: generi hominum, with respect to the verb constituerit; [whereas] the genitive depends on vexatricem. As in book II, chapter 15, end: "tormentors of men." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 224)

(14) ‹lemma: Obscuretque› · no call mark

Obscuretque. Lege obscuretve.

"And obscures." Read obscuretve ("or obscures").

(printed under page 224)

(15) ‹lemma: Hominibus inimica... et mox, inimicus bonis› · no call mark

Hominibus inimica... et mox, inimicus bonis. Inimicus cum tertio casu etiam lib. VI, c. 20, Epitom., c. 71, lib. de Ira Dei, c. 19.

"Hostile to men ... and soon after, hostile to the good." Inimicus with the dative also in book VI, chapter 20; Epitome, chapter 71; On the Anger of God, chapter 19.

(printed under page 224)

(16) ‹lemma: Iniquitatem fortunae lacerant› · no call mark

Iniquitatem fortunae lacerant. Cic. XI Philipp. 2: Cum verborum contumeliis optimum virum lacerasset. Val. Max., lib. IV, c. 4, extr.: Quid..... fortunam, quasi praecipuum generis humani malum diuturnis conviciis laceramus? BUN.

"They tear at the injustice of fortune." Cicero, Philippic XI, 2: "when he had torn the best of men with insulting words." Valerius Maximus, book IV, chapter 4, foreign examples: "Why ... do we tear at fortune with endless reproaches, as if she were the chief evil of the human race?" BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 224)

Page

  • running head: 441 LIBER III. DE FALSA SAPIENT (cut off at the image edge; presumably SAPIENTIA.)
  • marginal letters: A ‹Eumdem tamen interdum naturam›; B ‹falsum est. Quis, inquit, nescit?›; C ‹aeternitate fataliterque fiant› (in the Variorum Notae); D ‹Cum reflaverit. Sic legitur› (in the Variorum Notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: the column ends mid-sentence at "is plane", with no word split. The full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTA[E]" is cut off at the image edge and not set. The Variorum Notae below it (from "efficiat multa improvisa haec" to "Heum.") are left for the later apparatus pass. No editors' matter is set in the text block. Guillemets are set as printed.
PL 6:442
vulgi et imperitorum opinionibus credidit, qui fortunam putant esse, quae hominibus tribuat bona et mala. Nam simulacrum ejus cum copia et gubernaculo fingunt, tamquam haec et opes tribuat, et humanarum rerum regimen obtineat. Cui opinioni et Virgilius assentit, qui fortunam omnipotentem vocat; et historicus, qui ait: Sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur. Quid ergo caeteris diis loci superest? Cur non aut ipsa regnare dicitur, si plus potest; aut sola colitur, si omnia? Vel, si tantum mala immittit, aliquid causae proferant, cur, si dea sit, hominibus invideat, eosque perditos cupiat, cum ab his religiose colatur: cur aequior sit malis, iniquior autem bonis: cur insidietur, affligat, decipiat et exterminet: quis illam generi hominum vexatricem perpetuam constituerit: cur denique tam malam sortita sit potestatem, ut res cunctas ex libidine magis, quam ex vero celebret, obscuretque? Haec, inquam, philosophos inquirere oportuit potius, quam temere innocentem accusare fortunam: quae etiamsi sit aliqua, nihil tamen afferri ab his potest, cur hominibus tam inimica sit, quam putatur. Itaque illae omnes orationes, quibus iniquitatem
trusted the opinions of the common and unlearned people, who think that it is fortune which bestows good and evil things upon men. For they fashion her image with a horn of plenty and a rudder, as though she both bestowed riches and held the government of human affairs. With this opinion Virgil also agrees, who calls fortune omnipotent; and the historian, who says: But assuredly fortune holds sway in every matter. What room, then, is left for the other gods? Why is she not either said to reign, if she has more power; or worshipped alone, if she can do all things? Or, if she sends only evils, let them bring forward some reason why, if she is a goddess, she begrudges men and desires their ruin, although she is religiously worshipped by them: why she is fairer to the wicked but more unfair to the good: why she lies in wait, afflicts, deceives and destroys: who appointed her the perpetual harasser of the race of men: why, finally, she has obtained so evil a power that she makes all things renowned and obscure from caprice rather than from truth? These things, I say, the philosophers ought rather to have inquired into than rashly to accuse innocent fortune: for even if she is something, nothing can yet be brought forward by them why she should be as hostile to men as she is thought to be. Therefore all those speeches, by which they tear at the iniquity
Editors' notes and page, col. 442

Page

  • running head: FALSA SAPIENTIA PHILOSOPH.
  • marginal letters: A ‹vulgi et imperitorum›; B ‹cur denique tam›; C ‹etiam existimata› (in the Variorum notae); D ‹argumentis refellit› (in the Variorum notae)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: initial F of the running head is partly cut at the image edge; the heading VARIORUM NOTAE runs across the page and is cut off at the left edge, so it is not set; it stands between the text block (after "quibus iniquitatem") and the notes; the Variorum notae (Et humanarum ... Bun.) are left for the later apparatus pass; a stray mark before "quibus" is ignored; the overlapping lines between the images ("ab his potest ... quam pu-", "Plato in IV de Legibus") are set once; the column ends mid-sentence at "iniquitatem"; the "Digitized by Google" stamp is not set
PL 6:443
fortunae lacerant, se suasque virtutes contra fortunam superbissime jactant, nihil aliud sunt, quam deliramenta inconsideratae levitatis.
of fortune, and boast most arrogantly of themselves and their virtues against fortune, are nothing other than the ravings of ill-considered levity.
Quare non invideant nobis quibus aperuit veritatem Deus: qui sicut scimus, nihil esse fortunam; ita scimus esse pravum ac subdolum spiritum, qui sit inimicus bonis, hostisque justitiae; qui contraria faciat, quam Deus, cujus invidiae causam in secundo libro (Cap. 13) explicavimus. Hic ergo insidiatur universis; sed eos, qui nesciunt Deum, errore impedit, stultitia obruit, tenebris circumfundit, ne quis possit ad divini nominis pervenire notitiam, in quo uno et sapientia continetur, et vita perpetua. Eos autem, qui Deum sciunt, dolis et astu aggreditur, ut cupiditate ac libidine irretiat, ac peccatis blandientibus depravatos impellat ad mortem; vel, si dolo nihil profecerit, vi et violentia dejicere conatur. Idcirco enim in primordiis transgressionis non statim ad poenam detrusus a Deo est, ut hominem malitia sua exerceat ad virtutem: quae nisi agitetur, ni assidua vexatione roboretur, non potest esse perfecta; siquidem virtus est perferendorum malorum fortis ac invicta patientia. Ex quo fit, ut virtus nulla sit, si adversarius desit. Hujus itaque perversae potestatis cum vim sentirent virtuti repugnantem, nomenque ignorarent, fortunae vocabulum sibi inane finxerunt. Quod quam longe a sapientia sit remotum, declarat Juvenalis his versibus:
Let them therefore not begrudge us, to whom God has opened the truth: we who, just as we know that fortune is nothing, so know that there is a depraved and crafty spirit, who is the enemy of the good and the foe of justice; who does the contrary of what God does, the cause of whose envy we have explained in the second book (Chapter 13). He therefore lies in wait for all; but those who do not know God he entangles with error, overwhelms with folly, surrounds with darkness, so that no one may be able to arrive at the knowledge of the divine name, in which alone both wisdom and everlasting life are contained. Those, however, who know God he attacks with wiles and cunning, so as to ensnare them with greed and lust, and, when they have been corrupted by alluring sins, to drive them on to death; or, if he has gained nothing by guile, he tries to throw them down by force and violence. For this reason, indeed, at the beginnings of his transgression he was not at once thrust down by God to punishment, so that by his malice he might exercise man towards virtue: which, unless it is stirred up, unless it is strengthened by constant harassment, cannot be perfect; since virtue is the brave and unconquered endurance of evils that must be borne. From which it comes about that there is no virtue if an adversary is lacking. Since, therefore, they felt the force of this perverse power opposing virtue, and did not know its name, they invented for themselves the empty word "fortune". How far removed this is from wisdom Juvenal declares in these verses:
Nullum numen abest, si sit prudentia: sed nos / Te facimus, Fortuna, deam, coeloque locamus.
No divinity is absent, if there is prudence: but it is we / who make you, Fortune, a goddess, and place you in heaven.
Stultitia igitur, et error, et caecitas, et, ut Cicero ait,
Folly, therefore, and error, and blindness, and, as Cicero says,
Editors' notes and page, col. 443

Footnotes

[Header, as printed: VARIORUM NOTAE. The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] (printed under page 225)

(1) ‹lemma: Se suasque virtutes› · no call mark

Se suasque virtutes, etc. Ita scribo cum mss. Regio-Put., 2 Colbert., 2 Clarom., Cant. et editis sex. Alii tres vulgati habent, et se suasque virtutes. In 8 scriptis totidemque impressis deest et se.

"Himself and his virtues," etc. So I write, with the Regio-Puteanus manuscript, two Colbertini, two Claromontani, the Cantabrigiensis and six editions. Three other printed editions have "and himself and his virtues." In eight manuscripts and as many printed editions et se is missing.

(printed under page 225)

(2) ‹lemma: Contraria faciat, quam Deus› · no call mark

Contraria faciat, quam Deus. Ego tale exemplum deprehendi sine ulla mss. variatione in Augustini de Civit. Dei, lib. VIII, c. 24: Qui (Deus) haec contrariis caussis, quam instituta sunt, abstulit. Melius tamen noster Firmianus de Ira, c. 5: Qui contraria Deo faciat. BUN.

"Does the contrary of what God does." I have found such an example, without any manuscript variation, in Augustine's City of God, book VIII, chapter 24: "Who (God) took these things away by causes contrary to those by which they were established." Better, however, our Firmianus in On the Anger [of God], chapter 5: "who does things contrary to God." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 225)

(3) ‹lemma: Hic ergo insidiatur universis› · no call mark

Hic ergo insidiatur universis. Sic omnes mss. et plerique editi; in vulgatis nonnullis est His.

"This one, then, lies in wait for all." So all the manuscripts and most editions; in some printed editions it is His ("for these").

(printed under page 225)

(4) ‹lemma: Circumfundit› · no call mark

Circumfundit. Ita repositum ex mss. et quatuor editis; in caeteris est circumfudit, male. Vide praecedentia.

"Pours about" (present). So restored from the manuscripts and four editions; in the rest it is circumfudit (perfect), wrongly. See what precedes.

(printed under page 225)

(5) ‹lemma: Dolis et astu› · no call mark

Dolis et astu. Restitui ex 16 mss. veterrimis et optimis ac edit. Is. In 12 scriptis rec. et impressis est dolis et astutia.

"By tricks and cunning" (astu). I have restored it from sixteen very old and excellent manuscripts and the edition of Isaeus. In twelve recent manuscripts and in the printed editions it is dolis et astutia.

(printed under page 225)

(6) ‹lemma: Ac peccatis blandientibus› · no call mark

Ac peccatis blandientibus. Sic reposui ex editis 3 vet. Romanis, Is. et Cellar. nec non ex omnibus mss. praeter Cauc. et 1 Reg. rec. in quibus, ut et in vulgatis undecim est peccati blandamentis.

"And by flattering sins." So I have restored from three old Roman editions, those of Isaeus and Cellarius, and also from all the manuscripts except the Cauchianus and one recent Regius, in which, as in eleven printed editions, it is peccati blandamentis ("by the blandishments of sin").

(printed under page 225)

(7) ‹lemma: Vi et violentia› · no call mark

Vi et violentia. Voces vi et absunt a 15 mss. rec. et 8 editis.

"By force and violence." The words vi et are missing from fifteen recent manuscripts and eight editions.

(printed under page 225)

(8) ‹lemma: Non statim ad poenam› · no call mark

Non statim ad poenam. In eadem sententia fuere nonnulli antiquiores Patres, nixi videlicet his testimoniis Matthaei, c. VIII, v. 29 et 31, ac epist. II Petr., c. II, v. 4, S. Justinus Apolog. I pro christianis; S. Irenaeus, lib. V advers. Haeres.; Tertullianus in Apolog., c. 27; Origenes in cap. XXII Numer. Homil. 13; S. Augustinus, lib. II de Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 17, citat illud Christi Matth., c. XXV; Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus. Clarius adhuc testimonium vide in II Petri Epistol., c. II, v. 4, Partim ex. BETULEIO. Vide Isaeum si lubet.

"Not at once to punishment." Some of the more ancient Fathers were of the same opinion, relying, namely, on these testimonies: Matthew 8:29 and 31, and 2 Peter 2:4; St Justin, First Apology for the Christians; St Irenaeus, Against Heresies book V; Tertullian, Apology chapter 27; Origen on Numbers chapter 22, Homily 13; St Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees book II, chapter 17, cites that word of Christ, Matthew 25: "Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." See a still clearer testimony in the Second Epistle of Peter, chapter 2, verse 4. Partly from BETULEIUS. See Isaeus if you like.

(printed under page 225)

(9) ‹lemma: Ex quo fit› · no call mark

Ex quo fit, etc. Falsa haec Lactantii est sententia. Virtus quidem est: sed sine adversario, vires suas non exerit.

"From which it comes about," etc. This opinion of Lactantius is false. Virtue does indeed exist: but without an adversary it does not put forth its strength.

(printed under page 225)

(10) ‹lemma: Nullum numen abest› · no call mark

Nullum numen abest. Sic profecto legendum ex mss. Bonon. 4 Reg. aliisque octo, ac 12 editis, ut Juvenalis respondeat scopo. In 19 manu exaratis et 2 impressis habes, male. Hi duo versus in Juvenalis Sat. 10 circa finem. — Nullum numen habes. Mss., Cauc., Palat., Jun., Lips. 1, Reimm., Rost., Ven. altera 478, Paris.: nullum numen habes. Ultraj.: nullum nomen habes, cum Veneta prima 478. Variant quoque Juvenalis libri; at menti Lactantii habes hic convenientius, quam aliorum, abest. BUN.

"No divinity is absent." So it should certainly be read, from the Bologna manuscript, four Regii and eight others, and twelve editions, so that it answers to Juvenal's aim. In nineteen handwritten copies and two printed ones you have habes ("you have"), wrongly. These two verses are in Juvenal's Satire 10, near the end. — "You have no divinity." The manuscripts Cauchianus, Palatinus, Junius, Leipzig 1, Reimmann's, the Rostock edition, the second Venice [1]478, and the Paris edition: nullum numen habes. The Ultrajectinus: nullum nomen habes ("you have no name"), with the first Venice [1]478. The manuscripts of Juvenal also vary; but habes suits Lactantius's meaning here better than the others' abest. BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 225)

(11) ‹lemma: Cicero› · no call mark

Cicero. Quem vide in I Acad. quaest. ubi supra.

"Cicero." See him in Academic Questions I, in the place cited above.

(printed under page 225)

(12) ‹lemma: Armis› · no call mark

Armis. Iis scilicet, de quibus Paulus ad Ephes., c. VI, v. 11 et 13.

"With arms." Namely those of which Paul speaks, Ephesians 6:11 and 13.

(printed under page 225)

(13) ‹lemma: Vitalibus› · no call mark

Vitalibus. Hic est pro intestinis et visceribus. — Venientem vitalibus..... ictum. Vitalia sunt viscera interna. Seneca ep. 99: Quam multis vitalia eruuntur. Ammian. Marcellin., lib. XVI, c. 12: Tela eorum vitalibus immergebat. BUN.

"The vitals." Here it stands for the bowels and inward parts. — "A blow coming at the vitals." The vitalia are the internal organs. Seneca, letter 99: "from how many are the vitals torn out." Ammianus Marcellinus, book XVI, chapter 12: "he plunged their weapons into the vitals." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 225)

(14) ‹lemma: Sentio› · no call mark

Sentio. Ita restitui ex vetustissimis duobus Regiis, 2 Bonon. aliisque 32 mss. (absque 12 Vaticanis) ac 3 vet. Romanis aliisque 8 editis. In scriptis Cauc., 1 Reg. rec., Marm., 1 Lips. et 7 vulgatis est Scio.

"I perceive." So I have restored it from two very old Regii, two Bologna manuscripts and thirty-two other manuscripts (apart from twelve Vatican ones), and from three old Roman and eight other editions. In the manuscripts Cauchianus, one recent Regius, the Marmoutier and one Leipzig, and in seven printed editions, it is Scio ("I know").

(printed under page 225)

(15) ‹lemma: A pravis religionibus› · no call mark

A pravis religionibus. Sic Paulus ad Colossens. II, vocat susceptas religiones, sapientia carentes. Observa religionis nomen in plurali a Lactantio semper in malam usurpari partem. BETULEIUS.

"From perverse religions." So Paul, Colossians 2, speaks of religions taken up that lack wisdom. Note that the word "religion" in the plural is always used by Lactantius in a bad sense. BETULEIUS.

(printed under page 225)

(16) ‹lemma: Spes homini› · no call mark

Spes homini. Ita cum omnibus fere excusis manuscripti, praeter 2 Reg. rec. et Goth. nonnullosque typis expressos, quibus est hominis.

"Hope for man." So the manuscripts, with almost all the printed editions, except two recent Regii and the Gotha and some printed copies, which have hominis ("of man").

(printed under page 225)

(17) ‹lemma: Hic, hic est illud› · no call mark

Hic, hic est illud, etc. Sic restituo ex omnium mss. (continues)

"Here, here is that," etc. So I restore it from all the manuscripts ... (continues)

(printed under page 225)

Page

  • running head: 443 FIRM. LACTANTII DIVIN[...] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹fortunae lacerant, se suasque virtutes›; B ‹pravatos impellat ad mortem; vel, si dolo nihil pro-›; C ‹Se suasque virtutes, etc. Ita scribo› (in the Variorum notes); D ‹Dolis et astu. Restitui ex 16 mss.› (in the Variorum notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence with "fortunae lacerant" and ends mid-sentence at "ut Cicero ait,"; reference "(Cap. 13)" read as 13 but the figure is not entirely clear; in the Juvenal verses (Sat. 10.365-366) the scan appears to show "facimus" and "Fortuua", which looks like poor reproduction rather than a misprint, so it is set Fortuna (UNSURE); the two verse lines are set as one paragraph joined by " / "; the full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTA[E]" is cut off at the image edge and is not set; the Variorum notes at the page foot (Se suasque virtutes ... Partim ex. BETU-) are left for the later pass; "versis" shows a speck in the type but reads clearly
PL 6:444
ignoratio rerum atque causarum, Naturae ac Fortunae nomina induxit. Sed ut adversarium suum nesciunt: sic nec virtutem quidem sciunt, cujus scientia ab adversarii notione descendit. Quae si conjuncta est cum sapientia, vel, ut ipsi dicunt, eadem ipsa sapientia est, ignorent necesse est in quibus rebus sita sit. Nemo enim potest veris armis instrui, si hostem contra quem fuerit armandus, ignorat; nec adversarium vincere, qui in dimicando non hostem verum, sed umbram petit. Prosternetur enim, qui alio intentus, venientem vitalibus suis ictum nec praeviderit ante, nec caverit.
ignorance of things and of causes brought in the names of Nature and Fortune. But just as they do not know their adversary, so they do not even know virtue, the knowledge of which descends from the notion of the adversary. If virtue is joined with wisdom, or, as they themselves say, is that very wisdom itself, they must of necessity be ignorant of the things in which it is placed. For no one can be equipped with true arms if he does not know the enemy against whom he is to be armed; nor can he conquer an adversary who in fighting attacks not the true enemy but a shadow. For he will be laid low who, intent on something else, has neither foreseen beforehand nor guarded against the blow coming at his vitals.
CAPUT XXX.
Chapter XXX.
Epilogus ante dictorum; et qua ratione sit transeundum a vanitate philosophorum ad sapientiam veram et veri Dei cognitionem, in quo solo virtus est et beatitudo.
A summing-up of what has been said before; and by what means one must pass from the vanity of the philosophers to true wisdom and to the knowledge of the true God, in Whom alone are virtue and blessedness.
Docui, quantum mea mediocritas tulit, longe devium philosophos iter a veritate tenuisse. Sentio tamen, quam multa praeterierim, quia non erat mihi propria contra philosophos disputatio. Sed huc necessario divertendum fuit, ut ostenderem, tot et tanta ingenia in rebus falsis esse consumpta; ne quis forte a pravis religionibus exclusus, ad eos se conferre vellet, tamquam certi aliquid reperturus. Una igitur spes homini, una salus in hac doctrina, quam defendimus, posita est. Omnis sapientia hominis in hoc uno est, ut Deum cognoscat et colat: hoc nostrum dogma, haec sententia est. Quanta itaque voce possum, testificor, proclamo, denuntio. Hic, hic est illud,
I have shown, as far as my modest ability allowed, that the philosophers held a path far astray from the truth. I am aware, however, how many things I have passed over, because a disputation against the philosophers was not my proper task. But it was necessary to turn aside to this point, so that I might show that so many and such great talents had been spent on false things; lest anyone, perhaps shut out from depraved religions, should wish to betake himself to them, as though he would find something certain. The one hope for man, therefore, the one salvation, is placed in this doctrine which we defend. All the wisdom of man lies in this one thing, that he know God and worship Him: this is our dogma, this is our judgement. Therefore with as loud a voice as I can, I testify, I proclaim, I announce. Here, here is that
Editors' notes and page, col. 444

Page

  • running head: [L]ACTANTII DIVIN. INSTIT. 444 (initial L cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ignoratio rerum atque causarum; B a vanitate philosophorum ad sapientiam veram; C LEIO. Vide Isaeum (in the notes); D Cicero. Quem vide (in the notes)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: column begins mid-sentence (ignoratio) and ends mid-sentence (illud,); full-width heading [V]ARIORUM NOTAE above the foot apparatus, cut off at left edge, not set; Variorum notae (LEIO. Vide Isaeum ... Hic, hic est illud) left for the later pass; the italic chapter summary under CAPUT XXX is set as its own line
PL 6:445
quod philosophi omnes in tota sua vita quaesierunt, nec unquam tamen investigare, comprehendere, tenere valuerunt, qui religionem aut pravam retinuerunt, aut totam penitus sustulerunt. Facessant igitur illi omnes, qui humanam vitam non instruunt, sed turbant. Quid enim docent? aut quem instruunt qui se ipsos nondum instruxerunt? Quem sanare aegroti, quem regere caeci possunt? Huc ergo nos omnes, quibus est cura sapientiae, conferamus. An expectabimus donec Socrates aliquid sciat? aut Anaxagoras in tenebris lumen inveniat? aut Democritus veritatem de puteo extrahat? aut Empedocles dilatet animi sui semitas? aut Arcesilas et Carneades videant, sentiant, percipiant?
which all the philosophers sought in their whole life, and yet were never able to search out, to grasp, to hold, since they either retained a depraved religion or removed it altogether. Let all those, then, be gone who do not equip human life but throw it into confusion. For what do they teach? Or whom do they instruct, who have not yet instructed themselves? Whom can the sick heal, whom can the blind guide? Hither, therefore, let all of us who have a care for wisdom betake ourselves. Or shall we wait until Socrates knows something? or Anaxagoras finds light in the darkness? or Democritus draws truth up out of the well? or Empedocles widens the paths of his mind? or Arcesilas and Carneades see, feel, perceive?
Ecce vox de coelo veritatem docens, et nobis sole ipso clarius lumen ostendens. Quid nobis iniqui sumus? et sapientiam suscipere cunctamur, quam docti homines, contritis in quaerendo aetatibus suis, nunquam
Behold a voice from heaven teaching the truth, and showing us a light brighter than the sun itself. Why are we unjust to ourselves? and why do we hesitate to take up wisdom, which learned men, having worn out their lifetimes in seeking, never
reperire potuerunt? Qui vult sapiens ac beatus esse, audiat Dei vocem, discat justitiam, sacramentum nativitatis suae norit; humana contemnat, divina suscipiat, ut summum illud bonum, ad quod natus est, possit adipisci. Dissolutis religionibus universis, et omnibus, quaecumque in earum defensionem dici vel solebant, vel poterant, refutatis, deinde convictis philosophiae disciplinis, ad veram nobis religionem sapientiamque veniendum est, quoniam est, ut docebo, utrumque conjunctum; ut eam vel argumentis, vel exemplis, vel idoneis testibus asseramus, et stultitiam, quam nobis isti deorum cultores objectare non desinunt, ut nullam penes nos, sic totam penes ipsos esse doceamus. Et quamquam prioribus libris, cum falsas arguerem religiones, et hoc, cum falsam sapientiam tollerem, ubi veritas sit, ostenderim; planius tamen, quae religio, et quae sapientia vera sit, liber proximus indicabit.
have they been able to find? Whoever wishes to be wise and blessed, let him hear the voice of God, let him learn justice, let him know the mystery of his own birth; let him despise human things and take up divine ones, so that he may be able to attain that highest good for which he was born. Now that all religions have been dissolved, and everything that was accustomed to be said, or could be said, in their defence has been refuted, and then the disciplines of philosophy have been convicted, we must come to the true religion and wisdom, since, as I shall teach, both are joined together; so that we may establish it by arguments, or by examples, or by suitable witnesses, and may show that the folly which these worshippers of the gods do not cease to cast up against us, just as none of it is with us, so all of it is with them. And although in the earlier books, when I was refuting false religions, and in this one, when I was removing false wisdom, I have shown where the truth lies, nevertheless the next book will indicate more plainly what religion and what wisdom is true.
Editors' notes and page, col. 445

Footnotes

[Header: VARIORUM NOTAE (above the area visible in this page's foot images). The notes carry no call marks; each is keyed by a lemma from the text. They are numbered here in print order.] [GAP WARNING: the rendered foot images begin partway down the notes block. The opening lines of note (1) on this page ("vetustissimis ... quod Gallice", the top of the left notes column) were read from the column image and are now set (Q2b). The lines at the top of the right-hand notes column between "Sic" (end of note 2 in the left column) and "quod solus ita formatus" are still NOT visible here. Re-render this page with the full notes block to fill them.] [Below the notes, after a rule, the page begins the editor's "ANALYSIS LIBRI QUARTI QUI INSCRIBITUR DE VERA SAPIENTIA ET RELIGIONE." That is editors' matter of another kind (a synopsis of Book IV), not footnotes, and is not set here.] (printed under page 226)

(1) ‹lemma: Hic, hic est illud (continued)› · no call mark

(continued) vetustissimis et optimis 1 Bon., 1 Reg. 900 annor. et Regio-Put. necnon Em. et edit. Is. ut scribitur HIC in contractuum margine e regione loci, in quo consistit summa rei unde judicandum est: quod Gallice dicimus le Hic de la pièce, vel voilà le Hic: haec tamen nonnisi populari dicuntur sermone, non eleganti eloquio. Nostrae lectioni favent mss. 3 Reg. alii, 1 Colbert., Gat., Brun., quibus est, Hic est illud, sine repetitione; Jun. 1 Colb. Hoc, hoc est illud; in Cauc. et 11 aliis rec. scriptis cunctisque fere impressis, Hoc est illud.

(printed under page 226)

(2) ‹lemma: Retinuerunt› · no call mark

Retinuerunt. Ita reposui ex editis Tornes., Soubron., Walch. et omnibus mss. praeter 2 Reg. rec. et 14 impressos, in quibus est tenuerunt.

"They kept back" (retinuerunt). So I have restored it from the Tornaesius, Soubron and Walch editions and all the manuscripts, except two recent Regii and fourteen printed editions, in which it is tenuerunt ("they held").

(printed under page 226)

(3) ‹lemma: Sacramentum› · no call mark

Sacramentum. Id est mysterium, voce a Lactantio saepe usurpata. Id est a quo natus sit et creatus. Sic [... gap: lines at the top of the right column not visible in the rendered image ...] quod solus ita formatus, ut oculi ejus ad coelum directi... excitasse. BUN.

"Sacrament." That is, mystery, a word often used by Lactantius. That is, by whom he was born and created. So [... gap ...] "that he alone was so formed that his eyes, directed to heaven ..." "... had roused." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 226)

(4) ‹lemma: Utrumque conjunctum› · no call mark

Utrumque conjunctum. Dicit utrumque, id est, religionem sapientiamque conjunctam. Idem, lib. IV, c. 2, fin. dicit: Sapientiam cum religione sic cohaerere, ut divelli utrumque non possit. Ibid., c. 3: Sapientia cum religione inseparabili nexu cohaeret; ibid., c. 4: Apparet, quam inter se conjuncta sint sapientia et religio; ibid., c. 5: Sapientiam et religionem non posse diduci. BUN.

"Both joined." He says "both," that is, religion and wisdom joined. The same, book IV, chapter 2, end, says: "that wisdom so coheres with religion that the two cannot be torn apart." Ibid., chapter 3: "Wisdom coheres with religion in an inseparable bond"; ibid., chapter 4: "It is plain how closely wisdom and religion are joined to each other"; ibid., chapter 5: "that wisdom and religion cannot be separated." BUN[EMANN].

(printed under page 226)

(5) ‹lemma: Et hoc› · no call mark

Et hoc. Scilicet tertio libro: quod bene cohaeret prioribus libris. Itaque restitui hoc cum Cellario ex mss. praeter 6 Reg. in quibus legitur et hic, ut in cunctis fere vulgatis.

"And this." Namely, in the third book: which coheres well with the earlier books. So I have restored hoc with Cellarius from the manuscripts, except six Regii, in which one reads et hic ("and here"), as in almost all the printed editions.

(printed under page 226)

Page

  • running head: 445 ANALYSIS LIBRI IV. DE VERA S[APIENTIA] (cut off at the image edge)
  • marginal letters: A ‹quod philosophi omnes›; B ‹mus? et sapientiam suscipere›; C ‹Partes libri hujus quatuor sunt›
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: "nun-" ends the author's text in this column and is completed as "nunquam" at the head of the next column (446), before the notes intervene; the word is set whole as "nunquam" at the end of the col. 445 text, and the moved col. 446 text begins at "reperire" (Q2b); the full-width heading "VARIORUM NOTAE" (cut off) and the notes below it are apparatus, not set; the full-width title "ANALYSIS LIBRI [IV] / QUI INSCRIBITUR DE VERA SAPIE[NTIA]" (cut off at the right edge) stands between the notes and the analysis, not set; editors' matter set: the analysis of Book IV, ‹Partes libri hujus quatuor sunt›, which ends the column mid-word at "testi-"; "valuerunt" read from slightly blurred type
  • other: a full-width band stands across cols 445/446 in mid-page: the 1 paragraph(s) above it in col 446 are set here, after the 2 above it in col 445 (reading order, moved on receipt); the band itself (its title lines) is not set by the volunteer page: set it here, at the move, with full_width
  • other: the column continues with Partes libri hujus quatuor sunt (another unit); not set here
PL 6:446
Editors' notes and page, col. 446

Page

  • running head: …V. DE VERA SAPIENTIA ET RELIG. 446 (left part cut off at image edge)
  • marginal letters: A quam reperire potuerunt; B nius tamen, quae religio; C monio Trismegisti, Sibyllarum; D (none)
  • old-edition numerals: (none)
  • other: full-width heading "…ARIORUM NOTAE" (Variorum notae) after the text is not set in this file; its notes printed in this column (Bun. on sacramentum, continued; utrumque conjunctum; et hoc) are set with the page's notes under col 445 (n445, notes 3–5); full-width heading "…IS LIBRI QUARTI / …VERA SAPIENTIA ET RELIGIONE." above the synopsis is not set; editors' matter: synopsis of Book IV, beginning in this column with "monio Trismegisti" (the rest of testi- from col. 445), belongs to the next unit and is not set here; "dei" is printed in lower case in "dispositio fuerit dei impleta"; "Hac de virgine" is printed so, sense unsure; the column ends mid-sentence at "cum"
  • other: the 1 paragraph(s) of this column above the full-width band are set under col 445 (reading order, moved on receipt)
  • other: the text of this column below the full-width band belongs to the next unit; not set here (rail-only part)